ROMANIA: THE OUTLOOK FOR CEAUSESCU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000300350007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of ? Secret
Central
Intelligence
Romania:
The Outlook for Ceausescu
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Memorandum to Holders
Secret
SNIE 12.7-83
December 1985
COPY 18 4
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Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 12.7-83
ROMANIA:
THE OUTLOOK FOR CEAUSESCU
Information available as of 4 December 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which
was approved by the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Introduction ....................................................................................... 7
Prospects for the Economy .............................................................. 7
Popular Reaction ............................................................................... 8
Ceausescu's Prospects ....................................................................... 9
Succession Prospects ..................................................................... 11
Succession Scenarios ...................................................................... 11
The Key Variables in the Post-Ceausescu Era ............................. 12
Gorbachev's East European Policy ................................................ 13
Romania: The Soviet View ............................................................ 13
Soviet Concerns and Assets ............................................................ 13
Likely Soviet Policy ........................................................................ 14
Outlook ............................................................................................ 16
Implications for the USSR .............................................................. 17
Implications for the United States ................................................. 17
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders will reassess Ceausescu's and his
potential successors' ability to continue Romania's quasi-independent
foreign policy within the Soviet camp. It will not reexamine issues
covered in the Memorandum to Holders published last March or those
in SNIE 12.7-83 that remain constant, but rather will treat new
developments with the potential to alter previous forecasts. The time
frame for this Memorandum to Holders is the next 12 to 18 months.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
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The situation in Romania, chronically troubled since the early
1980s, has further deteriorated in several respects since the Memoran-
dum to Holders of SNIE 12.7-83 was produced in March 1985. The
principal causes of this decline:
- The economy has faltered more than expected.
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- Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev is more vigorously asserting
Moscow's influence over Eastern Europe, Romania included.
The economic outlook is bleak. The economy has not recovered
from problems last winter when unusually harsh weather left the
country without energy reserves. Most signs, however, indicate
Ceausescu will try to maintain vigorous pursuit of debt reduction (that
is, rapid payoffs of the debt through large trade surpluses), even though
the resulting austerity will continue to undermine the economy.
Such policies will depress already low living standards even
further, especially if the coming winter is severe. At best the allocation
of heat and electricity to households will only match last year's
painfully inadequate supplies. The overall food supply will be lower, in
part because of heavily increased net exports of wheat in the 1984/85
marketing year and increased meat exports to pay for Soviet energy.
And the 1985 grain crop will be about 16.6 million metric tons, or about
2.4 million tons less than that of last year and perhaps the smallest since
1975. Bread rationing has been reimposed in some localities.
Ceausescu's security forces have maintained tight control, and so
far there have been no signs of unrest. Absenteeism appears to be on the
rise, however, and the domestic situation could deteriorate if another
harsh winter coincided with a succession crisis-leaving the population
both angry and unsure of the leadership's stability and resolve.
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Gorbachev wants to enhance Moscow's control over Romania but
does not want a major upheaval. Many considerations would constrain
the Soviets from intervening militarily in Romania, and we doubt that
this would occur short of a major breakdown of authority in which there
were clear anti-Soviet overtones. We believe, however, the Soviets
intend to take advantage of Romania's economic problems and any
political turmoil by offering modest amounts of supplies in return for
incremental compromises by Bucharest. They will also attempt to build
bridges to key individuals and groups. Currently, Moscow appears to
have few assets in Romania. We believe it could expand them
significantly and quickly if Ceausescu lost his hold on the country or if
his successors had trouble-as would be likely-establishing their grip.
Should Gorbachev choose to demand Romania's full compliance
with Soviet foreign policies as a condition for any assistance to a new re-
gime, he could force a major crisis on Bucharest at a time when it would
be weakest. But such a crisis could force Gorbachev to make the stark
intervention choice he wants to avoid, and we therefore believe he will
keep Soviet pressures within bounds.
As long as Ceausescu stays in control,
Romania is not likely to return to the docility expected of Warsaw Pact
members. Rather, the US dilemma will be how to convince Ceausescu
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that his fixation on erasing Romania's foreign debt-let alone his long-
term policy of rapid and massive industrialization that led the country
into debt-might destroy whatever chance his successors have of
maintaining Ceausescu's foreign policy legacy. Even in the event of a
need for emergency energy or food supplies to stave off disastrous
situations this winter, chances would be slim that the West could
persuade Ceausescu to adopt a more flexible economic policy or
improve his record on human rights substantially.
