NAMIBIA: STATUS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102740001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 30, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
30 December 1980
MEMORANDUM
Namibia: Status of the Settlement Process
Efforts by the West to induce South Africa to relinquish
control over Namibia under a UN-administered transition plan
will reach a critical juncture on 7 January when a conference
of all the participants in the settlement process convenes
in Geneva. The conference will mark the first face-to-face
negotiating session between the indispensable parties to the
settlement: the South Africans and their Namibian allies
on the one side and the South-West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO), the principal Namibian insurgent group, on the
other. UN officials will preside, and envoys from the West,
the Frontline States, and Nigeria--aZZ of whom have hitherto
acted as mediators between the South Africans and SWAPO--
will attend the conference as observers.
SWAPO and its Frontline backers, impatient after more
than two years of South African footdragging, are bent on
using the conference to extract a firm South African
commitment to begin implementing the transition plan by
March 1981; the conference has, in fact, been officially
labeled the "preimplementation meeting." If such a
commitment is not obtained, the negotiating process will
probably break down, at least temporarily, with potentially
serious repercussions for the West.
This memorandum was written by
the Africa Division, Office of Political Analysis, with contributions
from other analysts in the Africa Division. It
has been coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations; the Offices of Strategic Research,
Economic Research, Geographic and Societal Research, and Central
Reference; and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. Questions
and queries are welcome and should be directed to Chief, Africa Division,
OPA,
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One immediate result would be an African-backed call
in the UN Security Council for sanctions against South
Africa. The West would then face a dilemma: accepting
sanctions would result in economic hardships for the
West and might lead South Africa to withdraw its backing
for the UN plan altogether, but vetoing sanctions might
prompt the black African states to abandon the UN plan
and could also result in economic retaliation by Nigeria.
The collapse of the Western mediation effort would probably
fuel an expanded guerrilla war in Namibia that would heighten
tensions throughout southern Africa and create opportunities
for further Soviet inroads.
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Prospects for the conference are not auspicious. To
obtain the agreement of all the participants to come to
Geneva, UN Secretary General Waldheim had to gloss over
several contentious issues:
-- Status of the participants. SWAPO leaders insist
that the "internal"--that is, pro-South African--
parties attend the conference only as members of
the South African delegation.
The South Africans, however, have demanded that
leaders of the internal parties participate on an
equal footing with SWAPO and on at least one
occasion have implied that Pretoria's represen-
tatives at the conference will merely serve as
advisers to the Namibians.
-- Further revisions in the UN plan. SWAPO and the
Frontline leaders want the meeting to discuss only
the modalities of implementing the UN plan; they
oppose any important revisions. The South Africans
and their principal internal allies have indicated
that they want some basic revisions. Their most
contentious proposal is for the participants at
Geneva to reach agreement on constitutional
arrangements for Namibia that would have the
effect of preventing SWAPO from imposing one-party
rule even if it wins a sweeping electoral victory
over the internal Namibian parties.
-- The March target date. All the participants at
Geneva have accepted March 1981 as a general
target date for beginning the implementation of
the UN plan. SWAPO and the Frontline view the
target date as nonnegotiable; they see the conference
as a face-saving concession to South Africa and
its Namibian proteges in return for a definite co-
mmitment to the target date. Pretoria has made
its acceptance of the target date contingent on
the success of the conference in fully dispelling
South Africa's concern that the UN plan might be
implemented in a way that would favor SWAPO.
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The disputes over these issues indicate that neither
side is ready to begin a genuine dialogue, let alone make
the mutual accommodations that are essential to make the UN
transition plan work. Both sides want to avoid a prolonged
war, but each would rather continue fighting than gamble on
a plan that could put its enemy in effective control of
Namibia. Hence, each side sees the Geneva conference as an
opportunity to achieve tactical gains and neither is likely
to accept any meaningful compromise in the absence of
concerted pressures from the Western and African "observers."
The UN Transition Program
The UN plan for Namibian independence was proposed in
)978 by the five Western states then on the Security Council
and known since as the Western Five--the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Canada. The plan,
designed to head off the simmering guerrilla war in Namibia,
was accepted in principle in 1978 by South Africa, SWAPO,
and the Security Council. The plan calls for a truce
between South Africa and SWAPO to be monitored by a 7,500-
man UN military force. Seven months after the truce goes
into effect, UN-supervised elections are to be held for an
assembly that would devise a constitution for an independent
Namibia.
