FOUR YEARS OF REVOLUTIONARY PERU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130123-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: November 27, 1972
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
bPcD
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Four Years of Revolutionary Peru
Secret
27 November 1972
No. 2436/72
88
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four years
of
revolutionary
Peru
"For the future generations we want ., Peru that is different from the
one we inherited from our forefathers, without the inequality and injustice
of the past; a Peru that will not become a colony or semicolony of anyone;
one that controls its wealth, its decisions, and its destiny; a Peru where law
and justice have no price tag, where law and justice are not servants of
money or force; a free and just Peru, without oppressors or oppressed,
without exploiters or exploited; a Peru where millions of our countrymen
will not be condemned to ignorance, hunger or exploitation, where our
farmers will no longer be landless, suffer injustice, or be virtual outcasts in
their own country; a Peru in short, which will be for all Peruvians and not, as
now, for a minority of privileged people."
President Juan Velasco Alvarado, 30 July 1972
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 November 1972
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Four Years of Revolutionary Peru
Building a i?dw Society
"Who can say nothing hays changed in Peru?"
President Velasco - on the fourth
anniversary of his government, 3 October 1972
The military government that took power on 3 October 1968 has
enacted an unprecedented series of reform measures aimed at bringing about
socio-economic change in Peru. Agrarian reform, greatly increased state
participation in the economy, and the imposition of profit sharing and
worker participation in the management of the key industries, fishing, and
mining have sapped the strength of the oligarchy. Those who once monop-
olized the political process now find themselves with little influence.
By 1968, Peru's professional soldiers, tempered by a major anti-guerrilla
campaign and with few ties to the ruling elite, had lost faith in the desire or
ability of the political establishment to take the bold steps needed to ward
off what was seen as inevitable revolution. The military's conviction that it
could save Peru and the near certain prospect that its archenemy, the
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party led by Victor Raul
Haya de la Torre, would carry the elections scheduled in 1969 brought the
nation to the brink of military take-over. At this point the Belaunde
government settled a long-standing dispute with the US-owned International
Petroleum Company on terms unacceptable to the deeply nationalistic
officer corps, and the military took over.
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordi-
nated with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of National Estimates.
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It set up a Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces and
proclaimed its determination not only to redeem Peruvian sovereignty and
free the nation from underdevelopment and foreign economic domination,
but to create a new social order-to carry out a peaceful revolution in order
to pre-empt a violent one. One of its first acts was to seize International
Petroleum's installations on 9 October 1968. The anniversary of this act is
celebrated as the "Day of N.:tional Dignity." In a speech in October this
year, President Velasco declared that the first paase of the revolution had
been completed and that th:: struggle henceforth would be to construct the
new socirty.
Social Democracy
The governr,.ent labels its vaguely de;ined vision of the future a "social
democracy of full participation" and cli'ints that it is a uniquely Peruvian
idea. Peruvian revolutionary liturgy castigates both capitalism and Commu-
nism. The former is denounced for bringing the nation to its sorry prerevolu-
tionary condition of dependence and underdevelopment. Communism is
flayed because of its centralizat;on of economic and political power and its
inevi`able tendency to become bureaucratic, dogmatic, and repressive. In
their place the regime offers a "labor community" which is to help build a
new Peru with "democratic participation." That is the community will
involve a gradually increasing number of workers in the management and
ownership of enterprises.
According to the government, "social democracy of full participation"
will leas; to a pluralist economy based on three areas of activity. The State
will have an important role, and there will be room for a "reformed" private
sector with agricultural cooperatives and labor communities. The third area
embraces something called "social property." "Social property" appears to
mean something akin to self-managed enterprises without shared ownership.
The State will own these enterprises and evidently will be the exclusive
source of financing, with the enterprise paying for the land, capital goods,
and other resources it uses. Earnings in excess of payments due will be
distributed to blue-and white-collar workers, who will share equally in
managerial responsibilities. "Social property" seems designed to give workers
a greater stake in the economic system and a sense of having a say in the
decisions that directly affect their lives. The long-range goal is to create a
society in which "each person owns a maximum of property, but the power
he may derive from it is reduced to a minimum."
Despite the military government's postulates, about greater participa-
tion, there has been little actual participation in the planning and construc-
tion of revolutionary institutions. Government rhetoric about participation
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has been largely negated by its "with-us-or-against-us" mentality, which has
led to suppression of dissent and dissipation of popular support. The regime
nevertheless professes, still to believe it can build a new society that would
seem to require nothing Icss than a remolding of human nature. To help
move contrary Peruvians along the chosen path the leaders have come up
with the National System in Support of Social Mobilization, Sinamos.
