CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600620029-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: MISC

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such links,
sparked a broader discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of
university scholars cooperating or collaborating in any way with
American intelligence. Indeed, on December 3rd of last year the
Boston Globe stated "The scholar who works for a government
intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true
scholar." These are strong words. While in my view they are
I solicited this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak
about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the academic community because recent events here have
ne
,-indefensible,, they reflect conce that should be addressed.
'7)A " t141
I intend tonight to speak about tie pattern over time of
CIA's ties to the academic community, our reasons for seeking
contact with you, the concerns scholars and the media have about
The History of CIA-University Relations
In discussing the relationship between the academic
community and American intelligence, it is important to go back
to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to
Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan, a World. War
I hero and successful New York lawyer, persuaded President
Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign
intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving
Y
our policies governing these ties. I will be
d
ppy then to take questions for a few minutes.
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world events. He proposed creating an organization that would
report to the White House and "which could draw on the
universities for experts with long foreign experience and
specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general
conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and
created the Office of the Coordinator of Information under
Donovan's leadership.
Donovan named James Finney Baxter III, President of Williams
College and an expert on American diplomatic history, as the
chairman of a board of analysts that would draw together
information relevant to the course of the war. Baxter in turn
recruited a Harvard historian, William L. Langer, as the Director
of Research. The two then set to work to invite outstanding
scholars in the social sciences to join their board of analysts
and enlist additional staff.
There is an interesting sidelight to this. One of the,
reasons the new organization was exempted from Civil Service
regulations on hiring and pay was that Langer and other
professors could not afford to join a Civil Service where the top
salary was $8,500--less than they were earning in their academic
posts. Donovan went to Roosevelt and obtained an exemption. from
Civil Service regulations, allowing the Office of the Coordinator
of Information to match university salaries.
Donovan clearly had a high opinion of scholarship and the
contribution that quality minds from America's universities could
make to the work of the Office of Strategic Service, as the
intelligence organization was renamed in 1942. As a result, a
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large number of university professors were brought into the OSS,
including G. T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at
Columbia (who was made chief of the Russian section); Hajo
Holborn, professor of history at Yale; Franz Neumann of the New
School for Social Research; and, interestingly, Herbert Marcuse,
whose later revolutionary views presumably were not then
evident. Harvard made no small contribution to this intellectual
talent bank, contributing scholars such as Crane Brinton and H.
Stuart Hughes in history, Carlton Coon in anthropology, John King
Fairbank in oriental studies, Bruce Hopper in government, Henry
Murray in psychology, and others as well.
The U.S. military during the war had grave reservations
about these scholars, and were especially worried about their
failure to appreciate adequately the need for security. General
Donovan once angrily told Langer that although the scholars no
doubt were smart, they were not discreet. He said, "They are
like chorus girls who have beautiful legs and like to show
them."
This is not the time or place to detail their
contribution. Let us simply say it was significant. And when
the war was over, most of the scholars demobilized, along with
the nation's soldiers.
Events in East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China
between 1945 and 1947 made apparent the need to strengthen the
nation's defenses, and especially the need to be well-informed
about developments around the globe. The result was the National
Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and
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the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, outstanding scholars
were recruited. Langer was brought back to establish the Office
of National Estimates. Other academicians who joined up
included: historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, and
DeForrest Van Slyck; MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized
the economic intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard
Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even
William Sloan Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to
join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming
Chaplain at Yale. He told "Beetle" Smith he joined the Agency
because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a
common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early
years. Again, the number of scholars in the leadership of the
new CIA was disquieting to the Pentagon. General Smith once
quoted some of his erstwhile uniformed colleagues as saying that
the new Agency hierarchy was "a wild eyed bunch of intellectuals
whose colleges don't want them back."
In short, in the Office of Strategic Services in World War
II and in the early days of CIA, prominent scholars from
America's greatest universities played a key role in the
establishment of the Agency itself and in particular its research
and analysis branch.
Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were
cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and
the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom
questioned by faculty or students. These halcyon days were soon
to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's
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in 1966 and peaked in 1968 when there were 77 incidents or
demonstrations.
Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA began to emerge
in the media in the early 1970s leading to the establishment of
the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church
Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of
~
(E:
involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961 and criticism
increased as the Agency, along with the Department of Defense and
the rest of the government, was increasingly attacked aq the war
in Vietnam continued. Despite instances of continuing academic
cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence, relations with
academia generally deteriorated in the(earl
-~~-- yjt~ mid-1960s. This
was given impetus in February 67 by the disclosure in Ramparts
magazine that CIA had been funding the National Student
Association for a number of years. Picketing of recruiters began
Representatives.
c
These bodies concentrated primarily on CIA's
covert actions, although there was some discussion--particularly
in the Church Committee--which tended to lump relations with
schools along with the media and religious organizations.
Professor Langer, writing his memoirs in 1977, expressed with
some relief that "I am very proud that in these days of
controversy and delation, the key parts of intelligence
evaluation that was worked out in R and A and then perfected in
the early days of the CIA has remained essentially untouched."
And, indeed, the Church Committee recognized that CIA "must have
unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our
universities can produce."
