NSSD 1-82 SUMMARY OF PART III-A: IMPACT OF MILITARY THREATS ON US MILITARY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00275R000100200012-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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ummary of Part III-A: Impact of Military Threats on
US Military Strategy
1. The key military threats to US national security continue to be posed
by the USSR and its allies and clients. Despite increasingly vexing pressures
and constraints on its economy and the growing political and military
vulnerabilities in its empire, the Soviet Union is continuing to expand and
modernize its strategic and conventional forces. Current Soviet leaders,
moreover, are probably prepared to accept the necessary sacrifices to sustain
the expansion of Soviet military power, which they see as the most important
element in the growth of Soviet political influence.
2. We do not believe, however, that the USSR is seeking to use its
military power directly against the United States or its allies, but rather
sees this power as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure upon US allies
and other states along the Soviet periphery: Western Europe, Pakistan, Iran,
China, and Japan. The Soviets are concerned about current US plans and
programs for rapid military modernization, but probably anticipate that US
defense spending will he tempered by domestic resistance and economic
dilemmas.
3. Direct military conflict with the USSR is much less probable than war
with other states which are supported by the Soviet Union. In such a
conflict, the risk of escalation to a confrontation with the USSR would vary
according to the situation, but as a result of their expanded strategic
military power the Soviets are probably less averse than in the past to take
the risks which might lead to such a confrontation.
4. The Soviet military buildup, combined with the absence of effective
resistance, has also encouraged the Soviets to adventures in the Third
World. Utilizing proxies and mobilizing a diversified arsenal of arms,
military and paramilitary training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and
economic aid, the USSR in opportunistic fashion, continues to exploit and
manipulate indigenous unrest in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and
Africa, in order to undermine US influence, to bring Soviet sympathizers to
power, and to acquire additional military bases.
5. Additional military threats to US interests are posed by the military
forces of Soviet allies and friends in the Warsaw Pact and by those of Cuba,
Vietnam, and North Korea. Some of these states act as surrogates for the USSR
in the Third World, and in the cases of Cuba, Libya, the PLO, and Syria, as
conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that undertake terrorism.
6. Other military threats to US interests arise out of numerous regional
hostilities which threaten to touch off military conflict on a much wider
scale and draw in the superpowers: the Arab-Israeli imbroglio, China-USSR,
China-Vietnam, India-Pakistan, and Greece-Turkey. Finally, the possession or
potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by certain countries may pose
additional military threats to the United States in the near future.
7. From a regional perspective, Europe and East Asia are the principal
Soviet military concerns. In both regions, the USSR continues to expand and
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to modernize its theater nuclear and conventional forces. In Europe, the
Soviets are deeply concerned about unrest in Poland. They are deeply engaged
in exploiting and encouraging US-West European differences and the West
European "peace movement." In East and Southeast Asia, the major military
threats to US security interests stem from Soviet efforts to contain China,
together with the related Soviet effort to hedge against the possibility of a
Washington-Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of Soviet military
might.
8. In the Middle East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian
revolution, and the war between Iran and Iraq have combined to make the
Persian Gulf area the focus of significant US strategic concern. In addition,
acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that would harm US
interests in the region.
9. The military threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the
Communist exploitation of social and political unrest in Central America, and
such exploitation constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests in
the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR.
10. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are
relatively small, and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or
domestic instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side
of local clients.
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NSSD 1-82
Part III-A
Impact of Military Threats on US National Security Strategy
1. The growing strategic and conventional military might of the USSR,
its acquisition of military strongpoints far from its frontiers, and its
willingness to provide training, military advisers, and arms to radical
governments and insurgency movements in the Third World pose increasingly
serious challenges to the United States. This effort has been sustained
despite changes in the international environment, the limited US-Soviet
accommodation of the 1970s, and the SALT agreements, but it has drawn scarce
human and technical resources and raw materials from the Soviet economy. For
the most part, the projection of Soviet power reflects opportunism--which has
been heightened by the absence of effective US or allied resistance. It will
become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to meet their military
requirements, as demographic and energy problems combine with other
fundamental difficulties to retard Soviet economic growth. Under these
conditions, maintaining historical rates of growth in defense spending will be
economically and politically more difficult. Even to, Soviets expenditures
for strategic and defensive forces probably will increase during the next
decade. Nevertheless, the inevitable succession problem which will occur
shortly in the USSR make predictions of Soviet military policy in the future
risky.
2. Direct military conflict with the Soviet Union, however, is much less
probable than war with other states which are supported by the USSR. Since
World War II, the United States has been engaged in major conflicts in Korea
and Vietnam; and current regional tensions, especially in the Middle East,
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East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, could once again involve the United
States in a war with a Soviet ally or client. In such a conflict, the risk of
escalation to a confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the
situation.
3. Additional military threats to US interests are posed by the military
forces of Soviet allies and friends in the Warsaw Pact and by those of Cuba,
Vietnam, and North Korea. Still other military threats to US interests arise
from numerous regional hostilities, the Arab-Israeli conflict, China-USSR,
China-Vietnam, India-Pakistan, among others. Nuclear proliferation will
become an increasingly serious problem in coming years as more and more
countries continue to seek access to nuclear energy and, in some cases, to
nuclear weapons. Many countries already have the technological capability to
produce nuclear weapons, and more countries will acquire such a capability.
