ALLIED ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND US DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001100280001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 20, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memora..aa161 -- ..
Subject: Allied Attitudes Towards the Strategic.
Defense Initiative and US Development
of Anti-Satellite Weapons
.Attached is a typescript memorandum on
Allied views on space weapons. I hope you will
find it useful.
Attachment
EUR M 84-10127
20 June 1984
Distribution:
1 -
Sven Kraemer, NSC Staff
4 -
IMC/CB
1 -
Peter Sommer, NSC Staff
1 -
D/EURA
1 -
Hugh Montgomery, State
1 -
EURA
1 -
Steve Steiner, NSC Staff
2 - EURA Production
1 -
Ronald Lauder, Pentagon
3
'EURA/EI
1 - John Hawes, State
2 -
EURA/EI
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1 - S.R. Hanmer, Jr., Pentagon
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1 - BGen Anthony Smith, Pentagon
1 - BGen Robert Rankine, Pentagon
1 - Kent Stansberry, Pentagon
1 - Frank Miller, Pentagon
1 - Olaf Groebel, State
1 - Charles Duelfer, State
1 - Vigdor Teplitz, State
1 - Dr. Morris Rosen, ? y~/ 7~
1 - George Bader, Pentagon
DDI/EURA/EI/SI (19Jun84)
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington,D.C20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 June 1984
Allied Attitudes Towards the Strategic Defense
Initiative and US Development of Anti-Satellite Weapons
Summary
US research programs on ballistic missile
defense--the Strategic Defense Initiative--and the
development of anti-satellite weapons are becoming
a single, major issue in Western Europe. Many
Allies, especially the INF basing countries, fear
the negative publicity about space weapons could
damage recent public relations gains that NATO has
made on arms control and further erode domestic
support for INF and other Alliance programs. NATO
members are skeptical about the reliability and
excessive costs of ballistic missile defense and
maintain that US research will spur a new arms
race. They fear that such US efforts will
undermine Alliance doctrine and strategic
planning, including the credibility of US nuclear
protection of Western Europe. France and the UK
believe that the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) could threaten the deterrent value of their
nuclear forces and jeopardize future modernization
plans. On ASAT weapons, the Allies view US
development and testing as a destabilizing step
that may prompt Soviet-US competition to develop
effective countermeasures.
As a result, many Allies are becoming
increasingly vocal on outer space arms control.
They have been discussing the topic among
themselves, most recently at the meeting of
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe Office
of European Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to 25X1
Chief of the European Issues Divisio
EUR M 84-10127
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Western European Union Foreign Ministers on
12 June. They may well believe that the
approaching US Presidential elections allows them
greater leverage to increase pressure on
Washington to initiate arms control discussions on
both anti-ballistic-missile and anti-satellite
weapons. Currently, West Germany, France,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy and Norway
support such talks. Paris on 12 June at the
Geneva Conference on Disarmament called for
negotiations leading to a ban on directed-energy
defensive and offensive systems and on high-
altitude ASAT weapons. Even the UK, customarily
the closest to the US on arms control issues,
wants negotiations on ballistic missile defense
during the research phase and reportedly is
considering support for limits on ASAT weapons.
The Allies and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Most NATO members remain skeptical over the feasibility and
desirability of a space and land-based ballistic missile defense
(BMD). They are concerned over the political, military, and
economic implications of systems now under consideration by the
US. They especially are worried that the issue will become a
major public relations problem for NATO.
The systems comprising SDI would be designed to incapacitate
enemy missiles in the liftoff, midcourse, and re-entry stages and
could conceivably be used also as anti-satellite weapons. They
could include:
-- Space-based chemical lasers designed to destroy missiles
shortly after liftoff.
-- Ground-based lasers, utilizing sensors in space, to
destroy missiles in the re-entry stage.
-- A space-based, nuclear-generated, X-ray laser.
-- A space-based, particle beam weapon.
-- Kinetic-energy weapons such as interceptor missiles and
"hyper-velocity guns," based on the ground or in space,
to hit enemy warheads at midcourse or re-entry.
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-- Microwave weapons using high frequencies to
electronically disrupt enemy communications and
targeting.