Once Ceausescu passes from the scene, the successor leadership-
or at least some contenders for power-might be more willing to ease
austerity. But the new leaders will be wary of each other, less confident
of their ability to control the country and keep the Soviets at bay, and
more anxious for rapid, large infusions of assistance to ease the plight of
the population. They could argue that Ceausescu's draconian financial
policy has driven down Romania's debt and made the country a more
acceptable credit risk. But international banks would probably need
Western governmental assistance before arranging major new financing.
Within the next few years, then, the United States and the West
are likely to be faced with the dilemma of what to do about an
economically bankrupt and politically vulnerable Romania. Remaining
aloof would leave the field to the Soviets. But, should the West choose to
help, there is little chance that its financial assistance would be used op-
timally or repaid on time. Further, should Gorbachev adopt an
extremely assertive policy, the United States would have to decide how
to respond to Soviet actions in light of its other equities in Europe. In
the final analysis, the future of Romania will probaby depend mainly
on how long Ceausescu or his successors persist in economically
disastrous policies and how skillful Gorbachev is in finding the right
mixture of pressures and inducements to bring Romania back fully into
the Soviet camp.
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DISCUSSION
Introduction
1. In the nine months that have elapsed since the
first Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 12.7-83, Presi-
dent Ceausescu, as expected, has retained his controls
over the Romanian political situation and steadfastly
adhered to the harsh domestic policy and relatively
independent foreign policies traditional during his
rule. But several developments raise new concerns
about Romania's future:
- The economy has faltered more than expected,
in part because of drought and the protracted
effect of the harsh winter of 1984/85.
The new Kremlin leadership is more vigorous in
asserting its influence over Eastern Europe and
might try to take advantage of any political or
social instability in Romania to reassert Soviet
control.
Prospects for the Economy
2. The economy has not recovered from last win-
ter's problems when increased exports of refined
petroleum products and energy-intensive goods com-
bined with stagnant coal and gas output and decreases
in hydropower left Romania without energy reserves
during unusually harsh weather. Domestic energy
output fell sharply, forcing prolonged and widespread
reductions and shutdowns of factory operations during
the first quarter of this year. Output of steel plummet-
ed, causing setbacks later in numerous industries de-
pendent upon steel deliveries. Continuing energy and
raw material shortages throughout the year appear to
have prevented any economic growth, worsened living
conditions, and virtually ensured hardships this winter
as severe as last year.0
3. Ceausescu has attempted to avoid another energy
crisis by new draconian measures that are likely to
compound rather than ease the problems. He declared
a state of emergency in the electric power system in
October, placed it under military cosupervision, and
later replaced several senior party and government
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officials responsible for the energy sector. He has also
ordered students into coal mines. Subsequently, this
fall he ordered an increase in the production of
thermal electric power of nearly 50 percent above last
year's average monthly output, a virtually impossible
task even if coal-fired plants were to consume the
reserves that he earlier ordered stockpiled for the
winter.
4. Such actions, however, will have little impact on
electric power generation, which is hindered mainly
by the shortage in primary fuels and imported spare
parts. Ceausescu recently indicated he will ease import
restraints on spare parts for power plants-a tacit
admission that restrictions he imposed on imported
spare parts had to be eased. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the parts arrive on time and in
adequate enough supply to limit plant downtime.
5. Should severe winter weather strike again, the
population would relive the sufferings of last year
when power to dwellings was reduced. Because priori-
ty in energy use has been allotted to industry, the
allocation of electricity and heat to households, even
with average weather, is likely to fall short of last
winter's painfully inadequate supplies. Infant mortal-
ity rates, which increased last winter, could go up
again.
