PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A002300040001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1952
• Content Type: NIE

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COPY NO.1 49
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR , ONE
SE 4
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
. IN NORTH AFRICA
NIE ? 69
Published 12 September 1952
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
concurred in this estimate on 4 September 1952.
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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH AFRICA
THE PROBLEM
To assess: (a) the strategic importance of North Africa; 1 (b) the current
strength and probable development of local nationalism in the area; (c) probable
French and Spanish ability to cope with this problem; (d) its likely international
repercussions; and (e) probable trends in Libya.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Chiefly because of its location along
the southern littoral of the Mediterra-
nean and its extensive military base net-
work, North Africa is of major strategic
importance to France, the US, and other
NATO powers.
2. The chief problem in the area is the
increasing instability created by growing
local nationalism in French North Africa,
especially in Tunisia and Morocco.
3. France will probably make a series of
limited concessions to the nationalists.
However, it is determined to retain con-
trol, by force if necessary, over French
North Africa, which it regards as the most
vital part of its overseas empire. Spain
is probably equally determined to retain
its hold on Spanish Morocco.
4. French reforms and security capabili-
ties probably will forestall the develop-
ment of any serious threat to French
control over Morocco and Tunisia for the
next several years. However, we believe
The term North Africa, as used in this paper,
means French North Africa, Spanish Morocco,
Tangier, and Libya.
that such concessions by the? French will
not be sufficiently timely or compre-
hensive to satisfy the nationalists. They
will almost certainly increase their de-
mands for complete independence and
might, if they fail to achieve their objec-
tives, turn to the Communists for support.
5. There also will probably be a further
growth in foreign sympathy for the
nationalist cause, especially among the
Arab-Asian nations, which will stimulate
nationalist activities and exert pressure
on the French.
6. So long as French military capabilities
are not seriously reduced, we believe that
the nationalists, acting alone, will not be
able to oust the French by force. How-
ever, as nationalist strength increases,
and if the French refuse to make further
concessions, the nationalists might at-
tempt an organized large-scale revolt,
anticipating that such a revolt would
arouse favorable world opinion and
result in political intervention, proba-
bly through the UN. We believe that
such a revolt is unlikely within the next
several years.
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7. Nevertheless, increasing native re-
sistance to French control will proba-
bly ? over a period of years ? create a
serious strain on French resources and
limit the strategic usefulness of French
North Africa to the West. We estimate
that eventually France will either have to
yield independence, contenting itself with
some form of close military and economic
ties, or else resort to increasingly costly
military repression.
8. The growth of organized nationalist
activity in Algeria will probably lag be-
hind that in adjacent areas, but we be-
lieve that eventually the conflict between
French and nationalist interests in Al-
geria may prove the most difficult to
resolve.
9. We believe that the Communists will
not capture control of the nationalist
movements in the next several years.
However, if nationalist 'leaders should
2
establish a common front with the
Communists, such action would seri-
ously increase sabotage capabilities and
strengthen the opposition to the sta-
tioning of Western troops and establish-
ment of Western bases in the area.
10. The North African problem will prob-
ably become a source of serious friction
among the non-Communist nations. The
US in particular is confronted with a
major policy dilemma and with the pros-
pect of a further strain on its relations
with both France and the Arab-Asian
states.
11. Libya will probably remain oriented
toward the US and U, but its economic
weakness, political immaturity, and un-
resolved Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differ-
ences create serious problems which
threaten its future stability and useful-
ness as a Western base.
DISCUSSION
Strategic Importance of North Africa
12. Chiefly because of its location along the
southern littoral of the Western Mediter-
ranean and its extensive military base net-
work, North Africa is of major strategic im-
portance to France and her NATO partners,
especially the US and UK. North Africa pro-
vides a base for: (a) control of the Western
Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches;
(b) invasion operations within the Mediter-
ranean basin; and (c) air operations against
Europe, European USSR, and Middle East.