4. During an era of general political stability at home and relaxed
tensions abroad Soviet military programs grew and entailed the proliferation
of weapons development programs, the mass production of weapons systems, and
the subordination of other interests to the military requirements of the
state. This effort, combined with the limited group of US military
capabilities in the 1970s, has reversed the quantitative US lead in strategic
nuclear delivery vehicles and so reduced the credibility of US nuclear forces
as an umbrella for others. It has also increased the Soviet advantages in
conventional military forces, and has enabled the USSR--aided by allies like
Cuba--to project its political and military influence into the farthest
reaches of the globe.
5. Utilizing proxies and mobilizing a diversified arsenal of arms sales,
military and paramilitary training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and
economic aid, the USSR continues to take advantage of indigenous unrest in the
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Middle East, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Such activities will continue
as. long as the Soviets perceive that they can undermine pro-Western
governments without risking a major confrontation with the United States.
6. The improved Soviet strategic position relative to the United States
may create a greater sense of security on the part of Soviet leaders bent on
pursuing additional adventures outside their frontiers. This enhanced
strategic position together with massive conventional military power, the
availability of proxies, and willingness to provide or sell weaponry on a
large scale permits the USSR to extend its influence in unprecedented
fashion. Indeed, the USSR now projects its military and political presence
into such remote regions as the Red Sea, Vietnam, the Indian Ocean, and the
Caribbean. Nevertheless, the bulk of its conventional forces--its divisions
and associated tactical air forces--are largely confined to the Eurasian land
mass, and its projectable forces could be matched by the United States and its
allies.
7. During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought after goal
of superpower status alongside the United States, codified in the SALT-related
agreements and politically acknowledged in a series of bilateral accords,
highlighted by the Joint Declaration of Principles Governing Relations Between
the US and USSR. However, Moscow did not regard acknowledged "parity" as
implying a global code of conduct acceptable to Washington. Moscow's pursuit
of detente with the United States was accompanied by a perception of the
United States as hamstrung by political indecision stemming not only from the
trauma of Vietnam but the inability to achieve a domestic consensus on foreign
policy in general and East-West issues in particular. In turn, the Soviets
have probed US resolve by means of an increasingly assertive policy in the
Third World, as witnessed by their military support ventures in Angola and
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Ethiopia, as well as their invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets have also
exploited detente to promote divisions between the United States and its NATO
allies.
8. Strategic nuclear forces support Soviet foreign policy aims by
projecting an image of military strength sufficient to offset the strategic
forces of potential opponents. Soviet leaders appreciate the political
importance of world perceptions of military power and have long acknowledged
the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower status. They
view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an
assertive foreign policy and the expansion of Soviet power and influence
abroad. However, the Soviets do not believe that they currently enjoy
significant strategic military advantages over the United States, and they
fear the possible consequences of US military modernization efforts,
especially the deployment of immediate range missles in Western Europe. But
their apprehensions are tempered by a willingness to wait for current US
determination to rebuild its military power to wane as a result of domestic
opposition. Although they do not wish a major confrontation with the United
States, the Soviets are probably less fearful of this occurring than they were
five years ago. Thus, although the Soviets are unlikely to initiate military
hostilities in an area of central importance to the United States like the
Persian Gulf, they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by
instability in Iran or Pakistan thereby initiating a sequence that could
escalate into a major US-Soviet confrontation.
9. The Soviets have achieved capabilities for intercontinental nuclear
conflict that are widely recognized as at least equal to those of the United
States. The USSR will further improve the striking power and survivability of
its strategic intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear offensive
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forces, make progress in overcoming some of the weaknesses of its strategic
defenses, and improve its supporting command, control, and communications
systems. Thus, the Soviets are expanding the capabilities of their SLBM
force, and are developing mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental
bomber. The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military
forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training
to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict
situations. They are well aware that the course of a nuclear conflict will
probably not go according to plans. But Soviet leaders have apparently worked
through many of the problems of conducting military operations in nuclear war,
improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict
and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR. Indeed, the
Soviets probably see their launch on tactical warning options as permitting a
larger and more coordinated counterattack than retaliation.
10. The Soviets have also engaged in a vigorous modernization and
expansion of their theater and peripheral nuclear forces. This effort has
been highlighted by continuing deployments of the SS-20, the Backfire bomber
--which is also capable of performing intercontinental missions--and new
generations of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. They are now in a better
position to match any NATO escalation of a European conflict from one level of
nuclear war to another and have acquired increased capabilities to use
peripheral strike forces opposite China and throughout the Eurasian periphery.