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The Allies initially broadcast their reservations about the
Strategic Defense Initiative immediately following the
President's speech on March 23, 1983. Their negativism was
caused, in part, by pique over the lack of consultations on the
issue and the fact that the speech caught them by surprise. They
were also concerned that the US chose to announce SDI when the
controversy over initial deployments of NATO INF was building in
Western Europe. In recent months, the Allies have voiced concern
that US emphasis on space-based defensive weapons could undermine
Western efforts to project an image of commitment to arms control
in the wake of the INF controversy. The West European media,
especially in West Germany and France, highlighted the successful
US test this month of an ABM interceptor missile--alongwith the
latest Soviet call for a ban on space weapons. 25X1
Despite extensive consultations with the US, many Allied
governments continue to question certain facets of SDI. These
reservations echo those now being debated within the US
scientific community and in the US and West European media: is
such a defense system affordable, is it workable, and will it
create strategic instability by fostering both an offensive and
defensive arms race between the US and the USSR? Virtually all
NATO members fear the impact of BMD on Alliance doctrine and
strategic planning, and many maintain that even a partial defense
system could undermine the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella
by allowing the US to "decouple" itself from Europe in time of
war. For example, Italian officials have indicated that the-US
could be perceived as abandoning its Allies after forcing them to
accept INF. French, Dutch and West German foreign office and
defense officials have emphasized that the SDI could eventually
decouple Western Europe from the US if protection was not fully
extended to Europe. 25X1
Allied officials also say that the US publicly is adding
credence to Soviet charges that it is preparing for a pre-emptive
first strike capability. In addition, they are dubious about the
ability to defend against tactical nuclear and short-range
weapons. West German, French, and Dutch defense officials have
voiced particular concern about this aspect. Allied officials,
moreover, maintain that BMD weapons can have anti-satellite
capability, and French, Dutch, and Italian officials have
stressed this linkage. The West Germans and French publicly--and
other Allies privately--are counseling the US to to open
discussions with the Soviets on BMD, and are also stressing that
the US should take care not to abrogate or undermine the 1972 ABM
treaty. 25X1;
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Views on ASAT Weapons
Several Allies, believing that their publics as well as many
non-aligned countries are receptive to Soviet criticism of the
West on arms control in outer space, have urged the US not only
to begin negotiations on space-based defense, but to resume talks
on ASAT weapons. Especially the UK and France have pointed out
that current US efforts on ASAT weapons will only spark an arms
race with the USSR. Many Allies also have voiced concern that
such arms competition would inevitably lead to the adoption of
countermeasures th2t would encourage development of more advanced
offensive systems. Allied officials accept US evidence of
current Soviet ASAT capabilities, ~ut some argue that the present
Soviet ASAT system is rudimentary. Italian officials contend,
for example, that an arms control agreement could forestall
Soviet and US development of effective systems by the end of the
decade, while Dutch officials observe that the US has the
capability quickly to eclipse Soviet technological advances.
Moreover, the West European media generally have ignored Soviet
capabilities while complaining of US activities in this area.
iSince the early 1960s, the US and USSR have subscribed to a
number of treaties and agreements that deal with the military
use of outer space. (See Appendix). Taken as a whole, these
pacts prohibit such activities as deployment of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction in orbits around the
earth, on celestial bodies, or stationed in outer space in any
other manner. On celestial bodies, they also prohibit creation
of military bases and fortifications, testing any type of weapon
and conducting military activities. In addition, several of
these agreements focus on non-interference with satellite
communications.
2Examples of countermeasures include an ASAT attack warning
system, hardening satellites against shock or nuclear effects,
enhancing their ability to maneuver, and the orbiting of "silent
spares"--satellites that can be activated to replace operational
systems.
3The existing Soviet ASAT system is a conventional interceptor
launched by a version of the SS-9 ICBM into a co-orbit with
the target satellite.