Set up in June 1971 to achieve the "conscious, active participation of
the national population in the tasks required by economic and social de-
velopnment," Sinamos, as an organization, is a mixed bag of leftists-including
a noted former guerrilla--and a large batch of military officers. Military
officers hold key positions at the organization's national headquarters and
dominate the regional offices too, Its aim is to be a revolutionary catalyst,
promoting participation in government programs using organizations such as
labor coin inunities, cooperatives, neighborhood associations, and self-man-
aged enterprises. It sends representatives among the people to organize
meetings, explain government policies, and drum up support for them.
According to the organization's chief, General Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa,
`only when the Peruvian citizen through a process of training, practice, and
participation has acquired full awareness of the problems of his local com-
munuty will one be able to feel optimistic that he is a responsible citizen
capable of facing national problems."
The regime claims that the ultimate aini of Sinamos is to guarantee the
permanence of revolutionary change by institutionalizing reforms so thor-
oughly and creating mass support so intense that they can never be chal-
lenged. Spokesmen for the regime emphatically deny that Sinamos is the
forerunner of a pro-government political party. This may or may not be true,
but Sinamos will be used to try to create an independent base of popular
support for the regime by convincing the mass of Peruvians that they have
benefited from the revolution and that it is in their own best interest to
support and defend the military government.
Creating a New International Image
The armed forces came to power convinc.":1 that pervasive foreign
economic influence had turned Peru into a less th'n independent state that
commanded little respect on the international scene. This they considered
intolerable. Their immediate foreign policy goal was to show the world that
Peru had regained the full exercise of its sovereignty-that Peruvian policy is
of, by, and for Peru-and to secure for the nation its "rightful" international
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prestige and influence. Those basic guidelines remain unchanged, As a result
of its aggressive pursuit of this foreign policy Peru has to some extent been
estranged from the US and has greatly increased its contacts with Conmmu-
nist nations.
To the military and the vast majority of Peruvians, the US-owned
International Petroleum Company was the embodiment of pernicious foreign
interference in Peruvian affairs; its elimination was the sine qua non for the
re-establishment of fill national sovereignty. Its take-over was one of the
first acts of the military government. The US and Peru are still contending
over compensation for the company's expropriated assets. The military
government is well aware of the economic costs of its intransigence, but
considers the loss of regular US bilateral assistance a price for national
dignity. The regime has also become increasingly upset over what it sees as
US obstructionist tactics in international lending agencies. Although Peru has
been willing to engage in secret talks with the US, there is little reason to
believe that this or any successor Peruvian Government will compromise on
the expropriation issue.
The territorial seas-fisheries question is another area of US-Peru fric-
tion. The military government professes to believe the US has been stalling
on this issue and is furious over a recent largely procedural amendment to
the US Fishermen's Protective Act. The current Peruvian policy of overlook-
ing US tuna boats operating within Lima's claimed 200-mile territorial sea
could be abandoned if there is no movement toward a solution soon. The
mandatory one-year suspension of' the US Foreign Military Sales program
caused by the last fishing boat seizure expired last March, but Peru has
bought very little US materiel since then. Despite these areas of disagreement
and certain political benefits to be had from standing up to the US, Peru says
it wants good relations with the US. Trade and investment tics are being
maintained. US oil companies are participating in the international consortia
investing large suns in the exploration and development of promising Ama-
zonian oil fields. President Velasco puts it this way: "Peru has nothing
against America, its history, and its greatness as a nation which we all know
and respect. But we do have fundamental reasons for ;ejection of imperialist
penetration. We have nothing against the US Government except when this
government acts in the mistaken idea that it must place itself on the side of
the interests of some concerns which are fundamentally exploiters, instead
of acting on behalf of countries it calls its brothers, and, in the last analysis,
on the side of most of the American people."
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As soon as the military government took power, it began to expand
Peruvian relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The govern-
ment not only wanted to assert Peruvian autonomy, but it also badly needed
trade and aid from any source, Communist or not. Soviet-Peruvian relations
have warmed. The USSR recently agreed to provide almost half of the
financing for a gigantic irrigation project that the Peruvians have wanted to
undertake for years. Top Soviet generals have been decorated by the Peru-
vian ambassador in Moscow, and Soviet arms reportedly have been offered to
Lima on attractive terms.
