YUGOSLAV REPORT ON SATELLITE ARMED FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000700110649-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 649
• Publication Date: July 2, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT N0.
In harmony with its counterrevolutionary theory, Soviet leadership prepared
plans during World War II to enslave many countries, Different tactics acre to
be applied for each country. For example, the Soviets advised Yugoslavia not
to create proletarisa brigades, to abolish the functions of political commissars
and the party organization in military detachments, to abolish the five-pointed
star, etc.
A typical example of the liguf.datlon of the people's military power can be
seen in Poland. In January 1942, the Polish Workers Party vas created to re-
place the earlier Polish Communist Party, which vas dissolved Just before World
War II because of the internationalism of the YI(p(b), The Polish Workers'
Party wgs a positive hindranrt to Moacov's designs to reach an agreement with
Hitler to divide Poland, but the lateness of its creetion vas one of the reasons
for its failure to dray the masses into a Polibh liberatf.on movement. However,
the party vas active against the Nazis in Poland.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGE CY REPORT
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADC` TS CD NO.
~
Poland; Czechoslovakia; Bulgar
umaaie;
Military
Pamphlet
Belgrade
Aug 1952
~he following report, taken Trom a pamphlet entitled
Moskovske Satelitske Trupe (Moscow's Satellite Troaps), by
A. RSstic, published in Belgrade is 1952 by Narodna KnJ1ga
(People's Boaks), describes (1) liquidation of World War II
Satellite military power; (2) subordination of Satellite
armies; (3) Satellite military maneuvers; (4) size, train-
ing, and facilities of Satellite armies; (5) morale of
Satellite armies and people; sad (6) Sate111tes aad Yugo-
slavia,
(j Gt ~+
CLASSIFICATI,Q~ ~~~ t'~i t~~~~ ~~?C fl~lLY
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~~~ (1FF~~I~L f~S~ ~INLY
STAT
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The People's Guard vas formed in 1942 ae an armed organization to resist
the occupation forces, Gen Marian Spihalski, a member of the Politburo of the
Polish Workers' Party who became the first postwar assistant Minister of
National Defense, vas the first Chief of the General Staff of the People's
Guard. People's Guard detachments, combat detachments of leftving Socialists,
peasant battalions, and other armed groups fighting against the Nazis were
united to form the People's Army at the end of 1942, Rola-Mihail Zymierzki,
vho later became an army marshal, Minister oP National Defense and commander of
the Polish Army, vas the People's Army's first Commander-in?Chief. This method
of creating a people's army contained guarantees that tt would be a strong
factor in the people's liberation struggle and in building Socialism. Hut
the Soviet hegemonists destroyed these guarantees by destroying the national
character of these armed forces.
In 1943, Smmedlately after the creatio^ of the People's Army, the Soviet
government began organizing Polish armed units in the UF,SR. IP the government
of the USSR had really been Sn evmnnthy with Lhe Polish liberation struggle, it
would have taken such action earlier, when there were hundreds of thousands of
Polish refugees in USSR concentrations camps. This failure to act earlier shove
that the Soviets planned to insure a Polish army which would be an appendage of the
Soviet Army in the USSR's enslavement of Poland. This vas the first step toward
the later complete subordination of Polish armed forces to Moscow.
The Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR, a Polish refugee organization,
was given the mission of training Polish units. The 1st Polish Infantry
Division, named after Thaddeus Kosciusko, vas organized in April 1943 from
Poles vho were living Sn the Soviet camp Oki. Even though the division vas
formed by a Polish organization, the USSR placed Soviet ofi'icers in command
positions of assigned to these positions Poles from the Soviet Army vho had
lived in the USSR for many years and enjoyed the full confidence oP the Soviet
command. Several other Polish divisions were organized immediately afterward,
and the Polish Armed Forces Corps was formed in the USSR. This corps vas
converted into the First Polish Army In March 1944,
From the moment Soviet troops entered Poland, Polish People's Army units
were absorbed indiscriminately into Polleh orgaaizatlons which had come from
the USSR, Thus began the liquidation of the Polish armed forces, which hhd
been created through the struggles of the Polish people. The Polish Feople's
Army undoubtedly vas liquidated because of Sts many weaknesses. Relatively
small, ideologically and organizationally weak, lacking sufficient leadership
from the party, the Pulish People's Army had the same deficiencies as the
Polish Communist Party and the Polish liberation struggle in World War II.
Nevertheless, Soviet intervention vas the determining factor in its liquidation.
The armies of Satellite countries, each in its own manner, have become
appendages oY the Soviet armed forces. The Eastern European countries could
not have been sub3ugated without transforming their parties, or more speci-
fically their lesdera, into agents of the USSR, or subordinating their armies
to Moscow. One of the first steps In subjugating a country vas the tranefor-
matlon of its army into an obedient tool of Moecov. Armies of the East Euro-
pean countries have thus become colonial troops of Soviet imperieliatic policy,
camouflaged as "Bulgarian," "Pollak," "Rumanian," etc., armies.
