INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200720002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Intelligence
in the
War of
Independence
The Nathan Hale Institute
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"I wish to be useful, and every kind
of service necessary to the public
good becomes honorable by being
necessary. If the exigencies of
my country demand a peculiar
service, its claims to perform that
service are imperious."
-Capt. Nathan Hale
1755-1776
The Nathan Hale Institute is an independent organization
devoted to nonpartisan research in the area of domestic and
foreign intelligence with particular emphasis on the role of
intelligence operations in a free society. The Institute's princi-
pal purpose is to increase public awareness and stimulate de-
bate and scholarly pursuit of important intelligence-related
issues.
Classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a publicly-sup-
ported Section 501 (c) (3) educational and research organiza-
tion, the Institute welcomes grants and contributions from
individuals, foundations and corporations. All contributions to
the Institute are tax-deductible under the Internal Revenue
Code and the Institute will provide documentation to substan-
tiate tax-deductibility of a contribution or grant.
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Intelligence
in the
War of
Independence
The Nathan Hale Institute
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8 Miles East of Morris Town July 26: 1777.
By a Letter received this morning from Lord Stirling
of the 22d Inst, I find he intends to pursue his Rout
from Peeks Kill, thro Keckyate & Pyramus to the
Great Falls - From thence thro Watsessing - Spring-
field & Brunswick or Bound Brook.
The reason of my being thus particular in describing
Lord Stirling's Rout, is, Because I wish you to take
even' possible pains in your power, by sending trusty
persons to Staten Island in whom you can confide, to
obtain Intelligence of the Enemy's situation & numbers
- what kind of Troops they are, and what Guard they
have - their strength & where posted. - My view in
this, is, that his Lordship, when he arrives, may make
an attempt upon the Enemy there with his Division, If
it should appear from a full consideration of all cir-
cumstances and the information you obtain, that it can
be done with a strong prospect of Success. - You will
also make some enquiry How many Boats are & may
be certainly [used?] to transport the Troops, in case the
Enterprize [should?] appear adviseable. You will, after
having assured yourself upon these [several?] matters,
send a good & faithful Officer to meet Lord Stirling
with a distinct and accurate Account of every thing -
As well respecting the numbers & strength of the
Enemy - their situation &c - As about the Boats, that
he may have a General view of the whole, and possess-
ing all the circumstances, may know how to regulate
his conduct in the Affair.
The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is ap-
parent & need not be further urged - All that remains
for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as
secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends
in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it,
they are generally defeated, however well planned &
promising a favourable issue.
I am Sir
Yr Most Obed Sert
G. Washington
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Preface
In mid-1976, the Central Intelligence Agency released a
bicentennial publication entitled "Intelligence in the War
of Independence." The booklet opened with a letter written
by General George Washington, in which the American
revolutionary leader wrote,
"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence
is apparent & need not be further urged-All
that remains for me to add is, that you keep the
whole matter as secret as possible."
A valuable lesson written by the father of our country for
its intended recipient and a lesson for us as well over the
centuries.
As Americans celebrated their bicentenary in 1976, the
nation was in the midst of an anti-intelligence campaign,
promoted by certain politicians and much of the media,
that threatened to destroy the effectiveness of its intelli-
gence services. Had more Americans understood the vital
role intelligence played in winning the cherished inde-
pendence they were celebrating in 1976, they might have
been more sanguine in dealing with the allegations that
were levelled against the intelligence community in such
profusion that year.
It is likely that without the successful intelligence, covert
action, and wartime special operations conducted by the
American patriots and their French, Spanish and Dutch
allies during the American Revolutionary War, this nation
might have died soon after its birth rather than survived
and prospered.
The CIA publication, reprinted by the Nathan Hale
Institute, Inc., deals with the Committee of Secret Corre-
spondence (the Revolutionary War American foreign in-
telligence agency) and the Secret Committee (the Ameri-
can covert action agency). It also describes the Committee
on Spies which dealt with enemy agents. These were the
forerunners of the modern intelligence services of the
United States-the early American "Intelligence Com-
munity," if you will. Without them and their efforts, there
probably would have been no United States of America.
Much of their work remains secret today.
Our nation was sorely beset in 1775. Our forefathers
well understood and effectively used the very means to
gain our independence that were under such severe attack
two hundred years later. The anti-intelligence storm has
abated somewhat in the last decade but in these difficult
times, more than two centuries after independence, it be-
hooves us to know the facts of our early history and to
understand the need for a strong and effective American
intelligence community today as then.
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Organization
of Intelligence
The Committee of Secret Correspondence
Recognizing the need for foreign intelligence and for-
eign alliances, the Second Continental Congress created the
Committee of Secret Correspondence by a resolution of
November 29, 1775:
"RESOLVED, That a committee of five be
appointed for the sole purpose of corresponding
with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and
other parts of the world, and that they lay their
correspondence before Congress when directed.
"RESOLVED, That this Congress will make
provision to defray all such expenses as they may
arise by carrying on such correspondence, and
for the payment of such agents as the said Com-
mittee may send on this service."
The five Committee members-America's first foreign
intelligence directorate-were Benjamin Franklin of Penn-
sylvania, Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, John Jay of New
York, John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and Thomas John-
son of Maryland. Subsequent appointees included James
Lovell, a teacher who had been arrested by the British
after the Battle of Bunker Hill on charges of spying. He
had later been exchanged for a British prisoner and was
then elected to the Continental Congress. On the Com-
mittee of Secret Correspondence he became the Congress'
expert on codes and ciphers.
Thomas Paine, author of "Common Sense," was briefly
the secretary of the Committee, but was discharged for
divulging information from Committee files.
The Committee employed secret agents abroad, estab-
lished a courier system, and developed a maritime capa-
bility apart from that of the Navy. It met secretly in
December of 1775 with a French intelligence agent who
visited Philadelphia under the cover of a "Flemish mer-
chant," and engaged in regular communications with
Britons and Scots who were sympathetic to the patriots'
cause.
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On April 17, 1777, the Committee of Secret Corre-
spondence was renamed the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
but continued with its intelligence function. Matters of
diplomacy were conducted by other committees or by the
Congress as a whole. With the creation of a Department
of Foreign Affairs-the forerunner of the Department of
State-on January 10, 1781, correspondence "for the pur-
pose of obtaining the most extensive and useful informa-
tion relative to foreign affairs" was shifted to the new
body, whose secretary was empowered to correspond
"with all other persons from whom he may expect to re-
ceive useful information..."
The Secret Committee
Even before setting up the Committee of Secret Cor-
respondence, the Second Continental Congress had created
a Secret Committee by a resolution on September 18,
1775. The Committee was given wide powers and large
sums of money to obtain military supplies in secret, and
was charged with distributing supplies and selling gun-
powder to privateers chartered by the Continental Con-
gress. The Committee also took over and administered on
a uniform basis the secret contracts for arms and gun-
powder previously negotiated by certain members of the
Congress without the formal sanction of that body. The
Committee kept its transactions secret, and destroyed many
of its records to assure the confidentiality of its work.