Trade ties were developed with The Peoples Republic of China and
Cuba, and subsequently full diplomatic relations were established. In an-
nouncing that Peru intended to re-establish diplomatic ties with Cuba,
President Velasco remarked that "no country of the hemisphere could
consider this sovereign act of Peru to be an unfriendly gesture." The military
government would like its overtures toward the Communist world to be seen
as a direct pursuit of Peruvian interests rather than a slap at the US. In any
case, the record indicates that the military government has no intention of
trading dependence on the US for dependence on a Communist power.
The regime's domestic reforms and assertive foreign policy have enabled
Peru to move forcefully onto the world stage as a spokesman for third-world
causes. In issues such as development, trade, monetary reform, and territorial
seas, Peru has pushed for greater participation by the world's less developed
nations in world councils. The military government takes great pride in
observing that "the voice of Peru is now being heard with attention in every
international organization."
Although Juan Velasco Alvarado has skillfully used ils presidential
prerogative to shape the revolution, he heads but does not dominate the
governing team. Under revolutionary decrees the president has not only
executive authority, but, with cabinet consent, legislative power. The revolu-
tionary junta is composed of the armed services commanders, who simulta-
neously hold the ministerial posts of war, navy, and air. Their positions,
however, apparently give them no special precedence over other cabinet
members except in the formality of signing decree laws.
Certain basic propositions are not open to challenge in ruling circles,
but there are personal, ?deoiogical, and practical disagreements on policy
matters. One group of cabinet members, including Energy and Mines Minister
Fernandez Maldonado ^nd Sinamos chief Rodriguez Figueroa, would give top
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priority to radical socio-economic reform. Another faction is somewhat
more concerned with investment and economic development, and seems to
find virtue in moderate programs. Prime Minister and Minister of War
Montagne and Economy and Finance Minister Morales Bermudez are usually
associated with this group. Similar differences in outlook probably exist at
all levels of the officer corps. The military, however, has consistently been
able to overcome internal disputes in the interest of preserving institutional
unity. The government leadership apparently informs and consults the rest
of the officer corps on an ad hoc basis.
The president and the cabinet are not the only power centers in the
Peruvian system. Legislative proposals are submitted to the Advisory Com-
mittee to the Presidency, a key interministerial coordinating body that
evolved from a prerevolutionary group of reformist colonels at the Center
for Advanced Military Studies. The advisory committee works suggested
programs ..to draft decrees suable for cabinet action, often making sub-
stantive changes in the submissions from the ministries. Military and civilian
students at the military school submit detailed critiques of government plans
and programs. Their skepticism concerning some recent initiatives has evi-
dently not been well received, however, and the school seems to have lost
some of its political impact.
President Velasco's activism and his desire to go down in history as the
man who transformed Peru make him a natural ally of his more radical
colleagues. But Velasco is no ideologue, and he is not inflexible. He is
amenable to argument and willing to modify or abandon unworkable pro-
grams. There seems to be a good deal of give and take during cabinet
sessions, and Velasco's position does not always carry the day. The President
apparently tests the political winds before committing himself on a particu-
lar issue; if he finds insufficient support he is not likely to force the matter
to a showdown. Velasco uses his position and power to the utmost, but he
maneuvers with discretion knowing that the loyalty of the armed forces is to
the institution, not the leader. He did indulge in a brief fling at personalisnio
during a trip to the south last year, which may well have irritated his military
colleagues; at any rate, it has not been repeated.
Leftist civilian elements in the government-orthodox, pro-Moscow
Commu'.usts, Christian Democrats, and academic Marxists-are constantly
jockeying for position. Out of the interplay among the President, the
cabinet, Sinanios, the Advisory Committee to the Presidency, the military
school, the officer corps, and the government's civilian elements has come a
series of generally pragmatic policies. The most radical decree laws are often
modified in spirit, if not in letter, by implementing regulations. The need to
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reconcile conflicting views in order to maintain unity of the armed forces is a
strong moderating force, as is the recognition of potential political and
economic obstacles to the achievement of revolutionary goals. The regime
has seemed capable of learning from mistakes and aware that radical reforms
and an independent foreign policy can have detrimental consequences;
within limits, it has been willing to adapt its policy to reality.