11. In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly expanded
their forces opposite Europe and China, while introducing a combat force of
about 100,000 men into Afghanistan. They have also developed the ability to
project their power into the Third World, as demonstrated most strikingly by
the Soviet airlifts of Cuban proxy forces and military materiel into Angola in
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1975 and Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviets have not developed forces specifically
for overseas invasion. They rely instead on general purpose forces designed
principally for use in Europe and along the Soviet periphery, but they also
have airborne forces suitable for operations in more distant areas. For the
most part, the Soviets will continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World
and will be unlikely to commit their own forces to such operations. However,
in light of their enhanced strategic force capabilities and continued
expansion of general purpose forces, the Soviets may be more willing to accept
the risks of confrontation with the United States in a serious crisis,
particularly in an area like the Persian Gulf where they enjoy military or
geopolitical advantages.
12. Since 1965, the growth of Soviet defense spending averaged about 4
percent a year--about the same as that for the overall economy. Throughout
this period Soviet priorities among the services have remained relatively
constant. The defense share of GNP has risen 12 to 13 percent, to 14 percent
in 1979. Between 1971 and 1980, the estimated cumulative cost of Soviet
defense activities (excluding pensions)--that is, the cost of reproducing them
in the United States--exceeded cumulative US defense outlays by 40 percent.
For 1980, the estimated Soviet dollar costs were $195 billion --50 percent
higher than total US outlays. If defense spending continues to grow at about
4 percent per year and economic growth continues to decline, the defense share
of GNP could increase to 15 percent in 1985 and might approach 20 percent by
the end of the decade. This would erode future increments to GNP that have
been so important in the past for easing internal political-economic
tensions. Indeed, although the preparation of the 1981-85 economic plan has
involved particularly vexatious decisions about the allocation of resources
between the defense and nondefense sectors of the economy, we have seen no
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indications of a shift of resources away from the defense sector.
13. The problems in the economy as a whole have made the acquisition of
Western goods and technology increasingly important to Soviet defense
programs:
-- Western goods have helped to improve the performance of a strained
economy, and this has lightened the burden of growth in defense
spending.
-- More directly, legal and illegal acquisitions of military-related
technology have saved the Soviets considerable time and resources
in designing and producing new weapons and military support
systems.
The importance in the 1980s of raising the technological sophistication of
weapons will ensure continued Soviet interest in obtaining advanced Western
technologies.
14. The West could slow improvement in the performance of Soviet weapons
by the late 1980s or the early 1990s by broadening controls over exports of
military-related technology--and increasing its efforts to plug leakages.
While there is little likelihood that even comprehensive and sustained Western
economic sanctions in the near term would significantly affect Soviet military
programs--many of which are already well under way--such sanctions applied for
a number of years could make qualitative improvements to Soviet weapon systems
more expensive.
15. Complicating the Soviet economic dilemma are serious problems within
the Soviet empire, instability along its periphery, indigenous unrest within
its overseas strongpoints, and continued hostility with China combined with
the prospect of US-Chinese military cooperation. Events in Poland and
Afghanistan reveal how shallow the roots of Communism are in those countries
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and create the spectre of "ideological contamination" elsewhere in the Soviet
Bloc. Unrest in Poland in particular brings into question once more the
reliability of Warsaw Pact forces in the event of war in Europe and the
security of Soviet lines of communication and logistics.
16. Turmoil along the Soviet periphery, notably in Iran, also reinforces
the long-time Soviet obsession with the need for order and friendly regimes
along its frontiers. Turmoil may also present opportunities to the Soviets,
again notably in Iran. Moreover, internal unrest and in some cases insurgency
have come to plague a number of Soviet overseas clients. Thus, even while the
Soviet presence in Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, Vietnam, and even Syria is
vulnerable, these countries continue to consume scarce Soviet resources,
placing additional burdens on the Soviet economy. The Polish crisis has
greatly increased the magnitude of these burdens. The drain on Soviet
resources, therefore, can pose acute dilemmas for Soviet leaders, dilemmas
which will intensify to the extent the Soviet empire continues to grow.
17. Despite the growing burdens of empire, however, Soviet leaders are
likely to maintain the pace of their military expenditures in the next few
years in order to cope with instability within the East Bloc and along the
Soviet frontier and to buttress insecure friends and allies in the Third
World. Moreover, the very insecurity which its imperial problems have created
for Moscow may encourage the Soviets to act to try to overcome them,
particularly before current US defense plans are carried forth. The invasion
of Afghanistan and the declaration of martial law in Poland illustrate that
the USSR will react vigorously where it sees its vital interests at risk.
18. Concurrent with their military effort, the Soviets will pursue an
arms control dialogue with the United States and the West. The strategic arms
control process in particular remains important to Moscow as a means of
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constraining the potential military competition from the United States.
Indeed, a major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce the
possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might seriously jeopardize
Moscow's strategic nuclear status. The economic motivation behind Moscow's
arms control policy is less evident. Soviet spending for all strategic
forces--offensive and defensive--constitutes only about 20 percent of total
military expenditures. The economic benefits derived from limitations on
strategic arms would likely be small, at least in the near term.
19. Soviet interests in arms control are also reinforced by political
considerations. Globally, the Soviets have advocated a myriad of
propagandistic arms control measures (such as proposals for "zones of peace"
and nuclear-free zones), designed in large part to curry favor with nonaligned
Third World states and to bring diplomatic pressure on the United States to
curtail its military presence in strategically important regions. In Europe
in particular, arms control overtures are a complement to diplomatic efforts
aimed at countering NATO charges of excessive Soviet military strength and of
Soviet military "aggressiveness."