The Secret Committee employed agents overseas, often
in cooperation with the Committee of Secret Correspon-
dence. It also gathered intelligence about Tory secret am-
munition stores and arranged to seize them. The Secret
Committee sent missions to plunder British supplies in the
southern colonies. It arranged the purchase of military
stores through the intermediaries so as to conceal the fact
that the Continental Congress was the tnie purchaser.
With and without permission, the Secret Committee used
foreign flags to protect its vessels from the British fleet.
The members of the Continental Congress appointed to
the Committee were among the most influential and re-
sponsible members of the Congress.
The Committee on Spies
On June 5, 1776, the Congress appointed John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, Edward Rutledge, James Wilson and
Robert Livingston "to consider what is proper to be done
with persons giving intelligence to the enemy or supplying
them with provisions." The same Committee was charged
with revising the Articles of War in regard to espionage
directed against the patriot forces. The problem was an
urgent one; Dr. Benjamin Church, Director General of
Hospitals, had already been seized and imprisoned as a
British agent, but could not be tried for espionage (and
never would be) because there was no espionage act.
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On August 21, 1776, the Committee's report was con-
sidered by the Continental Congress, which enacted the
first espionage act:
"RESOLVED, That all persons not members
of, nor owing allegiance to, any of the United
States of America, as described in a resolution
of the Congress of the 24th of June last, who
shall be found lurking as spies in or about the
fortifications or encampments of the armies of
the United States, or of any of them, shall .suffer
death, according to the law and usage of nations,
by sentence of a court martial, or such other
punishment as such court martial may direct."
It was resolved further that the act "be printed at the
end of the rules and articles of war."
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Intelligence Operations
Political Action
While the Committee of Secret Correspondence was
meeting secretly in Philadelphia with agents of France,
Dr. Arthur Lee was meeting in London with Pierre-
Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais, the successful author of
The Barber of Seville (and later The Marriage of Figaro)
-who was a French agent. Lee's inflated reports of patriot
strength, which either he fabricated for Beaumarchais'
benefit or were provided by Lee's regular correspondent,
Sam Adams, won the Frenchman to the American cause.
Beaumarchais repeatedly urged the French Court to give
immediate assistance to the Americans, and on February
29, 1776 addressed a memorial to Louis XVI quoting
Lee's offer of a secret long-term treaty of commerce in
exchange for secret aid to the war of independence. Beau-
marchais explained that France could grant such aid with-
out compromising itself, but urged that "success of the
plan depends wholly upon rapidity," as well as secrecy:
"Your Majesty knows better than any one that secrecy is
the soul of business, and that in politics a project once
disclosed is a project doomed to failure."
With the memorial, Beaumarchais submitted a plan pro-
posing that he set up a commercial trading firm as a
"cover" for the secret French aid; he requested and was
granted one million livres to establish a firm to be known
as Roderigue Hortalez et Cie for that purpose. Beau-
marchais' memorial was followed by one of March 12,
1776, by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Comte de Vergennes. Royal assent was granted, and by the
time Silas Deane arrived in Paris, French aid was on its
way to the patriots. Deane expanded the Franco-American
relationship, working with Beaumarchais and other French
merchants to procure ships, commission privateers, recruit
French officers, and "purchase" French military supplies
declared "surplus" for that purpose.
On September 26, 1776, the Continental Congress
elected three commissioners to the Court of France, Ben-
jamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and Silas Deane, resolv-
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ing that "secrecy shall he observed until further Order of
Congress: and that until permission be obtained from Con-
gress to disclose the particulars of this business, no mem-
ber he permitted to say anything more upon this subject,
than that Congress have taken such steps as they judged
necessary for the purpose of obtaining foreign alliance."
Because of his wife's illness, Jefferson could not serve, and
Dr. Arthur Lee was appointed in his stead.
With Franklin's arrival in France on November 29,
1776-the first anniversary of the founding of the Com-
mittee of Secret Correspondence-the vital French mis-
sion became an intelligence and propaganda center for
Europe, an unofficial diplomatic representation, a coordi-
nating facility for aid from America's secret allies, and a
recruiting station for such French officers as Lafayette
and Kalb. On February 6, 1778, the French-American
treaty of alliance was signed. On March 30, 1778, Frank-
lin, Lee, and Deane were received at the French Court
as representtaives of the United States of America, and on
July 7 of that year Comte d'Estaing's French fleet cast
anchor in the Delaware River. France was in the war;
the mission to Paris had succeeded.
Spain, at the urging of French Foreign Minister Ver-
gennes, matched France's one million Iivres for the opera-
tion of Ifortafez et Cie. But that was not the beginning of
secret Spanish aid to the patriots. During the summer of
1776 Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, the governor of New
Spain at New Orleans, had "privately delivered" some
twelve thousands pounds of gunpowder, "out of the King's
stores," to Captain George Gibson and Lieutenant Linn of
the Virginia Council of Defense. The gunpowder, moved
up the Mississippi under the protection of the Spanish
flag, made it possible to thwart British plans to capture
Fort Pitt.
Oliver Pollock, a New Orleans businessman, had inter-
ceded on behalf of the Virginians. When Bernardo de
Galvez became governor at New Orleans, Pollock-soon
to be appointed the agent of the Secret Committee at New
Orleans-worked closely with the young officer to provide
additional supplies to the Americans. The Spanish gov-
ernor also agreed to grant protection to American ships
while seizing British ships as "smugglers," and to allow
American privateers to sell their contraband at New
Orleans. Havana, too, became a focal point for dispensing
secret Spanish aid to the American patriots.
From Galvez the patriots received gunnowder and sup-
plies for the George Rogers Clark expedition, and from
Galvez' "very secret service fund" came the funds used
by Colonel Clark for the capture of Kaskaskia and Vin-
cennes.
When Spain formally entered the war on the American
side on June 21, 1779, Oliver Pollock-who suffered per-
sonal bankruptcy in funding the purchase of supplies for
the patriot cause-rode as aide-de-camp to Galvez in the
capture of Baton Rouge, Natchez, Mobile, and Pensacola.
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Another center of secret aid to the patriots was St.
Eustatius Island in the West Indies. A Dutch freeport set
in midst of English, French, Danish and Spanish colonies,
St. Eustatius became-in the words of a British intelligence
document of the period-"the rendezvous of everything
and everybody meant to be clandestinely conveyed to
America." It was a major source of gunpowder for the
patriot cause, and perhaps the safest and quickest means
of communications between American representatives and
agents abroad and with the Continental Congress at home.
The Continental Congress, sensitive to the vulnerability
of its covert allies, respected their desire for strict secrecy.