Despite their acceptance of the plan, SWAPO and South
Africa have differed sharply over the specifics of the truce
arrangements. In late 1979, both sides accepted a compromise,
proposed by the late President Neto of Angola, for a UN-mon-
itored demilitarized zone that would eliminate SWAPO bases
from Namibia and from a 50-kilometer strip north of the
border. The DMZ formula, however, allows the South African
military to retain 20 forward bases in Namibia during the
initial truce period. The DMZ plan favors the South Af-
ricans, and SWAPO only acceded to it under heavy pressure
from the Frontline States.
Since the accord on the creation of a DMZ, haggling by
both sides over largely tangential issues has prevented
S@dfetary General Waldheim from nailing down agreement on a
s?afting date for implementing the plan. The latest obstacle
he8 been South African insistence on proof that UN personnel,
iii btiefseeinq implementation of the transition plan, would
id? favor SWAPO over the internal Namibian parties. This
demand has its roots in a longstanding impasse between
South Africans and the UN General Assembly, which has
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recognized SWAPO as the sole authentic representative of the
Namibian people; SWAPO, in fact, draws its support largely
from a single tribe (by far the largest one in Namibia), the
Ovambo.
The Insurgency
During the nearly four years of negotiations on the UN
plan, SWAPO guerrillas have increased the level and scope of
their operations inside Namibia. The great majority of
SWAPO attacks occur in the Ovambo tribal homeland in north-
ern Namibia, where the guerrillas frequently attack economic
targets and kidnap or kill Ovambos suspected of collaborating
with the territorial administration. The decision by the
South African Administrator General in Namibia not to hold
elections in Ovamboland for provincial-level assemblies was
an indirect admission of the slowly deteriorating security
situation there.
Despite SWAPO's successes.in Ovamboland, the 12,000-man
South African military contingent in Namibia has been able
to prevent the insurgency from spreading to other parts of
the territory. SWAPO, moreover, still is able to operate
only in small units; an attempt by SWAPO earlier this year
to introduce conventional-sized military units into Ovamboland
was a failure, resulting in a sharp increase in insurgent
casualties.
Pretoria, though not facing a direct challenge for
control of Namibia, is paying an increasingly heavy price
for maintaining security there. Pretoria's own measure of
its forces' efficiency--the kill ratio--bears evidence of
growing guerrilla capabilities. In 1979, according to South
African figures, 24 insurgents were killed for every South
African soldier killed; in 1980 the ratio is closer to 10:1.
The South African military probably lost some 90 soldiers in
Namibia during 1980, three times the number it lost in 1979.
This figure is still tolerable by military standards, but
the mounting casualties are creating domestic concern in
South Africa.
As the insurgency has intensified, South Africa has
resorted to more frequent raids against SWAPO bases in
southern Angola and southwestern Zambia. Several airborne
strikes have gone over 200 kilometers into Angola and ground
units have remained inside Angola and Zambia for weeks.
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Et-h.
Pan
Tsumeb
GrootfonKi'n
~FRi Lri
Population of Namibia, 1980
Ethnic Group
Numbers
Percentage
Ovambo
470,300
46.7
Whites
113,800
11.3
Damara
88,600
8.8
Herero
67,500
6.7
Kavengo
67,100
6.6
Name
43,300
4.3
Coloreds
38,300
3.8
Caprivians
34,200
3.4
Bushmen
30,200
3.0
Rehoboth Beaters
22,200
2.2
Others
31,500
3.2
Total
11007,000
100.0
South
Africa
Lake
Ngami
Makgadikg.d;
(salt Pens)
Zambia
0
Namibia
_I Diamond mining
'5 Base metal mining
Cu Copper
Pb Lead
Zinc
R Tin mine
Uranium mine
--' Railroad
Road
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Although these operations have inflicted heavy casualties
and material damage on SWAPO, they have not long deterred
guerrilla activities. Within the past year, South African
incursion forces have met increasingly stiff resistance
from the Soviet-equipped and Cuban-trained guerrillas.
Pretoria's "Dual Track" Strategy
South Africa's stalling tactics in the negotiations are
intended to give it the option either of accepting the UN
plan or unilaterally establishing a quasi-independent
Namibian government. The overriding South African objective
is to assure that either option would result in a Namibian
government sufficiently responsive to Pretoria to assure
South Africa's basic interests: maintenance of a buffer
against the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Angola and
continued access to Namibia's extensive deposits of uranium,
diamonds, and other minerals.