20. Complementing Soviet eagerness for arms control agreements and
rhetoric on behalf of East-West detente, is Moscow's deep engagement in
support of revolutionary violence worldwide and probes for geopolitical
advantages. With Moscow's aid and encouragement, a number of radical regimes
have come to power during the past decade--in Nicaragua, Angola, and Ethiopia-
-which are fundamentally anti-American, and the Soviet Union continues to
court these and other Third World states assiduously. The USSR also directly
or indirectly supports a number of national insurgencies (e.g., SWAPO in
Namibia) and ethnic-separatist movements (e.g., the Palestine Liberation
Organization in the Middle East) by providing them with arms, advice, military
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training, and political backing. In addition, the USSR supports allied or
friendly governments and entities--notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups,
East European states, South Yemen, Syria, and Cuba--which in turn directly or
indirectly aid the subversive or terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of
violent revolutionaries in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Western
Europe. For their part, these Soviet proxies directly or indirectly are
applying military or paramilitary pressure upon governments friendly to the
United States, for example, El Salvador, Guatemala, the Sudan, and Somalia.
21. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales, military technicians and
advisers, and military training (locally and within the USSR) are potent
sources of Soviet political influence in the Third World. The total value of
Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales and assistance deliveries worldwide
peaked in 1979 (approximately $12.4 billion) but continues at a high level
(approximately $10.6 billion in 1980 and $4.5 billion in the first half of
1981). In addition to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, North Korea,
Romania, and East Germany also provide large amounts of military assistance to
Third World countries. Middle Eastern governments--notably Syria, Libya,
Algeria, and Iraq--are the major recipients of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military
sales and assistance, but Sub-Saharan African and Asia are also major targets
of such military sales and assistance. The amount of influence it buys is
arguable, but there is no question the aims sold tempt receipients to
aggressive actions.
22. The influx of large numbers of Soviet and Soviet-bloc military
technicians and advisers in the Middle East (6,400 in 1981), Sub-Saharan
Africa (10,500 in 1981), and Asia (3,700 in 1981) has provided the Soviets
with some political leverage, a potential basis for a greater military
presence in the future, and, in some cases, actual battlefield experience.
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And the military training of large numbers of Third World nationals in the
Soviet bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of sympathizers and allies
when they return home.
23. The military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its friends and
allies is manifested in a number of regions, especially those of greatest
priority to them: Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. In addition, in
several regions, particularly Latin America, there are military threats posed
by Soviet proxies, insurgency and terrorism, and local conflicts that do not
at present involve either superpower directly. Indeed, regional hostilities
within NATO, such as the long-simmering dispute between Greece and Turkey over
Cyprus and territorial claims in the Aegean, could weaken Alliance security.
Europe
24. It is Soviet policy to acquire and maintain forces capable of
winning a war in Europe whether conventional or nuclear. The Soviets take a
cautious view of NATO's military capabilities and of the risks of instability
in Eastern Europe. These concerns and their evident conviction that military
power is a key element of a successful foreign policy have led the Soviets,
together with their Warsaw Pact allies, to keep a clear numerical edge over
NATO in general purpose and strategic forces. While the Soviets are very
unlikely to initiate military hostilities against NATO, they may well use
their military advantages in Europe to exert political pressure on NATO
members and to encourage US-West European differences as well as "pacifist"
and "neutralist" trends in Western Europe.
25. The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on Western,
not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large, combat ready forces to
be in place at the outset of hostilities. The Soviets would prefer to achieve
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their theater objectives without using nuclear weapons. They apparently
believe that a theater nuclear war would arise either when NATO used, or was
preempted from using, nuclear weapons to avoid losing the conventional war,
or, less likely, when the Warsaw Pact had to use nuclear weapons to halt a
NATO break-through. In this phase the Soviets would use, in addition to
tactical nuclear weapons, hundreds of peripheral and some intercontinental
range missiles and aircraft against NATO's forward based nuclear forces and
against China, if the conflict had spread to the Far East. Their naval and
air forces, using both nuclear and conventional weapons, would continue
strikes against enemy naval strike forces.
26. The military balance in Europe, however, poses delicate problems for
overall Soviet policy. The Soviets probably perceive that their buildup has
been an important element in continued Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony
in Eastern Europe. They probably also see their forces as a deterrent against
political or military developments that would alter the European balance of
power. Furthermore, the confluence of Moscow's military buildup with
increasing US-Soviet tensions has heightened West European concerns about
limited nuclear war in Europe, and has provoked political schisms in West
Europe over NATO's defense policy. This in turn has jeopardized NATO's
fragile NATO consensus in favor of deployments of new theater nuclear
missiles. Nevertheless, the Soviets know that if they appear too threatening,
they risk a galvanizing of NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense
efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued, with some success, a dual policy:
improving its military strength while pursuring arms control talks, attempting
to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a massive
propaganda campaign--supplemented by covert activities--designed to undermine
public support for NATO's defense effort, particularly INF. In the meantime,
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the Soviets have continued with deployments of new SS-20 missiles and Backfire
bombers, thus reinforcing their overall superiority in INF systems opposite
27. The Warsaw Pact's theater nuclear contingent has experienced the
greatest growth over the past 15 years: more than a doubling in the number of
aircraft, rockets, missiles, and artillery available for nuclear weapons
delivery. There also has been substantial growth in ground force manpower and
weapons inventories as the size of divisions and support elements has
increased. Since 1970, overall Pact ground force manpower has increased by
more than 400,000. Air and naval forces have also grown; but, more
importantly, they have been substantially modernized so as to increase their
effectiveness in both nuclear and nonnuclear environments.