Even after France's declaration of war against England,
the fact of French involvement prior to that time remained
a state secret. When Tom Paine, in a series of letters to
the press, divulged details of the secret aid from the files
of the Committee of Foreign Affairs (formerly the Com-
mittee of Secret Correspondence), France's Minister to
the United States, Conrad Alexandre Gerard, protested
to the President of the Congress that Paine's indiscreet
assertions "bring into question the dignity and reputation
of the King, my master, and that of the United States."
Congress dismissed Paine, and by public resolution denied
having received such aid, resolving that ". . . His Most
Christian Majesty, the great and generous ally of the
United States, did not preface his alliance with any sup-
plies whatever sent to America...."
Covert Action
In July of 1775, Benjamin Franklin and Robert Morris
worked out a plan in collaboration with Colonel Henry
Tucker, the head of a distinguished Bermuda family, to
obtain the store of gunpowder in the Royal Arsenal at
Bermuda. To give Bermuda much-needed foodstuffs in
exchange for the powder, the Continental Congress re-
solved on July 15, 1775 to permit the exchange of food
for guns and gunpowder brought by any vessel to an
American port. On the night of August 14, 1775, two
patriot ships kept a rendezvous with Colonel Tucker's men
off the coast of Bermuda, and sent a raiding party ashore.
An American sailor was lowered into the arsenal through
an opening in the roof, and the doors opened from the
inside. The barrels of gunpowder were rolled to waiting
Bermudian whaleboats and transported to the American
ships. Twelve days later half of the powder was delivered
to Philadelphia and half to American forces at Charleston.
America's second covert action effort ended in failure.
General George Washington, hearing independently of the
Bermuda powder, dispatched ships to purchase or seize it.
Lacking a centralized intelligence authority, he was un-
aware of the Franklin-Morris success; when Washington's
ships arrived in Bermuda in October of 1775, the gun-
powder had been gone for two months and British ships
patrolled Bermuda waters.
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On the basis of information received by the Committee
of Secret Correspondence, the Continental Congress on
February 15, 1776 authorized a covert action plan to urge
the Canadians to become a "sister colony" in the struggle
against the British. A French printer was dispatched to
Canada "to establish a free press . . . for the frequent
publication of such pieces as may be of service to the
cause of the United Colonies." Benjamin Franklin, Samuel
Chase, and Charles Carroll were appointed from the Con-
gress to undertake the mission, and Father John Carroll
was invited to join the team to prevail upon the Catholic
clergy of Canada. The delegation was given a degree of
authority over American expeditionary forces in Canada; it
was empowered to raise six companies in Canada, and
to offer sanctuary in the thirteen colonies, in the event
its effort failed, "for all those who have adhered to us."
Excesses against the Canadian populace by the American
military forces, the hostility of the clergy, and the inability
of American commissioners to deliver little more than
promises in exchange for Canadian defection, doomed the
project. With the arrival of summer, both military and
political action in Canada had ended in failure.
Foreign Intelligence
Patience Mehitabcl Lovell Wright, an American sculp-
tress, served as a valuable patriot intelligence agent in Lon-
don at the outbreak of hostilities. A confidant of Ben-
jamin Franklin, Mrs. Wright had achieved fame for her
creation of life-life wax portrayals of prominent persons.
Her studios were "a fashionable lodging-place for the
nobility and distinguished men of England." and the King
and Queen with whom she dealt on a "democratic" first
name basis-often visited her workrooms. With this ac-
cess, she gathered "many facts and secrets" important to
the American cause and communicated them to Franklin
before she was forced to flee London early in 1776.
The first intelligence agent enlisted by the Committee
of Secret Correspondence was Arthur Lee, of "Stratford."
a physician then living in London. On November 30, 1775,
the day after its founding, the Committee appointed Dr.
Lee as its agent in England and informed him that "it is
considered of utmost consequence to the cause of liberty
that the Committee he kept informed of developments in
Europe." Following the first Congressional appropriation
for the work of the Committee on December 11, 1775, two
hundred pounds was forwarded to Lee with the urging
that he find out the "disposition of foreign powers towards
us," and the admonition that "We need not hint that great
circumspection and impenetrable security are necessary."
The next agent recruited abroad by the Committee of
Secret Correspondence was Charles W. F. Dumas, a Swiss
journalist at The Hague. Dumas was briefed personally by
Thomas Story, a courier of the Committee, and instructed
on the use of cover names and letter drops to he used for
his reports to the Committee and for communication with
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Dr. Lee in London. For use in his communications, Dumas
created a unique cipher which cryptographers declared
to be almost unbreakable.
On March 1, 1776, the Committee of Secret Corre-
spondence appointed Silas Deane, a former delegate to the
Continental Congress, as its agent in France. He was in-
structed to pose as a Bermudian merchant dealing in
Indian goods. He was also appointed as an agent of the
Secret Committee, charged with making secret purchases
and with attempting to gain secret assistance from the
French Crown. Later both Deane and Lee would be con-
verted from agents to commissioners to the French Crown,
albeit secret ones, until the open and formal alliance of
France with the Americans.
Another agent selected by the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, and enlisted by Deane under its instruc-
tion, was Dr. Edward Bancroft of London. Bancroft, un-
fortunately was a principal agent of the British Secret Ser-
vice! His duplicity was not learned until some ninety years
after his death.
Other agents of the Committee of Secret Correspon-
dence included Stephen Sayre, an American banker impli-
cated in 1775 in a plot to seize George III; William
Bingham, who served first in France and then in Marti-
nique, where he had once been British consul; Major
Jonathan Loring Austin, Ralph Izard, William Carmichael
and William Hodge.
Wartime Special Operations
After Benedict Arnold turned traitor, several special op-
erations, none successful, were mounted in an effort to
capture him. In September of 1780, Major Henry "Light-
Horse Harry" Lee presented to General Washington a
secret plan to return the defector to American control and
bring him to the gallows. Washington approved the plan,
but insisted that Arnold not be killed or injured in carry-
ing it out, even at the risk of allowing him to escape.
"Public punishment," said Washington, "is the sole object
in view."
Lee's sergeant major, John Champe of Loudoun County,
Virginia, was assigned to this special mission, and on the
evening of October 19, 1780, "deserted" to the British
under a hail of gunfire. The official documents he carried
and his cooperative attitude during interrogation convinced
the British of his bona fides. He was appointed sergeant
major of Benedict Arnold's so-called American Legion,
which was made up of deserters. Champe, now wearing a
British uniform and having obtained freedom of move-
ment in British-occupied New York, made contact with
patriot agents there and laid plans for Arnold's capture.
Unfortunately, Arnold's "legion" embarked for Virginia
on the night the operation was to take place, and the plan
was aborted.