6. In addition, the overall food supply has worsened
this year, largely the result of generally poor agricul-
tural production, combined with Ceausescu's insis-
tence on increased agricultural exports to reduce
Romania's foreign debt. For example, Ceausescu fool-
ishly increased net exports of wheat in the 1984/85
marketing year ending last June to 500,000 tons,
compared with a 50,000-ton import surplus in
1983/84. meat ex-
ports tote USSR have increased, probably to pay for
increased energy deliveries from Moscow. Meat and
milk have been nearly unobtainable for ordinary
citizens except through the black market, and rations
of basic staples have been reduced from last year's far
from abundant amounts. The usual seasonal improve-
ment in vegetable and fruit supplies did not occur
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during the summer. Ominously, bread rationing was
reimposed in some localities this year
7. This year's harvest prospects are particularly
bleak. Shortages of electric power-output was down
by perhaps as much as 10 percent during the first 10
months of the year compared with the same period
last year-prevented sufficient use of irrigation sys-
tems to offset dry summer conditions. Shortages of
fuel, fertilizer, and pesticides-all items exported to
earn hard currency-also reduced crop yields. A 1985
grain crop of about 16.6 million tons, the smallest crop
since 1975, is expected to be about 2.4 million tons less
and ordered the spare parts for the power industry. He
also accepted a new medium-term commercial credit
this year, relenting on his previous ban on new
borrowing to avoid default on debt payments. But
Ceausescu apparently has lost some flexibility because
export declines earlier this year have left the regime
with limited cash to increase imports and still meet
upcoming debt obligations. A request to reschedule
debt-as he consented to in 1982 and 1983-does not
appear likely, given his rejection of IMF "interferen-
ce" in his economic policy, but it remains an open
than that of 1984.
option.
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8. Ceausescu could reduce food shortages by im-
porting grain and cutting food exports. He could also
increase his options by reducing livestock inventories,
using the grain saved and the meat for consumers or
for export. He relented a bit in September by allowing
some purchases of foreign grain, including the first
corn from the United States in two years. Most signs,
however, are that Ceausescu will try to tough it
through. Indeed, his coercive style of dealing with
problems has become more pronounced as the econo-
my has stagnated. In recent months he has:
- Introduced a more punitive system of wage
reductions for economic managers who fail to
meet production goals.
- Launched an anticorruption campaign in the
agricultural sector and threatened to confiscate
unreported crops from the farms.
- Announced programs to redistribute the rural
population and to resettle urban elderly to rural
areas.
- Begun a campaign designed to channel food
from state stores and farm markets into a system
for meal distribution through workplace can-
teens.
9. Ceausescu has not eased his vigorous pursuit of
debt reduction-he reduced debts of about $10 billion
in 1981 to about $6 billion in late 1985 through large
trade surpluses. His policy, however, is responsible for
the shortages now plaguing the economy and has led to
a decline in the volume of foreign trade (see figure 1).
The effort over the last four years to produce more
export goods while sharply suppressing imports (see
figure 2) has led to severe shortages of raw materials
and energy for basic industries and to reductions in the
level of consumer goods available to the population,
particularly foodstuffs. He has showed a degree of
flexibility this fall when he increased grain imports
10. Ceausescu's overall behavior_ uggests
he blames failures on lack of discipline and refusal to
fulfill his orders rather than on his own policies and his
inflexibility in dealing with exceptionally harsh weath-
er. His introduction of military discipline into the
electric power system in particular seems to reflect a
belief that lack of effort is the basic cause of these
difficulties. He also threatens to punish officials who
fail to comply with his economic directives and over-
ambitious production quotas. In short, Ceausescu gives
every indication that he fails to understand the root
causes of economic problems and that he will continue
only to treat the symptoms.F--]
Popular Reaction
11. The Memorandum to Holders in March 1985
judged that the population probably would remain
incapable of united action and demoralized by the
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Figure 1
Romania: Volume of Trade With Socialist Countries and
the West, 1979-84
70 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
seeming futility of challenging the regime. Since then,
popular apathy appears to have deepened. The re-
gime's main worry now with regard to popular disaf-
fection seems to be absenteeism, which appears to
have worsened even as many factories have required
employees to work double shifts and holidays. The
security forces have maintained tight control, prevent-
ing any significant outburst of unrest. Despite the
population's passivity, however, discontent and anger
remain high, and are certain to grow as living condi-
tions worsen. If Ceausescu were to die in office or be
incapacitated for long, the situation could deteriorate
quickly as the population, unsure of the leadership's
stability and resolve, starts to vent old frustrations.