13. Military. French North Africa, with its
population of over 21,000,000, is important to
France as: (a) a reservoir of military man-
power; (b) the site of major base and training
areas; and (c) a place to which the French
and others could retreat, if necessary, in event
of war. According to French standards for
colonial troops, there are a total of 2,290,000
physically fit natives of military age. Of
these there are at present over 95,000 in the
French army, many of them serving in Indo-
china. Morocco is the chief basic training
area for the French air force. French naval
bases exist at Casablanca, Mers-El-Kebir, Al-
giers, and Bizerte. The US is also completing
five strategic air bases in Morocco as well as
expanding the naval air base at Port Lyautey.
Spain utilizes Spanish Morocco as a training
area and a source of native troops.
14. Libya's location in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean gives it considerable military impor-
tance. The US and UK each operate a large
air base there. Libya also serves as a UK gar-
rison area, the importance of which would
increase if UK forces withdrew from Egypt.
15. Economic. !The predominantly agricul-
tural North African economies are relatively
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poor and underdeveloped. The presently de-
veloped resources of the area are not of major
economic importance except to France. The
chief extractive industries are phosphates,
iron ore, and manganese. Since World War ?
II, some 10-15 percent of French imports
(chiefly wines, phosphates, cereals, fruits,
vegetables, and fish) have come from French
North Africa, while 20-25 percent of French
exports have gone to that area. On the other
hand, French North Africa's postwar budg-
etary and trade deficits have been a burden
on France.
16. The French have substantial investments
in North Africa. They have developed excel-
lent port facilities and a good transport net-
work. However, the outlook for large-scale
industrial development is severely limited by
the shortage of fuel resources, investment
capital, and skilled labor. French develop-
ment programs envisage no more than modest
industrialization, chiefly through increased
use of hydro-electric power, especially in
French Morocco. These programs emphasize
production of raw materials and food crops to
meet metropolitan needs. Roughly a quarter
of the arable land is under relatively efficient
European cultivation, but native agriculture
is for the most part inefficient. The popula-
tion of North Africa is increasing more rap-
idly than the food supply, and the region is in
danger of becoming a chronic food deficit
rather than surplus area.
Current Problems in French and Spanish
North Africa'
17. The most serious problem in North Africa
is the growing state of tension created by the
rapid postwar growth of nationalist sentiment
in the French protectorates of Tunisia and
Morocco and to a less extent in Algeria. The
nationalists in general look toward ultimate
independence, but they vary in their immedi-
ate demands. Nationalism, however, has no-
where yet developed to the point where it
represents a serious threat to French control.
2 For a more detailed appraisal of the situation in
each region see Supplement to NIE-69, "The Cur-
rent Situation in North Africa," published 12
September 1952.
18. Although Tunisia and Morocco are nom-
inally sovereign states under their own native
rulers, the Bey and Sultan, in practice the
French protectorate government controls and
administers each country. The chief existing
limitation on French authority is that the Bey
and Sultan must countersign all legislative
decrees. , Algeria is administered as an in-
tegral part of France. The French Govern-
ment and the large population of some 1,600,-
000 residents of French descent ("colons")
dominate the modern sector of the economy
in all three areas; most technical and man-
agerial positions are held by the French. A
garrison of some 139,000 troops assures close
security control. French control is also facili-
tated by the existence of various pro-French
native groups.
19. Among the Arab and Berber population,
especially the educated classes, there has been
a gradual increase in political consciousness
and a sense of national identity, largely as a
result of continued exposure to Western politi-
cal and social concepts. The nationalists
have been encouraged to press their demands
more actively by developments in Iran and
Egypt, by adjacent Libya's achievement of
independence, and by the external sympathy
and support they have received. For example,
Arab-Asian efforts to secure them a UN hear-
ing have served as a major stimulus to their
cause.
20. Except in Tunisia, however, the nation-
alist parties themselves have not yet devel-
oped a high degree of organization or acquired
active mass support. They still consist most-
ly of an educated middle-class minority organ-
ized chiefly in the cities, with a popular base
for the most part only in urban laboring
groups. The illiterate rural bulk of the pop-
ulation has only slight political consciousness.
