PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WASHINGTON 'A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM WITH RESPECT TO (CLASSIFIED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-01065A000200050002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 15, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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atL.unU n inrunrwi ivn
DOC. NO. D-15a/la
DATE Jan. 15, 1953
COPY NO. 48
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington
TO ESCAPEES FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT: PHASE B"
WARN ING
This document contains information affecting the national defense of the
United States, within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18,Sec-
tions 793 and 794, U.S.C., the transmission or revelation of which in
any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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*fto( *40V
SECURITY INFORMATION
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PSB D-l&a/la
January 15, 1953
PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
"A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROMRAAN WITH PSSPECT
TO ESCAPEES FROM TIM SOVIET ORBIT: PHASE B"
This program was approved by the Board at its 17th
meeting, January 15, 1953. Your attention is called to
the new wording, approved by the Board, for paragraph 2
on page 1.
Charles E. Jolmspn
Secretary-to theBbard
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11..1 SEC tEITY DWORMTION 'Now
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PSYCHQhOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
PSB D-]Sa/la
January 15, 1953
"A tonal achol ca Pro With Re t
T Pr Th S t Orbit: 7has B"
1. P chalo al Ob ect ve .
as To reduce the power and influence of the USSR by application
of affirmative psychological pressures upon the enslaved populations
in order to undermine and contribute toward destruction of control
of the Kremlin,
b. To strengthen and enhance the power of the non-communist
world by the progressive acquisition and psychological utilization
of escapees from the Soviet orbit.
2. Rgnuf"e iep for Program Development.
Within the framework of NSC 86/1 and with due regard for conditions
in specific areas, particularly Berlin and Hongkong:
a. Take action to insure that escapees from the Soviet orbit
will receive asylum and will be assisted in achieving a constructive
life in the free world; and to this end enlist the support of govern-
ments of the free world.
b, Emphasize the inducement to escape of Soviet orbit citizens
who can make a worthwhile psychological contribution either by pub-
licity based upon the fact of escape or by participation in psycho-
logical programs.
0. Give reasonable priority to exploitation of the psychological
potential of escapees except where jeopardy or substantial loss to
intelligence operations is clearly demonstrable.
Yn this Plan "escapee" is an inclusive term meaning a national of a
Soviet orbit state who has escaped from control of the Soviet orbit
and who refuses to return to such control. "Soviet prbit" includes
USSR, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania:, Poland, "German Democratic Republic"*
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania,,, Bulgaria, Albania, Tibet, "Chinese
People's Republic",' "Korean People's Republic"., and any nation which
may be added to the Soviet sphere of influence.
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d. Encourage, assist and guide the efforts of groups of escapees
(particularly recent escapees) to increase popular dissidence behind
the "iron curtains" to expose Soviet tyranny and to vitiate the
effect of Communist propaganda throughout the world.
(1) Assist in the development of dynamic, cooperative
leadership within groups of escapees, consistent with U, S.
policy.
(2) Encourage independent groups of escapees to indict
the Soviet system and. its individual leaders more effectively.
e. Utilize the military potential of escapees to derive, optimum
psychological advantages in the present situation and to provide
for appropriate military use in the event of war.
f. Through appropriate training and education of escapees,
representing various levels of educational background, produce
effective anti-Soviet leaders and workers, and develop and sustain
favorable psychological attitudes within all levels of these groups.
Attachment:
ANNEX A - ANALYSIS
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AMNEM, A
PSB D-1Sa/l a
3anuzary 15, 1953
ANNEX A
ANAMIS
1. Dissidence and FscaDe
a. A preponderance of available evidence indicates that large
numbers of people in Eastern Europe and the USSR are not in sympathy
with the regime. Within the past decade thousands of people have
expressed their objection actively by resistance and escape. RRe-
..+.sw.assmaasi..n...w+..was
sistance has led in most cases to execution or incarceration and
escape has often led to a life of hardship in the West. Expression
of resistance passively is generally ineffective and costly for the
individual, The usual personal solution is the submersion and con-
cealment of dissident feelings as necessary to achievement of the
best way of life possible under an oppressive system.
b. Escape from oppression must have as its counterpart escape
to something better. It appears that many people in the Soviet bloc,
particularly the peoples of the USSR, believe that they will be
handed back to the Soviets if they attempt to flee. Prospective
escapees are often beset by doubts concerning their material fate
abroad, apparently based upon rumors fostered by the regime of
suffering among those who have fled. Most important, the security
measures which Soviet and satellite authorities have instituted
ill.....~. .:..._ ..