Ceausescu's Prospects
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Figure 2
Romania: Regional Breakdown of Exports and
Imports, 1980 and 1984
Percent
Exports
1980
Percent
Imports
19811
1984
Developed West 16.7 -
LDCs 26.2
USSR 25.4
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Succession Prospects
15. In the last Memorandum to Holders, we fore-
cast that any succession would be likely to see a
collective leadership emerge that would adhere closely
to Ceausescu's key policies, but would be marginally
more lenient at home and less troublesome in Warsaw
Pact councils. This general prognosis holds, but the
surrounding circumstances are much murkier. A suc-
cession at a time of more severe economic hardships
would burden any successor regime with all-absorbing
economic problems in addition to the expected strug-
gles over personal precedence and policy issues. Al-
though still thoroughly intimidated, subordinates who
would never dare test a healthy Ceausescu might be
emboldened to move against him if an incapacitating
illness makes him vulnerable. Indeed, presuccession
maneuvers may be beginning.
Elena was involving erse
more in po icyma ing and was consulting with top
regime officials to win their support for her succession
in the event of his death.
16. Ceausescu so overshadows the others in the
leadership that no one could step immediately into his
leadership role. Nevertheless, Mrs. Ceausescu, his clos-
est adviser and overseer in personnel matters for the
past decade, appears to have the initial inside track,
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especially if Ceausescu has time to preside over a
transition. She could count on the support of several
close relatives in key positions in the apparatus and
probably also would get the backing of several mem-
bers of the leadership who are reportedly tied to her,
including party secretary for cadre and organization
Emil Bobu, security chief Tudor Postelnicu, and First
Deputy Prime Minister Ion Dinca
17. Mrs. Ceausescu, however, still lacks sufficient
personal power to rule alone. She probably would have
to share power with those cited above as potential
allies, in an inner core of a collective with other
prominent officials. Moreover, she is widely unpopular
because of resentment over the prominence of the
Ceausescu clan-including Nicu, their playboy son
who has been steadily promoted as a youth leader in
the regime-and the continuing bias in Romania
against women holding high office. For these reasons,
there is a good chance that the other members of her
team would eventually push her out of the leadership.
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Less likely but still credible scenarios would be for
Mrs. Ceausescu's competitors to block her succession
immediately on Ceausescu's sudden death or to stage a
coup if a seriously ailing Ceausescu tried to force her
on the party
18. No bid for power-either before or after
Ceausescu's demise-could succeed without the coop-
eration of the powerful security apparatus. Its chief,
Postelnicu, is therefore in a strong position to play
kingmaker or to advance his own candidacy. He is
completely in charge of his forces, and his special
status in the regime gives him close access to the
Ceausescus and to information on the activities of the
20. If Ceausescu's initial successors are discredited
by continuing economic decline and social unrest,
individuals less tainted by recent, close association
with his policies might seek support from the power
structure and of necessity from the Securitate. Former
aides of Ceausescu who crossed him and are now in
eclipse probably retain some following and might hope
to reemerge in a post-Ceausescu environment. These
men might include:
- Paul Niculescu, who fell from earlier promi-
nence as chief ideologue, then foreign policy
expert in the Secretariat and later Finance
Minister.
- Ion Iliescu, a former youth leader, party secre-
tary, and later provincial party chief who was
dispatched to political oblivion several years ago.
- Ilie Verdet, a former Prime Minister whose
recent demotion from party secretary to Minister
of Mines continues his fall from the inner circle.
The Key Variables in the Post-Ceausescu Era
21. The lack of a strong and clear-cut heir apparent
and the leadership inexperience of the likely contend-
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Emil Bobu,
party secretary
Constantin Dascalescu,
Prime MinisterF_
ers makes the chances for instability during the leader-
ship transition relatively high. And the nature, timing,
and circumstances of the transition may be key
factors:
A collective leadership headed by Mrs.
Ceausescu might well be temporary and too
weakened by internal contentions to tackle major
policy shifts while in power. The chances for
bolder policy revisions will increase as one leader
becomes truly dominant. But the duration of that
consolidation process is by no means sure. Even
if it were to begin soon, the succession struggle
could easily extend beyond the time frame of
this Estimate.