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At the same time, the Church Committee recommended that that
advice and judgment be openly sought. The Committee concluded ;by
placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing
relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college
administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee
believes that it is the responsibility of ... the American
academic community to set the professional and ethical standards
of its members."
This Is,ot..,of4',.a considerable debate within academic ranks and
..]d to numerous articles about the relationship between the
universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President
of the American Association of University Professors, CIA's
Director at that time replied that the Agency sought "only the
voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director
stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars rather than the Agency and he
refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
This approach was adopted and enlarged upon by Director
Stansfield Turner who engaged in a long and eventually
unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President B--Q-. of
Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency.
While some academic institutions took actions toward the adoption
of guidelines similar to the stringent regulations established at
Harvard, in most cases modifications were included. Moreover, in
a great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty
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and administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate to
protect both'the institution and individuals from corruption..
Relations between the Agency and the academic world have
slowly improved since 1977. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA
on many campuses. Indeed, the history of relations between CIA
and the academe appears to show a pattern of close ties during
periods of heightened tension between the US and the USSR and
strained relations during periods of detente. (Additionally, the
depressed state of the economy Curing that period was a catalyst
for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent
graduates as well as causing an] increased willingness to
cooperate with CIA by those interested in service as consultants
or external research contractors. Indeed, President Bok in April
1981 wrote the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Presidents
of 10 universities urging that the Department of Defense funds be
continued for a regional studies association. When the
Department responded that it would no longer fund the program
alone but only in cooperation with CIA, those joint arrangements
were acceptable.
Finally, another aspect of the relationship was the academic
community's understanding that the Departments of State and
Defense and CIA have been important and valuable supporters of
strengthening area and regional studies and foreign language
studies in the United States since the early 1950s. The agencies
of the American intelligence community as well as the Department
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of State have long been a primary source of employment for
specialties in these areas. The academic community also
consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence
community in their successful campaign to win support for a
Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence
agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.
I have reviewed this history because it is important to
understand that the relationship between CIA and the university
community has flowed hot and cold over the past forty years.
Issues that are raised today also were being raised twenty years
ago. In some areas, such as on the Soviet Union and to a lesser
degree China, our cooperation has remained both close and
constant. This also has been the case ofte in the fields of
G G~ rtj_ ., { .14 ~~ /4~ ! l rot ~a t to :,y.
economics and science. The focus of[~iscorJ has been primarily
in the world of the political scientist or in allied social
sciences, and particularly among those with expertise in the
Third World. There is however another constant in the history of
this relationship and in its future as well and that is our need
for your help. Let me describe how and why.
Why CIA Needs Academe
CIA and the American government need your help today more
than ever before. If you joined CIA, or as a professor dealt
with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the
odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China,
or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But the
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world has changed -)dramatically just in the last dozen years. The
oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices;
the related dramatic changes in the internationl economic. system
and growth of debt in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran,
Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European
colonialism from Africa; a more aggressive and successful Soviet
Union (with its Cuban ally) in the Third World; the US defeat in
Vietnam; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth
of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and
terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national security is
affected by developments and events in addition to the number and
capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering
in their diversity. They include problems such as the
implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World
countries, problems of instability and how to forecast it, human
rights, narcotics, the grey arms market, the implications of
immigration flows in various regions of the world, population
trends and their political and security implications, the global
food supply, water resources, energy, technology transfer,
terrorism, proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear
weapons, changing commodity markets and their implications for
Third World countries, and others too numerous to recount. In
each of these there are subsets of problems. Take, for example,
our knowledge of Shia Islam and its roots in the twelfth century
and the importance of that for understanding problems in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The
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problems of developing economies in the third world and how they
go awry and what opportunities there are for the United States to
play a constructive role are all difficult.
But nearly all of these problems have something in common:
there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight
in the community of university scholars that can help us, and
through us, the American government, better understand these
problems and their implications for us and for international
stability.
With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the
Directorate of Intelligence several years ago, initiated an
intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think
tanks of every stripe, and the business community for
information, analysis, advice and counsel. We took the following
specific steps.
-- Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive
areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of
sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of
concern to us and to encourage participation of our
analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private
sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300
conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable
participation by the academic community and touching on
many of the issues that I described a few minutes ago.
In addition, our analysts have attended more than 1500
conferences sponsored by others on such problems.
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-- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to
test our own assessments in ways consistent with
protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have
helped scholars get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A
growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists
in the academic community.
-- We have established panels of cleared specialists from
business and the academic community to meet with us
regularly to help improve not only specific research
papers but to help develop new methodologies, review
performance, and help us test new approaches and
hypotheses.
-- Our analysts are required to refresh their own
substantive credentials and expand their horizons by
obtaining outside training at least every two years.
This requirement can be met through taking university
courses, participating in a series of seminars and
conferences, attending military training courses, and so
forth.
The different types of our involvement with the academic
community are as follows:
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Recruiting: The vast majority of our analysts still come
from university campuses. Indeed, although we are
trying, with some success, to diversify the backgrounds
of our new officers, the university remains the primary
source.
