SOMALIA: PROSPECTTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303270007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of `~5-
Intelligence
Somalia: Prospects
for Stability
An Intelligence Assessment
ALA 82-/0032
Morch 1982
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Somalia: Prospects
for Stabilit~
IrE1ormation available as o.1'23 February 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, West-East Division, ALA, on
This assessment was prepared by~
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for Africa, the Directorate of
Operations, and the Offices of Soviet Analysis, Near
East-South Asian Analysis, and Central Reference.
Secret
ALA 82-10032
March 1982
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8oundery representation is
net necessarily authoritative.
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Somalia: Pros ects
for Stability
Key Judgments President Siad of Somalia is likely this year to face a serious challenge ei-
ther from a disaffected military or from within his own ruling junta. His
political position has been weakened considerably over the past two years
by economic, military, tribal, and political problems.
The Somali economy has posed particular problems over the past few
years. Most recently, the situation has been aggravated by damaging
weather, the influx of nearly a million refugees from Ethiopia, higher oil
prices caused by Somalia's loss of its regular Iraqi supplies in 1980, and in-
flation. These factors have combined to generate heightened internal
unrest.
The military is in disarray, with most units understrength, inventories of
military equipment low, and serious morale problems. Military leaders
have been repeatedly humiliated by their inability to repulse sporadic
Ethiopian ground incursions and air attacks. Ethiopian-sponsored insur-
gents, aided by Libya, present Siad with escalating guerrilla and terrorist
threats
Somalia has had little success obtaining foreign military aid. Siad's failure
to attract greater US assistance is eroding his position among the Army's
leaders, who increasingly see him as contributing to Somalia's problems.
Government leaders have been urging Siad to address these problems.
Siad, however, is responding to these difficulties with increasing rigidity
and appears to believe that he can protect his position by again resorting to
cosmetic political maneuvers and by persuading Washington to extend
substantial new military and economic aid. The Somali President hopes he
can convince the United States to rely heavily on Somalia in its strategic
planning, thus committing Washington to his personal survival.
iii Secret
ALA 82-/0032
March 1982
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Somalia's problems almost certainly are too deep seated to be resolved
without more decisive moves, despite Siad's considerable and well-tested
political skills. Even if he manages to survive his current difficulties, Siad
will be unlikely to regain the political strength he once enjoyed, and he will
be repeatedly subjected to political challenges. The depth of Somalia's
problems virtually ensures that any successor regime would also have grave
problems establishing a stable political system.
In the event of a coup from within the ruling junta, Siad's successor would
probably continue Mogadishu's pro-Western policies in the near term.
Over Zime, however, the new regime might seek a rapprochement with
Moscow if Siad's removal failed to bring increased Western aid. A turn
away from the United States could come more quickly if Siad were
overthrown by younger, radical officers
The Soviets tried to establish close relations with both Ethiopia and
Somalia in the mid-1970s. In the event of an ouster of Siad, whom Moscow
blames for the 1977 breakdown of the Soviet-Somali alliance, the Soviets
may again offer economic and military assistance to reestablish close ties
despite the longstanding hostility between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.
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Somalia: Prospects
for Stability
President Mohammed Siad Barre of Somalia enters
1982 having maintained political power for a dozen
years by facing an unprecedented array of challenges.
War, drought, and financial upheaval have further
weakened Somalia economically and militarily and
Siad's options for dealing with these problems all
carry significant domestic political risks. Even his
closest supporters have begun to assign Siad personal
responsibility for the country's problems
u Siad hopes to establish and benefit from increas-
ingly close ties to the United States, based on his
movement toward the West in recent years and
Somalia's strategic position near the Persian Gulf.
Heightened superpower interest in the region also has
carried risks for Somalia, however, primarily by
prompting radical states such as Ethiopia and Libya
to work together for his overthrow.