~.___ ._...~
and are steadily increasing render escape difficult and make it
unlikely that the flow of escapees will rise above its present order
of magnitude.
c. The fact of escape itself is a demonstration of opposition
to the Soviet system which has an important psychological impact
on both sides of the "iron curtain." Even if media inspired by the
U. S. do not publicize identities, escape stimulates disaffection in
the oppressed homeland because the departed individual is a symbol
to the community as one who chose freedom. Local policital leaders
85883
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January 15, 1953
and military commanders are held responsible for the escapee's
"orirne." Permanent stigma is placed upon them which requires more
effort on the part of the surveillance apparatus. Application by
the Soviet authorities of the rule of collective guilt may result
in administrative disruption of the units concerned, whether mili-
tary, political or industrial.. The Soviet system must live with a
continuing refutation of its claims to popular support. In the free
world, escapees are the most articulate instruments to counter com-
munist propaganda. The efforts to isolate the Soviet-controlled
populations from foreign contamination, and the bitter attacks on
U. S. efforts to promote escape lead inevitably to the conclusion
that Soviet leadership fears this type of U. S. action.
2. National Poles
a. NSC 20 ?4
Para. 19a: "To reduce the power and influence of the USSR
to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national
independence and stability of the world family of nations."
Jar, 20a: "To encourage and promote the gradual retraction
of undue Russian power and. influence from the present perimeter areas
around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satel-
lite countries as entities independent of the USSR."
b. NS O 'Z3
Para, 1c: "Without deliberately incurring grave risk of
general war induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and in-
fluence and so to foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet
system . . ."
c, NSC 86A
Pare 1: ". . . The long-range objective of U. S. policy
towards defectors is to contribute to the achievement of general
U. S. objectives and aims with respect to the USSR as stated in
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Janimt 15, 1955
NSC 20/4, particularly by placing the maximum strain on the Soviet
structure of power through threatening the regimets control of its
population. Corollary objectives to be sought by a defector program
are: (a) benefits to intelligence and related activities; (b) pro-
paganda use and value; (c) denial of valuable personnel to Soviet
and satellite regimes; (d) spread of increased disaffection and con-
fusion within Soviet and satellite regimes; and (e) availability of
personalities possessing background and knowledge the 4xcquisition
of which would be in the national interest."
Para. 2: ". . . The United States should, by both con-
ventional and unconventional means, encourage and induce the de-
fection of the maximum possible number of persons from all parts
of the USSR. . ."
Perm 1: ". . . No effort should now be made to encourage
general defection from the satellite states. However, present
efforts to induce the defection of key personnel from satellite
countries (including Commiiunist China and East Germany) should be
continued and, if possible, expanded."
Para,..b: ". . . The turning back or improper handling of
any defectors from countries under communist control would have a
very unfavorable effect on the entire defector program. Accordingly,
the United States should use its influence with the governments of
countries bordering on the Soviet bloc in an effort to insure that
they grant asylum and proper treatment to any defector."
d. ES-21V ,
Para 1: "It is in accord with the best U. S. tradition to
endeavor to protect and assist those fleeing from persecution. Under
present conditions it is in the important interests of national
security that defectors be welcomed and assisted in obtaining a
degree of personal and economic security and made to feed, that there
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A? El+. A
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January 15,. 1953
is a place for them in a free society, Defectors represent the
best sources of information and intelligence in the Soviet world.
The most effective agents to destroy the communist myth of Soviet
paradise are defectors who are able to tell the truth about con-
ditions of life behind the iron curtain."
e. Pea?mi s ,y?e, t ala ,ion:
(1) Title II, Section 21 of Public Law 51, 1951, pro-
vides for the enlistment of not more than twelve thousand
five hundred aliens in the Regular Army. These enlistees
are eligible to apply for U. S. citizenship.
(2) Section 101 (a)(1) of the ~,Iutual Security Act
of 1952 authorizes the use of up to X1100,000,000 to form
selected persons who have escaped from certain Communist-
dominated countries into elements of the military forces
supporting NAM and "for other purposes."