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External Pressure on the Allies
Aggressive Soviet promotion of its positions on arms control
in outer space greatly concerns many NATO allies.* The INF
basing countries in particular are worried over Soviet success at
the United Nations and at the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD)
in Geneva in exploiting the concern of many non-aligned nations
about an arms race. Some of these non-aligned nations are
seeking new legal and regulatory mechanisms through the UN to
control the militarization of outer space and to ban any
activities in space that might threaten their interests.;
NATO countries have remained united at the UN in insisting
that any international discussion of arms control issues be
conducted at the CD. However, when both the East and Neutrals
last fall advanced a UN resolution calling for negotiations on
outer space arms control, the Allies abandoned the US to vote for
the resolution, except for the UK, which abstained. At the CD,
the Allies until now have reluctantly supported the US position
that the mandate of the CD's working group on outer space be
limited to discussion of, but not negotiation on, arms control
agreements. But France's proposal at Geneva for negotiations
limiting space weapons effectively has broken the appearance of
Allied unity on this issue, and other NATO members of the Western,
Group in the CD (the UK, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Canada) may endorse multilateral negotiations in
that forum.
Current Positions of Key Allies
France, West Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Canada have all been vocal in their concerns about US plans'for
BMD. Paris and London are concerned over the implications of BMD
for NATO and its deterrent strategy as well as over the prospect
of a US-Soviet monopoly of such new systems. All but the UK have
also supported a ban on high-altitude ASATs, and London
reportedly is reassessing its position.
France
The comments of French officials to the US privately and in
recent NATO deliberations have mirrored the criticisms of other
*The Soviets last year at the UN tabled a new draft treaty that
prohibits testing and deployments of space-based weapons,
testing and military use of piloted space craft and new ASAT
systems. It also calls for elimination of existing systems and
provides for verification by national means.
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Allies. However, they also strongly contend that Soviet
competition with the US in the development of BMD could threaten
the deterrent value of existing and modernized French strategic
forces, strip Western Europe of US nuclear protection, and lead
to serious acrimony within NATO. For these reasons, French
defense officials say they favor negotiations to limit
development of these systems. Indeed, France on 12 June proposed
at the CD that the US and USSR agree to multilateral talks on
banning energy-directed anti-ballistic and anti-satellite weapons
and strictly limiting high-altitude ASAT weapons. Paris, like
other Allies, wants the US to exhibit more flexibility towards
space arms control at the CD. French officials, moreover, say
the US should be more "consistent" in its public statements on
SDI in particular and not stress imminent success of research
efforts.
At the same time, France apparently believes it must now
consider developing its own strategic defense capability to
protect its forces and to ensure that the US and USSR do not gain
a monopoly on defensive systems. Moreover, the French may be
concerned that through SDI, the US eventually will take the lead
in industrial development of the new technologies involved at the
expense of France and Western Europe. Defense Minister Hernu in
.mid-March claimed that President Mitterrand is thinking of
forming a special commission of leading French scientists and
strategists to investigate the development of a French system
usin technologies similar to those under consideration by the
US.
West Germany
Bonn, for the sake of public opinion, wants to be perceived
as strongly favoring both US-Soviet and multilateral negotiations
on arms control in space. West German officials say they are
sympathetic to the French proposal on space weapons at the CD.
Foreign Minister Genscher recently called publicly for
"precautionary" arms control talks on new defensive systems while
they are in the research stage. According to West German
officials, Bonn also favors a ban on high-altitude ASATs that is
monitored by specific verification procedures. The agreement
would allow the US and USSR to have one system each in a low
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Woerner and other top West German officials, have also aired
these concerns publicly in an attempt to distance the Kohl
government from the US on the BMD issue. In early April, Woerner
observed in a widely--disseminated interview that he understood
US desires to catch up to the Soviets on space research, but
believed that US-Soviet competition could destabilize the East-
West balance and split the Alliance. Woerner noted that
reasonable disarmament agreements were better than a new and
costly rearmament. His views were echoed subsequently in the
West German press by the government spokesman and by CSU leader
Strauss. The opposition Social Democrats, meanwhile, charged
that US research and development of defensive and ASAT weapons
would seriously harm West German-US relations and called on the
Kohl government to emphasize to the US the need to avoid a new
arms race.