-- Consultin : This can be formal, under a contractual
arrangement in which the individual is paid a set
government rate, or informal--an exchange of views
between interested specialists.
We are particularly
interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or
orthodoxy.
Sponsorship of conferences: We generally organize our
own, but occasionally contract with others to organize a
conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend
conferences sponsored by business, think tanks, and
universities.
-- Research: There are cases in which basic, unclassified
research can be carried out for us by scholars in
universities who have experience and expertise in areas
in which we are interested. Basic demographic and
economic research are examples of the kind of work for
which we contract. The Directorate of Intelligence has
no classified contracts with any academic institution.
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-- Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with
scholars who have traveled to places of interest to us.,,
participated in events of interest abroad, or whose
contacts might be of interest. This is, of course,
absolutely voluntary.
A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars
is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range
of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged
research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large
organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not
famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although
there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to
rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled
through government channels inevitably would constrict the range
of views and information needed. We are looking for people to
challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our
assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go
back to the drawing board when we have missed something
important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is
for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That
would undermine and obviate our entire effort.
Your Concerns
Let me now address,the concerns that have been raised by
scholars, deans, and institutions about dealing with us.
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1? ~IjEttM with C,IA,,inevitably will compromise academic freedom
and the honesty of academic research. -
-- First of all, when we contract for research, we insist
on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook
the books and we would never consult or contract with
a scholar a second time who did that. Our research
must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other
intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the
executive branch, the oversight committees of the
Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's
Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a variety of
other panels and organizations that have access to our
information. While we acknowledge we can be and have
been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable and
objective assessments. Any research we use should
have the same qualities.
-- As I noted above, the whole purpose of our effort is
defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks
we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure
in our organization to seek out people whom we know
disagree with us and against whom to can test our
ideas to make sure we have investigated all the
possibilities.
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Third, we have some confidence in the integrity of the
university community. We assume that scholars with
whom we deal will be straightforward both with us and
with their colleagues. We prefer that our contractual
relations be open and acknowledged, but are willing to
allow them to remain private if it is the wish of an
individual and in keeping with the rules of that
individual's institution.
Academic freedom, it seems to me, depends on a scholar
not being beholden to any outside influence but only to
the pursuit of truth. Contracts and consultantships with
business, other US government organizations, foundations
and other funding institutions, and with foreign
governments all have the potential to threaten academic
freedom and honest research.
Finally, I agree with the-Aart4""~"'? "
ommthat it is the
responsibility of the university itself to establish and
monitor the rules governing all these relationships. And
it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so simply by
isolating the scholar from all outside contact to protect
academic freedom. Openness is the best safeguard and we
support it.
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2. it~ts kith CIA will hinder the scholar's access and
freedom of inquiry both overseas, g ' ' ~~ ? I acknowledge
this as a problem. A scholar who is known to consult with
CIA may have difficulty getting a visa for or access in a
foreign country. By the same token, many who have worked
with us for years have not had a problem. The only
reassurance or protection we can offer in this regard is the
opportunity to keep
our relationship private. /Can one
reconcile this with the requirement for openness I Just
noted? Not entirely, but perhaps there could be some middle
ground where a scholar could notify university or
institutional authorities at least insofar as consultation is
concerned, without having that relationship publicized. But
if a university requires public exposure of any relationship
with CIA, then surely equity requires a similar practice for
all other outside relationships.
on with CIA could compromise an entire
department. I have been asked before about the danger of one
scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty
colleagues-through some sort of guilt by association. I
acknowledge that this is a potential problem but would offer
two observations. First, the university community is a
remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments
there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity
with which their colleagues would be loath to be
associated. So, again, this problem is not limited just to
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CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such
relationships that could be kept confidential would seem tp
me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My-second
observation, however, is that at some point it seems to me a
little courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I
disagree with what you say but will defend to the death your
right to say it." At some point you begin to infringe on the
freedom of those who do wish to consult with us because of
the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that
working with your government is a shameful activity; indeed,
it should be a source of pride and satisfaction.
covert action and a varier of 1immoral
acts and association with an
art of CIA is unacceptable,
Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the
approval of appropriate constitutional authorities, and with
the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated
by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive
and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress
can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities
thereby terminating such activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy
instrument of the elected representatives of the American
people, just like the military 5J If y } find its
activities distasteful or incompatible with your personal
values, you can do two things: you can vote for someone
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else next time and you can decline personally to have. any
association with us. But in the latter case, the .
decision whether to associate with us should be-left to
the individual. One individual's freedom of association
should not be denied because of another's personal point
of view. A university, or any American institution,
steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic
freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with
-- and, I would add, especially if one of those
organizations is a branch of its own democratically
chosen government.
Our Rules
Before I close, let me review our rules for dealing with
the university community:
-- First, we prefer not to let contracts for classified
research. As I stated before, the Directorate of
Intelligence has no contracts for classified research at
any academic institution.
Second, when we contract for research-to be done for us,
we reserve the right to review that research before
publication. The taxpayers justifiably would be
justifiably outraged if we were not to ensure that we had
received true value for the government's money. You have
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seen examples of such outrage in other areas recently.