Moreover, the nationalist movements in some
areas are internally divided and without effec-
tive leadership. None of the nationalist
movements are presently capable of successful
armed revolt, though the nationalists could
seriously handicap the French administration
through non-cooperation, sabotage, and other
forms of pressure.
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21. Tunisia. The nationalist problem is most
acute in Tunisia, where the native society is
politically and culturally the most advanced
in North Africa and has been allowed, since
World War II, f airly extensive participation
in government by the French. The current
tension in Tunisia resulted from the break-
down of reform negotiations at the end of
1951. French rejection of nationalist re-
quests for recognition of Tunisian internal
autonomy and for a program leading grad-
ually to independence led to nationalist efforts
to place Tunisia's case before the UN and to
the outbreak of strikes and riots. France re-
taliated by implementing a strict state of
siege, arresting the nationalist leaders, and
later dismissing the pro-nationalist cabinet.
While these measures have kept the situation
under control, they have prevented any recon-
ciliation and, together with the prospect of
UN action, have caused leading nationalists
to demand complete and immediate inde-
pendence. Hoping to forestall UN action,
France announced a limited "reform" pro-
gram and attempted to secure the Bey's ap-
proval. The Bey, under nationalist pressure,
is apparently temporizing, because the Tu-
nisian case is now scheduled for discussion in
the Seventh UN General Assembly.
22. Morocco. Since World War II national-
ism has also created increasing tensions in
French Morocco, where French political and
economic control is more complete than in
Tunisia. The French have traditionally fol-
lowed a policy of "divide and rule" by capi-
talizing on the historic antipathies of the
Berbers and Arabs. There are signs that this
policy is becoming less effective. The Istiqlal,
the dominant nationalist party, currently de-
mands immediate, complete independence,
believing that to follow the evolutionary Tu--
nisian pattern of gradual native participation
in government would postpone Moroccan self-
determination for many decades. National-
ism has also received the active support of the
young and able Sultan of Morocco who, al-
though stripped of governmental power, has
grown in popular prestige. His demands for
revision of the protectorate treaty, and the
4
consequent riots, almost led to his deposition
by the French in 1951. In March 1952 he
renewed his demands, and a potentially ex-
plosive situation now exists.
23. Algeria. Organized nationalist activity is
less effective in Algeria. Longest under
French control, Algeria has the largest popu-
lation of French descent, and lacks a cohesive
native society and a hereditary sovereign
around whom nationalists could rally. The
indigenous population has French citizenship,
but its participation in government is severely
limited by various devices which insure the
political predominance of the French resi-
dents. The nationalist movement is still
largely factionalized. An extremist faction
favors violent action to achieve independence,
while a moderate group appears to favor grad-
ual evolution within the French Union. The
ulema, Moslem religious teachers, appear to
be the natural leaders of the people. Many
of them support the nationalist movements ,
and have been endeavoring to reconcile the
aims of the nationalist factions. Some have
also shown willingness to ally with the Com-
munists to further their own ends. However,
they do not form a united group which is
fully identified with the nationalist cause.
24. Spanish Morocco and Tangier. Close
Spanish controls, reinforced by some 60,000
troops, have maintained stability in Spanish
Morocco, but the nationalist Isiah Party has
developed considerable strength. As part of
its policy of wooing the Arab states Spain has
recently made gestures favorable to native
nationalism, but has not materially relaxed
its control. The Spanish probably do not in-
tend to grant any significant degree of self-
government to the Arabs, but hope rather to
play up apparent Hispano-Moorish "coopera-
tion" in order to better Spain's relations with
the Arab states. Spain's ostensibly lenient
attitude toward the Arabs in Spanish Morocco
has been a cause of embarrassment to the
French.
25. Spain has now 4manded the same degree
of participation in the administration of the
International Zone of Tangier as it had before
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World War II. The other participating pow-
ers probably will meet Spain's demands in
large part. France and Spain appear anxious
to insure greater security in Tangier, which is
a center of North African nationalist in-
trigues.