Subordination of Satellite Armies
The methods of subordinating Satellite armies to the Soviet Army are mani-
fested by the following developments,
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Soviet Marshal Rokoseovskiy has been proclaimed a Pole and has become su-
preme commander oP the Polish Army as well as a member of the Politburo oP the
Polish Workers Party. These actions show that the situation Sn Poland is
dangerously anti-Soviet, that Poland occupies a place of extraordinary impor-
tance in Soviet hegemonistic plans, and that no person could be Pound who was
more trustworthy or more "Polish" than RokoseovBkiy.. The arrival of Roko=
aeovskiy vas accompanied by extensive and far-reaching measures to subordinate
the Polish Army still further. With him came a staff of "specialists," who
assumed all key positions in the~ara~y, A purge which had begun earlier was
continued with full vigor. The first to suffer vere distin
uished s
ldi
g
o
ers
who had organized and led the liberation movement during the German occupation.
In addition to Soviet'"specialists" and "Russian men" (Poles who had been
in the USSR for some time and had become devoted to Soviet bureaucracy) who were
placed is positions of leadership in 'the army, the party, and the government,
leaser-known men who blindly Fulfill all Soviet commands also were appointed to
such positions. They all quickly received high titles and the highest officer
ranks. This vas the case with Ochab, a union official vho overnight became a
member of the Politburo, a brigadier general, and first assistant to the Minis-
ter of National Defense. He replaced Cen Marian Spihaleki, vho was relieved of
his ministerial position, expelled from the Politburo, and named Municipal
Counselor in Wroclaw, but vas quickly arrested and will be tried for high trea-
son. Ochab also recently assumed the duties of chief of the Main Political Ad-
ministration, replacing General Wongrovskl. By a similar orders Gen Wladislav
Korczyc, also transferred from the Sovir_t Army to the Polish Army, became Chief
of the General Staff and an assistant minister.
Since February 1948, Soviet representatives in the Czechoslovak Socialist
Party have removed from responsible poeitioa in the arty those who vere not
favorable to Moscow's plans to transform the Czechoslovak Artyy into part of the
USSR armed forces. Gen Ludwig Svoboda, former Czechoslovak Minister oP National
Defense who belonged to the small group of Czechoslovak officers vho began the
struggle against the Germans, was replaced by Alexei Cepicka. Cepicka had lived
in the USSR for many years and returned to Czechoslovakia only after Nazi
Germany had been defeated. He is not a soldier and did not participate Sn the
var. The Czechoslovak Army is nav.being rapidly transformed into part of the
USSR armed;forcas. Czechoslovakia has its Rokossovskiy in Marshal Konev, vho
lives in Karlovy Vary, but, unlike Rokosaovskiy, operates incognito.
Col Gen Emil Bodnaras, Rumanian Minister of National Defense ~ow General
of the Army sad Minister of the Armed Force, had lived in the USSR since 1935,
where he had been trained by the security service and carried out missions as a
spy in many European countries. Mai Gen Dumitru Petrascu, chief oP the Main
Political Administration of the Rumanian Arty, also had lived in the USSR from
1933 until .the Soviet Army vent into Rumania: Other leaders in the Rumanian
Army have been recruited from men prepared to carry out Moscow's orders, issued
directly or by the increasingly large staff of Soviet "specialists". All these
men have quickly received general officer ranks and have become "first-class"
soldiers. Leontin Sala,janu, assistant to Bodnaras, became a ma,Jor general
in this manner. Sala,jaau vas formerly secretary of the Central Committee of the
Rumanian Communist Party in Timisoara. His sole military service consisted oP
his chauvinistic stand toward the Yugoslav minority in the Rumanian part of the
Banat He is of Hungarian descent. Before going to Bucharest, he changed his
name from Leo Szilagyi to the Rumanian name of Sala,janu. Constantin Doncea,
Viliam Sudar, Nicolas Ceausescu, and others have received general officer ranks
in the same manner. The selection of Constantin Doncea is typical. In the fall
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of 1948 he vae said to have been removed frO1a his position as assistant to the
president of the Bucharest district because oP large-scale embezzlement and
corruption, Nothing vas known of him for a year, but, following training in
the USSR, he vae assigned to the Rumanian Army ae a general.
The most typical "Russian men" are at the head oP the Bulgarian Army. They
lived and worked in the USSR and vere Soviet officers for many years. Several
days after Voroshilov's visit to Bulgaria is .ianuary 1950 to attend the funeral
a~ Yasil Kolarov, a ukase was tesued naming Lt Gen Asen Grekov first assistant
Mlnister oP National Defehae; Lt Gen Petur Panchevaki, second assistant; and
Mai Gen Ivan Mikhaylov, third assistant ~ov vice-chairman of the Council of
Ministers end Assistant Mlnister oP Defens], All three came to Bulgaria in
1944 as colonels with the Soviet Army.. Lieutenant General Panchevaki became
Minister of National DePnaee on 27 May 1950.