The relative privations of the populace at the
time of the initial transition and at critical phases
in the ensuing struggles for power could be
critical factors. (That is, a new regime coming to
power during a good harvest could expect some
time to explore its options, while one thrust into
power when shortages are testing the seemingly
superhuman tolerance of the Romanian people
would be riveted on the immediate shortcomings
in the economy.)
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And, perhaps the most critical factor, Romanian
perception of Gorbachev's still evolving policy
toward Romania and Eastern Europe as a whole,
will shape the successors' foreign policy options
and the nature of their appeal for domestic
support.
Gorbachev's East European Policy
22. Early indications suggest that Gorbachev will
play a more active personal role in managing the
Soviet-East European relationship than his predeces-
sors. His evident purpose is to reassert Soviet control
over the region and stem the foreign policy drift of
recent years that allowed the East Europeans to assert
some measure of greater independence. Romania tra-
ditionally has been the least willing of all the Warsaw
Pact states to follow Moscow's foreign policy lead.C
23. But Gorbachev apparently recognizes the limits
of Moscow's control and the risks of too heavy a hand.
He has reportedly acknowledged the inability of
CEMA countries alone to satisfy all the needs of the
more advanced East European economies and there-
fore has approved in principle selective trade with the
West. Closely monitored East European relations with
the West create openings for Moscow to exploit in its
"Pan-European" campaign as well as conduits
acquiring technology for the Soviet economy.
for
Romania: The Soviet View
24. The Soviets have fewer levers of control over
Romania than any of their other Pact allies. Party and
military contacts are not close, and Romania's trade is
highly diversified (see figure 2). Most annoying from
the Soviet viewpoint, the Romanians have often op-
posed Soviet proposals in Warsaw Pact forums creat-
ing a potential stalking horse for other East European
grievances.
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0
Romania
26. The USSR has chosen to tolerate Romania's
aberrant foreign policy probably both because
Ceausescu's authoritarian and ideologically orthodox
regime has not presented a challenge to Soviet security
interests-unlike earlier deviations in Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary-and because
Soviet options for curtailing this deviance have been
poor.
Soviet Concerns and Assets
27. We judge that currently the Soviets have few
reliable means of influencing Romania under
Ceausescu. Our evidence, which is highly suggestive
but not conclusive, indicates that:
- Despite recent agreements in principle to nearly
double Soviet-Romanian trade, trade levels fell in
the early 1980s and picked up only modestly in
1984/85 (see figure 3), and Moscow's latest goals
are also unlikely to be met. In part, this is
because Moscow has insisted on payment for its
energy and raw materials in hard currency or
"hard goods" that Romania needs to export to
the West for hard currency.
- Furthermore, Moscow has consistently linked
greater economic cooperation to such political
demands as closer party-to-party ties and closer
coordination of state five-year plans-policies
Ceausescu is wary of. The Romanians have ap-
parently not made any major political conces-
sions to the Soviets for greater economic support,
and Moscow's economic leverage to date has
been limited.
- Despite agreements to pursue closer party-to-
party ties, this year
that party exchanges are frosty and that the
Soviets have made no inroads in attracting sup-
port at the local level. At the national level,
Ceausescu has reportedly isolated or purged offi-
cials who have studied in the Soviet Union,
which makes Moscow's attempts to identify and
court potential anti-Ceausescu factions difficult.
- The Romanian military continues to have rela-
tively few contacts with their Soviet counter-
parts. The Romanians are isolated in the Warsaw
Pact staff and do not participate with troops in
Warsaw Pact field exercises nor allow their
officers to study at Soviet academies.
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Figure 3
Romania: Volume of Trade With
the USSR, 1979-84
Index 1979=100
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If
Ceausescu began to lose control seriously or was
ousted, we would anticipate a more active Soviet role
and bolder machinations. In such a changed political
climate, the regime's current bulwarks against Soviet
influence might be considerably weakened.