26. Cooperation between the Nationalist
Movements. To date, there has been little
coordination between the nationalist move-
ments in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, al-
though there have been sympathy strikes and
"days of mourning" designed to show Moslem
solidarity. The Maghreb Bureau in Cairo,
financially supported by the Arab League, in-
cludes representatives of most North African
nationalist parties and periodically issues di-
rectives to them, but the parties display no
enthusiasm for the Bureau and cooperate only
when it suits their local purposes. Political
and personal differences between the Maghreb
leaders also have prevented the effective func-
tioning of the Bureau, and its chief figure,
Abdel Krim, has recently resigned.
27. Communist Influence. The Communist
parties of Algeria, French Morocco, and Tu-
nisia maintain close liaison with, and are
directed and largely financed by the French
Communist Party. To date, the small North
African Communist parties have had only lim-
ited influence' on the nationalist movements,
largely because the nationalists realize that
such ties would alienate many sympathizers
in non-Communist areas and because the local
Communist parties are largely French in
membership.
Probable Developments in French North
Africa
28. International Pressures. External support
is already playing a major part in the de-
velopment of the nationalist movements in
North Africa. The chief source of this sup-
port has been the Arab-Asian nations, which
not only sympathize with national independ-
ence movements but in the case of the Arab
states have ties of cultural, racial, and relig-
ious kinship as well. The Arab and Asian
states will almost certainly increase their ef-
forts to help the nationalist causes, especially
through continuing efforts to bring the Tunis-
ian and Moroccan cases into the UN. These
cases will almost certainly gain a hearing,
and the Arab-Asian Bloc may eventually se-
cure some form of UN action. Any US action
in the UN which could be construed as favor-
able to the nationalists would be a major
stimulus to their activities.
29. Such external pressures will not only fur-
ther stiulate nationalist activities, but will
probably have substantial influence on French
policy. While France is apparently now will-
ing to permit inscription of the Tunisian case
on the UN agenda, it is strongly opposed
to any external interference in what it con-
siders to be a purely French problem, and
might refuse to abide by any UN recommeda-
tions. On the other hand, France might be
influenced by UN pressure to grant more ex-
tensive and earlier concessions to the nation-
alists than it presently appears willing to
make.
30. Although the North African nationalists
have so far received little direct material
assistance from the outside, the Arab states
may seek to increase such assistance in the
future, particularly if their relations with the
West remain strained. Their capabilities for
material assistance will remain limited
because of their own small resources as well
as French security controls, but they can help
nationalist exiles, provide some funds, and
possibly assist in smuggling arms.
31. French Intentions. The proximity of
North Africa to France, the large and well-
entrenched French population, and the ex-
tensive French investments in the area have
created a unique colonial relationship. The
ties between North Africa and France are so
close as to make extremely difficult any re-
conciliation between French interests and
nationalist desires for independence. How-
ever, the French recognize the necessity for
evolutionary political change in North Africa.
On the other hand, they will probably con-
tinue to act belatedly in response to external
pressures rather than try to reduce the threat
of local nationalism by fore-handed reforms.
The Socialists and many MRP members favor
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early and liberal concessions, but the right-
wing parties, especially the Gaullists, oppose
such a policy. The trend to the right in
France probably has made the French Gov-
ernment less willing to implement early and
liberal reforms. The "colons" also oppose any
broad changes which would threaten their
interests and security. Whatever the extent
of French concessions, France probably will
not hesitate to use force to control any na-
tionalist outbreaks, despite the effect on world
opinion which such repression might have.
32. French policies will vary in Tunisia, Mo-
rocco, and Algeria, because of the differing
French ties with these areas and their differ-
ent stages of political development. The pres-
sently proposed French reform program in
Tunisia allows among other things, for a Tu-
nisian majority in the cabinet, and a gradual
but large increase of natives in the civil serv-
ice. It is almost certain, however, that France
will not meet the nationalist demands for
an all-Tunisian cabinet responsible to an elec-
ted all-Tunisian legislature, and an all-native
administration.