The Soviet masters first had Mikhaylov promoted to lieutenant general,
than had Mikhaylov and Panchevaki promoted to colonel generals, Although
rarely seen publicly, Soviet generals Novikov and Kroaov are certainly part
of the Bulgarian General Staff, where very little is done without them. The
placement of "Russian men" and Soviet generals Sn Bulgaria has been accompanied
by the liquidation of all those who fought Tor their country and remained in
Bulgaria with their people. Dobri Terpeshev, lieutenant general is the
Bulgarian Army and commander of the People's Liberation Army during the war
~ov chief of DOSO (Voluntary Organization for Defense Cooperation, vas re-
moved. Gen Slavko Trunaki, General Borimechka, and all others who could not
be relied on to carry out Moscow's policy of destroying Bulgaria's independ-
ence and subordinating the Bulgarian Ara1y, vere arrested.
Col Gen Mihaly Farkas, Hungarian Minister of National Defense, came to
Hungary with Soviet troops, Lt Gen Iatvan B$ta, Chief of the Hungarian Gen-
eral Staff, lived Sn the USSR since 1917. As n maJor general during World
War II he commanded a Ukrainian division,
Because the lowest Soviet "specialist" in Albania Ss more influential
than many of Albania's most responsible leaders, it was unnecessary to assign
Soviet generals or "Russian men" there.
The organization of command cadres in Satellite armies clearly shows the
degree to which the armies are appendages of the Soviet armed forces. But the
inferior status of Satellite armies is also assured through agents in the high
commands of Satellite countries,
A large number of so-called instructors, actually Soviet officers, control
military instruction and supply, supervise arming, and are oa examining com-
missions for officers and enlisted men.. These instructors, who are in all
units on the regimental level and above, including border guard units, espec-
ially those on the Yugoslav border are real dictators.
The Bulgarian Army is overflowing with specialists and advisers, so there
are fewer and fewer positions for iulgarlan personnel. Bulgarian officers
are paid from 15,000 leva to 20,000 leva, whereas Soviet instructors receive
from 100,000 to 150,000 leva. The situation in Albania is still more nearly
typical, A highly skilled Albanian worker is paid about 3,000 leke; the
director of a large industrial enterprise, 4,200 leks. Soviet Snstructors
receive from 27,000 to 37,000 leka; allowances sad other pergL~eites bring
their pay nearer 60,000 leks, For instance, the Albanian government pays five
Soviet instructors 300,000 leks monthly, the payroll of an enterprise em-
ploying 100 highly skilled workers. There are almost 3,000 Soviet instructors
in Albania now, A similar situation exists in the other Satellite countries.
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Soviet arms and Soviet work methods also have been introduced in military
instruction and Sn arms supply. Rokossovskiy immediately after assuming
command of the Polish Anryy, reorganized the Polish armed forces into a model
of the Soviet, Zn November 1949, Poland enacted a law which abolished the army
and the navy and set them up under the Soviet system< mhe armed Porcea of Po-
land were divided into ground forces, navy, a.ir force, antiaircraft defense,
and state security troops. The Polish Military Academy was patterned after
that in the Soviet Union. No officer can be promoted unless he knows the
Russian language. Even the commands are given i? Russian. The text of the
military oath was changed in November 1950 so that Polish officers and en-
listed 3en now swear a11eg1ance to the Soviet Union as well as to Poland.
Rokossovskiy is continuing to sovietize the Polish armed forces.
The "re-education oP personnel," or political instruction, characterizes
the subJection of the Satellite armies to Moscow.. All education in the Satel-
11te armed forces is directed toward preparing soldiers to carry out Moscow's
aggressive plans. Because of this the Soviets foster hatred toward Yugoslavia
In every way and try to show that it is impossible to build Socialism, to pro-
tect independence, or even to live without the IFSR and its leaders. Political
teaching Ss the same in all armies under Soviet domination. OP the 23 sub-
Jecta taught in the Albanian Army during the first half of 1951, 9 glorified
the Soviet Union, 6 exalted Stalin, 3 slsadered Yugoslavia, and the remaining
5 were dedicated to Enver Boxha and Mehmet Shehu, Minister oP Internal Affairs.
In their private discussions on help from the USSR, Bulgarian soldiers
point to many facts which show the reverse, namely, that Soviet bureaucrats
take everything away from them. Bulgarian soldiers must study the biographies
of, the USSR's "great men," with Stalin heading the list, The only Bulgarian
biographies studied are those of Chervenkov and Dimitrov. The latter is
studied only because of his tremendous indestructible popularity with the
Bulgarian people. Stalin's name in embroidered in large letters on all regi-
mental flags. Ia September 1951, every Bulgarian officer and soldier, when
taking his oath, had to kneel before the flag and kiss Stalin's name.
Inciting hatred of the Yugoslav people has a specital place in the re-
education of Bulgarian soldiers. Psychological preparation of the soldiers
for war against Yugoslavia ie the central theme at exercises, large maneuvers,
officers' meetings, company and battalion conferences, and in everyday official
contacts.