In March of 1781, an attempt to capture Arnold during
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his daily ride to the Virginia shore of the Chesapeake Bay
was foiled by the chance anchoring of some British ships
in the area. Yet another plan, devised by Thomas Jeffer-
son, called for General John Peter Muhlenberg to send
hand-picked soldiers "to seize and bring off this greatest
of traitors" at Portsmouth, Virginia. Unusual security pre-
cautions at the British outpost thwarted the attempt.
Recognizing the value of an important hostage, General
Washington in 1782 approved a plan to capture the son of
King George III, Prince William Henry (the future Wil-
liam IV), during the young naval officer's royal visit to
New York. The operation failed to come off. After William
later became monarch, the American ambassador told him
of the wartime plan and of Washington's edict that, if the
mission were successful, the young Prince should suffer
no "insult or indignity." Upon hearing the story, William
IV responded: "I am obliged to General Washington for
his humanity, but I'm damned glad I did not give him an
opportunity of exercising it towards me."
On the high seas, British supply ships and troop ships
often fell to American privateers operating under letters of
marque and reprisal from the Continental Congress. Suc-
cess in intercepting these vessels was so great that the
British accused their captains of taking bribes from the
Americans to surrender their ships. One privateer, operat-
ing under contract to Silas Deane and a French business
associate and utilizing a French ship obtained by Benjamin
Franklin, was the Bonhonnme Richard, commanded by
John Paul Jones.
Of the sabotage operations conducted by the American
patriots, only one mission is known to have been launched
in England. Sometime after his arrival in Paris, Silas
Deane was visited by young James Aitken, recently re-
turned from America. Aitken produced crudely drawn but
accurate plans of Royal dockyards in England and pro-
posed to sabotage them by utilizing a unique incendiary
device of his own design. Deane engaged his services and
issued Aitken a passport signed by French Foreign Min-
ister Vergennes with instructions to French officials: "We
will and command you very expressly to let pass safely
and freely, Mr. James Actzen, going to England, without
giving him or suffering him any hindrance; but on the con-
trary giving every aid and assistance that he shall want or
occasion for." In late November 1776. Aitken landed at
Dover, and on December 7, he ignited a fire at the Ports-
mouth dockyard that burned from late in the afternoon
until the following morning, destroying twenty tons of
hemp, ten one-hundred-fathom cables, and six tons of ship
cordage. After failing to penetrate the security at Ply-
mouth, Aitken proceeded to Bristol, where he destroyed two
warehouses and several houses. On January 16, 1777, the
British cabinet met in emergency session and urged im-
mediate measures to locate the mysterious "John the
Painter" (Aitken was a house painter); guards were aug-
mented at all military facilities and arsenals, and a re-
ward was posted. By January 20 the cabinet, again in
extraordinary session, discussed suspending habeas corpus
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and placing the country under martial law. Five days
later the reward was incrceased to one thousand pounds
and newspapers reported panic throughout England.
Aitken was soon apprehended, with a pistol and in-
flammables in his possession. He would not admit to the
sabotage when interrogated but eventually confided in a
friendly American visitor-who was secretly in the pay
of the British. Based on these confidences, personal effects,
including the passport from Vergennes, were located. His
trial was speedy, and on March 10, 1777, Aitken went to
the gallows at Portsmouth dockyard, where his exploits
had begun.
Counterintelligence
Probably the first patriot organization created for
counterintelligence purposes was the Committee (later
called a Commission) for Detecting and Defeating Con-
spiracies. It was made up of a series of groups established
in New York between June of 1776 and January of 1778
to collect intelligence, apprehend British spies and couriers,
and examine suspected British sympathizers. In effect, there
was created a "secret service" for New York which had
the power to arrest, to convict, to grant bail or parole, and
to jail or to deport. A company of militia was placed under
its command to implement its broad charter. John Jay has
been called the first chief of American counterintelligence
because of his role in directing this Committee's work.
Nathaniel Sackett and Colonel William Duer were par-
ticularly successful in ferreting out British agents, but
found their greatest success in the missions of one of the
dozen or so agents of their own, Enoch Crosby. Crosby, a
veteran of the Continental Army, had been mistaken by a
Westchester County Tory as being someone who shared
his views. He confided to Crosby that a secret Tory mili-
tary company was being formed and introduced him to
the group. Crosby reported the plot to the Committee and
was "captured" with the group. He managed to "escape"
and, at Committee direction, infiltrated another secret
Tory unit. This unit, including Crosby, was also taken
and he "escaped" once more. He repeated the operation at
least two more times, before Tory suspicions made it
necessary for him to retire from counterintelligence work.
Another successful American agent was Captain David
Gray of Massachusetts. Posing as a deserter, Gray entered
the service of Colonel Beverly Robinson, a Tory intelli-
gence officer, and became Robinson's courier. As a result.
the contents of each of Robinson's dispatches were read
by the Americans before their delivery. Gray eventually
became the courier for Major Oliver DeLancey, Jr., the
head of the British secret service in New York. For two
years, Gray, as DeLancey's courier to Canada, successfully
penetrated the principal communications link of the British
secret service. Upon completing his assignment, Gray re-
turned to the ranks of the Continental Army and his name
was struck from the deserter list, where George Washing-
ton had placed it at the beginning of the operation.
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Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge, a senior intelligence offi-
cer under Washington, is credited with the capture of
Major John Andre, who preceded DeLancey as chief of the
British secret service in New York. Although Tallmadge
declined to discuss the episode in his memoirs, it is said
that one of his agents had reported to him that Major
Andre was in contact with a "John Anderson" who was
expecting the surrender of a major patriot installation.
Learning that a "John Anderson" had passed through the
lines "en route to" General Benedict Arnold, the com-
mander at West Point, Tallmadge had Anderson appre-
hended and returned for interrogation. "Anderson" ad-
mitted to his true identity-he was Major Andre-and was
tried, convicted, and executed as a spy. Arnold, learning
that Andre had been taken and that his own traitorous
role no doubt was exposed, fled West Point before he could
he captured, and joined the British forces.
General Washington demanded effective counterintelli-
gence work from his subordinates. On March 24, 1776,
for example, he wrote: "There is one evil I dread, and that
is, their spies. I could wish, therefore, the most attentive
watch he kept . . . I wish a dozen or more of honest sensi-
ble and diligent men, were employed . . . in order to ques-
tion, cross-question etc., all such persons as are unknown,
and cannot give an account of themselves in a straight and
satisfactory line. . . . I think it a matter of importance to
prevent them from obtaining intelligence of our situation."
Deception Operations
To offset British superiority in firepower and number of
troops, General Washington made frequent use of decep-
tion operations. He allowed fabricated documents to fall
into the hands of enemy agents or be discussed in their
presence. He allowed his couriers-carrying bogus infor-
mation-to be "captured" by the British, and inserted
forged documents in intercepted British pouches that were
then permitted to go on to their destination. Washington
even had fake military facilities built. He managed to make
the British believe that his three-thousand-man army out-
side Philadelphia was forty thousand strong! With elab-
orate deception, Washington masked his movement toward
Chesapeake Bay-and victory at Yorktown-by convinc-
ing the British initially that he was moving on New York.
