CHINA'S DEMARCHE ON TAIWAN'S INDIGENOUS DEFENSE FIGHTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 June 1986
China's Demarche on Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Fighter
Beijing's demarche of 19 June concerning US assistance to Taiwan
for its "indigenous defense fighter" (IDF) was prompted, in our judgment,
by several factors. We believe the Chinese calculate that, although it is
too late to stop the IDF program, they may be able to discourage the
United States from moving ahead with a similar program to upgrade
Taiwan's frigate fleet. The Chinese also may hope to persuade the United
States to reverse its refusal to transfer technology to China in the F-8
fighter avionics upgrade package. The Chinese no doubt sought to
maximize the impact of the demarche by making their move as
Washington prepared for Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen's visit, but we
doubt Zhu will make it a contentious issue.
This memorandum was prepared by I (Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 23 June 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Affairs, China Division,
OE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
Why Now?
We speculate China's primary reasons for making a demarche at this time are:
? Washington hosts Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen from 24 to 28 June and
would be highly sensitive to any indications of Chinese dissatisfaction with the
bilateral relationship.
? IDF contract negotiations have reached the signing stage.
? Washington has begun to seriously consider facilitating the sale of FFG-7 frigates
In our judgment, Zhu is unlikely to press the issue much during his visit. Given
the overall good state of US-China relations, the Chinese probably would consider a
hardline performance by Zhu, who is "junior" to most of his American hosts, to be
unnecessarily rude. Now that Beijing has set down its marker with the demarche, Zhu
can maintain propriety while still alluding to the IDF deal or making a pro forma protest
Condemning the IDF to Forestall the FFG-7
We doubt that the Chinese expect to kill the IDF deal at this late date. Rather, we
believe they hope to forestall a favorable US decision on the FFG-7 frigate for
Taiwan--which they undoubtedly know is under consideration. They probably also want
to discourage the United States from using this "backdoor" approach again. By naming
the specific US arms contractors involved in the IDF deal, we believe the Chinese
wanted to emphasize that they are well-informed on such US efforts to strengthen
Taiwan's defense capabilities. By being firm but ambiguous about how they would react
in the future, the Chinese probably hope the United States will show greater restraint in
defense ties with Taiwan to keep US-China relations from deteriorating. Indeed, Hu
Yaobang made just such a veiled warning on arms technology transfer in his interview
with Selig Harrison on 23 April.
Persuading the United States to Transfer F-8 Avionics Technology
The Chinese protest also in part may be intended to gain leverage to persuade
the United States to reverse its decision and allow China to have the production
technology associated with the F-8 fighter avionics package. Members of PLA Chief of
Staff Yang Dezhi's entourage repeatedly expressed their disappointment during his visit
in May that there would be no technology transferred with the deal. Although the
current package has already been approved by Congress and sent to COCOM, senior
Chinese leaders may believe it is still possible to renegotiate this point if Beijing can
increase its leverage. Given the administration's relative ease in pushing the current
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
package through Congress, moreover, we speculate Beijing may believe the United
States would have little difficulty gaining approval for a revision. 25X1
In any event, the Chinese probably resent Washington's refusal to transfer such
technology to them at a time when it is providing Taiwan with the technology to build a
new-generation fighter and considering the transfer of technology for a new frigate.
They have always been hypersensitive, moreover, to what they regard as Washington's
efforts to placate Beijing on US military technology transfers to Taiwan by selling China 25X1
some of the arms it wants. Thus, while they may not go to the mat on the IDF or even
the FFG-7, they may be signalling that the price of Chinese tolerance is going up.
In our opinion, it is conceivable that the following additional factors may have
influenced China's decision to present a demarche:
? Keeping the United States from ignoring Chinese concerns on Taiwan at a time
when Sino-Soviet political relations appear deadlocked.
? Responding in kind to recent US pressure on Beijing to halt arms sales to Iran.
? Protecting the reformist leadership's domestic flank from conservative charges
that their desire for US technology, trade, and investment has caused them to
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
National Security Council
1 - ADM. John P. Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, White House West Wing.
1 - Mr. James Kelly, Senior Staff Member, East Asia, EOB Rm 302.
1 - Don Gregg, Special Assistant to the Vice President, White House Room 298.
1 - David Laux, Senior Assistant for China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, EOB Rm 493.
Department of State
1 - Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary, Political Affairs, Rm 7240.
1 - Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Rm 6205.
1 - Amb. Morton I. Abramowitz, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Rm
6531.
1 - Richard L. Williams, Director, Office of China Affairs, Rm 4318.
1 - Amb. H. Alan Holmes, Director, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, Rm
7430.
1 - Richard H. Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Rm 7330.
1 - Mark S. Pratt, Director, EA/RA/Taiwan Coordination, Rm 4312.
1 - Thomas Fingar, Chief, INR/EAP/CH, Rm 8840.
Department of Defense
1 - RADM Baker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia, ISA, Rm 4E838
Pentagon.
1 - LTC Eden Woon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, China Plans and Policy,
FESA J-5, Rm 2E973 Pentagon.
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - D/OEA (4F18)
1 - Research Director/OEA (4G32)
2 - C/OEA/China Division (4G32)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
 ' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5
2 - DDI (7E44)
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV (4G32)
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF (4G32)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP04T00794R000301280001-5