29. Ceausescu and Gorbachev probably will meet
in Romania in late December. Gorbachev's reported
acceptance of the longstanding Ceausescu request for
a meeting in itself is no indicator of a change in Soviet
policy. The timing of the meeting-after Gorbachev
had held bilateral meetings with all the other Pact
leaders and in the midst of another punishing winter-
suggests that Gorbachev does not plan to woo
Ceausescu with concessionary economic assistance.
Gorbachev is likely to lecture Ceausescu-as he has
other Pact leaders-on the imperative of balanced
trade while offering the possibility of mutually advan-
tageous economic cooperation if Ceausescu is willing
to pay the price.
Likely Soviet Policy
30. We believe the confluence of a more energetic
Soviet leadership and deteriorating conditions in Ro-
mania foreshadows a more active Soviet policy plan.
We judge that the Soviets will use any influence they
have to push Ceausescu, but most especially a post-
Ceausescu leadership, to pursue some or all of the
following policies:
- Publicly endorse the Warsaw Pact and Soviet
foreign and military policy lines while privately
desisting from reportedly disruptive objections to
Soviet initiatives at Pact and CEMA meetings.
- Funnel more resources into the agricultural
sector.
- Place more emphasis on party leadership rather
than security forces while deemphasizing any
"cult of personality."
- Place greater emphasis on promoting pragmatic
technocrats.
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31. Moscow does not want Romania's troubles to
end in chaos and the necessity for military interven-
tion, but does want Ceausescu and his regime to feel
increased pressures that might make them more ame-
nable to accommodating Soviet goals. In this vein, the
Soviets probably see limited domestic turmoil in Ro-
mania to their advantage and do not plan to freely
assist Bucharest out of its difficulties. As the screws
tighten, the Soviets no doubt hope to influence
Ceausescu and, in case of his death or ouster, his
successors through a combination of economic and
political carrots and sticks as well as whatever active
measures they can mount.
32. The Soviets probably see several possibilities for
the future of Soviet-Romanian relations:
- The Romanians could muddle through their
present difficulties without a breakdown
Communist rule that might force Moscow
react.
short of a direct intervention. This policy could
include:
- Highly publicized party-to-party visits and visits
by high-level Soviet delegations to express Mos-
cow's displeasure and concern and to identify
"cooperative" Romanian officials.
- Public Soviet and Bloc criticism of the Romanian
situation, along with warnings that action by the
socialist community might be necessary.
- Promise of support and aid if the Romanians met
certain conditions.
- Publicized troop preparations and exercises along
the Romanian border.
- Isolation of Romania and reduction of traffic
moving into and out of the country.
34. Without a major breakdown of authority in
Romania or regime change with powerfully clear anti-
Soviet implications, the Soviets probably would not
want to pay the price of military intervention. Roma-
nia is not as strategically significant as northern tier
countries. The Yugoslavs also would see intervention as
a direct threat. Not only would they condemn it, but it
could result in Yugoslav military mobilization and a
clearer orientation of Yugoslavia toward the West,
heightening tension throughout Eastern Europe. Al-
though the Soviets would probably judge that their
military intervention in Romania would not provoke
direct US military actions in support of Romania, they
would know that their intervention would freeze US-
Soviet relations. Perhaps even more important, it
would be a disaster for Moscow's Pan-European poli-
cy, and, as in the Polish crisis, set off a fresh round of
suggests a self-satisfied view that Romania's pres-
ent troubles are an object lesson to Eastern
Europe and will narrow Ceausescu's ability to
conduct an independent foreign policy. If
Ceausescu felt the need to turn to the East for
help, the Soviets probably calculate he could be
made to temper his annoying foreign policy and
become more cooperative in Pact affairs.
- Alternatively, but much more unlikely, severe
domestic unrest could force Ceausescu to aban-
don his policy of autonomy in return for major
Soviet economic aid. The Soviets would probably
provide such aid and capitalize on Ceausescu's
vulnerability, rather than be confronted with a
serious challenge to continued Communist rule in
Romania.
In any event, any successor to Ceausescu will
face difficult domestic conditions while lacking
Ceausescu's skill, experience, and knowledge.
Hence any post-Ceausescu leadership will likely
be more vulnerable to Soviet pressures and more
willing to mute Romanian foreign policy inde-
pendence in return for Soviet economic support.