Ivan Borisov Mlkhov of the 7Erth Infantry Regiment of the Bulgarian Army
in Kyuatendil, who escaped to Yugoslavia on 28 June 1951, said that hie
battalion commander repeatedly told his soldiers that the political corsclous-
ness of each soldier is measured by how well he has learned to hate Y.igoslavis.
The same actuation prevails in all other units.. During political instruction
periods and i^ discussion with the soldiers, propagandists usually pose the
question; "who Ss the number one enem,}+ of Bulgaria7" The soldier is obli-
gated to answer "Yugoslavia." Any other answer results in criticism and public
reprimand, the soldier being told he does not know why he la fighting. In his
9 September 1950 order to the Bulgarian Army, Panchevski said that strengthening
the army and navy required a limitless love for Bulgaria nod hate for its
enemies, the Titoiats.
Similar psychological preparations for war against Yugoslavia are con-
ducted in the Rumanian Army. Soviet agents in the Rumanian Ministry o: Na-
tionnl Defense gave their propagandists the mission of developing the theme
that Jugoslavia has berome a bridge for a third world war; that resistance
and dissatisfaction is increasing in the Yugoslav Army; that US generals are
-5-
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assuming command in Yugoslavia; and that Turks, former soldiers oP the German
Wehrmacht, sad other war criminals are stationed on Yugoslav borders. Every
opportunity is used to develop hatred oP everything Yugoslav.
Lieutenant Sapca, is speaking to his soldiers about the Yugoslav Army
said: "We must shoot at Yugoslav soldiers sad officers, for they are our
enemies and are trying to destroy ua," Alex $tancu, a soldier of the 4th
Battalion of the 4th Rumanian Border Regiment, who escaped to Yugoslavia is
June 1951, said: "At one time the commissar and commander of the 2d Platoon,
4th Battalion, 4th Border Regiment, told ue ve should shoot every Yugoslav
officer or soldier who comes near the border. Lieutenant Popes;;i, a co~mter-
Lntelligence service officer is a border regiment, asks his soldiers to be
alert, for Ln an attack the Yugoslavs might reach Timisoara, but if his sol-
diers are alert, the Rumanians will reach Belgrnde first. Lt David Gheorhe,
while giving marksmanship instructions, told his troops to imagine they were
shooting at one oP Tito's soldiers instead of at the target. The Rumanian
military oath includes Lhe following: "I swear I will hate the enemies on the
borders of our fatherland the same as our internal enemies."
Ia its special broadcasts to Hungarian Army border units every Wednesday
or Thursday, Radio PetoPi allots most of its time to glorifying Ind praising
Hungarian border guards who have wounded Yugoslav border guards, or who have
killed Hungarian citizens and soldiers attempting to escape across the border
into Yugoslavia. Iatvaa Sreves, a soldier Sa a Hungarian infantry regiment
(military postofPice:number 2872, Kapoavar) who escaped on 22 June 1951, re-
ported that hie officers said that, after the US had failed to provoke p third
world war in Korea, St decided to use Yugoslavia to provoke a war. Because of
this Hungary was forced to atrengthnn its forces, Srevea Bald that during
exercises and maneuvers Hungarian leaders always give examples in connection
with an attack on Hungary by yugoslavia? On 3 February 1951~they created a
riot in the regiment by saying that "Tito's gang has attacked Hungary near
3arc."
Propagandists in the Albanian A:?s~y are not far behind the Hungarians sad
the Bulgarians. Tuk Jakova of Tirsaa said at a meeting that Yugoslavia was
attempting to vin over the people is the Kosmet but that the people would not
''~11 into the trap, Por their union with Albania has always been their only
dream, Haxhi Slnan, another Albanian leader, called upon Albanian soldiers to
fight to exteact their borders to the Kosmet, for Albanian people are living
there. Both of the talks are studied at meetings of officers and enlisted men.
After an Albanian independent infantry brigade hau been transferred frog
Vlonc to the Yugoslav border (Shkoder-Koplik), Shaqir Frak, an officer of the
brigade, said at a meeting that they had been transferred there so Yugoslavia
could be destroyed by Bulgaria,` Rumania, Hungary, sad the USSR att=acking oa
all sides. He said that Yugoslavia would not be able to resist even Pur ae
long ss 24 hours. .__ __ _ ?1,.
The 'holidays celebrating the formation of Satellite armies are another
indication of the armies' subjugation to.Moscov, Ia 1950, Poland decided that
12 October would be celebrated as the day the ?olish armed Forces were created,
as a tribute to the day the "Thaddeus Kosciusko" Division first entered combat
against the German Army near Leningrad. As Czechoslovak Army Day, Czechoslo-
vakia chose 6 October 1944, the day the I Czechoslovak Corps, organized in
the USSR, crossed the Czechoslovak border at Dukla Pasa and helped the Soviet
Army to liberate Czechoslovakia. A lead article in the Cominform propaganda
bulletin oP 7 October 1950, dedicated to Czechoslovak Army Days van entitles,
"Czechoslovak Army Day, a Manifestation of Loyalty to the USSR."