33. France probably will also institute a grad-
ual reform program in Morocco in the near
future, though on a more modest scale. This
program probably will call for an increase
in the number of elective native rural coun-
cils, from which cadres could be drawn for
later regional or provincial assemblies. There
is little chance of early French agreement to
the establishment of a national legislature,
although the French apparently contemplate
ultimate replacement of the present Council
of Government by a consultative assembly
with one Moroccan and one mixed house.
France also hopes to obtain the Sultan's ap-
proval for the creation of municipal councils
with local "colon" participation and the legal-
ization of Moroccan participation in labor
unions (now tacitly permitted) on condition
that at least half the officers remain French.
These two reforms would actually strengthen
the French position in Morocco by "legaliz-
ing" French participation in Moroccan unions
and local government.
6
34. Over the long run France will probably
grant a considerably greater degree of local
autonomy, first in Tunisia and later in Moroc-
co. The French appear to envisage a time-
table for gradual achievement of such auton-
omy over a five-year period in Tunisia and a
much longer period, perhaps ten to fifteen
years, in Morocco.
35. However, we believe that future French
governments will insist at a minimum on re-
taining certain key controls over Tunisia and
Morocco, particularly in the fields of foreign
affairs, security, and to some extent public
finance. France probably will also insist on
protecting the interests of the "colons" by
forcing the nationalists to allow the "colons,"
even though French citizens, the legal right
to vote and hold office. The French may pro-
pose the institution of dual citizenship to over-
come the strong nationalist objections to such
"co-sovereignty." France apparently hopes
that in the very long term Tunisia and Moroc-
co could be persuaded to become Associated
States in the French Union, or some variant
thereof.
36. The French do not contemplate granting
autonomy to Algeria, but rather strengthen-
ing Algeria's integration into the metropole.
As an inducement to the Moslem population
to accept such integration, France will prob-
ably feel compelled to grant to the Moslems
such benefits as: (a) extension of French
educational facilities; (b) wider application
of French social legislation; (c) increased
participation in local and regional councils;
and (d) increased powers for the Algerian
Assembly. Eventually the post of Governor
General might be abolished, thus eliminating
the chief symbol of colonial status.
37. Probable Further Growth of Nationalism.
We consider it almost certain that nationalist
opposition to French control will continue to
grow rapidly. The limited and gradual French
reform programs described above are unlikely
to keep pace with increasing nationalist de-
mands. Moreover, in allowing greater native
participation in local administration, such re-
forms will almost certainly increase both na-
tionalist desires and capabilities for self-gov-
ernment. Because of this, as well as the
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growing external support for' the nationalists,
we believe that demands for complete inde-
pendence will grow.
38. However, in Tunisia and Morocco the com-
bination of limited nationalist capabilities and
extensive French security controls will prob-
ably forestall for a number of years national-
ist attempts to oust the French by force. Ac-
cordingly, the nationalists will probably feel
compelled for some time to accept a gradual-
ist approach toward their objectives. In par-
ticular, they may be forced to accept French
"colon" participation in the protectorate gov-
ernment, which is their chief objection to
present French reform programs.
39. Nevertheless, since nationalist demands
will outrun French concessions, tensions will
almost certainly, increase. The nationalist
leaders will increase their efforts to enlist
support abroad, particularly to secure backing
for their cases in the UN. Moreover, they
may periodically resort to further sabotage
and terrorism, calculated to attract interna-
tional attention and put pressure on the
French. French countermeasures might tem-
porarily put down aggressive nationalist ac-
tivity but would probably lead to its even-
tual resumption in even more violent form.
40. The Sultan of Morocco and even the Bey
of Tunis will probably identify themselves
more openly with the nationalist cause. The
Sultan in particular may assume open leader-
ship of the nationalist movement, and in
view of his growing stature among his people
and the force of world opinion, the French
would now hesitate to depose him. On the
other hand, both the Sultan and Bey are still
vulnerable to French pressures and may
therefore exercise some moderating influence
on the nationalists.
41. So long as French military capabilities are
not seriously reduced, we believe that the na-
tionalists, acting alone, will not be able to
oust, the French by force. However, as na-
tionalist strength increases, and if the French
refuse to make further concessions, the na-
tionalists might attempt an organized large-
scale revolt, anticipating that such a revolt
would arouse favorable world opinion and
result in political intervention, probably
through the UN. We believe that such a re-
volt is unlikely within the next several years.