Economic Woes
Somalia's pastoral and subsistence agricultural econo-
my has been battered in recent years. Livestock
production, the nation's main source of export earn-
ings, has picked up since the drought of the mid-1970s
but may be hitting a new plateau. Government pricing
policies, poor management, and the weather have
sharply decreased the production of bananas, Soma-
lia's other major export. The drought ended in early
1981 with heavy flooding along Somalia's two rivers,
resulting in further agricultural losses
Since the loss in late 1980 of Somalia's regular oil
supplier, Iraq, because of the Iran-Iraq war, Somalia
has had to rely on the more expensive spot market for
energy supplies. As a result, Somalia has all but
exhausted its remaining foreign exchange reserves
and has experienced periodic fuel shortages. Although
Mogadishu contracted late last year for regular im-
ports from Saudi Arabia, a number of disputes,
apparently over bribes to Somali officials, so far have
prevented shipments.
The annual rate of inflation, although declining, is
about 45 percent, creating discontent among Somalis
on fixed government and military salaries. Govern-
ment efforts to cap inflation by outlawing price
increases have produced shortages of staple items
except in the flourishing black market.
The country's trade and infant industry have been
crippled by pervasive corruption and by the ineptitude
of the state corporations set up by Somalia's "social-
ist" government. Many of the centralized economy's
managers are appointed for, political reasons rather
than on the basis of ability.
Finally, the vast influx of refugees into Somalia from
Ethiopia during 1980 and 1981, which has now ended,
swelled the nation's population by nearly a million,
that is, by approximately one-fourth. Although the
600,000 refugees remaining in camps now are largely
supported by international relief aid, the administra-
tion of the camps is a continuing strain on government
resources.
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Libya
South
Yemen
0 Kdomefers 500
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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have helped organize, equip, train, and direct the
SDSF's approximately 3,000 combatants.
The Front's activities in Somalia generally have been
limited to attacks on isolated targets, ambushes,
terrorist bombings, and mining of rural roads and
bridges. Its effectiveness has been undercut by its
limited public appeal. The Front draws virtually all its
membership from the Majertain, one of Somalia's
many clans.2 The Majertain dominated Somalia's
Government during the 1960s and resent their loss of
power in Siad's 1969 coup. The Front is generally
seen as the vehicle for the political ambitions of the
Majertain rather than a national movement and is
stigmatized by its close association with the Ethiopian
enemy
The Front probably cannot overthrow the Siad regime
on its own, but by the end of 1981 there were signs
that Libyan aid and training were taking effect.
the Front has slowly increased
its activity and the insurgents have begun using more
sophisticated weapons, including armored personnel
carriers. The SDSF also has been carrying out more
numerous and larger attacks without the direct sup-
port of Ethiopian troops.
the
Soviets maintain close ties to political activists in the
SDSF and for a time last year provided the Front with
alliances among these groups.
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~ Somalia, unlike most African states, is inhabited primarily by one
culturally and ethnically unified people, but the Somalis are divided
into numerous tribes, clans, subclans, and smaller family groups.
Somali politics are characterized by frequent clashes and shifting
Military Disarray
The Somali Army has never recovered from its defeat
in the 1977-78 Ogaden war. Military equipment
inventories have been severely depleted by combat
losses, the withdrawal of troops from Ethiopia in
1978, and shoddy maintenance. Most units are under-
strength and suffer from severe morale problems
brought on by disorganization, tribal tensions, failure
of military pay to keep pace with inflation, and the
strain of a constant alert status. Some soldiers have
turned to banditry to supplement their incomes. Rela-
tively minor complaints, such as disputes over promo-
tions, have sparked isolated riots and mutinies. Dis-
turbances have been contained so far, but given the
mood of the military, spontaneous outbreaks could
easily escalate into a general military revolt.
Somalia's military situation has been made worse by
Mogadishu's limited success in attracting foreign
military aid. Somalia has not yet received any US
military equipment under the agreement signed in
1980 that provides for US access to Somali military
facilities. China, Egypt, and Italy, Somalia's major
arms suppliers, have cut off further shipments until
Mogadishu begins paying its outstanding debt.' With
its limited foreign exchange reserves, however, Soma-
lia is unable to meet this condition.