This strikes me as no different than a publisher who
wishes to review a manuscript before sending you a
check. By the same token, there are always exceptional
circumstances and we have the authority to waive this
right of review if it seems appropriate.
Third, in the past, people who have obtained security
clearances to consult with us and thereby gained access
to classified information have had to sign secrecy
agreements involving a commitment to prepublication
review of what they write on their own in the future. A
number of scholars have objected to such a broad
prepublication review by the Agency in that it commits a
scholar whose interests range widely to submit material
that has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject where
there was access to classified information. I agree that
this is inappropriate and we have obtained a change in
the rule that will confine prepublication review solely
to that area in which there was ((access to classified
information. ??f +. ~., / S,{e, , -.r 4 f f~ Y~ ~,c t
-- Fourth, when we help to fund a conference involving
participants outside the government or ask someone else
to organize a conference on our behalf, our role should
be known in advance to all the participants.
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Fifth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults
or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or,
her home institution in terms of reporting the - -
relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the
responsibility of the institution to set such rules and
to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to
comply. CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce
such compliance.
Conclusions
The American Government has been engaged in the last ten
years in an experiment unique in history -- that is, whether the
intelligence service of a large and powerful country can
effectively carry out its responsibilities with full and detailed
legislative oversight and an environment of constant exposure in
the media of our legitimate activities -- our sources, our
assessments and our personnel. There is a constant tension
between the clandestine and the open, between keeping secret that
which is necessary to allow us to do our work and yet having much
of our work exposed day in and day out.
Part of that tension extends to the utility and value of
contacts with the academic community. Reaching out for
alternative views, unorthodox thinking, challenges to
conventional wisdom and criticism are not characteristic of
government agencies. An intelligence organization unfortunately
is no exception. Those in the academic community and in the
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media who believe there should be no contacts between scholars
and others in the outside world with intelligence officers have
allies inside the organization -- though I believe fewer and
fewer.
The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the
security and well being of the American people are increasingly
diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the
Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees
believe that contacts with universities and others in the private
sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry
out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and
warning the government about developments around the world -- the
same mission identified by General Donovan and President
Roosevelt. Our ability to do this, as in the days of Langer and
Donovan, depend on the voluntary cooperation between those of us
who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the
university, business, and other institutions who can help us
understand these challenges better and forecast them more
accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on substtantive issues
and the problems facing our world are not threats to academic
freedom. However, those who would deny or disparage a scholar's
right, opportunity or willingness to exchange ideas or do
unclassified research for us are such a threat. Openness is the
surest safeguard of integrity, reputation, and academic
freedom.
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A final word. Preservation of the liberty of the nation. is
the first prerequisite of academic freedom. Those who believe
that the university community can prosper oblivious to the
fortunes of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce
any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense,
Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar
should be prohibited from or his reputation endangered by a
public-spirited, patriotic willingness to cooperate with those
charged with protecting our national freedom and well-being.
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CIA AND THE UNIVERSITY
I solicited this opportunity to come to Harvard and speak
about the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the academic community because recent events here have
sparked a broader discussion of both the propriety and wisdom of
university scholars cooperating or collaborating in any way with
American intelligence. Indeed, on December 3rd of last year the
Boston Globe stated The scholar who works for a government
intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true
scholar." These are strong words. While in my view they are
indefensible, 'they reflect concerns that should be addressed.
I intend tonight to speak about the pattern over time of
CIA's ties to the academic community, our reasons for seeking
contact with you, the concerns scholars and the media have about
such links, and our policies governing these ties. I will be
happy then to take questions for a few minutes.
The History of 'tA-UniversityRelations
In discussing the relationship between the academic
community and American intelligence, it is important to go back
to antecedents which, coincidentally, have important links to
Harvard. In the summer of 1941, William J. Donovan, a World War
I hero and successful New York lawyer, persuaded President
Roosevelt of the need to organize a coordinated foreign
intelligence service to inform the government about fast moving
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world events. He proposed creating an organization that would
report to the White House and "which could draw on the
universities for experts with long foreign experience and-
specialized knowledge of the history, languages and general
conditions of various countries." President Roosevelt agreed and
created the Office of the Coordinator of Information under
Donovan's leadership.
Donovan named James Finney Baxter III, President of Williams
College and an expert on American diplomatic history, as the
chairman of a board of analysts that would draw together
information relevant to the course of the war. Baxter in turn
recruited a Harvard historian, William L. Langer, as the Director
of Research. The two then set to work to invite outstanding
scholars in the social sciences to join their board of analysts
and enlist additional staff.
There is an interesting sidelight to this. One of the
reasons the new organization was exempted from Civil Service
regulations on hiring and pay was that Langer and other
professors could not afford to join a Civil Service where the top
salary was $8,500--less than they were earning in their academic
posts. Donovan went to Roosevelt and obtained an exemption from
Civil Service regulations, allowing the Office of the Coordinator
of Information to match university salaries.