33. The Soviets' handling of the prolonged Polish
crisis and actions before intervention in Czechoslova-
kia in 1968 suggests several probable lines in Soviet
policy in the event of a major systemic crisis in which
the future of party rule and adherence to the Warsaw
Pact came into question. Initially, they would mount
considerable pressure, using both carrot and stick,
pro-NATO sentiment in Western Europe.
35. There can be no doubt that the Romanian
military would be no match for the Soviets and the
USSR would prevail after a short crisis. The Roma-
nians are not nearly as well equipped and trained as
the Soviets. Nonetheless, the Soviets have no troops or
prepared infrastructure in Romania and the moun-
tainous terrain is not well suited for a quick, surgical
intervention. The Soviet military would expect pro-
longed "mopup" operations in the traditionally anti-
Soviet country, particularly if assistance were forth-
coming from Yugoslavia. Romania's military strategy
and organization emphasizes a decentralized "defense
of the nation by the entire population" and Romanian
exercises have featured defense against attacks coming
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from the direction of the Soviet Union. Moreover,
Soviet forces in the region are less capable and pre-
pared than Soviet forces in the northern tier of Eastern
Europe. This would make military operations less
appealing and make the decision to intervene more
difficult for the new team in Moscow
Outlook
36. The continuing difficulties in the economy and
the increasing cost of Ceausescu's draconian methods
in addressing national problems make for a bleak
outlook, including a growing prospect of political
instability.
the heightened chances of a succession
struggle make the future increasingly murky and
unpredictable The concurrent emplacement of a
more energetic Soviet leadership, moreover, could
threaten Romania's ability to maintain its limited
independence from the USSR.
still skillfully and ruthles-ly vnntrolc all
the short term-we believe he will stay in charge
through 1986. The overall prognosis under his rule is a
continuation of current foreign policy while the do-
mestic situation deteriorates further or, at best, re-
mains such that it can be controlled only by continued
harsh repression.
38. Under such conditions we believe hatred of the
regime will spread, with a greater risk of rekindling
the unrest and random violence of the early 1980s.'
Dissatisfaction within the regime will likely edge into
the higher echelons if not into Ceausescu's personal
retinue. It is highly unlikely, however, that any would-
be plotters would move against Ceausescu-much less
succeed-unless at least important elements of the
Securitate had joined the conspiracy. And we do not
believe this would happen unless Ceausescu's health
took a sharp turn for the worse and Elena, with or
without Ceausescu's blessing, attempted to ensure the
succession for herself.
39. If confronted with severe unrest at home, we
also believe Ceausescu might review his options
abroad. But he probably will resist foreign advice as
meddling in Romania's domestic affairs:
- He might canvas the West for assistance, but he
will not readily accept restraints on his policy
and is likely to bargain hard for preferential
financial treatment. He will accept IMF condi-
tions only as a last resort, under pressure of the
most dire events at home.
- We doubt he will go beyond isolated gestures in
accommodating Western concerns about his hu-
man rights policies.
- Ceausescu also wants more energy and raw
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make minor concessions, but he is unlikely to
compromise his independent policies in ways
that would ensure significant new support from
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In the maneuvering,
Fthe contenders probably would seek economic contacts
with East and West to give them an edge over the
competition. In the final analysis, the Securitate-in
the person of its leader Postelnicu-would most likely
emerge as kingmaker and dominant force in any
successor leadership, whether a transitional one led by
Elena or a more permanent one.
41. In the event of Ceausescu's sudden death, any
heirs would be under considerable pressure to satisfy
consumer needs and thereby bolster their claim to
legitimacy. A group led by Mrs. Ceausescu probably
would resist major policy shifts geared to economic
recovery. But a successor group without her might be
more flexible regarding IMF conditions for reschedul-
ing portions of about $2.5 billion in foreign debt that
comes due over the next two years. It might also be
more willing to ease Ceausescu's austerity regime. This
group could also argue that progress Ceausescu made
in reducing the foreign debt makes Romania, under a
new leadership, a more attractive candidate for West-
ern financial support. It is less certain, however, that
such a strategy would gain the economic payoffs
necessary to improve substantially the short-term eco-
nomic situation in Romania.