42. The growth of organized nationalist activ-
ity in Algeria will probably lag behind that in
adjacent areas. The objectives of many Al-
gerian nationalists are likely to remain mod-
erate in the next few years, with emphasis on
removal of discrimination and on more Mos-
lem participation in government. However,
French concessions are unlikely to be suffi-
cient to prevent the further growth of the
nationalist movement.
43. Because of the strong French position in
Algeria and the lack of any legal Algerian
sovereignty, the Algerians might be more will-
ing than their neighbors to accept some such
status as that of an associated state within
the French Union. We believe, however, that
the French will be unwilling in this case
to alter the juridical ties between Algeria and
the metropole, and that the conflict between
French and nationalists in this area may ulti-
mately prove the most difficult to resolve.
44. The Communists will probably continue
their efforts to exploit nationalist desires for
independence by attempting to capture the
nationalist movements. There is some dan-
ger that should the nationalists fail to achieve
their objectives they would accept Communist
support. While we believe that the Commu-
nists will not capture control of any nation-
alist movement in the next several years, Com-
munist influence might lead to the adoption
of more anti-Western policies and to increas-
ing resort to direct action on the part of the
nationalist groups. If nationalist leaders
should establish a common front with the
Communists, such action would seriously in-
crease sabotage capabilities and strengthen
the opposition to the stationing of Western
troops and establishing of Western bases in
the area.
45. Effect on French and NATO Position. In
the light of the above factors we believe that
the current outlook is one of growing insta-
bility, characterized by sporadic crises and
disturbances created by the growing nation-
alist opposition to French control in North
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Africa. While we believe that the national-
ists cannot oust the French from North Africa,
increasing native resistance will probably ?
over a period ? create a serious drain on
French financial and manpower resources and
impede French use of the area as a base.
Moreover, the reliability of French North
African troops might decrease under the stim-
ulus of nationalism, reducing the value of this
major military asset. Ultimately France will
probably either have to grant independence
or else resort to increasingly costly military
repression. In the latter case the time may
come when a combination of nationalist in-
surrections and external pro-nationalist pres-
sures will present France with problems in-
soluble short of complete withdrawal.
46. If the French should grant independence,
the nationalists would in return almost cer-
tainly accept close military and economic ties
with France. The Algerians in particular
might even accept some form of political asso-
ciation within the French Union. However,
unless such a settlement is made within the
next several years, the nationalists would ac-
c'ept such ties only with great reluctance and
would probably repudiate them as soon as
feasible.
47. Increasing nationalist resistance to
French control in North Africa would also im-
pede US and NATO use of bases in the area
and might constitute a serious threat to the
security of these bases, particularly if .the na-
tionalist movements become pro-Communist
in their orientation.
International Implications of North
African Developments
48. The growing conflict between the French
and nationalists in North Africa will also have
important international repercussions. Dif-
ferences over North African issues are likely to
become a source of increasingly serious fric-
tion among the non-Communist countries.
We believe that North African developments
will exert a strong influence on Arab and
Asian attitudes toward the West both in the
cold war and in event of global conflict. Many
Latin American countries are also anti-
8
colonial in outlook and might support the
North African nationalists.
49. Differences between the non-Communist
powers as a result of North African develop-
ments will come to a focus in the UN. Fur-
ther Arab-Asian efforts to secure UN interven-
tion on North African questions might lead to
a split in the Western-oriented UN majority
which could be exploited on this and other
issues by the Soviet Bloc.
50. The efforts of both sides to secure US sup-
port confront the US itself with a major policy
dilemma and the prospect of a serious strain
on its relations both with France and the
Arab-Asian world. If the US appears to favor
the North African nationalists, it will invite
serious complications in its relations with
France. The French Government has already
intimated that the granting of additional US
bases in North Africa will depend upon the
US attitude toward the North African prob-
lem.