The Military in Power
The revolutionary policies of the military government should not ob-
scure the fact that it is an authoritarian military dictatorship. Indeed,
arbitrary state power extends into practically all aspects of Peruvian life. The
country has neither congress nor elected local officials; the judicial branch
hzs been stripped of its independence; what remains of the free press is
intimidated; and radio and television are under effective state control.
On the other hand, the military government has not been particularly
repressive. Government leaders boast of their peaceful revolution, but they
have not been able to generate much popular support. Most Peruvians, more
interested in day-to-day life than in grand visions for the future, remain
apathetic about the government's grand plans, passive toward its policies,
frustrated by their own powerlessness, and uneasy over the future.
In its early years, the junta seemed content to push through reforms
first and worry about popular support later. By mid-1971, however, the
government came to realize that revolutionary institutions, no matter how
carefully established, could not become permanently rooted and secure
against attack without the support of the people. The task of building this
support has been entrusted to Sinamos. Its first efforts, concentrating on
those Peruvians who owed no allegiance to organized groups, generated little
active resistance, if little positive support.
The basic tactics of the military government in dealing with major
interest groups have not changed significantly over the years. No support is
sought or expected from the old oligarchy, the group that lost most because
of the revolution. On the other hand, the regirne has cultivated the pro-So-
viet Communists, promoting their General Confederation of Peruvian Work-
ers as a counterforce against the military's old antagonist, the APRA party.
The success of this strategy hinges on the government's willingness to
overlook conflicting ultimate goals and to pay the price of Communist-i: -
spired labor agitation, which, while ostensibly directed against oligarchical
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exploiters and predatory foreign companies, sometimes seriously damages
the nation's economy.
The regime's patience with the Communists has often seemed near
exhaustion, but "final" warnings and costly wage settlements have so far
been substituted for the crackdown that moderate government officials insist
must come eventually. The Communists tend to tread carefully in situations
where the government is party to a labor dispute.
The fishmeal industry, a key foreign exchange earner, was recently
disrupted by a shift in the offshore currents, and government spokesmen,
including the radical Fernandez Maldonado, let it be known that the nation
is counting on the mining sector to take up the slack and that unjustified
strikes will not be tolerated. The mines have been relatively quiet, but a rash
of industrial strikes reportedly led the government to reconsider once again
its policy toward the Communists.
The Communists' attitude toward Sinamos also causes the government
concern. While constantly reiterating "loyal and firm support of the revolu-
tionary process," the Communist unions declared that they will oppose
attempts by Sinamos to "undermine the autonomy of the labor union
organizations." The government has heretofore sidestepped a break with the
Communists by blaming labor unrest on the company involved or on APRA
and the extreme left. It will probably continue to do so in the near future.
Four years of effort to bring students into line behind the revolution
have been unsuccessful. The latest attempt to will their support backfired,
and another round of student violence may be in the offing. The regime has
been unable to break the hold of APRA and the extreme left (principally the
pro-Chinese Communists) on the universities.
The government has been gradually retreating from its earlier intransi-
gence toward the universities. Last March it promulgated a new general
education law that restored the students' role in university administration. A
commission composed of students, professors, and non-teaching staff was set
up and charged with drafting a new set of university statutes. Unhappily for
the government, the commission's working group was dominated by pro-Pe-
king Communists, and it soon became evident that some of its proposals
would be unpalatable.
Despite government warnings, the commission approved and submitted
several of these statutes. The government is now faced with demands that it
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amend its law to fit the statutes]
Extreme leftist students are contemptuous of Sinamos, and they have
begun openly and forcefully to oppose its activities among youth and
students. The government has responded by increasing both the frequency
and intensity of warnings that it is prepared to take drastic action. It has
begun a propaganda campaign aimed at undermining extremist influence in
student organizations, but a vigorous crackdown, while still a possibility, lies
in the future.
The government is disappointed over the failure of students and intel-
lectuals to accept the authenticity of its revolution. Denunciations of the
labor communities as "paternalistic neo-capitalism," Sinamos as "mobilizing
repression," and educational reform as "bourgeois democratization" do not
help the regime's revolutionary image. This kind of verbal abuse is a minor
annoyance; actions that might force the government to take violent counter-
measures would be a far more serious matter.
Anti-government Agitation
Violence on the scale of the student-led disorders this summer is the
regime's greatest fear. The brief but violent anti-government disturbances
that rocked the southern city of Puno in late June and early July were the
most serious manifestations of discontent the government has yet faced. It
was clearly shaken by the magnitude of anti-government sentiment and by
indications that the ultra left may be making inroads among the industrial
and agricultural workers of the south. The regime stuck to its standard
public explanation that an unholy alliance between APRA and the extreme
left was to blame, but its confidential investigations reportedly show that
APRA's participation was marginal.