Donovan clearly had a high opinion of scholarship and the
contribution that quality minds from America's universities could
make to the work of the Office of Strategic Service, as the
intelligence organization was renamed in 1942. As a result, a
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large number of university professors were brought into the OSS,
including G. T. Robinson, professor of Russian history at
Columbia (who was made chief of the Russian section); Hajo
Holborn, professor of history at Yale; Franz Neumann of the New
School for Social Research; and, interestingly, Herbert Marcuse,
whose later revolutionary views presumably were not then
evident. Harvard made no small contribution to this intellectual
talent bank, contributing scholars such as Crane Brinton and H.
Stuart Hughes in history, Carlton Coon in anthropology, John King
Fairbank in oriental studies, Bruce Hopper in government, Henry
Murray in psychology, and others as well.
The U.S. military during the war had grave reservations
about these scholars, and were especially worried about their
failure to appreciate adequately the need for security. General
Donovan once angrily told Langer that although the scholars no
doubt were smart, they were not discreet. He said, "They are
like chorus girls who have beautiful legs and like to show
them."
This is not the time or place to detail their
contribution. Let us simply say it was significant. And when
the war was over, most of the scholars demobilized, along with
the nation's soldiers.
Events in East and West Europe, the Soviet Union and China
between 1945 and 1947 made apparent the need to strengthen the
nation's defenses, and especially the need to be well-informed
about developments around the globe. The result was the National
Security Act of 1947 which created the Department of Defense and
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the Central Intelligence Agency. Again, outstanding scholars
were recruited. Langer was brought back to establish the Office
of National Estimates. Other academicians who joined up
included: historians such as Ludwell Montague, Sherman Kent, and
DeForrest Van Slyck; MIT economist Max Millikan, who organized
the economic intelligence effort; Yale and MIT economist Richard
Bissell, who later headed the clandestine service; and even
William Sloan Coffin who left the Union Theological Seminary to
join CIA for the duration of the Korean War before becoming
Chaplain at Yale. He told "Beetle" Smith he joined the Agency
because "Stalin made Hitler look like a Boy Scout." It was a
common reason for academicians to join the Agency in the early
years. Again, the number of scholars in the leadership of the
new CIA was disquieting to the Pentagon. General Smith once
quoted some of his erstwhile uniformed colleagues as saying that
the new Agency hierarchy was "a wild eyed bunch of intellectuals
whose colleges don't want them back."
In short, in the Office of Strategic Services in World War
II and in the early days of CIA, prominent scholars from
America's greatest universities played a key role in the
establishment of the Agency itself and in particular its research
and analysis branch.
Relations between the scholarly community and CIA were
cordial throughout the 1950s. The cold war was at its height and
the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom
questioned by faculty or students. These halcyon days were soon
to change. There was some criticism on campuses over CIA's
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involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition^in1961/andF'criticism
increased as the Agency, along with the Department of Defense and
the rest of the government, was increasingly attacked as the war
in Vietnam continued. Despite instances of continuing academic
cooperation with the Directorate of Intelligence, relations with
academia generally deteriorated in the(early- to mid-1960x. This
was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in Ramparts
magazine that CIA had been funding the National Student
Association for a number of years. Picketing of recruiters began
in 1966 and peaked in 1968 when there were 77 incidents or
demonstrations.
Sensational allegations of wrongdoing by CIA began to emerge
in the media in the early 1970s leading to the establishment of
the Rockefeller Commission and subsequently both the Church
Committee in the Senate and the Pike Committee in the House of
Representatives. These bodies concentrated primarily on CIA's
.covert actions, although there was some discussion--particularly
in the Church Committee--which tended to lump relations with
schools along with the media and religious organizations.
Professor Langer, writing his memoirs in 1977, expressed with
some relief that "I am very proud that in these days of
controversy and delation, the key parts of intelligence
evaluation that was worked out in R and A and then perfected in
the early days of the CIA has remained essentially untouched."
And, indeed, the Church Committee recognized that CIA "must have
unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our
universities can produce."
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At the same time, the Church Committee recommended that that
advice and judgment be openly sought. The Committee concluded :by
placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing
relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college
administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee
believes that it is the responsibility of ... the American
academic community to set the professional and ethical standards
of its members."
This set off a considerable debate within academic ranks and
led to numerous articles about the relationship between the
universities and CIA. In response to a letter from the President
of the American Association of University Professors, CIA's
Director at that time replied that the Agency sought "only the
voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the
foreign policy processes of the United States." The Director
stated that where relationships are confidential they are usually
so at the request of the scholars rather than the Agency and he
refused to isolate the Agency from "the good counsel of the best
scholars in our country."
This approach was adopted and enlarged upon by Director
Stansfield Turner who engaged in a long and eventually
unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with President Ba.-h of
Harvard on relations between this university and the Agency.
While some academic institutions took actions toward the adoption
of guidelines similar to the stringent regulations established at
Harvard, in most cases modifications were included. Moreover, in
a great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty
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7
and administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the
grounds that existing regulations or practices were adequate tq
protect both the institution and individuals from corruption.