To this end, the South African Administrator General in
Namibia has groomed a multi-ethnic political coalition, the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), that will either
compete with SWAPO if an election is held under UN auspices,
or try to rally popular support for a unilaterally installed
government. The DTA, composed of 11 ethnic-based parties
and led by a white, Dirk Mudge, won 82 percent of the votes
in elections the South Africans held in 1978 despite a UN
injunction; it now holds 41 of the 50 seats in the Namibian
"National Assembly." In 1979, the South Africans gave the
assembly limited legislative powers, and last July the
Administrator General appointed an all-DTA "Council of
Ministers" to share some of his executive powers. The South
Africans believe that granting the DTA greater authority
will enable the coalition to broaden its popular base,
thereby increasing its chances of competing with SWAPO in
UN-supervised elections.
The DTA, however, has failed to expand its support.
Among whites, the coalition has suffered from general
suspicions about the UN plan; a conservative white party
opposed to the plan defeated Mudge's Republican Party in
recent local elections.
The DTA's efforts to appeal to nonwhites are being
undermined by the territorial administration's efforts
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to contain SWAPO. The Administrator General has authorized
the establishment of local home guards and a territorial
force to augment the South African military units in Namibia.
These local units are badly disciplined and often terrorize
the local population; in many areas, particularly Ovambo-
land, the home guard is feared more than SWAPO. Because of
the DTA's attempt to portray itself as the internal government
of Namibia, nonwhite dislike of the home guard units is
translating into opposition to the DTA.
Pretoria's recent move to institute compulsory military
service for nonwhites in 1981 has again identified the DTA
with an unpopular decision. Many nonwhites will refuse to
serve in a territorial force and young Ovambos, faced with
the prospect of fighting for the South Africans, may choose
instead to cross into Angola and fight for SWAPO.
South African officials, acknowledging trends within
Namibia, admit privately that SWAPO probably would defeat
the DTA if a UN-supervised election were held soon. SWAPO
would not only draw overwhelming support from the Ovambos,
who make up 46 percent of Namibia's total population, but
could also pickup support from moderates in other tribes who
resent the DTA's collaboration with Pretoria.
Attitudes Toward the Geneva Conference
South Africa. Pretoria's delegation to Geneva will be
under orders to push hard for revisions in the UN plan that
would give the DTA the best possible chance in the elections
and in shaping a constitution acceptable to South Africa.
The South Africans may be hoping for developments at Geneva
that would relieve them of blame for a collapse of the UN
plan. They may hope, for example, that the presiding UN
official will slight the leaders of the internal parties, or
that the SWAPO delegates will walk out. Pretoria might
believe that under these circumstances the Western Five
would come around to the view that the UN plan would subvert
the Western goal of genuine self-determination, or that _
SWAPO is scuttling efforts toward valid modification of the
plan.
The South Africans realize, however, that such windfalls
may not accrue from Geneva. Hence, Pretoria's agreement to
participate in the conference indicates the South Africans
have accepted the risk that the outcome at Geneva might
compel them to either give a green light to the UN operation
or appear as spoilers.
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Pretoria is unlikely to agree to the UN plan unless it
is convinced that it has done all it could to bend the plan
to the advantage of South Africa and the DTA. Because
Pretoria fears that SWAPO would win an open election despite
South Africa's efforts to the contrary, Prime Minister Botha
almost certainly intends to make the leaders of the DTA
publicly agree to all transitional arrangements, so that
they could not claim he sold them out. The South Africans
can only achieve these two aims by holding to a consistent
tactical line at Geneva--haggling until the DTA spokesmen
get a full hearing on every issue, and until agreement is
reached on transitional arrangements that give the South
African Administrator General or his Namibian surrogates
ample opportunities to counteract any UN partiality for
SWAPO.
The Namibian "Internal Parties." The Administrator
General has announced that 14 members of the DTA and 12 rep-
resentatives of smaller parties have agreed to participate
in the South African delegation. The leaders of the DTA
fully share Pretoria's maximum objective of gaining in-
ternational support for a Namibian government that they
would dominate, but they are not eager to compete against
SWAPO in an election conducted by the UN. Moreover, they
fear that a SWAPO takeover would put them in personal dan-
ger.
The DTA leaders probably will follow cues from the
South Africans at Geneva as long as Pretoria maintains a
hard line, but they are likely to resist any compromise that
Pretoria adopts. Foreign Minister Botha has gone to the
Namibian capital of Windhoek several times in recent years
to "explain" unpalatable switches in Pretoria's stance, but
offstage arm-twisting may be more difficult at Geneva. The
other Namibians in the South African delegation are a
diverse lot, ranging from two centrists who probably would
accept a compromise solution to three white rightwingers who
probably would seize any opportunity to scuttle the UN plan.
