ISSUES PAPER SUMMARY OF SELECTED READINGS BACKGROUND FOR THE 12 NOVEMBER EVENING SESSION

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• Document Release Date: June 17, 2011
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Issues Paper
Summary of Selected Readings
Background for the 12 November Evening Session-'
What is the Information Revolution?
Advances in computing and communications promise to
transform global society in the 21st' century. The massive,
sustained increase in the capability to access, process; analyze,
and transmit large amounts of data has emerged as a major force
in technological innovation and a key determinant of national
economic health. Information technologies have remolded existing
and created entirely new industries. Cheap yet powerful
computers have dramatically expanded information available to the
ordinary citizen and simultaneously placed his privacy at risk.
Military programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative call for
successful integration of computing and communications activities
of unprecedented scope and complexity.
Ingredients
The pace and thrust of the information revolution hinges on
a handful of interrelated technologies:
Microelectronics: Advances in semiconductor manufacturing
have increased exponentially the density and performance of
integrated circuits (ICs)--the basic ingredient of all modern
computer and communications hardware. Some IC prices have
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remained stable, but mass production of inexpensive, general
purpose ICs has caused the cost of memory and logic functions to
plummet, fueling an explosion in the use of microelectronics-
based computing and communications by the military, industry, and
the public. Continuing advances in manufacturing methods ensure
that this trend is unlikely to stop soon. Globally,
electronics--broadly defined--is reportedly a $300 billion-a-year
business that is slated to triple by the year 2000 (see reading
1, "The High Tech Race: Who's Ahead?"; and The Information
Technology Revolution, Forester, "Editor's Introduction," pp.
xiii-xvii).
Computers: Although advances in the power, speed, and
efficiency of large mainframe computers were fairly predictable,
the surge in the use of minicomputers and personal computers
(PCs) was largely unforeseen. In 1985, US business bought 2,000
mainframes for $6.9 billion while 84,000 minicomputers were sold
for $9.5 billion. Sales of minicomputers are expected to grow at
an annual rate of 8 - 9 percent for the balance of the decade,
while mainframes are to grow at 2 percent. Meanwhile PC sales in
1985 stood at $3.6 billion worldwide and are expected to grow at
20 percent through 1987. A modestly priced PC typically used in
an office today often outperforms the large costly mainframe
computers used as recently as a decade ago.
Telecommunications: In addition to making traditional
communications services less expensive and more flexible, the
advent of digital transmission and switching systems served to
link rapidly proliferating computers and data bases in commerce,
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government, and industry. In 1983 sales of communications
equipment--such as communications satellites, cable television,
cellular radio, videodata systems, and local area networks--
totaled-almost $60 billion worldwide and was expected to climb to
$90 bilTion by 1988. In 1983, one large telecommunications
network was linked to 100,000 computer terminals, and required
4000 minicomputers and 300 mainframe computers to operate.
Software: Perhaps the most rapidly growing and changing
aspect of the information industry is the software that generates
the myriad of instructions that operate, link, and apply
computers and telecommunications hardware. Global sales of
software totaled $26 billion in 1985 and were growing at an
annual rate of more than 17 percent. In the United States alone,
PC software sales have doubled annually since 1980 and now
account for one third of total software sales of $18 billion. By
1990, business is projected to spend more on computer software
than on hardware.
Software increasingly determines the function and
performance of digital systems, enables hardware to be ever more
generally applied, and serves as the nervous system of national
and local telecommunications and information networks.
Development of software for artificial intelligence largely
governs prospects for the major US information processing
challenges--whether battle management for SDI or the "thinking
machine", the 5th generation computer (see reading 2,
"Information Technology" and Forester, "Software: The New
Driving Force," pp 27-44).
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Most authors hold that Western technological progress has
depended in large part on a hospitable economic system, providing
both support and incentive. In the United States, computer-
related?training is the most rapidly growing component of high
school and college curricula. Venture capital has facilitated
rapid pursuit of high risk avenues of technology development for
commercial use, while government funding has generated a massive
effort directed at defense needs. Government decontrol of
telecommunications has intensified competition, ostensibly
encouraging innovation and efficiency. In Japan, the educational
system supplies impressive numbers of skilled engineers, and the
government nurtures a dialogue with industry aimed at gaining
international competitive advantage. Japan is attempting to spur
development by privatizing its national telecommunication
research and development system (staffed by half a million
employees), and by purchasing innovative US firms--in essence,
keeping venture capital initiatives "in the family" (see
Forester, "Chips: The US versus Japan," pp. 45-55, and reading
3, "The Information Revolution: Trade in Services").