28. During the 1980s, improvements are likely to focus more on quality
than quantity. The Soviets will face a series of very difficult problems
relating both to maintaining state-of-art technology in advanced weapons
systems and coping with future manpower stringencies. Potentially the most
threatening problems for the USSR, however, are political. The question of
the reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in a war with the West
has always been present; recent events in Poland have made it even more
pressing.
29. The military threat to Europe and the NATO Alliance will be affected
by developments within Western Europe. Strains within the NATO alliance and
the potential estrangement of some West European neutrals from some US
policies are likely to make US relations with these countries more
contentious. The European allies will seek increasingly to coordinate their
policies on international trade, security, and Third World issues in order to
present the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This
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tendency toward bifurcation within the Alliance may increasingly hinder NATO
as a mechanism for determining and coordinating security policy. Neutrals
such as Austria and Sweden probably will not be ideologically disposed toward
US policies and actions in the Third World and will attempt to apply their
exaggerated weight in international fora to oppose US initiatives.
30. The Soviets are increasingly persuaded that NATO cohesion is
declining, and they have undertaken a massive overt and covert campaign to
assist the West European "peace movement" and to foster US-West European
disagreements on security issues. Moscow may believe that growing West
European-US discord, combined with Soviet military advantages in Europe, will
make America's NATO allies increasing vulnerable to Soviet pressures and
promote neutralist tendencies in some of them.
East and Southeast Asia
31. The major military threats to US security interests in this region
stem from the Soviet Union's expanding military power and access, North
Korea's military buildup and aggressive posture, and Vietnam's capabilities
and options. Soviet military power in the region serves as an instrument of a
foreign policy program that seeks to contain or reduce China's influence,
decrease American and Japanese influence in the region, discourage anti-Soviet
policies on the part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution of a
Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system. A Sino-Soviet conflict
would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese relationship, forcing the United
States to decide whether it wished to be involved and, if so, to what
extent. Such a conflict could arise as a result of renewed tension along the
Sino-Soviet frontier or an escalation of a new Sino-Vietnamese clash.
Similarly, the possibility of Soviet efforts to intimidate Japan militarily
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might also test the credibility of the US security guarantee to its allies in
Northeast Asia. Finally, the Soviets will exploit every opportunity to
disrupt evolving Sino-US relations.
32. The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could directly
involve US forces exists on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea remains
dedicated to reunifying the Peninsula on its own terms and has not ruled out
the use of force to achieve its goal. The decade-long North Korean military
buildup is aimed at insuring the credibility of the military reunification
option. Despite its military advantages over its southern counterpart,
considerations that discourage North Korea from attempting forceful
reunification include: the US security commitment and US military presence,
the strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its
government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to maintain the
status quo.
33. The ability of Moscow or Beijing to restrain North Korean military
adventurism has been reduced as Pyongyang has become increasingly self-
sufficient in providing for its armed forces. Pyongyang's continuing
investment in the military sector indicates that the North plans to maintain
its option for war as a means of achieving its overriding goal of
reunification. Thus, any changes in the factors now discouraging North Korean
aggression that Pyongyang would perceive as substatially altering the
situation in its favor might induce the North Koreans to attack. However,
North Korea would run out of ammunition within months without external
assistance.
34. Aggressive action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely
cause of expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. About 180,000
Vietnamese combat troops in Kampuchea directly threaten Thai security.
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Vietnamese forces might strike into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it could
no longer tolerate Thai support of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces in
Kampuchea because such support was preventing Vietnam's pacification of the
country. Any Vietnamese ground or air strikes would have severe consequences,
especially in view of US and Chinese security ties to Thailand and the USSR's
considerable commitment to Hanoi. China with or without US encouragement,
might threaten a second border war in order to remind the Vietnamese that they
are vulnerable along their northern front.
35. A renewal of fighting between China and Vietnam would lead to
increased Soviet support of an important ally in Southeast Asia. At least
initially, this support probably would not include direct Soviet military
operations against China or the introduction of Soviet combat forces in
Vietnam. Rather, we would expect the Soviets to respond with a propaganda
campaign against China and to increas substantially their material aid to
Vietnam. If the conflict were prolonged or were going badly for Vietnam,
however, limited Soviet military actions against China would be possible.