At Yorktown, James Armistead, a slave who had joined
Lafayette's service with his master's permission, crossed
into Cornwallis' lines in the guise of an escaped slave, and
was recruited by Cornwallis to return to American lines as
a spy. Lafayette gave him a fabricated order that sup-
posedly was destined for a large number of patriot replace-
ments-a force that did not exist. Armistead delivered the
bogus order in crumpled, dirty condition to Cornwallis,
claiming to have found it along the road during his spy
mission. Cornwallis believed him and did not learn he had
been tricked until after the Battle of Yorktown. Armistead
was granted his freedom by the Virginia Legislature as a
result of this and other intelligence service.
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Another deception operation at Yorktown found Charles
Morgan entering Cornwallis' camp as a "deserter." When
debriefed by the British, he convinced them that Lafayette
had sufficient boats to move all his troops against the
British in one landing operation. Cornwallis was duped by
the operation and dug in rather than march out of York-
town. Morgan, in turn, escaped in a British uniform and
returned to American lines with five British deserters and
a prisoner!
Propaganda
Upon receiving accurate intelligence that the British
were hiring Hessian mercenaries for service in America.
the Continental Congress appointed a three-man committee
"to devise a plan for encouraging the Hessians and other
foreigners . . . to quit that iniquitous service." The result
was a resolution, believed to have been drafted by Thomas
Jefferson, offering land grants to German deserters. It was
translated into German and sent among the Hessians.
Benjamin Franklin, who jointed the committee to imple-
ment the operation, arranged for the leaflets to be disguised
as tobacco packets to make sure they would fall into the
hands of ordinary Hessian soldiers. Christopher Ludwick
was dispatched by Washington into the enemy camp, pos-
ing as a deserter to contact the Hessians and encourage
them to defect. He is credited with the defection of "many
hundred soldiers" from the German ranks.
In 1777, after his arrival in France, Benjamin Franklin
fabricated a letter purportedly sent by a German prince to
the commander of his mercenaries in America. The letter
disputed British casualty figures for the German troops,
arguing that the actual number was much higher and that
he was entitled to a great amount of "blood money," the
amount paid to the prince for each of his men killed or
wounded. The prince also encouraged the officer to be
humane and to allow his wounded to die, rather than try
to save men who might only become cripples unfit for
service to their prince. Franklin also produced a news-
paper report purporting to describe the transmittal of
scalps of soldiers, settlers, women and children to the
Royal Governor of Canada by Britain's Indian allies. The
Indian transmittal letter indicated that a certain mark on
scalps indicated they were those of women who "were
knocked dead or had their brains beat out."
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Intelligence
Techniques
Secrecy and Protection
The Committee of Secret Correspondence insisted that
matters pertaining to the funding and instruction of intelli-
gence agents be held within the Committee. In calling for
the Committee members to "lay their proceedings before
Congress," the Congress, by resolution, authorized "with-
holding the names of the persons they have employed, or
with whom they have corresponded." And on May 20,
1776, when the Committee's proceedings-with the sensi-
tive names removed-were finally read in the Congress, it
was "under the injunction of secrecy."
The Continental Congress, recognizing the need for
secrecy in regard to foreign intelligence, foreign alliances
and military matters, maintained "Secret Journals," apart
from its public journals, to record its decisions in such
matters.
On November 9, 1775, the Continental Congress
adopted its own oath of secrecy, one more stringent than
the oaths of secrecy it would require of others in sensitive
employment:
RESOLVED, That every member of this Con-
gress considers himself under the ties of virtue,
honour and love of his country, not to divulge,
directly or indirectly, any matter or thing agitated
or debated in Congress, before the same shall
have been determined, without the leave of the
Congress: nor any matter or thing determined in
Congress, which a majority of the Congress shall
order to be kept secret. And that if any member
shall violate this agreement, he shall be expelled
this Congress, and deemed an enemy to the liber-
ties of America, and liable to be treated as such,
and that every member signify his consent to this
agreement by signing the same."
Cover
Robert Townsend, an important American agent in
British-occupied New York, used the guise of being a
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merchant, as did Silas Deane when he was sent to France
by the Committee of Secret Correspondence. Townsend
was usually referred to by his cover name of "Culper,
Junior." When Colonel Benjamin Tallmadge, who directed
Townsend's espionage work, insisted that he disengage
himself from his cover business to devote more time to
intelligence gathering, General Washington overruled him:
"It is not my opinion that Culper Junior should be advised
to give up his present employment. I would imagine that
with it little industry he will be able to carry on his intelli-
gence with greater security to himself and greater advan-
tages to us, under the cover of his usual business. . . . It
prevents also those suspicions which would become natural
should he throw himself out of the line of his present em-
ploynment." Townsend also was the silent partner of a cof-
fee house frequented by British officers, an ideal place for
hearing loose talk that was of value to the American cause.
Legend has it that Pompey Lamb, a black man, visited
the British strong point at Stony Point, New York, under
the cover of selling fruits and vegetables, and that the
British provided Lamb with their password so he could
make his deliveries after dark. It was said that on the night
of General "Mad Anthony" Wayne's successful assault on
the fort, the British had opened the gates in response to
the password called out by Pompey Lamb.
Another American agent who operated under the cover
of selling produce to British soldiers was Sarah (Sally)
Salter, who in 1781 entered an enemy camp at Elizabeth-
town, North Carolina, in the guise of selling eggs. In addi-
tion to gathering intelligence about the layout of the camp,
Sally took egg orders which, when analyzed, revealed the
approximate number of enemy troops there. Based on the
intelligence she gathered, the patriots launched a surprise
attack and defeated the enemy force.
Disguise
During the campaign in the winter of 1775-76 to cap-
ture Quebec, American forces became badly depleted and
needed reinforcement. Aaron Burr volunteered to cross
enemy lines with a request for more troops. Disguising
himself as a priest, Burr obtained a guide and cart from a
monastery and traveled from monastery to monastery
through British-patrolled territory until he reached General
Montgomery's lines and delivered the request.
In January of 1778, Nancy Morgan Hart disguised her-
self as a "touched" or crazy man and entered Augusta,
Georgia. to obtain intelligence on British defenses. Her
mission was a success. Later, when a group of Tories at-
tacked her home to gain revenge, she captured them all,
and was witness to their execution.
In June of 1778, General Washington instructed "Light-
Horse Harry" Lee to send an agent into the British fort at
Stony Point to gather intelligence on the exact size of the
garrison and the progress it was making in building de-
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fences. Captain Allan McLane took the assignment. Dress-
ing himself as a country bumpkin, and utilizing the cover
of escorting a Mrs. Smith into the fort to see her son,
McLane spent two weeks collecting intelligence within the
British fort and returned safely.