Applications
Intensifying global technological and economic competition
makes the effective exploitation of these information
technologies a key feature of military and economic survival.
Most modern weapons, command and control, and logistical systems
are otherwise unfeasible.
Information technologies already pervade Western science,
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industry, and society, aiding analysis and decision making,
managing industrial operations, and providing convenience and
entertainment for the consumer. Scientists use large, high-
performance, mainframe cbmputers to access and analyze enormous
streams-of data, while engineers routinely use minicomputers to
grapple with more modest problems and PC networks to share
information. Desktop terminals and PCs provide executives and
white collar workers in government and industry with rapidly
growing capability to access and analyze statistical, financial,
and operational data. Telecommunications links within and
between organizations can provide an almost unlimited ability to
share information (see Forester, "The Mechanization of Office
Work," pp. 298-311, and reading 4, "The Soviet Lag in High Tech
Defense").
Information technologies have moved on to the plant floor.
In the US, purchases of factory automation systems doubled
between 1980 and 1985 to $18.1 billion, and are expected to
double again by 1990. Minicomputers and microcomputers routinely
control manufacturing processes, machine tools, and robots.
Flexible manufacturing approaches link one or more machine tools
and programmable robots under the supervision of a computer to
further automate manufacturing processes. Local area networks
integrate production scheduling, procurement, and material
handling. Computer-aided design terminals host complex and often
specialized software packages to create designs in hours that
would require months to complete manually. Many larger
manufacturers are developing computer-integrated manufacturing
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(CIM) approaches that would eventually integrate many of these
functions Into a "lights out" factory. (see reading 5, "High
Tech to the Rescue: Can Automation Save American Industry?" and
Forester, "Computers in Manufacturing", pp. 260-272).
Information technologies have rapidly expanded the variety
and quality of services available to private citizens. Smart
appliances, pocket calculators, automatic teller machines, and
laser scans at stores and supermarkets save time. Cable
television and video cassette records bring in high quality
entertainment and in some areas even make it possible to shop in
the home. PCs and telephone modems that can link to remote data
bases or local and national networks enable professionals to work
at home, help students with their homework, allow hobbyists to
readily share information and support video games. Application
of information technologies in medicine has created more precise,
non-intrusive diagnostic tools to monitor individual health,
directly linked service paramedics to diagnostics available at
their base hospital, and created minicomputers on a chip for
smart implants such as pacemakers. Fire and police departments
increasingly control their vehicles with the aid of computer
networks, while local governments use office automation to speed
customer services.
The impact of advancing information technologies on US
economic productivity, growth, and international competitiveness
is debatable. Some analysts argue that productivity for white
collar workers, comprising three fourths of the US labor force,
is no greater than it was in the 1960s. They postulate that
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managers and workers either have not yet learned how to use
computers, or that the burden of meeting more intrusive
government demands for tax, fiscal, and labor relations reporting
have overwhelmed productivity gains. Other assessments-point to
the clear advantages major airlines and financial services firms
have gained over domestic and foreign competitors by raising
productivity through office automation. There is general
consensus that the introduction of information technologies has
streamlined manufacturing operations in the U.S., renewing growth
even in mature industries like automobiles and aircraft.
Nevertheless, manufacturing productivity gains in Japan--even
in 'critical elements of the electronics industry--have
outstripped growth in the U.S., inciting fears that America is
losing the high tech race (see reading 6, "A Puzzlingly Poorly
Productive America").
Information technologies are increasingly important in
weapons development and production. Prowess in smart munitions,
avionics, missile guidance, fire control, and surveillance and
command and control systems--rooted in advances in
microelectronics, microcomputers, and software--is widely viewed
as America's primary military advantage. Computers and software
accounted for less than two percent of development costs for
the F-4 Phantom, the mainstay US fighter aircraft of the 1960s
and early 1970s. The figure for the F-15 was over 40 percent,
and that for the F-18 even higher. In 1985 the Department of
Defense spent $194 million for the very-high-speed integrated
circuit (VHSIC) project with the goal of increasing the density
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and performance of silicon-based ICs a hundred fold by 1990. The
Pentagon has plans to use the first generation of VHSIC chips in
37 major weapons systems by 1992. Military software demands will
also be-fueled by the 250,000 military computers estimated to be
in military operation in 1990.
