INDIA: NUCLEAR DEBATES AND DECISIONMAKERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000505160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Decisionmakers
India:
Nuclear Debates and
Seerct
NESA 86-10011
February 1986
Directorate of
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Decisionmakers
India:
Nuclear Debates and
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared byl Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Division, NESA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications
Secret
MESA 86-10011
February 1986
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India:
Nuclear Debates and
Decisionmakers
Key Judgments Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, like his predecessors, holds the
Information available Cabinet's nuclear portfolio and is the focal point for major nuclear
as of 3 Februarv 1986 decisions. Since coming to office, he has persistently drawn attention to the
was used in this report.
threat that Pakistan's nuclear program poses to India's national security.
He would prefer to find a diplomatic and political solution to the nuclear
dilemma in the subcontinent, since he does not want to divert scarce Indian
resources to a nuclear weapons program.
Gandhi's decisionmaking style is consultative and conciliatory. On nuclear
issues he receives advice from a wide range of political appointees, opinion
makers, and scientists. Indian Government officials and opinion makers are
divided in their views on nuclear weapons, although proweapons advocates
are more vocal than in the past.
India's relatively free press and extensive professional cadre of civil
servants, scientists, and military strategists encourage lively discussion of
the nuclear options and set the climate for policy debate and formulation.
Although there is no unanimity in official opinion, public opinion and the
press increasingly favor building a nuclear deterrent.
New Delhi will be slow to come to a decision on the troublesome nuclear is-
sue and will be extremely reluctant to make any decision public. A large-
scale, highly publicized weapons program would entail major diplomatic
and economic costs, and India's democratic traditions will ensure that all
sides have an opportunity to contribute to-and drag out-the debate.
Although India demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability in 1974, it has
steadfastly maintained that its nuclear research and energy program is
peaceful and has resisted demands to start a nuclear weapons program.
New Delhi's resolve, however, is being eroded by increasing evidence of
nuclear weapons capability in Pakistan.
If Pakistan were to give undeniable evidence of its nuclear weapons
capability, or if China were to deploy nuclear weaponry in a manner to
threaten India, there would be overwhelming public support in India for a
nuclear weapons program.
Secret
MESA 86-10011
February 1986
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Even if India and Pakistan were to reach a bilateral understanding without
submitting to international safeguards, New Delhi could still undertake a
small, covert nuclear weapons program. This is probably India's most 25X1
attractive option, since it would preserve plausible denial, be economically
feasible, and could be kept proportionate to Pakistan's program.
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Secret
Hardliners
Moderates
The Advisers-Splintered Opinion
The Inner Circle
New Delhi's Scientists
Bureaucratic Equities
Department of Atomic Energy
Ministry of External Affairs
Ministry of Defense
Committee on National Security
Nonofficial Influences
Public Opinion
Opposition Parties
The Press
Outlook
Implications for the United States
Alternative Scenario
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India:
Nuclear Debates and
Decisionmakers
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced in
June 1985 that-in view of Pakistan's nuclear ambi-
tions-India was being forced to review its commit-
ment to a peaceful nuclear program, long the corner-
stone of New Delhi's nuclear policy. Although India
detonated what New Delhi termed was a "peaceful
nuclear explosion" in 1974, that nation is internation-
ally identified with the worldwide nuclear disarma-
ment movement and a widely publicized moral stand
against nuclear weaponry. New Delhi, however, has
kept its options open by refusing to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and publicly stating its in-
tention to maintain an option to acquire nuclear
weapons.
Since coming to office in November 1984, Gandhi has
made clear, as no previous Prime Minister has, that
India must respond to the change in the military
balance that a nuclear-capable Pakistan would create.
Gandhi has been persistent in searching for an appro-
priate response to Pakistan's progress. He has made
frequent public comments about the economic cost of
a nuclear weapons program and the military difficul-
ties of adapting to nuclear warfare.