Secret Writing
While serving in Paris as an agent of the Committee of
Secret Correspondence, Silas Deane is known to have used
a heat-developing invisible ink, compounded of cobalt
chloride, glycerine and water, for some of his intelligence
reports back to America. Even more useful to him later
was it "sympathetic stain" created for secret communica-
tions by James Jay, a physician and the brother of John
Jay. Dr. Jay, who had been knighted by George III, used
the "stain" for reporting military information from London
to America. Later he supplied quantities of the stain to
George Washington at home and to Silas Deane in Paris.
The stain required one chemical for writing the message
and a second to develop it, affording greater security than
the ink used by Deane earlier. Once, in a letter to John
Jay, Robert Morris spoke of an innocuous letter from
"Timothy Jones" (Deane) and the "concealed beauties
therein," noting "the cursory examinations of a sea cap-
tain would never discover them, but transferred from his
hand to the penetrating eye of a Jay, the diamonds stand
confessed at once."
Washington instructed his agents in the use of the
"sympathetic stain," noting in connection with "Culper
Junior" that the ink "will not only render his communica-
tions less exposed to detection, but relieve the fears of
such persons as may be entrusted in its conveyance ...-
Washington suggested that reports could be written in the
invisible ink "on the blank leaves of a pamphlet . . . a
common pocket book, or on the blank leaves at each end
of registers, almanacks, or any publication or book of
small value." Washington especially recommended that
agents conceal their reports by using the ink in corre-
spondence: "A much better way is to write a letter in
the Tory stile with some mixture of family matters and
between the lines and on the remaining part of the sheet
communicate with the stain the intended intelligence."
Intercepting Communications
The Continental Congress regularly received quantities
of intercepted British and Tory mail. On November 20,
1775, it received some intercepted letters from Cork, Ire-
land, and appointed a committee made up of John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Johnson, Robert Livingston,
Edward Rutledge, James Wilson and George Wythe "to
select such parts of them as may by proper to publish."
The Congress later ordered a thousand copies to be printed
and distributed. A month later, when another batch of in-
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tercepted mail was received, a second Committee was ap-
pointed to examine it. Based on its report, the Congress
resolved that "the contents of the intercepted letter this
day read, and the steps which Congress may take in con-
sequence of said intelligence thereby given, be kept secret
until further orders . . ." By early 1776, abuses were
noted in the practice, and Congress resolved that only the
councils or committees of safety of each colony, and their
designees, could henceforth open he mail or detain any
letters from the post.
James Lovell is credited with breaking British ciphers,
but perhaps the first to do so was the team of Elbridge
Gerry, Elisha Porter and the Rev. Samuel West who suc-
cessfully decoded the intercepted intelligence reports writ-
ten to the British by Dr. Benjamin Church, the Director
General of Hospitals for the Continental army.
When Moses Harris reported that the British had re-
cruited him as a courier to carry messages for their Secret
Service, General Washington proposed that General Schuy-
ler "contrive a means of opening them without breaking
the seals, take copies of the contents, and then let them
go on. By these means we should become masters of the
whole plot . . ." From that point on, Washington was
privy to British intelligence pouches between New York
and Canada.
Technology
Dr. James Jay used the advanced technology of his
time in creating the invaluable "sympathetic stain" used
for secret communications, but perhaps the American
patriots' most advanced-if not successful-application of
technology was in David Bushnell's "turtle," a one-man
submarine created for affixing watchwork-timed explosive
charges to the bottom of enemy ships.
The "turtle," now credited with being the first use of
the submarine in warfare, was an oaken chamber about
five-and-a-half feet wide and seven feet high. It was pro-
pelled by oars at a speed of about three miles an hour, had
a barometer to read depth, a pump and second set of oars
to raise or lower the submarine through the water, and
provision for both lead and water ballast.
When Bushnell learned that the candle used to illumi-
nate instruments inside the "turtle" consumed the oxygen
in its air supply, he turned to Benjamin Franklin for help.
The solution: the phosphorescent weed, Foxfire! Unfortu-
nately, heavy tides thwarted the first sabotage operation.
A copper-clad hull which could not be penetrated by the
submarine's auger foiled the second. The secret weapon
would almost certainly have achieved success if it had not
gone to the bottom of the Hudson River when the mother
ship to which it was moored was sunk by the British in
October of 1776.
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An early device developed for concealing intelligence
reports when traveling by water was a simple, weighted
bottle that could be dropped overboard if there was a
threat of capture. This was replaced by a wafer-thin leaden
container in which a message was sealed. Not only would
it sink in water, but it would melt and destroy its contents
if thrown into a fire, and could be used by agents on land
or water. It had one drawback-lead poisoning if it was
swallowed! It was replaced by a silver, bullet-shaped con-
tainer that could be unscrewed to hold a message and
which would not poison a courier who might be forced
to swallow it.
Intelligence Analysis and Estimates
On May 29, 1776, the Continental Congress received
the first of many intelligence estimates prepared in re-
sponse to questions it posed to military commanders. The
report estimated the size of the enemy force to be en-
countered in an attack on New York, the number of Con-
tinental troops needed to meet it, and the kind of force
needed to defend the other New England colonies.
An example of George Washington's interest in intelli-
gence analysis and estimates can he found in instructions
he wrote to General Putnam in August of 1777: "Desert-
ers and people of that class always speak of number . . .
indeed, scarce any person can form a judgement unless
he sees the troops paraded and can count the divisions.
But, if you can by any means obtain a list of the regiments
left upon the island, we can compute the number of men
within a few hundreds, over or under." On another oc-
casion, in thanking James Lovell for a piece of intelligence,
Washington wrote: "It is by comparing a variety of infor-
mation, we are frequently enabled to investigate facts,
which were so intricate or hidden, that no single clue could
have led to the knowledge of them . . . intelligence be-
comes interesting which but from its connection and col-
lateral circumstances, would not be important."
Washington's intelligence chief for a short period in
1778, Colonel David Henley, received these instructions
when he wrote to Washington for guidance: "Besides com-
municating your information as it arises . . . you might
make out a table or something in the way of columns,
tinder which you might range, their magazines of forage,
grain and the like, the different corps and regiments, the
Works, where thrown up, their connexion, kind and ex-
tent, the officers commanding, with the numbers of guns
&ca.&ca. This table should comprehend in one view all
that can be learned from deserters, spies and persons who
may come out from the enemy's boundaries." (It was
common practice to interrogate travelers from such British
strongholds as New York, Boston and Philadelphia.)
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Personalities
George Washington
George Washington was a skilled manager of intelli-
gence. He utilized agents behind enemy lines, recruited both
Tory and patriot sources, interrogated travelers for intelli-
gence information and launched scores of agents on both
intelligence and counterintelligence missions. He was adept
at deception operations and was a skilled propagandist.