Computer and communications security is a vital concern
throughout government, business, and industry, given the danger
of espionage and sabotage. A recent survey of more than 17,000
computers used in the Department of Defense concluded that one
half required better access control. Disaffected engineers or
programmers could insert a few lines of code among the millions
of lines of operating code a large computer may use and severely
disrupt the machine functions. Hackers--often teenagers--share
information on techniques for illegally accessing computers on
some of the roughly 1,000 computer bulletin boards operated in
the U.S. The question of how to proceed against hackers has
raised unprecedented issues in jurisprudence.
The information revolution is also placing, at least
potentially, the security of the individual at risk. Some
estimate that the individual is referenced on average in roughly
40 local and federal government agency files and about the same
number of private sector files. The Internal Revenue Service is
obligated to pass its records to 38 different government
offices. A 1984 Gallup poll revealed that two thirds of the US
population believed that they had lost or are likely to lose some
privacy. A 1983 Harris poll revealed that 86 percent of the
citizenry felt it was possible for the government to use
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available information to persecute its "enemies" (see reading 7,
"Privacy Protection in the United States in 1984: Is it
Adequate?").
Although there appears to be general agreement that the
information revolution is likely to bring about sizeable changes
in the world economy, how much, how soon, and in what direction
are hotly debated. Some analysts make the point that it is
difficult to forecast the effects of these new technologies,
because their application will be determined more by economic,
political, and demographic conditions than by the intrinsic
merits of the technologies. In any event, the importance of
product "intellectual content" is likely to increase the
dominance of the services sector in national economies.
Dislocations of workers in aging smokestack industries, the
semiskilled, and, increasingly white collar workers, may be a
substantial force as well.
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How Do the Soviets View the Western Information Revolution?
Soviet officials actively follow developments in Western
information technologies and applications. Like many aspects of
the East-West competition, two themes frequently arise in their
statements and writings: concern over the potential threat, and
a carefully crafted balance of admiration and criticism as they
move to emulate Western progress. Although different factions in
the Soviet establishment may place varying emphasis on each
theme, nearly all officials toe the official line: Western
development must and can be matched, borrowing positive aspects
and side-stepping the negatives.
Concern
Soviet leaders--especially Gorbachev--have been blunt in
depicting the threat posed by the Western information
revolution. They have criticized the lethargy of the 1970s,
implicitly charging that the Brezhnev leadership failed to act on
the promise of information technologies and to appreciate the
pace and consequences of Western advances. They have
specifically criticized the practice of overreliance on a
follower strategy--adopting Western advance. Officials have
noted the difficulty of reverse engineering, and the accelerating
progress in many of the key technologies. They express concern
over the prospect of being condemned to a permanent lag.
The economic consequences are frequently highlighted.
Leaders and officials talk about achieving international
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competitiveness in manufactures, both in the high technology
products themselves and especially in the broad array of product
groups--like vehicles and machine tools--where applications of
information technologies are driving cost and quality. Other
officials--frequently scientists--talk about the importance of
maintaining prestige as a first rate technical power.
More broadly, and more seriously, Soviet officials cite the
contribution of information technologies to productivity growth
and economic development in all advanced industrial countries.
Noting that productivity must fuel virtually all Soviet growth
for the remainder of the century, they have argued that
information technologies are a linchpin in their efforts to match
Western industrial prowess, international influence, and
consumption levels.
"Economic competition between the two systems is more
noticeably moving into the scientific and technical
sphere. The result of this competition will be decided
precisely in that sphere."
They also acknowledge the "bandwagon" effect in the West--that
information technology advances rapidly reinforce further
advance-- as a way of highlighting the danger of playing catch
Military concerns also surface. Generally, Soviet military
and political leaders always have acknowledged the role of a
strong economy in supporting military power. More specifically,
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Soviet military leaders have cited the contribution of
information technologies to advancing Western weapon
capabilities--most recently in "smart" conventional weapons and
SDI. They note that Soviet progress is essential to emulate and,
in many-cases, also to defeat (see reading 4, Gannes).
Admiration and Criticism
Active Soviet proponents of information technologies and
applications, probably encouraged by Gorbachev's admonition to
confront and acknowledge shortcomings, speak and write favorably
about Western accomplishments. They are impressed by Western
dynamism, particularly in rapid industrial assimilation and mass
production, and admit that they were caught by surprise. They
cite Western cost advantages--comparing, for example, Western
computers costing in the hundreds of dollars with the 8-bit Agat,
"costing'up to 3,000 rubles." They have praised Western
innovators like Stephen Wozniak. And some have even acknowledged
that Soviet systems--like the Agat--are modeled after Western
systems and basically use Western developed components.