STAT
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The anniversary of the victory over Jelacic ~overnor (Ban) of Croatia,
~ 1848-285J, who aided Vienna in putting down the Hungarian revolution in'
1848-184y, vas chosen as Hungarian Army Day. The Soviets have used Jelacic's
campaign against the Hungarian revolutionists to spread hatred against the
Yugoslav people and their leaders. Szabad Hep openly states that present
Yugoslav leaders are successors of Jelacic. Since Jelacic vas a reactionary
and enemy of Hungary, present-day Yugoslavs, ae his supposed auccesaors, are
also supposed to be reactionary and enemies of the Hungarians.
Uniforms and arm ranks were patterned on the Soviet model after the
subordination of Satellite armies vas assured. The traditional Polish insignia
vas replaced by the Soviet. Alexei Ce icka'stated that the nev uniforms are
bringing the army nearer to its ideal ~he Sovie]. Seeing the Czechoslovak
Army on parade in its nev Soviet uniforms in May 1951, many Czechoslowks
yelled "Long live the Soviet Army " .+Phe Bulgarians have made similar changes;
their noncommissioned officer grades are now junior sergeant, sergeant, and
senii~r sergeant. The lover officer ranks are ~unlor lieutenant, lieutenant,
and senior lieutenant; instead of officer candidates they have sublieutenants
and lieutenants. The same applies to the other Satellites.
Satellite Military Maneuvers
In 1950, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had 14 divisions on the Yugoslav
border, while they had 25 divisions oriented toward the border. Together with
Albania, they have a total of 53 divisions, not counting police Porcea.
Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Albanian armies bivouac and hold
extensive maneuvers near the Yugoslav border, mostly on the avenues of ap-
proach to Yugoslavia. From 6 to 28 September 1950 the Hungarian Army, with
Army Minister Farkas preab'nt, held maneuvers between the Danube and the Tisza
rivers, only 20 to 30 kilometers from the Yugoslav border. The maneuvers were
participated in by the airforce, tanks, and the Danube fleet. finaign (zastavnik)
Istvsa Radi, former Hungarian border guard commander in Hercegszanto vho
took part in the maneuvers but escaped to Yugoslavia later, said that the
maneuvers involved defense of the southern borders of Hungary, then counter-
attack and pursuit oP Yugoslav Armed Forces deep into Yugoslavia.
In 1951 the Hungarians held extensive autumn maneuvers Sn the Kiekunhalae-
Szeged-Baia area on the same strategic routes used in 1950. All branches oP
the army participated, and military leaders of other Satellite countries were
present,
Numerous escapees from Rumania, 20 of whom were army personnel, have re-
ported that since 1949 large-scale demonstration movements and maneuvers have
been conducted by Rumanian and Soviet armed forces along the Rumanian-Yugoslav
border and in nearby villages.
From 5 May to 23 July 1950 there were 13 large-scale movements of military
units in Bulgaria; on 3 May 1950, 80 tanks left Sofia in daylight traveling
on the main highway leading to the Yugoslav border. According to witnesses,
Bulgaria held its largest demonstration of armed strength along the Yugoslav
border in September and October 1950. The.~th Infantry Division held extensive
maneuvers in the Strome River valley near Kyust~adil, while the 6th Infantry
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triangle. ,Soviet generals and other Soviet officers observed the maneuvers.
At the same time, large groups oP Bulgarian and Soviet oPPlcera reconnoitered
the border zoife, measuring and sketching terrain. In 1951 all Bulgarian unite
stationed 35 kilometers from the Yugoslaq border were transferred nearer.
These units have been intensively constructing permanent Plring positions Por
automatic and heavy arms, and other Pertifications.
Bulgaria has built fortifications along the entire length oP the Bulgarian-
Yugoslav border. Highvaya leading to Yugoslavia are being widened and given
a atone or concrete base. Bridges are being strengthened to carry 40 tone.
The Sofia-True, Sofia-Berkovitsa, Starke Dimitrov-Kyustendil, and other hdgh-
vsys have been rebuilt in this manner. Hungarians are rebuilding fortifi-
cations built by Horthy and used against Yugoslavia in World War II, especially
in the Pecsely, Kaposvar, and Hagykanizea areas.