SWAPO. For years there have been evident tensions
within SWAPO between a militant faction which is determined
to fight on to a decisive military victory, and a pragmatic
faction which acknowledges that a military victory is
remote and prefers to gamble on gaining power by means of
the UN transitional program. SWAPO President Nujoma and
his closest lieutenants appear to be militant; they seem
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reluctant to give up control of the guerrilla force to face
the prospect of open politicking.
During the persistent Western diplomatic efforts to
devise transitional arrangements that are acceptable to both
sides, Nujoma has time and again agreed to pragmatic com-
promises, only to resume a hard line designed to provoke the
South Africans into actions that would scuttle the plan.
Nujoma has announced that he will head the SWAPO delegation
at Geneva, and his record suggests that he will take a hard
position. Nujoma has recently said that SWAPO will never
deal. directly with the DTA leaders, a stance that very
likely reflects a consensus of SWAPO's executive committee.
The Frontline. The leaders of the black African
governments that will be represented at Geneva will be
pressing for credible progress toward implementing the UN
plan. Frontline leaders share to a considerable degree the
Western objective of stopping the Namibian war before it
spreads further. Although each of the Frontline States has
sought military aid from one or another of the Communist
states, the black leaders as a group want to avoid an in-
crease in the Soviet and Cuban presence that would probably
accompany a major expansion of the SWAPO insurgency.
Angola and Zambia, the two Frontline States that have
allowed SWAPO to establish bases in their territory, have an
even more immediate stake in keeping the insurgency in
check. Zambian and Angolan leaders fear that any escalation
of the war would draw more frequent and more economically
and politically damaging South African raids. Luanda,
moreover, probably calculates that Pretoria would retaliate
for increased Angolan support for SWAPO by stepping up South
African backing for Angola's UNITA insurgency; the initial
Angolan proposal for a DMZ along the Namibian border was in
part aimed at cutting off the flow of South African aid to
Jonas Savimbi's group.
The desire to avoid sanctions will be another major
incentive for the black African governments to work for a
positive outcome at Geneva. Some of the Frontline leaders
have unrealistically optimistic notions about the impact of
sanctions on South Africa, but there is a general recognition
that an actual cutoff of trade and transport links with
South Afirca would be crippling for Botswana and Zimbabwe,
and very costly to Mozambique and Zambia.
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Nigeria and Tanzania have taken the lead in calling for
UN sanctions and for increased military support for SWAPO
unless the South Africans stop stalling. The two countries
are relatively safe from the side effects of these actions.
Each aspires to a broader African leadership role, however,
and recognizes that the solidarity that grew out of the
effort to resolve the Rhodesian war and the quest for a
Namibian settlement would shatter if individual national
leaders had to choose between continued delays in imple-
menting the UN plan or sanctions and increased conflict.
The Frontline nations, then, will have much to gain by
pushing SWAPO at Geneva toward compromises that could lead
to implementation of the UN plan. None of the black African
leaders, however, can afford to push an agreement that SWAPO
and its more militant backers could later depict as a
"sellout". For this reason, the Frontline states may have
insisted that Nujoma--who initially asserted that he would
not attend the conference--be present at Geneva so that he
could not repudiate decisions made there. Having the SWAPO
leader in Geneva will also enable the Frontline envoys to
induce the SWAPO delegation to accept compromises more
quickly.
Nujoma could easily turn the tables on the Frontline
representatives however, by engaging in verbal duels with
the DTA delegates. In a confrontational atmosphere, advo-
cating compromises would be even more embarrassing for the
Frontliners than for the South Africans. The Frontline
envoys must at least pay lip service to the UN and OAU
premise that SWAPO is the sole authentic voice of the
Namibian people.
Outlook for Geneva and Implications for the United States
At present the odds are against a positive outcome at
Geneva within the eight days UN Secretary General Waldheim
has allowed for the proceedings. The South Africans are
unlikely to commit themselves to the March target date
without having first obtained significant revisions in the
UN plan. Reaching mutually acceptable revisions will
require difficult and time consuming negotiations. Given
the presence of the mutually antagonistic Namibian parties
and the ready ammunition they will have in the form of the
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unresolved procedural issues, the conference probably will
break down into rhetorical fireworks long before serious
negotiations can begin.