Open criticism seems to come from two quarters. Some
officials with a clear vested interest criticize aspects of
Western development--like decentralized computing--that are
"incompatible" with Soviet approaches. Other writers in the
popular press frequently use Western experience with information
technologies to criticize the capitalist system. Information
technologies are variously accused of causing bankruptcy,
unemployment, alienation, and invasion of privacy and of
supporting Western :-2ilitaricm nd espionage -Qati'sngs R,
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"American Capitalism Criticized for Use of Computers," and 9,
"USSR: Academic Journal Takes Up Debate Over Computers").
Soviet officials confidently reassure their people that
socialism can reap the benefits and avoid the pain: "We, of
course,.do not have these problems and cannot have them."
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What Are Soviet Goals For Their Own Information Revolution?
Gorbachev has embraced the information revolution. He has
called for the "technical restructuring" of the Soviet economy
and singled out information technologies and their supporting
industries for highest priority development in the USSR and
Eastern Europe (see reading 10, Excerpts from Gorbachev's June
1985 Speech on Science and Technology). He expects information
and other advanced technologies to reverse the decline in the
growth of Soviet labor productivity and GNP, acknowledging that
the }prospect of very little increase in the Soviet labor force
makes this even more urgent (see The Soviet Economy Under a New
Leader, p.2) Over all, he wants to launch the Soviet Union onto
a new development course and holds out the hope that the USSR
will be in the same league as the US and Japan in the year 2000.
In the economy, he has set ambitious targets for the
suppliers of information technologies, while prominent officials
promise substantial gains from information technology
applications.
o Production of computer equipment is slated to grow
annually by 18 percent through 1990. By that time
the Soviets are to produce 1.1 million personal
computers, after producing virtually none until the
mid-1980s.
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o Output by the main producer of instrumentation
equipment is slated to grow by 19 percent per year
in the 1986-90 period, up from 6 percent in, the
previous five-year period.
Production of robots in the 1986-90 period is to
increase by 2.2 times, NC machine tools by 1.9
times, and machining centers by 4.3 times compared
with 1981-85 production.
The Soviets are counting on flexible manufacturing systems and
other computer-aided machinery to provide the necessary precision
to achieve the increasingly complex designs required by advanced
military systems, including subsystem miniaturization, increased
structural strength, and reduced weight.
Installation of CAD/CAM is to dramatically increase.
Optimistic Soviet officials have claimed that CAD systems will
shorten product development times by 50 to 80 percent. Other
officials have claimed that automation in engineering industries
will increase labor productivity 2-2.5 times, while automation of
continuous processing can free up to one-half of the laborers.
In the military, specific Soviet goals are less clear. It
is evident, however, that the Soviets have not become any less
aggressive in meeting the challenge of advancing Western weapons
technology. As weapon costs skyrocket and technology
breakthoughs offer large performance gains, there are indications
that the Soviet military is pressing harder than in th,- 1,970,z for
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weapons of better quality even at the cost of reduced
quantities. Information technologies are central to this
strategy, both in the weapons and in the factory (see The Soviet
Weapons Industry: An Overview).
In society, the authorities promise an improvement in the
quality of life, and a smooth transition to the new information
society. In the near term, the regime emphasizes education and
training, with the introduction in 1985 of a mandatory course on
the basic principles of computers and computer programming at the
9th and 10th grade level. The Soviets are planning to supply
500,000 personal computers to the schools by 1990--or about 40
percent of total production-- and 5 million by the year 2000.
Mass communication services, as well as home personal computers
and VCRs, are expected to increase in number and improve in
quality.- Advocates claim that citizens' lives will be enriched
and creative forces unleashed throughout society. Other
officials point to the need to mobilize control organs to guard
against "infection" by "bourgeois" ideas, but--at least openly--
express confidence that infection can be contained. In all, as
an architect of the computer literacy program promises,
information technologies "will change our life, making it fuller,
wiser, more sensible, and, in the end, happier than now".
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Where Are the Soviets Starting From?
Soviet and Western observers generally agree that the USSR
lags Western nations considerably in the development and
application of information technologies. These lags have
persisted--and in some areas lengthened--despite a massive
commitment of resources to information technology R&D dating back
to the 1960s. As in many areas of Soviet technology, the quality
of R&D is sometimes impressive--the USSR claims, for example, to
have "invented" the transistor. While this competence has
enabled Moscow to erode certain Western leads at the laboratory
stage, familiar Soviet problems in industrial innovation and
application are the major brakes on Soviet progress.