36. The Far East is second only to the European theater in importance
for Soviet military policy. Its strategic value, combined with its remoteness
from the heartland of greater Russia, makes regional security an especially
difficult problem in Soviet eyes. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly
borders its major potential enemy. Furthermore, the long, slender supply
line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously close to a hostile China--
hence vulnerable to attack and interruption.
37. The buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East from 1965 through the
early 1970s, was characterized by rapid growth of ground and air combat force
levels. Since the early 1970s, it has been marked by more moderate and slower
growth in active forces, and has emphasized the creation of a substantial
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reserve force structure, the enhancement of existing forces through weapons
modernization, improvements in the combat support infrastructure, and the
development of new command structures to control and employ the forces. The
Soviet military now has a substantial portion of its general purpose forces
committed in the Far East. The Soviets are also capable of an effective
defense and strong offensive operations:
-- Roughly a threefold increase in the number of ground force
divisions and a fivefold increase in fixed-wing aircraft have been
accompanied by an expansion of support forces and substantial
increases in the numbers of tanks, artillery, armed helicopters,
and air defenses. About a quarter of the total Soviet ground and
tactical air forces are now located in the Far East.
-- The Pacific Ocean Fleet (the largest of the four Soviet fleets) has
grown significantly and has acquired more capable surface
combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, replenishment ships, and
aircraft.
-- There has been substantial growth and modernization of the theater
and strategic nuclear delivery systems available for use against
targets in the region. More than half of the SS-20 IRBM force, for
example, can be targeted against China or other countries in Asia.
38. Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to contain China
and diminish US influence, for the present complementing Vietnam's national
interests in the region. For their sizable economic investment in support of
Vietnamese policy in Indochina, the Soviets have already realized substantial
returns that further their regional interests. They have a highly visible
advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have gained access to Vietnamese
air and naval facilities that enhance their military capabilities in Southeast
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Asia. These facilities enable the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean
deployments and to expand intelligence collection capabilities in the
region. Moscow will seek greater influence in Southeast Asia over the longer
term by using Vietnam and the neighboring Indochina states to strengthen its
presence in the region, even though Vietnam is a major drain on Soviet
economic resources.
39. Although the Soviets have established permanent fortifications in
defensive zones along the border with China, they are not resigned to
conducting a static defense. They have developed a decisive conventional and
nuclear military capability to give them the capacity for major offensive
operations beyond their own borders. Whether the Far East would be a
defensive theater for the Soviets in a global war or whether they would
attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on
factors such as their political objectives, the degree of their superiority
over Chinese forces, and the military situation in other theaters. In a
strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Chinese should expect a Soviet offensive to
seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the
frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the United States would be faced with
operations designed to prevent the use of Japanese bases.
40. Other than fighting a major war, Soviet forces in the Far East could
be used to apply pressure on China to abandon its evolving relationship with
the United States. A significant deterioration in Sino-US relations might
induce a limited Sino-Soviet accommodation which would have the most serious
consequences for US security in Asia.
41. Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is now
reasonably secure, the Soviets observe no basic change in China's hostile
posture toward the USSR, and at the same time see intensified US pressure on
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Japan to assume a greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-
Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving
US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They
have also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to
maintain sizable forces in South Korea and to strengthen Seoul's political,
economic and military structure.
42. To meet these perceived challenges during the coming decade, the
Soviets will continue to depend on superior military power as the critical
instrument of foreign policy. Thus, changes to their military capabilities
will be aimed at:
-- Ensuring Soviet territorial security by deterring potential Chinese
aggression or containing a Sino-Soviet conflict.
-- Developing further Soviet offensive military capabilities to
improve their capability to inflict damage on China's military-
industrial capability and seize all or portions of Manchuria.
-- Countering US naval and air forces in the region.
-- Preventing China from taking any advantage of Soviet involvement in
a war with NATO.
-- Limiting American, Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
-- Frustrating and delaying the emergence of a "Washington-Beijing-
Tokyo axis" with links to NATO.
-- Encouraging the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective
security system.
In the last decade, the Soviets' military policy has led to a much stronger
military posture in the Far East. However, their stationing of a division on
the Japanese-claimed islands, their invasion of Afghanistan, and their support
for Vietnam have all hampered other Soviet regional political objectives.
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43. Finally, several Southeast Asian countries are troubled by long-
standing insurgencies. These insurgencies are largely contained by government
forces at present, but they could be fueled if external powers were tempted to
greater involvement.
44. The greatest potential for intensification of insurgency is in the
Philippines. The New People's Army (NPA), operating in various parts of the
country, has been successful in exploiting popular dissatisfaction with the
Government and, although still relatively small, is considered the most
formidable long-term threat to security. The NPA threat will continue to be a
serious concern because of the grave consequence for US security interests
(particularly our military bases at Subic and Clark) should it prosper.
45. Otherwise, we see little prospect for radical domestic upheavals
that would be seriously detrimental to US interests during the near-term, even
though local conditions may be conducive to varying degrees of political
change. Again, the question of future political stability in the Philippines
will be of particular concern.
