FREEDOM, REGIONAL SECURITY, AND GLOBAL PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380042-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: March 14, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release March 14, 1986
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:
FREEDOM, REGIONAL SECURITY, AND GLOBAL PEACE
I. America's Stake in Regional Security
For more than two generations the United States has
pursued a global foreign policy. Both the causes and con-
sequences of World War II made clear to all Americans that our
participation in world affairs, for the rest of the century
and beyond, would have to go beyond just the protection of our
national territory against direct invasion. We had learned
the painful lessons of the 1930's, that there could be no
safety in isolation from the rest of the world. Our Nation
has responsibilities and security interests beyond our
borders -- in the rest of this hemisphere, in Europe, in the
Pacific, in the Middle East and in other regions -- that
require strong, confident, and consistent American leadership.
In the past several weeks, we have met these responsi-
bilities -- in difficult circumstances -- in Haiti and in the
Philippines. We have made important proposals for peace in
Central America and southern Africa. There and elsewhere, we
have acted in the belief that our peaceful and prosperous
future can best be assured in a world in which other peoples
too can determine their own destiny, free of coercion or
tyranny from either at home or abroad.
The prospects for such a future -- to which America has
contributed in innumerable ways -- seem brighter than they
have been in many years. Yet we cannot ignore the obstacles
that stand in its path. We cannot meet our responsibilities
and protect our interests without an active diplomacy backed
by American economic and military power. We should not expect
to solve problems that are insoluble, but we must not be half-
hearted when there is a prospect of success. Wishful thinking
and stop-and-go commitments will not protect America's
interests.
Our foreign policy in the postwar era has sought to
enhance our Nation's security by pursuit of four fundamental
goals:
o We have sought to defend and advance the cause of
democracy, freedom, and human rights throughout the
.world.
o We have sought to promote prosperity and social
progress through a free, open, and expanding
market-oriented global economy.
o We have worked diplomatically to help resolve
dangerous regional conflicts.
o We have worked to reduce and eventually eliminate
the danger of nuclear war.
Sustained by a strong bipartisan consensus, these basic
principles have weathered contentious domestic debates through
eight administrations, both Democratic and Republican. They
have survived the great and rapid changes of an ever-evolving
world.
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There are good reasons for this continuity. These broad
goals are linked together, and they in turn match both our
ideals and our interests. No other policy could command the
broad support of the American people.
A foreign policy that ignored the fate of millions around
the world who seek freedom would be a betrayal of our national
heritage. Our own freedom, and that of our allies, could
never be secure in a world where freedom was threatened every-
where else. Our stake in the global economy gives us a stake
in the well-being of others.
A foreign policy that overlooked the dangers posed by
international conflicts, that did not work to bring them to a
peaceful resolution, would be irresponsible -- especially in
an age of nuclear weapons. These conflicts, and the tensions
that they generate, are in fact a major spur to the continued
build-up of nuclear arsenals. For this reason, my Adminis-
tration has made plain that continuing Soviet adventurism in
the developing world is inimical to global security and an
obstacle to fundamental improvement of Soviet-American
relations.
Our stake in resolving regional conflicts can be simply
stated: greater freedom for others means greater peace and
security for ourselves. These goals threaten no one, but none
of them can be achieved without a strong, active, and engaged
America.
II. Regional Security in the 80's
Our efforts to promote freedom, prosperity, and security
must take account of the diversity of regional conflicts and
of the conditions in which they arise. Most of the world's
turbulence has indigenous causes, and not every regional con-
flict should be viewed as part of the East-West conflict. And
we should be alert to historic changes in the international
environment, for these create both new problems and new oppor-
tunities. Three such realities must define American policies
in the 80's.
Soviet Exploitation of Regional Conflicts. The first
involves the nature of the threat we face. The fact is, in
the 1970's the challenge to regional security became -- to a
greater degree than before -- the challenge of Soviet expan-
sionism. Around the world we saw a new thrust by our adver-
saries to spread Communist dictatorships and to put our own
security (and that of friends and allies) at risk. The Soviet
Union -- and clients like Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya -- supplied
enormous quantities of money, arms, and training in efforts to
destabilize and overthrow vulnerable governments on nearly
every continent. By the 1970's the long-proclaimed Soviet
doctrine of "wars of national liberation" was for the first
time backed by a global capability to project military power.
The Soviets appeared to conclude that the global "correlation
of forces" was shifting inexorably in their favor.