Military leaders have been humiliated by their inabil-
ity to challenge or respond to occasional Ethiopian air
attacks on border settlements, wide-ranging over-
flights of Somali territory, and guerrilla incursions by
the Ethiopian- and Libyan-supported Somali Demo-
cratic Salvation Front (SDSF). The lack of military
preparations by Ethiopian forces in the border region
makes it clear that the Ethiopians have decided for
the present to avoid a direct confrontation with
Somalia's inferior forces. The insurgent Front, howev-
er, is accelerating its effort to overthrow the Siad
regime.
Externally Supported Subversion
The substantial resources being invested in the Front
by Ethiopia and Libya indicate that they are using the
SDSF as their principal vehicle to bring down the
Siad regime, a major target of the Aden Pact signed
last year by Ethiopia, Libya, and South Yemen.
Addis Ababa holds Siad personally responsible for
launching the devastating Ogaden invasion in 1977,
and appears convinced that he is vulnerable to guerril-
la subversion. To carry out this effort, the Ethiopians
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Tribes and Major Clans of the Somali Nation
Boundaryrepreaenketi?nie
not necasaarily authoritative.
Somali Tribes
~_.__
(_ _Dir !_._JHawiya
Ishaak Digil
JDarod ~ `,'Rahanwein
-Limit of Somali-inhabited
area
Somali Clans
-. Clan
_ .Non-Somali Groups
Socotra
(South Yemen)
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a small number of advisers. Moscow, however, is
reluctant to become directly identified with the
SDSF, and for this reason favors efforts by Ethiopia
and Libya to aid the Front. Partly for this reason,
Moscow apparently encouraged the formation of the
Increasing Tribal Tensions
Siad has long been adept at balancing the interests of
Somalia's numerous antagonistic tribal groups to
maintain his position. This has encouraged the wide-
spread belief within Somalia that only Siad enjoys
sufficiently broad respect to keep peace among the
clans and ensure national unity.
During the past year, however, this balancing act has
become more difficult as tensions between clans have
slowly increased. The influx of nearly a million
refugees from Ethiopia, scarcity of goods, and corrup-
tion have intensified the normal level of tribal animos-
ity. As Somalia's mounting problems increasingly
come to be blamed on Siad's leadership, the Somali
President has found it more difficult to preserve the
mosaic of clans supporting his rule. In some instances,
clans have attempted to extract concessions from the
weakened President by threatening to associate or
negotiate with dissident movements
In recent years, Siad has come to rely more and more
on his own Marehan clan to support his regime. The
elite presidential guard is composed almost entirely of
members of this clan, and Marehans within the Army
report directly to Siad on political dissension. They
also receive a disproportionate number of government
and government-controlled jobs. Discontent with
Marehan domination has been particularly severe in
the north, where violent protests over the harsh rule of
the Marehan military governor resulted in widespread
arrests in early 1982.
Siad might even be losing support among the Mare-
han, who probably are troubled by the depth of
feeling being generated against them among the other
clans. The clan's elders, however, want to maintain
the previleged position of their group and are thus
unlikely to oppose Siad actively unless another accept-
Since Siad came to power in a military coup in 1969,
he has concentrated authority in his own office and
now runs the Somali Government on his own, accept-
ing only limited advice from even his closest aides.
Although other members of the junta resent this
concentration of power, disputes and jealousies among
them, accentuated by Siad's clever political maneu-
vering and his self-serving reputation for indispens-
ability, have prevented any effective opposition from
within the ruling group. Siad also has confounded his
critics in the junta through frequent and dramatic
acts such as cabinet reshuffles and his declaration of a
"state of emergency" in 1980 which still remains in
force. Siad apparently believes he can continue to use
such tactics to keep potential challengers off balance.