Size, Training, and Facilities of Satellite Armi s
Reports on budgets of Satellite countries do not show the full extent of
the military expenditures. Military 'expenditures in 1948 in Bulgaria totaled
10 billion leva; in 1950, 14 billion; and in 1951,20 billion. The gdlitary
budget for 1948 in Hungary totaled 1.15 billion forints; in 1950, almost 2
billion; and in 1951, over 3.5 billion. Thirty billion leis vere spent in
Rumania In 1948; 39 billion in 1949; and 42 billion in '.950. In Poland~$3.1
billion zlotys vere spent in 1948; 60 billion in 1949; 93 billion in 1950;
and 123 billion in 1951. The Czechoslovak budget Por 1951 allotted 10.4
billion crowns Por "external" security and 5.1 billion Por "ia'cerral" ;.tcurity,
while the entire budget for 1948 totalol 67 billion croons. It ie certain
that significant sums for military expenditures vere hidden under the heading
of "national econorgy," which totaled 86 billion crowns. The same is true of
the budgets of the other Satellites.
IP the military budgets oP Satellite countries vere the actual amounts
announced, they would be insufficient to clothe and feed their large military
establishments (for example, 67,924,000,000 leis ~n 1951] is Rumania).
According to the British periodical, The World Today, Poland has as army
of 350,000 men organized into 16 divisions and plane to add seven more divisions.
In its June 1951 lsaue the same periodical elated that Poland has 250,000-
450,000 soldiers, while state security units have from 120,000-200,000. Tvo
of the divisions undoubtedly are armored and four are motorized. N11 arms of
the Polish Army are of Soviet Y,ype., It is expected that Poland will begin to
produce its own tanks. During the past year Poland and Czechoslovakia have
greatly strengthened their air forces with het fighter aircraft oP the Soviet
type. According to The World Today, the Czechoslovak Army has 150,000-250,000
men, while Czechoslovakia's state security forces c~sist oP 100,000-150,000
men. During the occupation, Germany increased Czechoslovakia's heavy indusrgy
output by 200 percent: Czechoslovakia hsa been made the arsenal for `supplying
the Satell?tes with heavy arms. Marshal Konev conducts frequent inspections of
Czechoslovak heavy ads factories,
. R
In his talk to the Yugoslav Rational Assembly in 1950, Marshal Tito said
that Hungary l,ad 95,000 moroumen is the army than it is allowed under the peace
agreement; the Rumanian Army had about 300,000 more than it is allowed; and
Bulgaria had 129,500 more than it is allowed. Since that time, the Satellite
armies have steadily increased until, 1n July 1951, Hungary, Rumania, and Bul-
garia had a combined total of 830,000 men under arms, These armies are being
improved qualitatively with modern arms from the USSR.
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The rapid build-up Sn numbers has created a critical shortage of officers
io the Satellite armies. At the April 1950 Plenum of the Bulgarian Communist
Party, Vulko Chervenkov emphasized this shortage. This resulted in Bulgaria's
trying in one year to create an officer cadre sufficient to lead 200,000 men.
Schools, academies, and courses were established. Whereas Bulgaria had only
three military academies in 1847, it had 12 academies and schools Sn 1951,
including the Military Academy in Sofia. Each school and academy has a
"supplementary battalion of cadets" from which a large number of officers
are supplied overnight. This method has relieved the officer shortage in
numbers but not in quality. Bulgaria has concealed the true strength oP its
armed forces by organizing eo-called labor battalions. In addition to its
paramilitary organizations, Rumania is developing special armed Forces in its
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Aided by the arty, the Federation oP Hungarian
Freedom Fighters, which was organized in early May 1948 for the military
training of its members, conducts military training, trains parachutists, and
maintains engineer, diversionary, and other specialized schools. The Hungarian
Arely Ministry ~Minlstry of Defens~ has a specialist counselor who directs
training in the federation and has several million forints at his disposal
(concealed under other headings in the budget), The Hungarian government strives
to have the organization viewed as b2Yng civilian sad social by patterning it
after a sports organization to hide its militaristic character. High-ranking
active officers head the organization but wear no insignia. Rbporting for
training is "voluntary," but anyone refusing a suggestion that he participate
may find himself released Prom his fob, proclaimed as being suspect or may be
executed or exiled.
According to many Hungarian escapees into Yugoslavia, the federation's
training courses last 90 hours and are organized through district centers which
are usually located Sa school gymnasiums or large homes requisitioned for this
purpose. In 90 hours students cover courses apr~ad over 6 months for army
recruits. Subjects include individual and squad training, courier vork, ob-
servation, guard duty, reconnaissance, manual of arms, and marksmanship.
Each organization is trying to develop its own leaders, but until this ie
achieved leaders are taken from the army. There is a 45-day platoon leader's
school in Budapest; every Saturday the students go for practice work to the
Alsogod military bivouac area, 22 kilometers from Budapest. A so-called
"2-month" school at God is a cover Por teaching engineer and diversionary
courses. The federation's parachute training is organized into three courses.
Hungarian-Soviet LZ-2 transport aircraft are borrowed for the dumps. The
federation also has courses Tor drivers, mechanics, and parachute riggers, and
a Hungarian civil aviation organizatio^ cond~.icts aviation training. Female
members of the federation are trained in ^ursiag and allied duties in courses
organized under the leadership of the Hungarian Army.