Gandhi's raising the issue has exposed a lack of
consensus within the government and thrown the
debate on nuclear weapons into sharper relief. The
Indian newspapers' front page stories and columnists
have begun to discuss in earnest the pros and cons of
nuclear weapons development and have criticized the
Prime Minister for his inability to resolve the issue.
Some members of Gandhi's Congress Party and other
political parties have demanded that the government
launch a nuclear weapons program.
Since the Chinese nuclear test of 1964, India has had
pro- and anti-bomb lobbies. The dominant antibomb
forces believed that India's moral stand against nucle-
ar weaponry should serve as a model for the world.
The probomb advocates argued that India needed
nuclear arms as a deterrent to the threat from China
and as a means for India to take its rightful place as a
world power.
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We do not believe New Delhi has sanctioned a large-
scale nuclear weapons program, but India retains the
capability to do so on short notice. India detonated a
nuclear device in the Thar Desert in 1974-the
"peaceful nuclear explosion. " Analysis of the re-
search of key Indian nuclear scientists indicates that,
until 1977, they worked on theoretical problems that
have weapons applications and on the diagnostics of
the 1974 test. India's large program of civil nuclear
power and research and development also gives it an
ample basis from which to develop a nuclear weapons
effort. Stockpiles of plutonium and recent advances in
plutonium-producing research reactors and fast-
breeder reactors will give India the advantage over
Pakistan in fissile material production.
If India were to initiate a major nuclear weapons
program, which we define as a development and
testing program leading to deployment of several
small nuclear weapons, we might expect to detect the
following indicators:
? Testing of the high-explosives components of nucle-
ar weapons, probably at Chandigarh.
? Growing contacts between personnel of the Depart-
ment of Atomic Energy and the military to estab-
lish weapons requirements and characteristics and
to administer a hardware development program.
? Stepped-up efforts to procure abroad specialized
materials, components, and equipment for weapons
production and for the civil nuclear program in
anticipation of a foreign nuclear suppliers' boycott.
? Reassignment of key personnel within the nuclear
establishment to new duties or locations.
? A nuclear test, probably at the Thar Desert site, to
provide new technical data or more conclusive proof
that technical development objectives had been
achieved.
We have observed none of these activities, but we
believe India could have a nuclear device ready for
testing and could proceed rapidly with an under-
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During the last five years the dominance of the
antiweapons forces has been assailed by growing
ranks of hawks responding to the entry of Pakistan
into the nuclear arena. A flurry of books and films
alleging that Pakistan was building an "Islamic
bomb" appeared in India. The allegations were given
added credibility in Indian eyes when the United
States invoked the Symington Amendment and sev-
ered aid to Pakistan in 1979.' Press reports last
summer that Pakistan illegally obtained and used US-
made krytron triggers for a test of the nonfissile
components of a nuclear device intensified Indian
concern.
A lively debate over the circumstances that should
trigger a nuclear weapons program has replaced the
militant pro- and anti-weapons arguments of the
1960s and 1970s. The introduction of the Pakistani
angle has given the discussion a new twist, and, to
most Indians, the question is no longer whether but
when India should acquire nuclear arms. Arguments
of the antiweapons forces have moderated considera-
bly as more observers argue that India must be able to
respond quickly and decisively to Pakistan's advances.
the opinion that nuclear weapons are tools of diploma-
cy and that the decision to develop them should not
depend upon what Pakistan does.
Moderates
According to our analysis of the public debate, most
moderates argue that India should initiate a weapons
program only in response to undisputed evidence of a
Pakistani nuclear weapons capability such as a nucle-
ar test or a cutoff of US aid. Many adherents of this
view acknowledge that a Pakistani explosion of a
nuclear device would begin an expensive nuclear arms
race in South Asia. There are very few Indians who
would argue against nuclear weapons in the face of a
demonstrated Pakistani nuclear capability.