The world now knows the results, above all the staggering
human toll. Murderous policies in Vietnam and Cambodia pro-
duced victims on a scale unknown since the genocides of Hitler
and Stalin. In Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion led to the
terrified flight of millions from their homes. In Ethiopia.,
we have witnessed death by famine and more recently by forced
resettlement; and in South Yemen this year, factional killing
that consumed thousands of lives in a span of a few days.
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The Democratic Revolution. If American policy can
succeed only in cooperation with others, then the third
critical development of the past decade offers special hope:
it is the democratic revolution, a trend that has signifi-
cantly increased the ranks of those around the world who share
America's commitment to national independence and popular
rule.
The democracies that survived or emerged from the ruins
of the Second World War -- Western Europe, Japan, and a hand-
ful of others -- have now been joined by many others across
the globe. Here in the Western Hemisphere, the 1980's have
been a decade of transition to democracy. Today, over
90 percent of the population of Latin America and the
Caribbean live under governments that are democratic -- in
contrast to only one-third a decade ago. In less than six
years, popularly-elected democrats have replaced dictators in
Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru,
Brazil, Uruguay, and Grenada.
In other parts of the world, we see friends and allies
moving in the same direction. Earlier in this decade, the
people of Turkey fought back a violent assault on democracy
from both left and right. Similarly, since the fall of
Vietnam, the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia have
rallied together; with prosperous economies, and effective,
increasingly democratic national governments, they play an
increasingly important role on the world stage.
These trends are far from accidental. Ours is a time of
enormous social and technological change everywhere, and one
country after another is discovering that only free peoples
can make the most of this change. Countries that want
progress without pluralism, without freedom, are finding that
it cannot be done.
In this global revolution, there can be no doubt where
America stands. The American people believe in human rights
and oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the left or
the right. We use our influence to encourage democratic
change, in careful ways that respect other countries'
traditions and political realities as well as the security
threats that many of them face from external or internal
forces of totalitarianism.
The people of the Philippines are now revitalizing their
democratic traditions. The people of Haiti have their first
chance in three decades to direct their own affairs.
Advocates of peaceful political change in South Africa are
seeking an alternative to violence as well as to apartheid.
All these efforts evoke the deepest American sympathy.
American support will be ready, in these countries and
elsewhere, to help democracy succeed.
But the democratic revolution does not stop here. There
is another, newer phenomenon as well. In recent years, Soviet
ambitions in the developing world have run head-on into a new
form of resistance. Peoples on every continent are insisting
on their right to national independence and their right to
choose their government free of coercion. The Soviets over-
reached in the 1970's, at a time when America weakened itself
by its internal divisions. In the 1980's the Soviets and
their clients are finding it difficult to consolidate these
gains -- in part because of the revival of American and
Western self-confidence, but mainly because of the courageous
forces of indigenous resistance. Growing resistance movements
now challenge Communist regimes installed or maintained by the
military power of the Soviet Union and its colonial agents --
in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.
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These have been only the most horrifying consequences.
Other outgrowths of Soviet policies have been the colonial
presence of tens of thousands of Cuban troops in Africa; the
activities of terrorists trained in facilities in the Soviet
bloc; and the effort to use Communist Nicaragua as a base from
which to extinguish democracy in El Salvador and beyond.
These are not isolated events. They make up the dis-
turbing pattern of Soviet conduct in the past fifteen years.
The problems it creates are no less acute because the Soviet
Union has had its share of disagreements with some of its
clients, or because many of these involvements have proved
very costly. That the Soviet leadership persists in such
policies despite the growing burden they impose only testifies
to the strength of Soviet commitment. Unless we build bar-
riers to Soviet ambitions, and create incentives for Soviet
restraint, Soviet policies will remain a source of danger --
and the most important obstacle to the future spread of
freedom.
In my meetings and other communications with Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev, and in my address before the UN
General Assembly last October, I have made clear the impor-
tance the United States attaches to the resolution of regional
conflicts that threaten world peace and the yearning of mil-
lions for freedom and independence -- whether in Afghanistan
or in southern Africa.
For the United States, these conflicts cannot be regarded
as peripheral to other issues on the global agenda. They
raise fundamental issues and are a fundamental part of the
overall U.S.-Soviet relationship. Their resolution would
represent a crucial step toward the kind of world that all
Americans seek and have been seeking for over forty years.