51. On the other hand, if the US strongly sup-
ports its NATO partner, it will probably lose
influence among the Near and Far Eastern
states. Sharp differences between the Arab
states and the Western Powers over North
Africa might diminish the prospects for secur-
ing Arab cooperation in Middle East defense.
The US might also prejudice its prospects for
subsequent influence in any North African
state which might ultimately receive its in-
dependence.
Prospects for Libyan Stability and
Pro-Western Orientation
52. Prospects for Internal Stability. Libya's
poverty and economic underdevelopment, un-
resolved Tripolitanian-Cyrenaican differences,
the weakness of the government and the un-
certain strength and attitude of the present
ruler all make for an unstable future. Most
important of these factors is the continued
cleavage between the Cyrenaicans, who pres-
ently dominate the government, and the more
advanced and numerous Tripolitanians, who
constitute two-thirds of the population. The
Tripolitanians are not yet sufficiently well-
organized to challenge the present regime, but
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if they reconstitute a strong opposition group,
the prospects for future internal schisms
would grow. Increased internal instability
might impede the use of Libyan bases by the
US and UK.
53. Despite his failure thus far to take steps
to unite his kingdom, King Idris is the strong-
est political factor in Libya. The current in-
capacity of the Libyan Parliament, the politi-
cal indifference of the people and their tradi-
tional submission to authority have all
strengthened his hand. The King is strongly
supported by the British, who retain a dom-
inant position in the country. The King,
however, is 62 years of age and the succession
has not yet been established. While accept-
ing Idris, many Tripolitanians and some
Cyrenaicans only reluctantly pledged alle-
giance to his dynasty as well. Unless the
King survives long enough to consolidate his
power, his death might be followed by a period
of intrigues during which the kingdom could
be dismembered.
54. Probable Trends in Libyan External Rela-
tions. At least during the next two or three
years, Libya will almost certainly remain pro-
Western in its orientation because of its acute
need for external aid and its continued close
ties with the US and UK. British influence
has recently declined somewhat and the gov-
ernment has discharged a number of UK ad-
visors. At the same time the King and Prime
Minister have expressed a desire for closer
relationship with the US and indicated that
they would prefer the US to assume the role
of their chief "protector."
55. Libya appears to regard its strategic posi-
tion as a bargaining lever to extract greater
financial and economic concessions; it will un-
doubtedly seek to increase the future price for
continued or expanded use of its facilities.
Libya is almost certain to ratify, the proposed
20-year base agreement with the US and is
probably willing to join any Middle East de-
fense organization. The government has in-
dicated that US facilities in Cyrenaica would
be welcome. A British-Libyan treaty of alli-
ance also will probably be ratified soon, but
Libya probably will not agree to its covering
as long a period as the UK had hoped. More-
over, the related military and financial agree-
ments may require protracted negotiations.
56. Despite strong Libyan resentment over the
French sphere of influence in the Fezzan,
there will probably be no outward trouble with
France in the near -future. The French are
relieving the Libyan Government of a finan-
cial and administrative burden it might not
otherwise be able to carry. Moreover, French
influence in this remote area will remain only
a minor issue so long as the major Cyrenaican-
Tripolitanian differences are unresolved.
57. A Libyan swing toward closer alignment
with the Arab states seems unlikely at present,
largely because of US-UK influence and Cyre-
naican fears of Egypt. Over the longer run,
however, Libyan nationalism may well follow
the pattern of the other Arab states in the
direction of anti-Westernism, particularly if
the Tripolitanians, already pro-Egyptian and
anti-Western, assume a larger political role.
Should the new kingdom break up under
separatist pressures, Tripolitania might turn
to Egypt for support. In any case the devel-
opment of increasing anti-Westernism might
lead to a reduction of US-UK influence and to
obstruction of US-UK use of Libyan facilities.
Much will depend upon the over-all state of
Western relations with the Arab world. If
Anglo-Egyptian differences are resolved and
the Arab states enter a Middle East defense
arrangement, such difficulties might not de-
velop. If Arab relations with the West re-
main strained, however, there will be strong
pressures on Libya to adopt a less pro-Western
course.
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