India's consistently held anti-nuclear-weapons posture
suggests that most policymakers are moderates on
nuclear issues, and
policymakers base their opinions on a prag-
matic assessment of the economic and diplomatic
costs. , a weapons
program that includes sophisticated delivery systems
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Hardliners
Proponents of an immediate nuclear weapons pro-
gram have always argued that this would not only
counter a Chinese nuclear threat and a growing
Pakistani weapons program but also would have wider
international political benefits for India. They see a
weapons program as a means to ensure India's right-
ful position in global power politics and to contribute
to the strength of the Third World by redressing the
gross imbalance of power between the developed and
developing world. Many adherents of this view hold
' The Symington Amendment provides for the cutoff of foreign
assistance to any country importing uranium enrichment technol-
ogy for unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. In April 1979, as a result
of the publication of news regarding Pakistan's unsafeguarded
uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, all US assistance to that
country was cut off. In 1981 the provisions of the Symington
Amendment were amended, allowing Congress to waive the law if
US national security interests were jeopardized-as they were
believed to be when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. If Congress
has reason to believe Pakistan is obtaining weapons-grade uranium
or if that country tests a nuclear device, Congress can reinvoke the
have argued that a weapons program would seriously
undermine India's credibility in international forums
and the Nonaligned Movement, as well as the credi-
bility of the disarmament movement, with which New
Delhi is closely associated.
Rajiv Gandhi's key advisers do not agree on the
appropriate response to Pakistan's growing nuclear
capability (see foldout). Although we do not have good
evidence of the views of all his intimate advisers, it is
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Over the years Indian policymakers have defined
several nuclear policy alternatives that are supported
by various government bodies and officials. These
options, not mutually exclusive, continue to be ar-
gued in the press and policy circles:
reports that Pakistan tested the nonfissile compo-
nents of a detonation system have led Indian ob-
servers to conclude that Pakistan may not need a
full-blown nuclear test to have confidence in the
reliability of a nuclear weapon design.
? A preemptive strike on Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
Gandhi's and Zia's joint announcement in Decem-
ber 1985 not to attack each other's nuclear facili-
ties would presumably negate this option. Gandhi in
numerous public interviews had already disavowed
a preemptive strike as contrary to Indian principles
as well as incapable of guaranteeing the elimination
of all enriched uranium that may be stockpiled. We
believe that New Delhi has military contingency
plans to carry out such an attack, although some
Indian strategists are concerned that the inevitable
Pakistani retaliatory attack on Indian nuclearfa-
cilities would spread radioactive contamination
over large portions of India.
? Mutual no-first-strike pledge. In late July 1985, K.
Subrahmanyam proposed in an article published in
the Times of India that both countries develop
confidence-building measures that would culminate
in the acceptance of a pledge not to use nuclear
weapons against each other. Initial steps in the
process would include a pledge not to attack each
other's nuclear facilities (agreed to in December
1985) and the accession by Pakistan to the environ-
mental modification convention and the partial test
ban treaty. Ultimately, the pact would allow each
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Cartoonist's depiction of cynicism about the Gan-
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facilities.
side to retain its weapons option and would not
involve mutual inspection of facilities.
? Move under the nuclear umbrella of a superpower.
This idea first appeared, and was rejected, in the
1960s when a faction within the Ministry of Exter-
nal Affairs supported the acceptance of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and a security guarantee
from the United States. The ruling Congress Party
has publicly indicated as recently as August 1985
that it continues to believe India should not depend
upon another power to safeguard its sovereignty.
? A weapons program. This option generates the most
debate and is perceived by many Indians to be the
only workable alternative.
? Accept the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. New
Delhi's official policy is never to accept the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, since it is viewed as discrimi-
natory to nonnuclear weapons states and would
force India to put all nuclear facilities under full-
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According to most Indian observers, Rajiv Gandhi has introduced a
new style of decisionmaking to India. He is consultative and decisive.