Technologies
Western experts generally hold that Soviet microelectronics,
computer, and telecommunications technologies lag Western state-
of-the-art by anywhere from zero to 15 years, depending on the
specific technology (see readings 11 Stapleton and Goodman,
"Microcomputing in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," and 12,
Selin, "Communications and Computers in the USSR: Successes and
Failures"). In general, the Soviets are said to fare better in
major hardware development than in the developmental support
technology such as computer peripherals and software. Where
advance is more amenable to a massive, focussed campaign--like
certain programs in telecommunications and microcircuit
development--the Soviets do relatively better and the Western
lead may shrink; where advance depends more on coordinated and
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mutually reinforcing development in a host of interelated
technologies, such as in computers or computer-aided
manufacturing, the Western lead is more likely to be sustained or
even increase. Across all information technologies, however, it
has been-demonstrated that Soviet advance has depended
significantly on imported or stolen Western technology (see
Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western
Technology: An Update, and reading 13, Goodman, "Technology
Transfer and the Development of the'Soviet Computer Industry").
In the last several years Soviet officials appear to have
become more acutely aware of the need for much improved
coordination of interrelated information technologies. Support
services--software, peripheral equipment, maintenance, and user
training--have repeatedly been singled out as the most serious
problem areas (see reading 14, "Microcomputer Repair Service
Excoriated"). Soviet leaders have responded by creating
organizations to coordinate development and foster compatibility
among the hundreds of independent product lines (see reading 15,
"Computerization Encounters Difficulties"). To date, the
response appears to be largely bureaucratic--new oversight
committees, expanded technical standards, and formal quality
certification.
Moreover, on the hardware, software, and support fronts the
Soviets are trying to capitalize on the resources of Eastern
Europe, part of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA). This also is not new--computer development (initially
the Ryad Series) was the first major product of CEMA integration
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of R&D in the early 1970s. Recently, the CEMA has announced the
S&T 2000 program, singling out key information technologies for
much expanded cooperative development efforts. Soviet
organizations will lead these development efforts and stand to
gain particularly in areas where East European countries are
leaders (see reading 16, "Computer Bang-or Whimper"). The
Soviets also gain by using Eastern Europe as a conduit for
Western information technology.
Applications
According to Soviet official data, information technologies
are being applied on an increasing scale throughout the
economy. R&D and industrial customers are receiving preference
in the allocation of computers. Mainframes used for inventory
control, payroll, and other management support functions are
fairly common in large plants, while minicomputers are held to be
applied extensively in process control. Soviet and Western
authors, however, claim that Soviet computers are generally used
less intensively than those in Western firms.
Western authors have described the Soviet telephone system
as primitive by Western standards and notorious for poor-quality
transmission and unreliability. The plan for 1985 called for
increasing the level of existing network automation--switching of
long distance calls without the assistance of an operator--to a
mere 55 percent. The Soviets also have a large but
unsophisticated communications satellite network. They have
launched six times as much payload weight as the US Intelsat
system, but have less than one-fifth the communications
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capacity. Leading edge technologies such as optical fibers for
data transmission, network control programs, and digital
switching presently appear in Soviet literature as problems that
must be-solved before widescale use begins. At the same time,
the Soviets make more modest demands on their telecommunications
system than is typical in an advanced Western country. (see
readings 11, Selin, and 17, Selin, "Ma Bell's Spirits Alive and
Well in Moscow").
The development of the computer, microelectronics, and
telecommunications industries allowed the Soviets in the mid-
1970s to begin introducing automated management systems (ASUs) on
the plant, regional and national levels. The Soviets use ASUs for
economic, administrative, inventory, product planning, and
process control applications. By 1985, the USSR reported they had
installed over 6,300 systems of all types. Difficulties in
applying largescale systems apparently have convinced the Soviets
to deemphasize ministerial and enterprise level systems in favor
of lower-level process control ASUs, as illustrated in the chart
below.
1971-75
1976-80
1981-85
ASUs for technical processes
564
1306
2611
ASOIs (automated data processing
systems)
108
133
259
ASUs for ministry management
168
92
60
ASUs for enterprise management
838
389
296
Source: Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR, 1985.