The Near East, South and Southwest Asia
46. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the
war between Iran and Iraq have combined to make the Persian Gulf area with its
major oilfields the dominant US strategic concern in the Middle East. The
most severe and persisting dangers are that Iran might fall prey to increased
Soviet influence or pressure, and possibly military intervention; that
friendly states may be attacked by other local states--most immediately that
the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of
the fighting and again threaten other Gulf Arabs--; and that friendly
governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly exacerbated by
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the Soviets.
47. The potential for greater Soviet influence in Iran and in other
countries surrounding the Arabian peninsula, Afghanistan, South Yemen, and
Ethiopia is the dominant strategic concern in the area. It overshadows Iran's
efforts to export its Islamic revolution to neighboring countries, efforts
deflected by the Iran-Iraq war and which may be intensified. Pakistan, in
particular, may be subjected to direct Soviet military pressures. The Soviets
already have sought to intimidate Pakistan by diplomatic warnings, by
condemning, if not provoking a number of attacks by Afghan helicopters on
Pakistani border outposts, and by supporting anti-government terrorist
elements.
48. The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the present
the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against Israel. Even without
this advantage, Israel will maintain its wide margin of military superiority
over the Arab states and remain capable of defeating any combination of Arab
forces. Although this superiority would serve to deter a premeditated Arab
attack, skirmishes in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a wider conflict.
Less likely, Syria might inititate hostilities on the Golan Heights in an
effort to attain political objectives and negotiating leverage despite the
prospect of its defeat on the battlefield. In a major Israeli conflict with
the Arabs, the possibility of Soviet intervention must be considered.
49. Egypt is unlikely to participate in any Arab hostilities against
Israel. Cairo could help safeguard US strategic interests in the Red Sea
basin, which is growing in importance as a staging area for protection of the
Arabian Peninsula and as a terminus for new oil pipelines. Egypt's ability to
provide military assistance outside its own borders is questionable, however,
given the steady decline in its combat capabilities.
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50. A more troublesome adversary is Libya, whose sizeable equipment
inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for subversion and terrorism
are viewed with alarm by the Egyptians and others in the Middle East. Qadhafi
shows no sign of curbing his troublemaking and his efforts to undermine
moderate regimes and Western influence in the area. Nevertheless, the Libyan
military will remain ineffective in exploiting its plethora of weapons in
conventional combat.
51. Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion, the war
in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and Algeria will remain a
lesser threat to US interests than the fluid conditions around the Persian
Gulf and the threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities. Moreover, US ability to deal
with the Soviet threat will be complicated by the increasing linkage of
military developments around the Gulf with Arab-Israeli issues.
52. Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part by
Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the development of
a nuclear weapons production capability. India will become increasingly
concerned and might undertake either a military strike against Pakistan's
nuclear facilities or the production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New
Delhi's calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities of
weapons-usable fissible material. Any Indian attack would rapidly escalate
into a full-scale war.
53. Both the Soviets and the United States will face significant
obstacles in their efforts to bolster and direct the military capabilities of
regional states:
-- Neither the United States nor the USSR is likely to be able to
exercise effective control over the use of weapons supplied to more
adventuresome clients and allies such as Israel, Syria, and Libya.
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-- All states in the region, but to a lesser extent Israel, will have
substantial difficulty in alleviating shortages of skilled manpower
in military specialties. The Arab states, especially, will be slow
in absorbing and exploiting the full potential of the even more
sophisticated weapon systems. that will enter the region and in
building a logistic and support infrastructure capable of
sustaining high-intensity combat.
54. Although terrorism will not be eradicated if the Palestinian issue
is resolved in the Middle East peace process, there could be a substantial
impact on Palestinian involvement in international terrorism. Moderate Arab
states would likely reduce significantly their financial support, which could
seriously affect the ability of radical Palestinian elements to influence
terrorist activities. Nonetheless, funding and support for various terrorist
groups constitute a practice which is likely to be continued by some radical
states, especially Libya.
Latin America
55. The military threat environment in Latin America is dominated by the
Communist exploitation of social and political trends in Central America, and
such exploitation constitutes the most serious challenge to US interests in
the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR. Owing to US military
and geopolitical advantages, however, it is doubtful that the USSR would be
prepared to engage in a major confrontation with the United States in the
Caribbean or Central America. A continuation of the present trends could
result in victory for the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory
would heighten prospects for the revolutionaries in Guatemala and elsewhere in
the region. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab forces providing
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external support and management help to the insurgencies intend to make
Central America a battleground over the next few years which would distract,
weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of the world. The
evolution of these scenarios would bring the revolution to Mexico's border and
Panama, thereby raising the risks of internal destabilization and infiltration
by radical leftists.
56. Prospects are probably dim for reversing Central America's slide
toward increasing instability within the next 12 to 15 months. During this
period, political extremism and economic deprivation will intensify, producing
domestic conditions conducive to further revolutionary growth.
57. Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and
opportunities to undermine US prestige, Fidel Castro since 1978 has increased
virtually all types of assistance to revolutionaries in the region, including
arms, funding, and training. The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take
the lead, has gradually expanded its involvement--efforts complemented by some
East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and the PLO. Given the
current situation, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
58. Moreover, Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet
upgrading of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have enabled the
Soviet Union to make extensive use of Cuban facilities, and have resulted in
Soviet/Cuban collaboration in intervention abroad. Because of Cuba's
strategic position adjacent to key SLOCs in the Caribbean, its growing
military capabilities and its ties with the Soviet Union pose a threat to US
security interests in the Carabbean. The Cuban Armed Forces are already the
most powerful in Latin America.
59. The principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are
to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, and to use Nicaragua as
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a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the region. Indeed by
virtue of its location, cooperation with Communist and other radical advisers,
and support for Central American insurgencies, Nicaragua has become a hub for
revolution in Central America.
60 External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build what is already
the region's largest standing army; Nicaragua's armed forces will overshadow
those of its Central American neighbors by 1983. Managua's leaders consider
that they must protect the Sandinista revolution by building up Nicaragua's
armed strength. At the same time, however, this buildup is intimidating
governments in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to
expand their export of revolution.
61. Regional rivalries as well as political and economic instability
elsewhere in Latin America could prove tempting targets for direct or indirect
Soviet involvement in the future. The Soviets already have an extensive and
long-standing arms supply relationship with Peru, including the stationing of
military advisers there. The Soviets, moreover, offered in 1976 to train
Peruvian intelligence officers in the USSR, and some Peruvians have already
received such training.
Sub-Saharan Africa
62. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are
relatively small and involve mainly the possibility that local conflicts or
domestic instabilities might broaden and draw in the superpowers on the side
of local clients. These for the most part are the consequences of indigenous
factors including racial animosities, ethnic and tribal communalism,
63. Since 1974 the Soviets have managed to achieve major gains and
significantly strengthened their position in Africa, although they were not
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immune to reverses in Somalia, Zimbabwe, Guinea and Cape Verde. Despite these
setbacks, however, since 1974 the Soviets have:
-- Used their airlift and sealift capabilities to provide large-scale
military assistance, military advisers, and technicians to clients
at great distances from the USSR.
-- Helped keep in power pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia
including exercising command and control functions for Ethiopia in
its war with Somalia.
-- Signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mozambique.
-- Gained the use of a naval facility on Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in
the Red Sea.
-- Used their presence in Ethiopia to conduct reconnaissance flights
over the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean.
-- Used Luanda in Angola as a naval facility and staging point for
reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic.
-- Greatly increased military assistance and arms sales to Sub-Saharan
Africa.
-- Profited from the employment in combat operations of large numbers
of Cuban proxy military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. (In 1980
there were 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and 11,000 to
13,000 in Ethiopia.)
-- Encouraged and coordinated the placement of hundreds of East
Germans in security, organizational, and propaganda training jobs
in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and other countries.
-- Channeled arms to insurgents operating in Namibia, Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe), and South Africa.
-- Provided technical military assistance and even military advisers
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to Libyan forces in Chad.
64. Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may
create for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could
-- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by
providing military assistance--either directly or through the
Cubans--to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in
Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to
exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.
-- Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and
equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up
Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if
threatened with internal collapse.
-- Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third
country--with or without Soviet encouragement. For example,
Ethiopian encroachment on Somalia.
-- Soviet aquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
-- An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region.
-- Stepped up Cuban and Soviet involvement with Southern African
states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and Havana to counter
South Africa's military posture.
65. Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely to
present a frontal challenge to the West in the areas of access to strategic
metals or oil. They would not be able either to seize Sub-Saharan strategic
metals for themselves, or--barring a collapse of political order in South
Africa--to impose a prolonged denial of them to the West; nor does Soviet
behavior to date suggest that they are currently pursuing either a seizure or
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a denial strategy in the near or middle term. Likewise, Soviet naval
activities do not signal an active intention to interfere with the flow of oil
supplies for the West, given the high risk this would entail and Soviet naval
inferiority in the region. Rather, these activities are intended to promote
essentially political objectives--as well as enhance the USSR's future
strategic capabilities in the area.
66. Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily
assure greatly heightened future Soviet influence. The Soviets are probably
worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian
settlement, by their own failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US
success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-
Western stance of Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola
and Mozambique to seek greater economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s
the Soviets will be vulnerable to Western counteraction, particularly with
respect to:
-- The Soviet inability to compete with the West in trade and economic
development assistance.
-- The dissatisfaction of African military forces with the quality of
Soviet arms, availabilty of spare parts, level of maintenance
provided, and training.
-- The dependence of the Soviets on Cuban proxy military forces could
force difficult choices on the Soviets if the Cubans decided to
remove or reduce their troops in Angola or Ethiopia.
-- The incompleteness so far with which Soviet-style political
controls have been institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia, and the potential for leadership defection from Soviet
tutelage.
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-- Suspicion among Africans of Soviet intentions, reinforced by
Moscow's arm-twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for
short-term tactical gains and by African awareness of attempted
Soviet subversion.
-- The perception that "Russians" harbor racist attitudes.
-- Soviet lack of leverage to encourage the sort of negotiated
resolutions of the Namibian and--perhaps eventually--South African
problems that many black African countries would probably prefer to
see.
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