Imre Arco, Mihaly Kis, Jozsef Geri, Jozsef Sasvar, and other Hungarians
who escaped to Yugoslavia reported that factories in GerJe, Csenel and other
places produce light arms, tanks, and aircraft. Dile Teofilovici of Bucharest,
who escaned tc Yugoslavia on 2 July 1951, and Petru Borcian, Rumanian Army squad
leader who escaped is early 1951, reported that the Geradest Aircraft Factory
in Bucharest a* that time produced aircraft parts and that the Malaxa Factory
in Bucharest produced arms instead of repairing locomotives. Nicola Vasici,
from Giurgiu, Rumania, who escaped 2 June 1951, stated that the Pyrotechnic
Aeroaautcs ("Pirotehnica Aeronaut'_ca") Factory in Bucharest was doing the same
manufacturing aircraft parts, Nicvlai Bogdan from Tulcea, who escaped
25 June 1951, says that the "1 Mai" Shipyard in Turnu-Severin is building mine-
layers and minesweepers.
Instead of the 90 aircraft it is allowed by the peace agreement, Bulgaria
h~{s 400 aircraft, including bombers, most of them oi' Soviet manufacture, and
k00 Soviet tanks. Hungary has at least one tank and one aviation division.
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Satellite airfields which have been built, repaired, or expended recently
far exceed the requirements oP the Satellite air forces. These airfields,
especially in Bulgaria sad Rumania, are for use by a foreign power. Bulgaria
has 17 airfields, whereas Rumania has 60 {compared with 28 in 1947), 18 of
which are under construction. Engr Raimoat Alexei Comnen, who escaped from
Rumania 1 November 1951, reported that a large airfield with underground
hangars vas being completed near the village of Saaca, 45 kilometers southwest
of Braila. The airfield has its own railroad and electric pover plant and is
designed t'or use by ,Jet aircraft.
Bogdan Georgiev Gelev, machinery technician from Bulgaria, reported on
6 November 1951 that a new airfield designed for ,Jet aircraft vas being built
under the direction of Soviet engineers 14 kilometers northwest of Sofia, be-
tween the v?.llages of Kumaritsa, Dobroslavtel, Mirovyane, and Katina.
Nev airfields are being built in Hungary, while some are being prepared
for ,Jet aircraft. Geza.Szabo, an emigrant, reported on 2 November 1951 that
the airfield near Kunmadaras vas 10 kilometers long, j kilometers vide, sad
vas built under the direction of Soviet technicians, It has 3 concrete run-
ways and has about 15 MIG-15s and about 20 YAK-9s. The ~'iamadaras airfield
aas been made "prohibited territory" ~o civilian] by the L'mgarian Minis-
try of National Defense.
Morale oP Satellite Armies and Peo le
Ever since Rokoseovskiy assumed command of the "Polish" armed forces?
the Polish Society of Friends of the Servicemen has attempted through propa-
ganda to convince the people that the Polish Ars~y is the faithful guardian
of Poland's peaceful development, the alert defender of Polish freedom and
independence, etc. The organization holds lectures, meetings, and enter-
tainments Sa enterprises, establishments, and schools, attended by soldiers
and civillaas, Soldiers are forced to speak favorably of their life in the
army and uphold the contention that the Polleh Army is growing and becoming
stronger because of Soviet brotherly and friendly help. This propaganda
activity Ss especially active during Friends of the Servicemen Week, which
is held annually prior to the Polish Army holiday.
Soviet officials in Poland pay particular attention to popularizing the
"Polish Army" with children and youth, even us?ng the school system for this
purpose. They prepare various attractions for children and youth, vh:ch
sometimes are made to coincide with the return of military units Prom maneu-
vers. Selected groups of soldiers are sent to make speeches 1~ students'
homes, enterprises, war orphans' homes, etc. After the speeches the children
are g?vea packets containing candy, brochures, and pictures in which the
"Polish Army" Ss represented as the "defender of a finer and happier future
for the young generat?on."
The Society of Friends of the Servicemen periodically organizes collec-
tion of packages for "people's donations" to the soldiers, to foster the
feeling that the masses are expressing their love tavard the Polish Army and
indicating their satisfaction with the Polish Arm's position ae a Satellite
army. Hut the working people of Poland and of the other subjugated countries
are paying less and less attention to such urdertakings.
At a special meeting of the High Military Council oP the Bulgarian Army
called in January 1951, Generals Trunski (later arrested) and Dzirov reported
on the morale problem, Snvolving "treason," desertions, failure to conduct
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training, unsatisfactory mastery of Soviet arms, poisoning of horses, end
other destructive activities. Kristo Tashev, an escaped bakery worker and
soldier (elase of 1929), related how little authority Bulgarian leaders have,
because they have to carry out a foreign oppressive policy, and how they are
hated by the Bulgarian people because of their beP 'trea~ment oP the soldiers.