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In general, both Soviet and Western analysts say that the
range and intensity of Soviet applications remain well behind
those in the West. The Soviets have highly automated factories,
but many are islands in a sea of aging industrial plant. Uneven
development--especially in services--also contributes to failure
to achieve the hoped for gains in efficiency (see reading 18,
"Problems of Production Automation"). The Soviet system itself
also weakens the Soviet manager's interest in embracing the
information age, whether he provides or uses information
services. Soviet authors acknowledge that these shortcomings
significantly reduce the economic benefits they obtain from
automated management systems (see reading 19, "The Great Soviet
Computer Screw-Up" and reading 20, "Problems in Acceptance of
Computers Reported"). Information technologies have made limited
inroads into the schools.
Information technologies have had varying impact in the
home. The USSR has significantly upgraded and expanded its
television and radio broadcasting capabilities (see reading 21,
"The Rapid Expansion of Soviet Satellite TV Broadcasting").
Soviet surveys reveal that most citizens obtain an increasing
share of their information from broadcast media at the expense of
print media and lectures. Video cassette recorders are in great
demand; an estimated 300,000 are already in homes (see reading
22, Yasman, "The Collectivization of Videos"). Personal
computers appear to have made the least impact, due to shortages
of equipment, maintenance, and training (see reading 23 "Home
Computers Have Gone On Sale").
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Information technologies also have the potential to be used
by organs of political and social control. Western analysts have
assumed that the privileged position of the KGB, police,- and
Communist Party apparatus would assure them ready access to the
best available technology for communications intercept and
surveillance.
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Discussion Questions
1. Do the Soviets view.the Western information revolution as a
threat, an opportunity, or both? What threats do they
foresee--to military power, international competitiveness,
and/or domestic control? What opportunities do they
foresee, particularly for capitalizing on Western advance?
i
2. Where are the Soviets starting from? Where do key Soviet
technologies stand relative to Western technologies, and is
the gap widening or narrowing? What aspects of the Soviet
political and economic system particularly favor or impair
advance? What interest groups will most forcefully press
for or resist the information revolution?
3. What are Soviet goals for information technology development
and application, and how do goals for economic, military,
and social programs rank in importance? Are Soviet goals
realistic by the standards of Western experience?
4. How important are Soviet information technology goals for
their overall economic, military, and social programs? Are
there any feasible alternatives to these goals--i.e. can
they sit out aspects of the Western revolution, and/or rely
exclusively on a follower strategy?
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Issues Paper
Summary of Selected Readings
Background for the 13 November Morning Session
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress in the Information Revolution?
Judgments about the pace of Soviet advance depend on
assumptions about how the Soviets will choose between partly
incompatible goals. Most authors take as a given that the
centralized, socialist Soviet system creates an inhospitable
environment for maximizing advance in information technologies and
their applications. Thus, as one author (Malik) puts it, the
Soviets face an "agonizing dilemma"--balancing the gains of
development with the risks of losing political and social control.
Experts differ, of course, over where the Soviets will end up
along this continuum, and what the consequences will be for the
Soviet position in the world. We summarize below the key elements
of a general consensus that seems to emerge-- the Soviets will
"muddle through" but will not reach the levels of leading western
nations in the year 2000. (see reading 24, Goodman "Advanced
Technology: How will the USSR Adjust?", reading 25, Malik,
"Communism vs. the Computer," and reading 26, Dizard, "Mikhail
Gorbachev's Computer Challenge").
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The Ingredients
Even before Gorbachev, most Western experts believed that
Soviet information technologies would continue to advance at a
healthy.rate, benefiting from the traditional impetus of massive
resource commitments, exploitation of Western developments, and
leadership attention. Gorbachev has given a strong kick to the
program, especially in terms of resources. Even so, few observers
expect the Soviets to signficantly narrow the gap, except possibly
in a narrow front of specialty military applications. Most believe
the Soviets will remain about ten years behind in most technology
areas--that is, in 1995 they will have about the same array of
technologies available that we have today. Moreover, within the set
of information technologies, most expect to see relatively faster
Soviet progress in technologies that lend themselves to a "national
program" approach (e.g. telecommunications) and relatively worse off
in technologies that don't (e.g. software) (see, for example,
reading 12, Selin).
These judgments are predicated on the widely held belief that
Gorbachev will not fundamentally change the Soviet system, moving
from a Party-dominated command system to a more pluralistic,
decentralized system. Gorbachev is moving aggressively on weak
links--orienting science to the needs of production; stressing
services, maintenance, and computer literacy; and generally trying
to create an environment that encourages individual initiative and
creativity. These measures are nevertheless conservative. Although
many Soviet officials are optimistic, most Westerners believe the
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system will remain fundamentally hostile to information technology
advance (see reading 27 Graham, "The Soviet Union is Missing Out on
the Computer Revolution").