Joining Others' Strength to Ours. The second reality
that shapes America's approach to regional security is the
need to join our own strength to the efforts of others in
working toward our common goals.
Throughout the postwar period, our country has played an
enormous role in helping other nations, in many parts of the
world, to protect their freedom. Through NATO we committed
ourselves to the defense of Europe against Soviet attack.
Through the Marshall Plan we helped Western Europe to rebuild
its economy and strengthen democratic institutions. We sent
American troops to Korea to repel a Communist invasion.
America was an ardent champion of decolonization. We provided
security assistance to help friends and allies around the
world defend themselves. We extended our hand to those
governments that sought to free themselves from dependence on
the Soviet Union; success in such efforts -- whether by
Yugoslavia, Egypt, China or others -- has contributed
significantly to international security.
Despite our economic and military strength and our
leading political role, the pursuit of American goals has
always required cooperation with like-minded partners. The
problems we face today, however, make cooperation with others
even more important. This is in part a result of the limits
on our own resources, of the steady growth in the power of our
adversaries, and of the American people's understandable
reluctance to shoulder alone burdens that are properly shared
with others. But most important, we want to cooperate with
others because of the nature of our goals. Stable regional
solutions depend over the long term on what those most
directly affected can contribute. If interference by out-
siders can be ended, regional security is best protected by
the free and independent countries of each region.
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These realities call for new ways of thinking about how
to cope with the challenge of Soviet power. Since Harry
Truman's day, through administrations of both parties,
American policy toward the Soviet Union has consistently set
itself the goal of containing Soviet expansionism. Today that
goal is more relevant and more important than ever. But how
do we achieve it in today's new conditions?
First of all, we must face up to the arrogant Soviet
pretension known as the Brezhnev Doctrine: the claim that
Soviet gains are irreversible; that once a Soviet client
begins to oppress its people and threaten its neighbors it
must be allowed to oppress and threaten them forever. This
claim has no moral or political validity whatsoever. Regimes
that cannot live in peace with either their own people or
their neighbors forfeit their legitimacy in world affairs.
Second, we must take full account of the striking trend
that I have mentioned: the growing ranks of those who share
our interests and values. In 1945 so much of the burden of
defending freedom rested on our shoulders alone. In the
1970's some Americans were pessimistic about whether our
values of democracy and freedom were relevant to the new
developing nations. Now we know the answer. The growing
appeal of democracy, the desire of all nations for true
independence, are the hopeful basis for a new world of peace
and security into the next century. A world of diversity, a
world in which other nations choose their own course freely,
is fully consistent with our values -- because we know free
peoples never choose tyranny.
To promote these goals, America has a range of foreign
policy tools. Our involvement should always be prudent and
realistic, but we should remember that our tools work best
when joined together in a coherent strategy consistently
applied. Diplomacy unsupported by power is mere talk. Power
that is not guided by our political purposes can create
nothing of permanent value.
The two tools of U.S. policy without which few American
interests will be secure are our own military strength and the
vitality of our economy. The defense forces of the United
States are crucial to maintaining the stable environment in
which diplomacy can be effective, in which our friends and
allies can be confident of our protection, and in which our
adversaries can be deterred. And our economic dynamism not
only provides the resources essential to sustain our policies,
but conveys a deeper message that is being better understood
all the time, even by our adversaries: free, pluralist soci-
eties work.
The failure to maintain our military capabilities and our
economic strength in the 1970's was as important as any other
single factor in encouraging Soviet expansionism. By reviving
both of them in the 1980's we deny our adversaries opportuni-
ties and deter aggression. We make it easier for other coun-
tries to launch sustained economic growth, to build popular
institutions, and to contribute on their own to the cause of
peace.
Security Assistance and Arms Transfers. When Soviet
policy succeeds in establishing a regional foothold -- whether
through invasion as in Afghanistan or Cambodia, or sponsorship
of local Leninists as in Nicaragua -- our first priority must
be to bolster the security of friends most directly threat-
ened. This has been the reason for increasing our security
assistance for Pakistan, Thailand, and the friendly democratic
states of Central America. U.S. aid to Pakistan has been
indispensable in demonstrating that we will not permit the
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We did not create this historical phenomenon, but we must
not fail to respond to it.
In Afghanistan, Moscow's invasion to preserve the puppet
government it installed has met stiff and growing resistance
by Afghans who are fighting and dying for their country's
independence. Democratic forces in Cambodia, once all but
annihilated by the Khmer Rouge, are now waging a similar
battle against occupation and a puppet regime imposed by
Communist Vietnam.