3. Programs for Use of Esc .pees
a. All use of escapees should be designed primarily to weaken
the power of the Soviet bloc in accordance with approved national
objectives. Whether individuals are used to pierce the veil of
Soviet secrecy in order to obtain intelligence necessary for the
defense of the free world, to perform underground psychological
missions behind the iron curtain, or in propaganda activities in
the free world, they make a valuable contribution toward our ob-?
jectives. Groups of escapees form a basis for appeals to their
enslaved compatriots, they contain candidates for positions of
leadership in the ideological struggle. and they constitute a pool
from which individuals can be recruited for special. tasks.
b. MilitcryUse
(1) Pea,me:
(a) A program for the formation of military units
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January 15, 1953
from Soviet orbit escapees might permit utilization of
a large number of these individuals. It would have a
significant psychological impact behind the iron curtain,
particularly in the armed forces, and for this reason should
contribute to the achievement of the national objectives of
NSC 20/4.
(b) There appear to be several ways of carrying out
such a program although the most careful planning and
execution would be required to minimize political and.
military difficulties. It is impossible to estimate
how many escapees would volunteer for military service,
but in any event it is obvious that small projects could
be started with limited numbers of escapees which would also
serve to make the pilot operation administratively manage-
able. Since the program has at the outset primarily psycho-
logical objectives, the concept rather than the order of
magnitude is of the essence. It has been argued that
residual escapees from World War II could provide large
numbers of recruits for such units; however, resettlement
programs have integrated the overwhelming majority of these
people which would probably discourage large-scale voluntary
enlistment.
(2) Contne~
(a) In the event of war or a situation requiring
extreme measures the United States should be prepared to
make use of escapee forces as guerrilla and conventional
units. German experience and their mishandling of a dynamic
opportunity in Byelo-Russia, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus
should stand as an object lesson to the free world. To a
somewhat lesser extent, Allied experience with the Polish
Army of Liberation under General Anders during World War II
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demonstrates the vital potential of this kind of force. V
(b) The knowledge that one's countrymen are fighting
in significant numbers under their own native leaders
against the regime has a demoralizing impact on the will
to fight. The soldier who throws down his arms and goes
over is no longer a deserter but an escapee to freedom in
the eyes of the democratic world. He leaves the service
of the oppressor and joins the forces of democracy. Since
he is welcomed into the ranks of his already free country-
men, he is not just a prisoner of war as one captured against
his will. Soviet technique to discourage desertion actually
complements this strategy by making defection a crime sub-
ject to severe punishment. It is made known that deserters
will be executed when recaptured, and the political officers
attached to the units of the line stress the futility of
escape.
(c) If war should come, cooperation with escapee
forces would demolish the false communist propaganda line
As a. matter of historical record, there was a significant element of
support for the German cause against the Stalinist Government in the
population of the USSR. large numbers of soldiers deserted the Red Army
in the first year of the German-Soviet War. In some areas of the Soviet
Union, particularly the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia, the Baltic States and the
Caucasus, German invaders were welcomed as liberators. Standing on doc-
trines of racial, superiority, the German occupation introduced a policy
of brutality and ruthless exploitation. When the Nazis saw the folly of
this policy (though they would not give up their fallacious racial doe-
trims) it was too late to effect a change. Soviet psychological warfare
had already solidified most of the people in the struggle for survival
or had at least convinced them of the utter hopelessness of their situa-
tion. At the outbreak of World War II it was the almost universal opinion
of German officers familiar with Eastern Europe that Germany could not will
without the help of the peoples of the USSR themselves. Soviet officer
and enlisted prisoners of war stated repeatedly that Germany would have
defeated the Red Army if a true policy of liberation had been adopted.,
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which accuses the U. S. of espousing Hitler's doctrines
of racial superiority. It would contribute toward the
real meaning of the U. S. policy of self-determination
for all peoples without the necessity of adopting narrow
qualifications. Failure to recognize the military-psycho-
logical potential of escapees from the Soviet bloc in time
of war has proved., and would prove., to be a historical
mistake of the greatest magnitude.
4.
Conclusions:
It is in the interest of the United Stakes to;
a. Convince the peoples of the Soviet orbit that escapees will
not be forcibly repatriated and that they will be assisted In achiev-
ing a constructive life.
b. Emphasize the inducement of escape from the Soviet orbit
for its psychological value.
c. Encourage and guide the efforts of groups of escapees to
make a greater psychological contribution.
d. Derive optimum psychological advantages from the military
value of escapees*
e. Produce effective anti-Soviet loaders and workers among
escapees.
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