Relations between the Agency and the academic world have
slowly improved since 1977. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA
on many campuses. Indeed, the history of relations between CIA
and the academe appears to show a pattern of close ties during
periods of heightened tension between the US and the USSR and
strained relations during periods of detente. Additionally, the
depressed state of the economy during that period was a catalyst
for greater interest in Agency employment on
the part of recent
graduates as well as causing an increased willingness to
cooperate with CIA by those interested in service as consultants
or external research contractors. Indeed, President Bok in April
1981 wrote the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Presidents
of 10 universities urging that the Department of Defense funds be
continued for a regional studies association. When the
Department responded that it would no longer fund the program
alone but only in cooperation with CIA, those joint arrangements
were acceptable.
Finally, another aspect of the relationship was the academic
community's understanding that the Departments of State and
Defense and CIA have been important and valuable supporters of
strengthening area and regional studies and foreign language
studies in the United States since the early 1950s. The agencies
of the American intelligence community as well as the Department
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of State have long been a primary source of employment for
specialties in these areas. The academic community also
consulted closely with senior officials of the intelligence
community in their successful campaign to win support for a
Congressional-approved endowment of Soviet studies. Intelligence
agencies informally strongly supported this endeavor.
I have reviewed this history because it is important to
understand that the relationship between CIA and the university
community has flowed hot and cold over the past forty years.
Issues that are raised today also were being raised twenty years
ago. In some areas, such as on the Soviet Union and to a lesser
degree China, our cooperation has remained both close and
constant. This also has been the case often in the fields of
economics and science. The focus of discord has been primarily
in the world of the political scientist or in allied social
sciences, and particularly among those with expertise in the
Third World. There is however another constant in the history of
this relationship and in its future as well and that is our need
for your help. Let me describe how and why.
Why CIA Needs Academe
CIA and the American government need your help today more
than ever before. If You Joined CIA, or as a professor dealt
with CIA, during the first quarter century of its existence, the
odds are that you would have worked on the Soviet Union, China,
or in the latter part of that period, Southeast Asia. But the
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world has changed dramatically just in the last dozen years. The
oil embargo of 1973 and subsequent skyrocketing of oil prices;
the related dramatic changes in the internationl economic system
and growth of debt in Third World countries; revolutions in Iran,
Ethiopia, and Nicaragua; the final passage of European
colonialism from Africa; a more aggressive and successful Soviet
Union (with its Cuban ally) in the Third World; the US defeat in
Vietnam; changing patterns in international trade; and the growth
of technology transfer, international narcotics networks and
terrorism have demonstrated vividly that our national security is
affected by developments and events in addition to the number and
capabilities of Soviet strategic weapons.
Accordingly, the subjects we deal with today are staggering
in their diversity. They include problems such as the
implications of the enormous indebtedness of key Third World
countries, problems of instability and how to forecast it, human
rights, narcotics, the grey arms market, the implications of
immigration flows in various regions of the world, population
trends and their political and security implications, the global
food supply, water resources, energy, technology transfer,
terrorism, proliferation of chemical/biological and nuclear
weapons, changing commodity markets and their implications for
Third World countries, and others too numerous to recount. In
each of these there are subsets of problems. Take, for example,
our knowledge of Shia Islam and its roots in the twelfth century
and the importance of that for understanding problems in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The
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problems of developing economies in the third world and how they
go awry and what opportunities there are for the United States:to
play a constructive role are all difficult.
But nearly all of these problems have something in common:
there is a vast reservoir of expertise, experience, and insight
in the community of university scholars that can help us, and
through us, the American
government, better understand these
problems and their implications for us and for international
stability.
With this diversity of issues and problems in mind, the
Directorate of Intelligence several years ago, initiated an
intensified effort to reach out to the academic community, think
tanks of every y stripe, and the business community for
information, analysis, advice and counsel. We took the following
specific steps. ing
Senior managers in charge of each of our substantive
areas were directed to undertake an expanded program of
sponsorship of conferences on substantive issues of
concern to us and to encourage participation of our
analysts in such conferences sponsored by the private
sector. Since 1982, CIA has sponsored more than 300
conferences, nearly all of them involving considerable
participation by the academic community and touching on
many of the issues that I described a few minutes ago.
In addition, our analysts have attended more than 1500
conferences sponsored by others on such problems.
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-- We have increasingly turned to the academic community to
test our own assessments in ways consistent with
protecting intelligence sources and methods. We have
helped scholars get security clearances so that they
could examine the actual drafts of our studies. A
growing percentage of our work is reviewed by specialists
in the academic community.
We have established panels of cleared specialists from
business and the academic community to meet with us
regularly to help improve not only specific research
papers but to help develop new methodologies, review
performance, and help us test new approaches and
hypotheses.
Our analysts are required to refresh their own
substantive credentials and expand their horizons by
obtaining outside training at least every two years.
This requirement can be met through taking university
courses, participating in a series of seminars and
conferences, attending military training courses, and so
forth.
The different types of our involvement with the academic
community are as follows:
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Recruitinp.: The vast majority of our analysts still come
from university campuses. Indeed, although we are
trying, with some success, to diversify the backgrounds
of our new officers, the university remains the primary
source.