In Angola, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA forces have waged
an armed struggle against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Marxist
regime, and in recent years UNITA has steadily expanded the
territory under its control.
In Nicaragua, the democratic resistance forces fighting
against another Soviet- and Cuban-backed regime have been
holding their own -- despite their lack of significant outside
help, and despite the massive influx of the most sophisticated
Soviet weaponry and thousands of Soviet, Cuban, and Soviet-
bloc advisers.
The failure of these Soviet client regimes to consolidate
themselves only confirms the moral and political bankruptcy of
the Leninist model. No one can be surprised by this. But it
also reflects the dangerous and destabilizing international
impact that even unpopular Leninist regimes can have. None of
these struggles is a purely internal one. As I told the
United Nations General Assembly last year, the assault of such
regimes on their own people inevitably becomes a menace to
their neighbors. Hence the threats to Pakistan and Thailand
by the powerful occupying armies in Afghanistan and Cambodia.
Hence the insecurity of El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras
in the face of the Nicaraguan military build-up.
Soviet-style dictatorships, in short, are an almost
unique threat to peace, both before and after they consolidate
their rule. Before, because the war they wage against their
own people does not always stay within their own borders. And
after, because the elimination of opposition at home frees
the r hand for subversion abroad. Cuba's foreign adventures
of the past decade are a warning to the neighbors of Communist
regimes everywhere.
The drive for national freedom and popular rule takes
different forms in different countries, for each nation is the
authentic product of a unique history and culture. In one
case, a people's resistance may spring from deep religious
belief; in another, from the bonds of ethnic or tribal soli-
darity; in yet another, from the grievances of colonial rule,
or from the failure of an alien ideology to contribute to
national progress. Our traditions and the traditions of those
whom we help can hardly be identical. And their programs will
not always match our own experience and preferences. This is
to be expected. The real question is: can our policy -- of
active American support -- increase the likelihood of demo-
cratic outcomes? I believe it can.
III. The Tools of American Policy.
These three realities of the 80's -- the new thrust of
Soviet interventionism, the need for free nations to join
together, the democratic revolution -- are inseparable.
Soviet power and policy cannot be checked without the active
commitment of the United States. And we cannot achieve
lasting results without giving support to -- and receiving
support from -- those whose goals coincide with ours.
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efforts (and the improvement of internal political conditions)
are essential to ending the violence, promoting freedom and
national self-determination, and bringing real hope for
regional security.
With these goals in mind, in my address to the UN General
Assembly last fall, I put forward a plan for beginning to
resolve a series of regional conflicts in which Leninist
regimes have made war against their own peoples. My ini-
tiative was meant to complement diplomatic efforts already
underway. To all of these efforts the United States has given
the strongest possible support. We have done so despite the
fact that the Soviet Union and its clients have usually
resisted negotiations, or have approached the table primarily
for tactical purposes. We intend, in fact, to redouble our
effort through a series of bilateral discussions with the
Soviets.
In Afghanistan, we strongly support the diplomatic
efforts conducted under UN auspices. We see no clear sign
that the Soviet Union has faced up to the necessity of with-
drawing its troops, which remains the central issue of the
negotiations. But we will persist.
In southern Africa, the recent announcement by the South
African government of a date for the creation of an indepen-
dent Namibia provides a new test of its own and of the Angolan
regime's interest in a settlement that truly begins to reduce
the threats to security in this region.
In Central America, President Duarte of El Salvador has
offered a bold initiative that would produce three sets of
simultaneous peace talks -- his own with Salvador's Communist
guerrillas; U.S.-Nicaragua bilateral discussions; and an
internal dialogue between the Communist regime in Nicaragua
and the democratic opposition -- if the Sandinistas will agree
to the latter. My new envoy for Central America, Ambassador
Philip Habib, will pursue the Duarte initiative as his first
responsibility.
In Cambodia, we support ASEAN -- the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations -- in its intensive diplomatic efforts
to promote Cambodian self-determination and an end to
Vietnam's brutal occupation.
Support for Freedom Fighters. In all these regions, the
Soviet Union and its clients would of course prefer victory to
compromise. That is why in Afghanistan, in Southeast Asia, in
southern Africa, and in Central America, diplomatic hopes
depend on whether the Soviets see that victory is excluded.
In each case, resistance forces fighting against Communist
tyranny deserve our support.