As an intelligence manager, Washington insisted that the
terms of an agent's employment and his instructions he
precise and in writing. Washington wrote many letters of
instruction himself. He emphasized his desire for receiving
written, rather than verbal, reports. He demanded repeat-
edly that intelligence reports be expedited. reminding his
officers of those bits of intelligence he had received which
had become valueless because of delay in getting them to
him.
Washington sought and obtained a "secret service fund"
from the Continental Congress, and expressed preference
for specie, preferably gold: "I have always found a diffi-
culty in procuring intelligence by means of paper money.
and I perceive it increases." In accounting for the sums
in his journals, he did not identify the recipients: "The
names of persons who are employed within the Enemy's
lines or who may fall within their power cannot be in-
serted."
He instructed his generals to "leave no stone unturned.
nor do not stick to expense" in gathering intelligence, and
urged that those employed for intelligence purposes he
those "upon whose firmness and fidelity we may safely
rely."
The Intelligence Officers
Although he regularly urged all his officers to be more
active in collecting intelligence, General Washington re-
lied chiefly on his aides and specially-designated officers to
assist him in conducting intelligence operations. The first
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to assume this role appears to have been Joseph Reed, who
fulfilled the duties of "Secretary, Adjutant General and
Quarter Master, besides doing a thousand other little
Things which fell incidentally." A later successor to Reed
was Alexander Hamilton, who is known to have been
deeply involved with the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence
operations, including developing reports received in secret
writing.
When Elias Boudinot was appointed Commissary of
Prisoners, responsible for screening captured soldiers and
for dealing with the British concerning American patriots
whom they held prisoner, Washington recognized that the
post offered "better opportunities than most other officers
in the army, to obtain knowledge of the Enemy's Situation,
motions and . . . designs," and added to Boudinot's re-
sponsibilities "the procuring of intelligence." In 1778,
Washington selected Brigadier General Charles Scott of
Virginia as his "intelligence chief." When personal consid-
erations made it necessary for Scott to step down, Wash-
ington appointed Colonel David Henley to the post tem-
porarily, and then assigned it to Colonel Benjamin Tall-
madge. Tallmadge combined reconnaissance with clan-
destine visits into British territory to recruit agents, and
attained distinction for his conduct of the "Culper" ring
operating out of New York.
Other intelligence officers who served with distinction
during the war of independence included Captain Eli
Leavenworth, Major Alexander Clough, Colonel Elias Day-
ton, Major John Clark, Major Allan McLane, Captain
Charles Craig and, for a short period, Aaron Burr.
Paul Revere and the Mechanics
The first patriot intelligence network on record was a
secret group in Boston known as the "mechanics." The
group apparently grew out of the old "Sons of Liberty"
organization that had successfully opposed the hated Stamp
Act. The "mechanics" organized resistance to British au-
thority and gathered intelligence. In the words of one of
its members, Paul Revere, "In the Fall of 1774 and winter
of 1775, 1 was one of upwards of thirty, chiefly mechanics,
who formed ourselves into a Committee for the purpose
of watching British soldiers and gaining every intelligence
on the movements of the Tories." According to Revere,
"We frequently took turns, two and two, to watch the
(British) soldiers by patrolling the streets all night."
Through a number of their intelligence sources, the
"mechanics" were able to see through the cover story the
British had devised to mask their march on Lexington and
Concord. Dr. Joseph Warren, chairman of the Committee
of Safety, charged Revere with the task of warning John
Adams and John Hancock at Lexington that they were the
probable targets of the enemy operation. Revere arranged
for the warning lanterns to he placed in Old North Church
to alert patriot forces at Charleston, and then set off on his
famous ride. He completed his primary mission of notify-
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ing Adams and Hancock. Then Revere, along with Dr.
Samuel Prescott and William Dawes, rode on to alert
Concord, only to he apprehended by the British en route.
Dawes got away, and Dr. Prescott managed to escape soon
afterward and to alert the patriots at Concord. Revere was
interrogated and subsequently released, after which he re-
turned to Lexington to warn Hancock and Adams of the
proximity of British forces. Revere then turned to still
another mission, retrieving from the local tavern a trunk
belonging to Hancock and filled with incriminating papers.
With John Lowell, Revere went to the tavern and, as he
put it, during "a continual roar of Musquetry . . . we
made off with the Trunk."
Fortunately, when interrogated by the British, Revere
did not have his travel orders from Dr. Warren; the au-
thorization was not issued to him until two weeks later.
And when Paul Revere filed a travel voucher for his
famous ride, it was not until August, some four months
later, that it was approved-and when it was approved, his
per diem payment was reduced from five shillings a day
to four.
Paul Revere had served as a courier prior to his famous
"midnight ride," and continued to do so during the early
years of the war. One of his earlier missions was perhaps
as important as the Lexington ride. In December of 1774,
Revere rode to the Oyster river with the intelligence report
that the British, under General Gage, intended to seize
Fort William and Mary. Armed with this intelligence,
Major John Sullivan of the colonial militia led a force of
four hundred men-all in civilian clothing rather than
militia uniform-in an attack on the fort. The one hundred
barrels of gunpowder taken in the raid were ultimately
used by the patriots to cover their retreat from Bunker Hill.
Martyrs and Heros
Nathan Hale is probably the best known but least suc-
cessful American agent in the War of Independence. He
embarked on his espionage mission into British-held New
York as a volunteer, impelled by a strong sense of patri-
otism and duty. Before leaving on the mission he report-
edly told a fellow officer: "I am not influenced by the
expectation of promotion or pecuniary award; I wish to he
useful, and every kind of service necessary to the public
good becomes honorable by being necessary. If the exi-
gencies of my country demand a peculiar service, its claims
to perform that service are imperious."
But dedication was not enough. Captain Hale had no
training or experience, no contacts in New York, no chan-
nels of communication, and no cover story to explain his
absence from camp-only his Yale diploma supported his
contention that he was a "Dutch schoolmaster." He was
captured while trying to slip out of New York, was con-
victed as a spy and went to the gallows on September 22,
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1776. Witnesses to the execution reported the dying words
that gained him immortality: "I only regret that I have
but one life to lose for my country."
The same day Nathan Hale was executed in New York,
British authorities there arrested another patriot and
charged him with being a spy. Haym Salomon, a recent
Jewish immigrant involved in the cause of independence,
was confined to Sugar House Prison. Fortunately he spoke
several European languages, and was soon released to the
custody of General Heister, who needed someone who
could serve as a German-language interpreter in the
Hessian commissary department. Even while in German
custody, Salomon's patriotism could not he repressed; he
is credited with inducing a number of the German troops
to resign or desert.