42. The poor state of the economy could tempt a
successor regime to find a new, more accommodation-
ist modus vivendi with the USSR if it perceives that:
- The West is unwilling to provide quickly major
new financing.
- The USSR, although suspect in all its motives, is
able to deliver quickly what Romania needs
most-energy-and in a sufficient quantity.
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- The risks of popular unrest and consequent
intervention by Soviet troops are making it in-
creasingly dangerous for the new leaders to
procrastinate indefinitely.
Implications for the USSR
43. Romania's economic difficulties and the
Ceausescu regime's harsh police state quality are to
Moscow's interest; hence, time is on the Soviets' side as
long as the Kremlin can avoid a stark choice between
direct military intervention and watching a new re-
gime even more hostile to the USSR gain power. We
do not believe that choice will have to be made during
the period of this Estimate.
44. The challenge to the Soviets is to craft a subtle
political game plan that will allow them to reap the
fruits of Romania's distress and prospective turmoil,
particularly if Ceausescu becomes incapacitated or
dies. Low-keyed offers of assistance, insinuation, and
pressures will best achieve Soviet objectives as con-
cerns Romania, Yugoslavia, and the West.
45. If Romania's plight worsens, the Soviets will
likely offer modest amounts of vital supplies in return
for incremental compromises by Bucharest. Such deals
might further undermine the regime's already low
popularity more than they bolster the Romanian
economy, and concurrently help Moscow to build a
constituency that in a succession crisis could serve it
well. Should Gorbachev choose to demand Romania's
full compliance with Soviet foreign policies as a
condition for any assistance to a new regime, he could
force a major crisis on Bucharest at a time when it
would be weakest. If his demands were not met, this
could set off the crisis and force the stark choice that
Gorbachev wants to avoid. How well Moscow plays
this game with Ceausescu and his possible successors
could prove a litmus test of the new Kremlin leader-
ship's diplomatic skills and the challenge Moscow
poses to Western interests in Eastern Europe
Implications for the United States
46. For the past 20 years or so, US interests have
been served by Romania's relatively independent for-
eign policy. While carefully avoiding frontal chal-
lenges to Moscow, Ceausescu has pushed back the
limits of the possible for a Warsaw Pact member,
acted as a thorn in Moscow's side during Warsaw Pact
and CEMA meetings, and generally provided the
United States with a country other than Hungary to
point to as an example of its differentiation policy at
work. As long as Ceausescu stays
in control, Romania is unlikely to return to the docility
expected of the other Warsaw Pact members.
47. Unfortunately, Ceausescu's domestic misrule
has jeopardized the long-term stability of his country
and thus imperiled a foreign policy that normally
enjoys the support of most Romanians. And, even in
the event of a need for emergency energy or food
supplies this winter, chances would be slim that the
West could persuade Ceausescu to adopt a more
flexible economic policy or substantially change his
record on human rights.
48. Once Ceausescu passes from the scene-and
this could happen at any time in the next few years-
the United States may have to review its policy options
in Romania. The successor regime or the contenders
for power may be more willing to listen to economic
reason. But the new leaders will be wary of each other,
less confident of their ability to control the country
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rapid, large infusions of aid in order to satisfy popular
demands for a better life. Western banks, taken with
the lower debt burden left by Ceausescu and im-
pressed that the successors are more rational and
flexible than Ceausescu, might judge that Romania is a
somewhat better credit risk. But the banks are unlikely
to respond in that manner early in a succession, when
support is most needed, without a lead from Western
governments. US actions will help determine the
Western response and thus could greatly affect Ro-
mania's future.
49. Within the next few years, then, the United
States and the West are likely to be faced with the
dilemma of what to do about an economically bank-
rupt and politically vulnerable Romania. Remaining
aloof would leave the field to the Soviets. But, should
the West choose to help, there is little chance that its
financial assistance would be used optimally or repaid
on time. Further, should Gorbachev adopt an extreme-
ly assertive policy, the United States would have to
decide how to respond to Soviet actions in light of its
other equities in Europe. In the final analysis, the
future of Romania will probably depend mainly on
how long Ceausescu or his successors persist in eco-
nomically disastrous policies and how skillful Gorba-
chev is in finding the right mixture of pressures and
inducements to bring Romania back fully into the
Soviet camp.
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