The form and extent of support we provide must be care-
fully weighed in each case. Because a popularly supported
insurgency enjoys some natural military advantages, our help
need not always be massive to make a difference. But it must
be more than simply symbolic: our help should give freedom
fighters the chance to rally the people to their side. As
John Kennedy observed of another nation striving to protect
its freedom, it is ultimately their struggle; winning inevi-
tably depends more on them than on any outsiders. America
cannot fight everyone's battle for freedom. But we must not
deny others the chance to fight their battle themselves.
In some instances, American interests will be served best
if we can keep the details of our help -- in particular, how
it is provided -- out of view. The Soviets will bring enor-
mous pressure to bear to stop outside help to resistance
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Soviet Union to gain hegemony over all within reach of its
growing power. By raising and sustaining aid to El Salvador
after the Communist guerrillas' failed "final offensive" of
1981, we showed that controversy here at home could not stop
us from backing a friendly and democratic government under
threat.
Similarly, by providing needed equipment to friends in
the Middle East -- whether to democratic Israel, or to long-
standing friends in the Arab world who face clear and present
radical threats -- we contribute to stability and peace in a
vital region of the world.
By supporting the efforts of others to strengthen their
own defense, we frequently do as much for our own security as
through our own defense budget. Security assistance to others
is a security bargain for us. We must, however, remember that
states hostile to us seek the same sort of bargains at our
expense. For this reason, we must be sure that the resources
we commit are adequate to the job. In the first half of this
decade, Libyan and Iranian aid to Communist Nicaragua, for
example, totaled more than three times as much as U.S. aid to
the democratic opposition. Soviet assistance to Vietnam, at
nearly $2 billion annually, far outstrips U.S. support for any
country save those that signed the Camp David peace accords.
Soviet support for Cuba is larger still.
Economic Assistance. In speaking of Central America in
1982, I said that "economic disaster [had] provided a fresh
opening to the enemies of freedom, national independence, and
peaceful development." We cannot indulge the hope that eco-
nomic responses alone are enough to prevent this political
exploitation, but an effective American policy must address
both the short-term and long-term dimensions of economic
distress. In the short term our goal is stabilization; in the
long term, sustained growth and progress by encouraging
market-oriented reform.
In Central America, for example, the dollar value of our
economic aid has consistently been three, four, or five times
as much as our security assistance. In 1985 the former
totaled $975 million, the latter, only $227 million.
Over the long term, America's most effective contribution
to self-sustaining growth is not through direct aid but
through helping these economies to earn their own way. The
vigorous expansion of our own economy has already spurred
growth throughout the Western Hemisphere, as well as else-
where. But this healthy expansion of the global economy --
which benefits us as well as others -- depends crucially on
maintaining a fair and open trading system. Protectionism is
both dangerous and expensive. Its costs include not only the
waste of resources and higher prices in our own economy, but
also.the blow to poorer nations around the world that are
struggling for democracy but vulnerable to anti-democratic
subversion.
Diplomatic Initiatives. Some have argued that the
regional wars in which the Soviet Union is embroiled provide
an opportunity to "bleed" the Soviets. This is not our
policy. We consider these wars dangerous to U.S.-Soviet
relations and tragic for the suffering peoples directly
involved.
For those reasons, military solutions are not the goal of
American policy. International peace and security require
both sides in these struggles to be prepared to lay down their
arms and negotiate political solutions. The forms of such
negotiations may vary, but in all of these conflicts political
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forces; while we can well withstand the pressure, small
friends and allies may be much more vulnerable. That is why
publicity for such details sometimes only exposes those whom
we are trying to help, or those who are helping us, to greater
danger. When this is the case, a President must be able to
work with the Congress to extend needed support without
publicity. Those who make it hard to extend support in this
way when necessary are taking from our hands an important tool
to protect American interests. Other governments that find
they cannot work with us on a confidential basis will often be
forced not to work with us at all. To hobble ourselves in
this way makes it harder to shape events while problems are
still manageable. It means we are certain to face starker
choices down the road.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Central America. The
Nicaraguan Communists have actively sought to subvert their
neighbors since the very moment they took power. There can be
no regional peace in Central America -- or wherever Soviet
client regimes have taken power -- so long as such aggressive
policies face no resistance. Support for resistance forces
shows those who threaten the peace that they have no military
option, and that negotiations represent the only realistic
course.
Communist rulers do not voluntarily or in a single step
relinquish control and open their nations to popular rule.