Eventually paroled, Salomon did not flee to Philadelphia
as had many of his New York business associates. He
continued to serve as an undercover agent, and used his
personal finances to assist American patriots held prisoner
in New York. He was arrested again in August of 1778,
accused this time of being an accomplice in a plot to burn
the British fleet and to destroy His Majesty's warehouses
in the city. Salomon was condemned to death for sabotage,
but bribed his guard while awaiting execution and escaped
to Philadelphia. There he came into the open in the role
for which he is best known, as the financier of the revolu-
tion. It is said that when Salomon died in bankruptcy in
1785, at forty-five years of age, his government owed him
more than $700,000 in unpaid loans.
Less than a year after Nathan Hale was executed, an-
other American agent went to the gallows in New York.
On June 13, 1777, General Washington wrote the Presi-
dent of Congress: ". . . You will observe by the New York
paper, the execution of Abm. [Abraham] Patten. His family
deserves the generous Notice of Congress. He conducted
himself with great fidelity to our Cause rendering Services
and has fallen a Sacrifice in promoting her interest. Per-
haps a public act of generosity, considering the character
he was in, might not be so eligible as a private donation."
"Most accurate and explicit intelligence" resulted from
the work of Abraham Woodhull on Long Island and
Robert Townsend in British-occupied New York. Their
operation, known as the "Culper Ring" from the opera-
tional names used by Woodhull (Culper, Sr.) and Town-
send (Culper, Jr.), effectively used such intelligence trade-
craft as codes, ciphers and secret ink for communications:
a series of couriers and whaleboats to transmit reporting;
at least one secret "safe house," and numerous sources.
The network was particularly effective in picking up valu,
able information from careless conversation wherever the
British and their sympathizers gathered.
One controversial American agent in New York was
the King's Printer, James Rivington. His coffee house, a
favorite gathering place for the British, was a principal
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source of information for Culper, Jr. (Townsend) who
was a silent partner in the endeavor. George Washington
Parke Curtis suggests that Rivington's motive for aiding
the patriot cause was purely monetary. Curtis notes that
Rivington, nevertheless, "proved faithful to his bargain,
and often would intelligence of great importance gleaned
in convivial moments at Sir William's or Sir Henry's table,
be in the American camp before the convivialists had slept
off the effects of their wine . . . The King's printer would
probably have been the last man suspected, for during the
whole of his connection with the secret service his Royal
Gazette literally piled abuse of every sort upon the cause
of the American general and the cause of America."
Hercules Mulligan ran a clothing shop that was also
frequented by British officers in occupied New York. The
Irish immigrant was a genial host, and animated conversa-
tion typified a visit to his emporium; since Mulligan was
also a patriot agent, General Washington had full use of
the intelligence he gathered. Fortunately so, for Mulligan
was the first to alert Washington to two British plans to
capture the American Commander-in-Chief.
Mulligan was more than an American agent, he was a
British counterintelligence failure. Before he went under-
ground as an agent, he had been an active member of the
Sons of Liberty and the New York Committees of Cor-
respondence and Observation, local patriot intelligence
groups. Mulligan had participated in acts of rebellion and
his name had appeared on patriot broadsides distributed
in New York as late as 1776. But every time he fell under
suspicion, the popular Irishman used his gift of "blarney"
to talk his way out of it. The British evidently never
learned that Alexander Hamilton, Washington's aide-de-
camp, had lived in the Mulligan home while attending
King's College, and had recruited Mulligan and possibly
Mulligan's brother for espionage.
Another American agent in New York was Lieutenant
Lewis J. Costigan, who walked the streets freely in his
Continental Army uniform as he collected intelligence.
Costigan had originally been sent to New York as a
prisoner, and was eventually paroled under oath not to
attempt escape or communicate intelligence. In September
of 1778 he was designated for prisoner exchange and freed
of his parole oath. But he did not leave New York. and
until January of 1779 he roamed the city in his American
uniform, gathering intelligence while giving the impression
of still being a paroled prisoner.
On May 15, 1780, General Washington instructed Gen-
eral Heath to send intelligence agents into Canada. He
asked that they he those "upon whose firmness and fidelity
we may safely rely," and that they collect "exact" informa-
tion about Halifax. In support of a French requirement for
information on the British defense works there, Washing-
ton suggested that qualified draftsmen be sent. James Bow-
doin, who was later to become the first president of the
American Academy of Arts and Science, fulfilled the in-
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telligence mission, providing detailed plans of Halifax
harbor, including specific military works and even water
depths.
In August of 1782, General Washington created the
Military Badge of Merit, to be issued "whenever any
singularly meritorious action is performed . . . not only
instances of unusual gallantry, but also of extraordinary
fidelity and essential service in any way ..." Through the
award, said Washington, "the road to glory in a patriot
army and a free country is thus open to all." The following
June, the honor was bestowed on Sergeant Daniel Bissell,
who had infiltrated New York, posed as a Tory, and joined
Benedict Arnold's "American Legion." For over a year,
Bissell gathered information on British fortifications, mak-
ing a detailed study of British methods of operation, before
escaping to American lines.
Dominique L'Eclise, a Canadian who served as an in-
telligence agent for General Schuyler, had been detected
and imprisoned and had all his property confiscated. After
being informed by General Washington of the agent's
plight, the Continental Congress on October 23, 1778,
granted $600 to pay L'Eclise's debts and $60, plus one
ration a day "during the pleasure of Congress," as com-
pensation for his contribution to the American cause.
Family legend contributes the story of Lydia Darragh
and her listening post for eavesdropping on the British.
Officers of the British force occupying Philadelphia chose
to use a large upstairs room in the Darragh house for
conferences. When they did, Mrs. Darragh would slip into
an adjoining closet and take notes on the enemy's military
plans. Her husband, William, would transcribe the intelli-
gence in a form of shorthand on tiny slips of paper that
Lydia would then position on a button mold before cover-
ing it with fabric. The message-hearing buttons were then
sewn onto the coat of her fourteen-year-old son, John, who
would then he sent to visit his elder brother, Lieutenant
Charles Darragh, of the American forces outside the city.
Charles would snip off the buttons and transcribe the short-
hand notes into readable form for presentation to his offi-
cers. Lydia Darragh is said to have concealed other intelli-
gence in a sewing-needle packet which she carried in her
purse when she passed through British lines.
Many other heroic patriots gathered the intelligence
that helped win the War of Independence. Their intelli-
gence duties required many of them to pose as one of the
enemy, incurring the hatred of family members and friends
-some even having their property seized or burned, and
their families driven from their homes. Some were captured
by American forces and narrowly escaped execution on
charges of high treason or being British spies. Many of
them gave their lives in helping to establish America's
freedom. Time has obscured many of their names and
their exploits, but all have joined the ranks of those whose
achievements we honor during the nation's bicentennial.
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Additional copies of this report may be obtained from:
THE NATHAN HALE INSTITUTE
422 First Street, S.E., Suite 208A
Washington, D.C. 20003
[phone]
Permission to quote from this publication is granted
provided due acknowledgment is made.
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ISBN 0-935067-07-8
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