-- Consultin : This can be formal, under a contractual
arrangement in which the individual is paid a set
government rate, or informal--an exchange of views
between interested specialists. We are particularly
interested in ideas that challenge conventional wisdom or
orthodoxy.
Sponsorship of conferences;
We generally organize our
own, but occasionally contract with others to organize a
conference for us. And, of course, our analysts attend
conferences sponsored by business, think tanks, and
universities.
-- Research: There are cases in which basic, unclassified
research can be carried out for us by scholars in
universities who have experience and expertise in areas
in which we are interested. Basic demographic and
economic research are examples of the kind of work for
which we contract. The Directorate of Intelligence has
no classified contracts with any academic institution.
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Information: Finally, we are interested in talking with
scholars who have traveled to places of interest to usv.
participated in events of interest abroad, or whose
contacts might be of interest. This is, of course,
absolutely voluntary.
A principal factor in our pursuit of contact with scholars
is our perception that quality analysis on the incredible range
of issues with which we must cope requires not only dogged
research but also imagination, creativity, and insight. Large
organizations, and particularly government bureaucracies, are not
famous for their encouragement of these characteristics--although
there is surprisingly more than you might think. Similarly, to
rely solely on intelligence sources or on information funneled
through government channels inevitably would constrict the range
of views and information needed. We are looking for people to
challenge our views, to argue with us, to criticize our
assessments constructively, to make us think and defend and go
back to the drawing board when we have missed something
important. In short, the last thing we want from a scholar is
for him or her to tell us what they think we want to hear. That
would undermine and obviate our entire effort.
Your Concerns
Let me now addres}`s theoncerns that have been raised by
scholars, deans, and insti utfo s about
dealing with us.
7/
13-
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-A% iuevjLabI
First of all, when we contract for research, we insist
on honest work. We do not permit our analysts to cook
the books and we would never consult or contract with
a scholar a second time who did that. Our research
must stand up to close scrutiny, not only by other
intelligence agencies, but by other elements of the
executive branch, the oversight committees of the
Congress, the Congress as a whole, the President's
Foreign Intellience Advisory Board, and a variety of
other panels and organizations that have access to our
information. While we acknowledge we can be and have
been wrong in the past, our very existence depends on
our reputation for integrity and for reliable and
objective assessments. Any research we use should
have the same qualities.
-- As I noted above, the whole purpose of our effort is
defeated if the scholar tells us what he or she thinks
we want to hear. Indeed, there is consistent pressure
in our organization to seek out people whom we know
disagree with us and against whom to can test our
ideas to make sure we have investigated all the
possibilities.
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freedom and honest research.
Academic freedom, it seems to me, depends on a scholar
not being beholden to any outside influence but only to
the pursuit of truth. Contracts and consultantships with
business, other US government organizations, foundations
and other funding institutions, and with foreign
governments all have the potential to threaten academic
Finally, I agree with the Church 41C,,
t
e0 hat it is the
responsibility of the university itself to establish and
monitor the rules governing all these relationships. And
it is both foolish and irresponsible to do so simply by
isolating the scholar from all outside contact to protect
academic freedom. Openness is the best safeguard and we
-- Third, we have some confidence in the integrity of the
university community. We assume that scholars-with
whom we deal will be straightforward both with us and
with their colleagues. We prefer that our contractual
relations be open and acknowledged, but are willing to
allow them to remain private if it is the wish of an
individual and in keeping with the rules of that
individual's institution.
support it.
4 r
e 2. 0 r f. A, t, (. (?
4'-~
fly.
fig,,,-t?,; ~. ~-,.,. ~ b
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2. Relations with CIA will hinder the scholar's access and
freedom of inquiry hnth
opportunity
,ir At , r
to keep our rejlationship private.
consult with
access in
only
i`
regard is the
reconcile this with t
requirement for openness
noted? ~Aof entirely, but perhaps there
';ground where a scholar could notify university or
institutional authorities at least
insofar as consultation is i
concerned, without having that relationship publicized. But
if a university requires public exposure of any relationshi Lti~r~ /
P
with CIA, then surely equity requires a similar practice for
all other outside relationships.
department. -I-.have been asked before about the danger of one
scholar's association with us involving his or her faculty
colleagues through some sort of guilt by association. I
acknowledge that this is a potential problem but would offer
two observations. First, the university community is a
remarkably diverse one and I am sure that in many departments
there are scholars who are involved in some sort of activity
with which their colleagues would be loath to be
associated. So, again, this problem is not limited just to
3. A collea ue's associatio with CIA could compromise an entire
this as
CIA may
foreign
with us
??~~~? 1 acknowledge
a problem. A scholar who is known to
have difficulty getting a visa for or
country. LL DttG ( kt._C~rj?s~j ,
"fie,, many ivo
for years have not had a problem.
reassurance or protection we can offer in this
u s t % W
-~ C Cc( ~7P f
?
- _ could be some middl
e
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 acts and association with an art of CIA is unacceptable
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CIA. Some form of reporting to the university on such
relationships that could be kept confidential would seem to
me an appropriate way to minimize this problem. My-second
observation, however, is that at some point it seems to me a
little courage is called for. Remember the adage that "I
disagree with what you say but will defend to the death your
right to say it." At some point you begin to infringe on the
freedom of those who do wish to consult with us because of
the fears of their colleagues. We do not believe that
working with your government is a shameful activity; indeed,
it should be a source of pride and satisfaction.