But there is no historical basis for thinking that Leninist
regimes are the only ones that can indefinitely ignore armed
insurgencies and the disintegration of their own political
base. The conditions that a growing insurgency can create --
high military desertion rates, general strikes, economic
shortages, infrastructural breakdowns, to name just a few --
can in turn create policy fissures even within a leadership
that has had no change of heart.
This is the opportunity that the freedom fighters of the
80's hope to seize, but it will not exist forever, either in
Central America or elsewhere. When the mechanisms of repres-
sion are fully in place and consolidated, the task of
countering such a regime's policies -- both internal and
external -- becomes incomparably harder. That is why the
Nicaraguan regime is so bent on extinguishing the vestiges of
pluralism in Nicaraguan society. It is why our own decisions
can no longer be deferred.
IV. Regional Security and O.S.-Soviet Relations
My Administration has insisted that the issue of regional
security must have a prominent place on the agenda of
U.S.-Soviet relations.
We have heard it said, however, that while talking about
these issues is a good idea, the United States should not be
involved in other ways. Some people see risks of confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union; others, no chance that the Soviets
would ever reduce their commitment to their clients.
I challenge both of these views.
A policy whose only goal was to pour fuel on existing
fires would obviously be irresponsible but America's approach
is completely different. Our policy is designed to keep
regional conflicts from spreading, and thereby to reduce the
risk of superpower confrontations. Our aim is not to increase
the dangers to which regional states friendly to us are
exposed, but to reduce them. We do so by making clear to the
Soviet Union and its clients that we will stand behind our
friends. Talk alone will not accomplish this. That is why
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our security assistance package for Pakistan -- and for
Thailand and Zaire -- is so important, and why we have
increased our help to democratic states of Central America.
We have made clear that there would be no gain from widening
these conflicts. We have done so without embroiling American
forces in struggles that others are ready to fight on their
own.
Our goal, in short -- indeed our necessity -- is to con-
vince the Soviet Union that the policies on which it embarked
in the 70's cannot work. We cannot be completely sure how the
Soviet leadership calculates the benefits of relationships
with clients. No one should underestimate the tenacity of
such a powerful and resilient opponent.
Yet there are reasons to think that the present time is
especially propitious for raising doubts on the Soviet side
about the wisdom of its client ties. The same facts about the
democratic revolution that we can see are visible in Moscow.
The harmful impact that Moscow's conduct in the developing
world had on Western readings of its intentions in the last
decade is also well known. There is no time in which Soviet
policy reviews and reassessments are more likely than in a
succession period, especially when many problems have been
accumulating for some time. General Secretary Gorbachev
himself made this point last year when he asked American
interviewers whether it wasn't clear that the Soviet Union
required international calm to deal with its internal
problems.
Our answer to this question can be very simple. We
desire calm too, and -- even more to the point -- so do the
nations now embroiled in conflict with regimes enjoying
massive Soviet support. Let the Soviet Union begin to
contribute to the peaceful resolution of these conflicts.
V. Conclusion
I have often said that the tide of the future is a
freedom tide. If so, it is also a peace tide, for the surest
guarantee we have of peace is national freedom and democratic
government.
In the long struggle to reach these goals, we are at a
crossroads. A great deal hangs on America's staying power and
steadfast commitment.
If America stays committed, we are more likely to have
diplomatic solutions than military ones.
If America stays committed, we are more likely to have
democratic outcomes than totalitarian ones.
If America stays committed, we will find that those who
share our goals can do their part, and ease burdens that we
might otherwise bear alone.
If America stays committed, we can solve problems while
they are still manageable and avoid harder choices later.
And if America stays committed, we are more likely to
convince the Soviet Union that its competition with us must be
peaceful.
The American people remain committed to a world of peace
and freedom. They want an effective foreign policy, which
shapes events in accordance with our ideals and does not just
react, passively and timidly, to the actions of others.
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Backing away from this challenge will not bring peace. It
will only mean that others who are hostile to everything we
believe in will have a freer hand to work their will in the
world.
Important choices now rest with the Congress: whether to
undercut the President at a moment when regional negotiations
are underway and U.S.-Soviet diplomacy is entering a new
phase; to betray those struggling against tyranny in different
regions of the world, including our own neighborhood; or to
join in a bipartisan national endeavor to strengthen both
freedom and peace.
I have no doubt which course the American people want.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 14, 1986.
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