The Applications
Western and Soviet experts seem to agree that information
technologies will be applied preferentially in government, science,
industry, and, as a means to an end, education. Conservative Soviet
authorities write of the need for "unified state control" of
information technologies, while even the most vocal believers in
information technologies generally write in terms of the provision
of centralized services.
In the government, police, and military establishments,
information technologies are likely to be extensively applied to
support the maintenance of central control. For economic
management, computers have been described as the "last great hope of
central planning." Although early dreams of "computerizing" the
entire economy have been scaled back considerably, computers are
likely to find increasingly widespread use at all levels in planning
production and supply. With an improved telecommunications network,
expanded automated data links will increase Moscow's ability to
collect information and convey instructions. In the military,
information technologies will continue to be incorporated in weapon
applications, but the real frontier is command and control. Soviet
military literature extolls such computer applications, and most
experts believe that information technologies will be more
extensively applied in combat modeling, operational planning
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(including reconnaissance and fire support), and strategic battle
management. Western authors presume that the KGB and militia will
be quick to pioneer surveillance and record-keeping applications,
but doubt that the technologies would support truly Orwellian
measures of control--at least by the year 2000.
In the economy, most experts expect that the Soviets will apply
information technologies extensively in information dissemination,
product design, and manufacturing process control. The Soviets have
long invested large sums in acquiring and disseminating technical
information, and the Soviets are moving to automate this process
more extensively. Access to Western data bases will be aggressively
pursued. Soviets acknowledge-- and Western experts agree--that
computer-aided design will be a very high priority, as the Soviets
move into components (e.g. VLSI integrated circuits) and systems
(e.g. high performance aircraft) that are either impossible or
prohibitively expensive to develop by other means. Computer-aided
manufacturing probably will be pursued the most vigorously, because
it is so important for Gorbachev's productivity and growth goals.
Many Western experts believe the Soviets will succeed in producing
large numbers of robots, automated machine tools, materials handling
equipment, and control computers, but will not develop an effective,
integrated systems approach. "Islands of automation" will spread,
but continuing deficiencies in software, maintenance, technical
standards, and Soviet incentives will impair comprehensive advance
and efficient use.
In the home, Western experts anticipate substantial progress In
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entertainment applications but little prospect of a "computer
culture" comparable to that in the West. Mass communication
services already permeate Soviet society. Given the receptivity of
Soviet citizens to radio and (especially) TV, Soviet officials are
likely to try to improve the quality, timeliness, and variety of
offerings, if only to compete with Western alternatives. At the
same time, information technologies are likely to be used in jamming
or otherwise interfering with these Western alternatives. Ownership
of videocassette recorders and possibly video cameras will become
more widespread as Western systems and Soviet products become
increasingly available. The apparent Soviet concern over impact of
these systems makes it difficult to forecast how rapidly this
process will unfold. Ownership of personal telephones will
increase, but most experts believe that even by the mid-1990s they
will not achieve levels prevalent in the West in the mid-1980s.
Finally, most Western experts seem to believe that personal
computers will reach Soviet citizens in relatively small numbers.
The priority of applications in the computer literacy program and in
industry, along with restrictions on imports, makes it unlikely that
large numbers would be available to the Soviet consumer before the
early 1990s. Deficiencies in or unavailability of peripheral
equipment--such as printers or modems--will further restrict
personal applications.
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What Will Be the Consequences for the Soviets?
If the Soviets do indeed "muddle through", the Soviet Union of
the 1990s will be not much different than it is today--a repressive
society still playing catch up the the West, but still dangerous
militarily. Progress and change will be constrained by and
contained within a Soviet system that resemble the current model.
Of course, the scenario assumes that the West will generally
continue playing the same kind of role it does today. The West
generally will try to hold the Soviet Union at arms length in its
quest for high technology, and to influence the evolution of the
Soviet political and social systems mainly by the provision of
information.
In the economic and military arenas, most experts believe that
information technologies will support continued steady Soviet
progress, but that the Soviets will not reach present Western levels
of per capita production, quality of life, or military technology by
the year 2000. Although no one is willing to hazard a precise
forecast, most doubt that Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union
into an engine of economic development, achieving his goal of five
percent annual growth in the 1990s. There is at least as much
skepticism that Soviet technology and products will become
competitive with the best Western alternatives. If so, the Soviets
will continue to have an export profile like that of a third world
country--selling mainly raw materials. Continuation or worsening of
the Soviet position in those markets would impair Soviet ability to
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rely on the West. In sum, many Western experts would agree the the
chance of the Soviets falling further behind is at least a good
chance of their catching up.