Even if a businesslike atmosphere is maintained in
Geneva, a possible flare-up in the insurgency might cause
one of the principal parties to walk out. In the past,
the South Africans have launched major counterinsurgency
operations during sensitive phases of the negotiating process,
apparently aiming either to induce SWAPO and the Frontline
States to make concessions or to derail the negotiating
process.
Waldheim apparently felt compelled to set an early
closing date for the conference to obtain the agreement of
the African bloc to postpone a General Assembly debate on
Namibia that probably would have resulted in a resolution
calling on the Security Council to adopt mandatory economic
sanctions'against South Africa. Militants within the
African bloc almost certainly will resume their campaign for
sanctions with broad Communist and Third-World support
if convincing evidence is not obtained by mid-January that
Pretoria is willing to go ahead soon with the UN plan.
The African bloc apparently views a demand for a total
trade embargo against South Africa as a device to induce
the West to back more limited measures, such as a cutoff of
commercial air traffic with South Africa. Even a token
embargo, however, might lead Pretoria to withdraw its
support for the UN plan and undercut Western efforts to
deal constructively with Pretoria on other issues. In-
fluential members of Prime Minister Botha's National Party
adamantly oppose any dilution of white supremacy, even in
Namibia, and would depict Western backing for any new
sanctions as proving the futility of dealing with Western
leaders who urge South Africa to adopt reformist policies
that would counter international criticism.
A Western veto of a sanctions resolution in the absence
of evident progress toward a Namibia settlement could make
it politically impossible for the Frontline leaders to
continue backing Western efforts to end the guerrilla war.
Throughout the prolonged settlement talks the Frontline
leaders have maintained, with some Western encouragement,
that they, and the Western Five, would back additional
sanctions against South Africa if the Frontline States
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guaranteed SWAPO's observance of a UN truce and Pretoria
balked. If a Western veto of a sanctions resolution made
the Frontline leaders'appear as stooges, they very likely
would disassociate themselves from the UN plan and reaffirm
their backing for the SWAPO insurgency.
The most the West can probably expect from the eight-
day conference is a messy outcome that will fall short of
obtaining unequivocal South African agreement to the March
target date, but will entail gestures of good faith from
Pretoria sufficiently convincing to head off a call for UN
sanctions and buy time for the participants at Geneva to
continue trying to reach mutually acceptable transition
arrangements. The maximum efforts of the Western and
African "observers" will be required to obtain even such an
outcome, however, and the Frontline States and Western Five
would have to devote considerable diplomatic energies to
preventing any post-Geneva negotiations from breaking down.
The most immediate problem facing the Western sponsors
of the UN plan is that of convincing the South Africans that
a UN task force in Namibia will not be partial to SWAPO.
Ultimately, Pretoria's decision on whether to offer even
minimal assurances of good faith at Geneva may hinge on
Prime Minister Botha's assessment of the Western Five's
willingness to maintain sufficient leverage over the UN task
force to avert a deliberate tilt toward SWAPO and to assure
that the task force can effectively cope with violations of
agreed groundrules.
The Western Five, of course, cannot give Botha the
ironclad guarantees that he may demand; Waldheim has already
excluded all the major powers from direct participation in
either the military task force or the civil staff that would
conduct the election. Nevertheless, Western logistical
support is indispensable to the UN operation; the United
States, for instance, has agreed to a major role in the
airlift of the seven infantry battalions to Namibia. Botha
might be reassured by vigorous US support of the preparatory
measures that should get underway in January if the pro-
jected UN task force is to be ready for effective action in
March.
If the South Africans make it clear that they no
longer intend to delay the arrival of a UN task force in
Namibia, Frontline leaders might be willing to back tran-
sitional arrangements, short of constitutional guarantees,
that would tend to limit SWAPO's opportunities for gaining
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full control of an independent Namibia. For instance,
procedural rules for the constituent assembly, such as
requiring an 80 percent majority for adopting a consti-
tution, could give some leverage to the parties that failed
to gain a majority in the constituent assembly. Such rules
would not be digressions from the UN plan, which stipulates
truce arrangements but merely sketches the latter phases of
the transitional scenario.
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SUBJECT: Namibia: Status of the Settlement Process
Distribution:
1 - NSC/FUNK
1 - State/INR/Thorne
1 - D/NFAC
1 - NIO/AF
1 - DDO/AF/SB
1 - D/OPA
3 - OPA/PROD
4 - OPA/AF
4 - OCO/IDCD/CB
NFAC/OPA/AF/
(30DEC80)
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