During the past year, the Supreme Revolutionary
Council (the latest incarnation of the ruling junta) has
used its infrequent meetings to blame Siad for Soma-
lia's troubles and to call on him either to step down
from the presidency or to share more of his authority
Siad's Response to His Problems
Publicly, he has blamed Somalia's economic difficul-
ties on the cost of meeting the Ethiopian military
threat, which is only partially true, while privately
censuring other members of the Council for alleged
corruption and incompetence.
able Marehan leader were available.
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In early February Siad released a number of promi-
nent political prisoners, including former Prime Min-
ister Egal, a northerner overthrown in the 1969 coup,
in a gesture partially aimed at tribal reconciliation.
Siad appears to have no intention of accepting sugges-
tions from government leaders that he also break up
the inefficient state corporations, decentralize and
liberalize the economy, and attack pervasive corrup-
tion in an effort to bolster investor confidence in
Somalia. The liberal dispensation of patronage pro-
vided by the centralized sytem, particularly to Siad's
Marehan kinsmen, provides an important component
of his power base. Siad reasons that it would be
extremely risky to give up these immediate political
benefits in exchange for the long-term and indefinite
hope of general economic revival.
Siad, instead, has tired to pacify his critics by promis-
ing abonanza of military and economic aid from the
United States to bail out the country. Nonetheless,
disappointment among the ruling elite about the
limited nature of Washington's aid commitment to
Somalia is already becoming evident.
Siad apparently hopes that Somalia will become more
important for Washington's defense planning in the
Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region and that greater
US aid commitments will materialize as a result. To
encourage this, Siad is eager to become identified as
closely as possible with the United States, despite the
resultant criticism and active opposition he can expect
from neighboring radical states. The Somali Presi-
dent's efforts included pushing for a personal meeting
with President Reagan-which is currently scheduled
for mid-March-and broad hints to US officials that
he would be willing to allow the establishment of a US
military base in Somalia. The release in early Febru-
ary of former Prime Minister Egal, whose condition
was the object of repeated inquiries from Washington,
was partially designed to boost Siad's credit in the
United States.
Siad's Options
Somalia's economy will continue to suffer from uncer-
tain weather and changes in international trade pat-
terns. Moreover, there are limits on the extent to
which government measures can alleviate Somalia's
economic problems, and most potentially effective
steps would carry political costs for Siad. The rapid
decentralization and liberalization of the Somali econ-
omy, for example, would deprive Siad of leverage
provided by patronage jobs for his supporters and
fellow Marehans and would boost unemployment.
Thus, while such a campaign could alleviate resent-
ment among non-Marehan Somalis toward corrupt
Marehan officeholders, it also would weaken Siad's
hold on the loyalty of his own clan.
In view of the near collapse of the Somali military
since its withdrawal from the Ogaden in 1980, Moga-
dishu realizes that it must make a major effor~to
reorganize and reequip the Army. The Somalis have
already begun this task, with Acting Defense Minister
Omar Haji attempting to root out corruption and
instill discipline in the officer corps. Such an effort,
however, risks alienating important segments of the
military, including those who owe their assignments to
clan favoritism and who profit by corruption.
Somalia's need to rearm its military also presents Siad
with costly political choices. Potential Western bene-
factors are reluctant to provide military aid as long as
Somalia harbors Irredentist ambitions against all its
neighbors. Siad clearly recognizes this problem, and
has tried to patch up the dispute with neighboring
Kenya, which also has an access agreement with the
United States and is generally friendly to the West. In
recognition of his inferior military position, Siad also
is trying to gain a temporary respite in the dispute
with Ethiopia by reducing aid to querrillas operating
in that country's Ogaden region. Nevertheless, Siad
probably hopes, in the long run, to rearm Somalia
sufficiently to challenge Ethiopia once again
After Siad
The men around Siad who would most likely take his
place in the event of a "palace revolt" are all pragma-
tists whose inclination would be to continue Somalia's
present foreign policies at least for the short term.