On-the political and social front, many Western authors imply
that there will be a gradual moderation of state control--whether
intended or unintended. Gorbachev's campaign to encourage
individual and local initiative--plus the technologies he is
supporting it with-- requires some moderation. At the same time,
Gorbachev acknowledges that the increasingly sophisticated and
demanding Soviet citizen must be catered to, and indeed one Western
author (Dizard) argue that the Soviet "Yuppie"--and not the
dissident--will be the driving force. Among areas of potential
Soviet concern are:
0 Direct Western broadcasts, likely to become
increasingly accessible to ordinary citizens-- although
Soviet cable TV could check this trend (see readings
28, Quester, "Transboundary Television" and 29,
Reichlin, "Big Brother's Grip Can Fail").
Paradoxically, to the reported consternation of Soviet
Party officials, even Soviet television may have a
moderating influence. Television, a major
entertainment medium, is undermining the effectiveness
of political lectures and other, more traditional means
of conveying propaganda.
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o The growing availability of videocassettes, both
Western-origin and blank tapes. (see readings 22,
Yasman, and 30, Yasman, "Video in the Soviet Union:
Trouble With a Capricious Stepchild"). Propagation of
"antisocial values" and popular agitation are feared.
o Direct telecommunication links. Increasing access to
telephones (and possibly modems), plus improvement in
the national systems at least increases control and
surveillance problems for the KGB. The Soviets' 1982
cut-off of international direct dialing illustrates
their willingness to take drastic measures.
The Soviet leadership has reason to worry that an increasingly
computer-literate citizenry may develop the ability to obtain,
manipulate, and transmit unauthorized information, whether at home
or on the job. Even within the bounds of the official system,
information technologies can be a double-edged sword-- Moscow can
use them to centralize and penetrate, but local authorities can use
them to deceive. According to Velikhov, Soviet social scientists
are also looking into possible consequences of the information
revolution that have been discussed in the West--worker alienation,
reduced peer contacts. There are also hints of concern over worker
"dislocation", if not unemployment.
Even under the scenario of steady if unspectular Soviet
progress, some Western authors have raised the possibility of more
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serious conflict or disruption within the Soviet system. One
eventuality might be unanticipated by the Soviets--that as
information technologies expand, a "cross-over point" is reached--
possibly suddenly--at which time developing networks overwhelm the
ability of controls (see Malik and Dizard). Alternatively, tension
may grow between "conservatives" and "modernizers" as one or both
sides become dissatisfied with trends in Soviet economic progress
and political control. Disagreement could lead to an abrupt change
in policy, with ramifications extending beyond the world of
information technologies. It could prompt a dramatic liberalization
of the Soviet system, or monumental internal crackdown and external
beligerence. Malik, perhaps the most alarmist of the writers on
}
this topic, concludes that "we are on track for a highly dangerous
situation."
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Discussion Questions
1. Will the Soviets meet their goals for information technology
development? How advanced will Soviet microelectronic,
computer, telecommunications, and software technologies be in
the late 1990s? What key technical or systemic deficiencies
will constrain progress?
2. Will Soviet technologies be adequate to support Soviet goals
for information technology applications? If not, to what
extent can and will the Soviets resort to Western, Japanese, or
East European technology to meet these goals? Taking all
technology resources into account, what progress will the
Soviets make in industrial automation, economic management,
social control, and personal applications?
3. How will Soviet progress in information technology applications
contribute to broader Soviet economic goals? Will likely
Soviet information technology progress endanger Soviet goals
for growth in productivity and consumer welfare?
4. Will progress in information technology applications lead to
some moderation of political and social control--whether
planned or unplanned? Or will information technologies serve
mainly to intensify central control? What will be the major
forces supporting moderation and intensification? Which
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sources of moderation are beyond the Soviets' control, and
which of these do they fear most?
5. Do or will the Soviets face a crisis? Will likely'progress in
applications of information technologies be compatible with
goals for both economic development and political and social
control? Even if the Soviet officials are content with their
apparent progress, will the growth of information technology
applications reach a critical concentration that threatens to
overwhelm control mechanisms? If Soviet interest groups are
unhappy with either the pace of progress or the diminution of
central control, is this likely to precipitate a fundamental
change in course? What is the more likely eventuality--
sacrifice of progress to preserve control, or the reverse?
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