United Kingdom
British officials have privately stressed London's numerous
reservations on the Strategic Defense Initiative, particularly
the potential expense involved and the ramifications for NATO
strategy. London also has expressed concern that the successful
US demonstration of ballistic missile defense on
10 June could be seen as a violation of the ABM treaty. The
British, like the French, also are greatly concerned about the
impact of BMD on the government's public justifications for INF,
on the already controversial Trident program, and on other
nuclear modernization programs. Defense Minister Heseltine has
suggested that NATO consider arms control alternatives in this
On other outer space issues, the Thatcher government
generally has been closest to US positions, but British officials
are warning that this may change. They say the UK is sympathetic
to the "substance" of the French proposal at the CD, and London
reportedly is considering support for a partial ban on ASAT
weapons.
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The Netherlands
The Dutch have been outspoken in expressing their concerns
in Allied discussions on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They
also have actively sought support within the Alliance in recent
months for negotiations on ASAT weapons. Dutch officials have
joined their British and West German counterparts in voicing
sympathy with the French proposal at the CD. The Hague fears that
the current public discussion of potential US defensive and
offensive weapons in space will heighten the skepticism about the
US commitment to arms control already widespread in the
Netherlands in connection with INF. Dutch defense and foreign
ministry officials recently noted that West Europeans perceive
SDI as part of a major change in US strategic thinking, and that
it could lead to further US-European "estrangement." They
pointed out that the Dutch Parliament in February adopted a
"sweeping" motion sponsored by the opposition Labor party calling
for the Netherlands to urge the US and USSR to negotiate
bilateral and multilateral bans on the development and testing of
space weapons.
Within the Alliance, the Netherlands has proposed three
alternative bans on ASAT weapons: on all existing and future
systems, only on future systems, or on high-altitude systems
only. The Dutch in NATO discussions have said they are
encouraged by signs that the US is considering a partial
prohibition of ASAT weapons.
Canada
Ottawa for some time has been pushing for a ban on testing
and deployment of high-altitude ASAT weapons. Negotiations on
space weapons is a key part of Prime Minister Trudeau's proposals
for strategic stability, and Canada has used discussions of the
Trudeau Initiative to stimulate Allied interest in arms control
and put pressure on the US. The Canadians have agreed, however,
not to present their ASAT proposal at the CD pending further
discussions with US officials. Canada recently publicly rejected
Soviet allegations that Ottawa's interest in arms control had
flagged since Trudeau announced his impending resignation,
claiming that it will push for a ban on high-altitude ASAT
weapons despite US opposition. Canada has circulated within NATO
a lengthy paper drafted by its embassy in Moscow outlining
"clear" Soviet concerns about SDI and US development of ASAT
weapons. The paper concludes that Moscow may be receptive to
discussions in these areas next year.
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Outlook
US plans for research on BMD and development of ASAT
weapons, and its position on arms control of space weapons,
almost certainly will be a major topic within the Alliance in the
months ahead. The Allies will escalate pressure for arms control
dialogue between the USSR and the US on ballistic missile defense
and a limited ban on ASAT weapons. At the same time, many will
press for multilateral talks on arms control in outer space in
Beyond this, the Allies almost certainly will hope that they
can discourage the US from publicly highlighting SDI and at least
to influence US thinking on the issue in ways that will protect
their interests. They thus will continue to air their concerns
privately and publicly both toward this end and to ensure that
the US keeps them informed.
There are indications that Mitterrand and Kohl especially
hope to exploit growing Allied interest in greater European
defense cooperation in order to enhance coordination among the
major Allies on arms control issues, and thereby increase their
leverage on the US. France, for example, is proposing that the
Agency for Control of Armaments of the Western European Union
(WEU) be restructured to provide a forum for discussion of arms
control issues and to deal with verification of agreements.
Significantly,
foreign ministers of the seven WEU members agreed at their
meeting on 12 June that the WEU could be used as a forum to.
discuss s arms control issues, including space weapons.
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Appendix
Agreements or Treaties Involving Arms Control in
Outer Space and BMD
-- The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
-- The Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
-- Agreement on Measures to Reduce Risk of Nuclear War of
1971.
-- The Hot-Line Modernization Agreement of 1971.
-- Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects of 1972.
-- The ABM Treaty of 1972.
-- The SALT I Agreement of 1972.
-- The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into
Outer Space of 1975.
-- SALT II, signed in June 1979, but not ratified.
-- Environmental Modification Convention of 1980.
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