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Whoever replaces Siad will find it difficult to depart
from Somalia's present foreign policies. Past govern-
ments in Mogadishu have occasionally deemphasized
the struggle to "regain" the Ogaden, as Siad appears
to be doing now, but the depth of feeling on this issue
makes it virtually impossible for these claims to be
abandoned completely. The resulting hostility toward
Ethiopia lessens the chance of a rapprochement with
Addis Ababa's Soviet patrons
Nonetheless, the Soviets almost certainly would renew
efforts to establish close ties with both Mogadishu and
Addis Ababa in a post-Siad period. The receptivity of
Siad's successors to a rapprochement with the Soviet
Union would depend, in part, on the results of their
attempts to obtain military assistance from the West.
At present, most Somali military officers appear to
support the idea of looking to Washington for help.
The continued failure of large-scale US aid to materi-
alize will, however, generate doubts in Mogadishu
concerning the utilty of the United States as a
diplomatic and military partner. Although many in
the Army are inclined to blame Siad for delays in
arms transfers, a successor government would be
conscious of the part that such delays played in Siad's
downfall and probably would be impatient in its own
dealings with Washington.
While the initial tendencies of Siad's successors prob-
ably would be pro-Western, their probable pragma-
tism and sense of desperation about Somalia's eco-
nomic and military problems could lead them within a
short time to explore other options for assistance.
Siad's successors might reason that a rapprochement
with Moscow would result in a major military supply
relationship, similar to the one that existed during the
period of close Somali-Soviet ties in the early 1970s.
They also might reason that renewed cooperation with
the Soviets would encourage Moscow to apply pres-
sure on Ethiopia to compromise in the Ogaden dis-
pute. Such a hope is probably unrealistic; Siad once
tried this strategy himself and found that the Soviets
were unable to move Addis Ababa on this point. ~
Other, less likely, possibilities are that Siad could be
replaced by radically nationalist young Army officers
or by a radical Islamic regime. Either would be likely
to turn away from the present orientation to the
United States. Somalia is an overwhelmingly Islamic
country, fundamentally dissatisfied with the status
quo in East Africa. There is no strong radical Islamic
movement in Somalia today, but Islam has played an
important part in past Somali national movements
such as the quixotic anti-British, -Italian, and
-Ethiopian revolt at the turn of the century. Somalia's
major opponent, Ethiopia, is ruled by a Marxist
regime led by men with a Christian cultural heritage.
It is possible, therefore, that a charismatic, radically
nationalist, Islamic leader could emerge who would
again seek to unite the nation by renewing the old
ethnic crusade.
Implications for the United States
Siad has been able to protect his position for 12 years,
but Somalia's problems are now so grave that his
position will remain weak even if he is able to hold on
for the next year or more. This will make the
Government of Somalia a fragile and troubled ally for
the United States. Despite Siad's hopes, no US aid
program on a scale currently being considered would
solve enough of Somalia's problems to ensure political
stability.
Despite occasional and ambiguous signs of recovery,
the Somali economy is narrowly based and will
require long-term and substantial outside aid. The
Somali military shows little prospect of recovering its
former strength and will also need sustained foreign
help. In an attempt to elicit this aid from the United
States, Siad probably will intensify his current efforts
to convince Washington of Somalia's strategic value
as the state in the northwest Indian Ocean region
most willing to permit extensve US use of its military
facilities.
forthcoming.
The overthrow of Siad probably would result-at
least initially-in the accession to power of similarly
opportunistic military officers who would request
substantial military and economic aid. In seeking such
assistance, the new rulers would be acting on the
belief that Siad's failure to obtain this aid was a
central cause of his fall. Such pressure would intensify
the current US dilemma of how to help the Somalis
without alienating their neighbors, and would raise
the possibility that a new regime would seek a rap-
prochement with the Soviets if US aid were not
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