Government hopes that guerrilla terrorist groups had been eliminated
once and for all with the round-up of Revolutionary Vanguard members
early this year were shattered when rural violence broke out in the north in
April. A Civil Guard counterinsurgency force was ordered into action in
July, and 15 alleged members of a faction of the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left were captured. The problem has not disappeared
None of the guerrilla terrorist
groups poses a real threat to stability, they are merely bothersome. Neverthe-
less, the government is becoming impatient with recalcitrant elements and is
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issuing almost daily warnings that it is prepared to use force against the
`enemies of the revolution." In his anniversary speech President Velasco
delivered another "last" warning to both the ultra left and APRA, but the
crackdown is yet to come.
Many of the revolution's reforms are similar to those long advocated by
APRA, but bloody clashes between the party and the army nearly 40 years
ago created a mutual animosity that has yet to be overcome. Some contacts
were made between government officials and APRA leaders, but these
apparently failed to reach an accommodation. APRA contends that it is still
willing to engage in a dialogue.
Despite its troubles with the extreme left, the students, and the Com-
munists, the military persists in viewing APRA as its principal adversary, and
the party is blamed for anti-government agitation; there is, in fact, no
information to confirm that APRA is working hand and glove with the
extreme left, though it seems likely that there may be ad hoc cooperation
when tactical interests coincide.
APRA is, of course, a useful whipping boy, and this plus the govern-
ment's concern to avoid charges of repression has restrained it from declaring
the party illegal. Various less severe measures have, however, been employed
to undermine it. APRA refuses to fade away, and after four years in
semi-dormancy still draws impressive and enthusiastic crowds to its rallies.
Still at the helm, the 77-year-old Haya de la Torre has managed to keep his
party's nationwide organization intact, and there is reason to believe that
APRA has lost little of its considerable strength. In April, for example,
Aprista-dominated slates were victorious in "non-political" elections, admin-
istered by Sinamos, at the major sugar cooperatives.
President Velasco I wants to
remain in office until 1975. There is little reason to doubt that he will. He
faces no apparent challenge from within the armed forces, and barring a
decision to do away with the military presidency altogether, it would seem
that only a desperate economic setback* or a series of major blunders,
neither of which now seems likely, could force him from office. Even when
Velasco passes from the scene, it is unlikely that there will be major changes
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in Peruvian policy guidelines and goals. Regardless of personal preferences,
any military successor to Velasco will be constrained by the necessity of
muting radical-moderate controversy and maintaining military unity.
Army chief of staff and former foreign minister Mercado will take over
as prime minister and minister of war, thus becoming next in line for the
presidency, when General Montagne retires in January. Mercado, who is fully
committed to the regime's policies, will be a forceful prime minister and may
try to undercut the influence of other generals. He reportedly has consider-
able support aniona e *ional troon commanders and could emerge as a rival
to Velasco
The military leadership may, from time to time, consider how to play
down the predominant role of the armed forces in national life, perhaps even
to the point of handing over formal control of the government to trusted
civilians. There has always been some military support for the proposition
that the armed forces belong in the barracks, but this feeling is more than
offset by a fondness for the emoluments of high office and a conviction that
only the armed forces can lead Peru to its proper destiny.
The government keeps a close eye on developments in opposition
circles. It reportedly suspects that APRA, supporters of former President
B;launde, and followers of the popular former mayor of Lima, Luis Bedoya,
may try to forge an opposition alliance. Although the government is not
overly alarmed, the recent exiling of I-laya de la Torre's private secretary was
probably a warning that it will not tolerate serious anti-government activity.
The government still needs to attract popular support if it is to succeed
over the long haul. It must find a way to make organizations like Sinamos
work for the common good without alienating other influential bodies. It is,
for example, a question whether Sinamos will be allowed to press on with its
attempts to organize the masses at the risk of increasing conflict with the
Communists and the extreme left. The answer may depend on a re-evaluation
of the government's policies toward these groups and tcwa,-d APRA.
The course of the next phase of the revolution may, in fact, be
determined by the extent of the military government's willingness to take
the actions and risks necessr.:y to build an independent base of support and
render its accomplishments "irreversible."
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