Activities at CIA are carried out within the law, with the
approval of appropriate constitutional authorities, and with
the oversight of the Congress. They are activities mandated
by the decisions of elected officials in both the Executive
and Legislative branches. As we have seen recently Congress
can and does deny funds for legal intelligence activities
thereby terminating such activities.
The Central Intelligence Agency is a foreign policy
instrument of the elected representatives of the American
people, just like the military. If you find its
activities distasteful or incompatible with your personal
values, you can do two things: you can vote for someone
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else next time and you can decline personally to have any
association with us. But in the latter case, the
decision whether to associate with us should be-left to
the individual. One individual's freedom of association
should not be denied because of another's personal point
of view. A university, or any American institution,
steps on precarious ground and itself endangers academic
freedom if it starts making arbitrary rules about which
organizations a scholar may participate in or talk with
-- and, I would add, especially if one of those
organizations is a branch of its own democratically
chosen government.
Our Rules
Before I close, let me review our rules for dealing with
the university community:
First, we prefer not to let contracts for classified
research. As I stated before, the Directorate of
Intelligence has no contracts for classified research at
any academic institution.
Second, when we contract -fox -research to be done for us,
we reserve the right to;,,revie
v. that research before
publication. The taxpayers justifiably would be
lust ably outraged if we were not to ensure that we had
received true value for the government's money. You have
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seen examples of such outrage in other areas recently.
This strikes me as no different than a publisher who
wishes to review a manuscript before sending you a
check. B - .
y the same token, there are always exceptional
circumstances and we have the authority to waive this
right of review if it seems appropriate.
Third, in the past, people who have obtained security
clearances to consult with us and thereby gained access
to classified information have had to sign secrecy
agreements involving a commitment to prepubli ation
review of what they write on their ownf in the future.
A
number of scholars have objected to such a broad
prepublication review by the Agency in that it commits a
scholar whose interests range widely to submit material
that has nothing whatsoever to do with the subject where
there was access to classified information. I agree that
this is inappropriate and we have obtained a change in
the rule that will confine prepublication review solely
to that area in which there was access to classified
information. ..,
A 'r-' . -- '2
Fourth, when we help to fund a conference involving
participants outside the government or ask someone else
to organize a conference on our behalf, our role should
be known in advance to all the participants.
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Fifth, we expect any scholar or individual who consults
or works with us to abide fully by the rules of his or,
her home institution in terms of reporting the -
relationship with us. But, in our view, it is the
responsibility of the institution to set such rules and
to enforce them, and the responsibility of the scholar to
comply.
CIA cannot and should not monitor or enforce
such compliance.
Conclusions
The American Government has been engaged in the last ten
years in an experiment unique in history -- that is, whether th
intelligence service of a e
large and powerful country can
effectively carry out its responsibilities with full and detailed
legislative oversight and an environment of constant exposure
the media of our legitimate activities in
-- our sources, our
assessments and our personnel. There is a constant tension
between the clandestine and the open, between keeping secr
which is necessary to allow us to do our work and yet having much
of our work exposed day in and day out.
Part of that tension extends to the
utility and value of
contacts with the academic community. Reaching out for
alternative views, unorthodox thinking, challenges to
conventional wisdom and criticism are not characteristic of
government agencies. An intelligence organization unfortunate)
is no exception. Those in the academic y
community and in the
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media who believe there should be no contacts between scholars
and others in the outside world with intelligence officers have
allies inside the organization -- though I believe fewer and
fewer.
The world is increasingly complex. The challenges to the
security and well being of the American people are increasingly
diverse and subtle. Director Casey and I, and others in the
Executive Branch and our Congressional oversight committees
believe that contacts with universities and others in the private
sector are imperative if we are properly and effectively to carry
out our mission of informing, improving understanding, and
warning the government about developments around the world -- the
same mission identified by General Donovan and President
Roosevelt. Our ability to do this, as in the days of Langer and
Donovan, depend on the voluntary cooperation between those of us
who carry this responsibility in intelligence, and those in the
university, business, and other institutions who can help us
understand these challenges better and forecast them more
accurately. The country is the ultimate beneficiary.
Consultation and cooperation with CIA on substtantive issues
and the problems facing our world are not threats to academic
freedom. However, those who would deny or disparage a scholar's
right, opportunity or willingness to exchange ideas or do
unclassified research for us are such a threat. Openness is the
surest safeguard of integrity, reputation, and academic
freedom.
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A final word. Preservation of the liberty of the nation is
the first prerequisite of academic freedom. Those who believe:
that the university community can prosper oblivious to fhe
fortunes of the nation are blind. The government cannot coerce
any scholar to cooperate or work with the Department of Defense,
Department of State, or CIA. By the same token, no scholar
should be prohibited from or his reputation endangered by a
public-spirited, patriotic willingness to cooperate with those
charged with protecting our national freedom and well-being.
Approved For Release 2011/09/12 : CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600620029-6