TashPV described an incident involving two soldiers in an engineer unit who
had fulfilled their norm only to have their commander increase it. When they
refused to do more, they were cursed. They attacked the commander with their
shovels, whereupon he drew his pistol. Tashev said he believed that Sf Bul-
garia attacked Yugoslavia, only about 25 percent of tie Bulgarlau Arigy would
fight against the Yugoslavs.
The precarious state of the Bulgarian Army is evidenced by frequent
changes is the Bulgarian General Staff, transfers and removals of prominent
military leaders, arrests and sentencing of officers and soldiers, arrests of
soldiers Por preparing to escape, arrests for permitting soldiers to escape,
the trial of a group of high-ranking officers in Sofia in mid-1951, the death
sentences imposed on six officers in Pleven, etc.: In 1951 the army was used
for interning people living in Bulgarian border areas. In Kula Okollya in
northern Bulgaria, soldiers refused an order to intern inhabitants. An under-
ground organization composes of officers and soldiers who have deserted is lo-
cated Sn Sliven, Blagoevgrad, Slivnitsa, end in the Vidin-Vratsa area. The
organization works with the people in arranging escapes and is offering vari-
ous forms of opposition to the Chervenkov government.
The dissatisfaction and resistance of the Albanian people have developed
into soldier resistance.' mid-July 1951 a restriction was issued prohibiting
soldiers Prom speaking to members of their Families privately when the latter
vlsi.ted thew. Army leaders are supposed to be present at such visits. This
measure Ss intended to prevent bad news from the country penetrating the army,
and vice versa.
Disobedience in the Albanian Army Ss a frequent occurence. Very few or-
ders are carried out without grumbling and comment, which sometimes lasts an
hour. Isuf Roxha and Naziz L,Jaboti, soldiers in a border unit, refused an or-
der to repair a telephone line. Often an entire morning is taken to instnll
a line which could be installed in an hour. Even when performed, pork Ss
Yrequently sabotaged. Don Petri, Naziz LJaboti, and Don Mili were assigned
to an outpost; as soon as their commanding officer left they quit the out-
post sad returned to their unit. At the designated time they awoke the next
shift. which also neglected to go on duty. Soldiers regularly return from
assigned duties one to 2 hours ahead of time.
Most horrible are the ,Jails (for questioning) of the state security
agency, and the Jails for military personnel, especially the one in Tirana,
vhich housed 1,500 prisoners in 1950. The procedure in these ,jails is usually
brief, consisting of an examination by torture, a short trial, and death by a
firing squad. Lieutenants Mio Capan, from Derven, and L~uti Canl, from Fire,
were tortured In the Jail, This is the reaso^ there are frequent escapes from
Albania to Yugoslavia.
T,t Ioan Glnea, political commissar and party leader of a Rumanian Army reg-
iment, who escaped to Yugoslavia in mid-March 1952. reported that the Ruma-
nians speak of their army as if it were an enemy army. This feeling has re-
cently been displayed openly in the streets, in public placed, and at meetings.
The Rumanians look upon members of the arty, especially officers, with distrust
STAT
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and do not willingly have contact with them. The Soviet Arty in Rumania ie no-
thing but sa occupation army. This unfriendly feeling toward the Rumanian
Arm ie increasing.
In the Rumanian prey, commissars examine reports on soldiers whose past
history ie suspect. Frequently, without cause, soldiers are assigned to dis-
ciplinary battalione,_aeat to forced labor, or are arrested. Through their
attitude toward training and political instruction, their questions which
confuse leaders, their frequent circulation oP pamphlets, and their more fre-
quent escapes from the army and the country, Rumanian soldiers show little
faith in their leaders. Rumanian soldiers are promised large rewards sad
furloughs iP they thwart as escape or capture someone who escapes, whereas
they are threatened with 20 years' imprisonment if they are able to prevent an
escape but fail to do so. Mlrcea Stoics, a mechanic from Potcova and a sol-
dier (class of 1927) vho escaped to Yugoslavia in June 1950, said that, In
the event of war, half the soldiers would Plee to Yugoslavia.
Ia mid-March 1952, Pive Rumanian fliers of the 17th Bombardment Regiment
escaped to Yugoslavia in a twin-motored Heinkel-111 bomber. The fliers were
Ioan Ginea, political commissar; Senior Aviation Lieutenant Dumitru Picurka;
Senior Lieutenant Doctor Ioan Bucur; Senior Sergeant Eugen Horho~anu, a radio-
telegrapher; and Sgt Diure Gheorghi, a mechanic. The fliers related how the
resistance of the people sometimes finds open expression. They said that a
photograph of Stalin hanging in the headquarters building of the 17th Aviation
Regiment was mutilated by having the eyes cut out and that a photograph oP
Ana Packer vas soiled and dirty. Inscriptions full oP bitterness against the
regime often appear on room walls, in hallways, and in other places. When
service in the Air Force was Sncreased Prom 2 years to 3, the catchwords
throughout the fegiment were, "We want 2 years of service!", and "Dove with
Minister of the Armed Forces Hodnaras." The fliers Bald that many Rumanian
military pet