According to an Indian opinion poll, he is widely perceived to be a good
crisis manager. He has termed himself "noncortfrontational. " Unlike
Indira Gandhi, who procrastinated, Rajiv is quick to identify problems,
examine the issues, and seek workable solutions. He looks to his
advisers for facts and options and seeks counsel from those he
considers experts-often professionals who had no influence in
his mother's circle. According to a US Embassy report, Indian
officials say that Gandhi often asks detailed questions that
reveal a thorough understanding of technical concepts.
Gandhi has surprised observers with his prompt attempts to reach
sometimes bold solutions to major policy problems and has earned high
ratings in a recent Indian public opinion poll. Within his first year,
Gandhi concluded accords on two highly contentious domestic issues: the
Punjab crisis and Assam. In both instances, according to press accounts,
he sacrificed his party's political advantage for the nation's good. In both
instances he introduced unexpected proposals to bring movement toward
solution.
clear their opinions range from those hesitant to take
any steps now to at least one adviser who sees
advantages in both India and Pakistan having nuclear
weapons.
The Inner Circle
Arun Singh, Minister of State for Defense Research
and Development, is the Prime Minister's most trust-
ed adviser, according to the Indian press. Singh is
responsible for a large network of defense research
establishments that will irteract closely with the civil
nuclear program in the event of a decision to acquire
nuclear weapons. He has been involved in high-level
discussions with the Pakistanis on nuclear matters.
The Indian press speculates that one reason Gandhi
appointed Singh is to ensure that he had a trusted
official in a key post in the event of a decision to
launch a nuclear weapons program. Singh's position
in the Ministry of Defense makes him responsible for
India's external security. Since Gandhi holds the
Defense Ministry portfolio, many political observers
believe that Singh will function as de facto Minister
of Defense.
G. Parthasarthy's longevity in government-he is 25X1
currently head of the Policy Planning Committee of
the Ministry of External Affairs-combined with his
personal relationship with the Gandhi family, proba-
bly ensures him a place in discussions on nuclear
matters. Parthasarthy is the titular head of the influ-
ential South Indian Brahman circle, among whose
members, three-Raja Ramanna, K. Subrahman-
yam, and V. S. Arunachalam-are also nuclear advis-
ers, according to the US Embassy. Although diplo-
matic sources in New Delhi predicted that
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ment because of his leftist orientation, he has been
involved in all major talks with Pakistan, including
nuclear discussions. Parthasarthy was involved in the
decision to conduct the 1974 test of a nuclear device,
and his comments that New Delhi did not fully
calculate the political and economic costs of the event
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suggest that he would be cautious about the costs of a that Subrahmanyam-who writes regularly for the
nuclear weapons program. influential Times of India-frequently tests ideas for
government policy options in his news column.
Romesh Bhandari, the Foreign Secretary, is a relative
newcomer to nuclear decisionmaking circles. Accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting, Bhandari, who is slated
to retire soon, takes part, with Parthasarthy, in all the
Indo-Pakistani nuclear discussions and probably ad-
vises on tactics and diplomacy. Before becoming
Foreign Secretary, Bhandari said that he did not
believe India could live with a nuclear Pakistan,
according to the US Embassy.
The widely accepted spokesman for the probomb
lobby, K. Subrahmanyam, is an important Gandhi
adviser on strategic issues. Subrahmanyam, a career
Indian Administrative Service officer, director of the
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, and re-
cently appointed member of India's new National
Security Board, his views
on Indian nuclear aims have little to do with Pakistani
nuclear developments, according to a US academic
who follows nuclear issues. He has long held that
India, to position itself properly in the global order
and to demonstrate its abilities relative to China,
should have a nuclear weapons program. Subrahman-
yam uses the specter of a nuclear Pakistan to gain
support for his opinions, but he believes that India and
Pakistan would benefit from the resulting balance of
power if both states controlled nuclear weapons.
In recent publications, Subrahmanyam-in reaction
to the announcement by Pakistan that it could enrich
uranium-has urged that India justify its own weap-
ons program and project an image that it "may be
harboring some bombs in the basement with the last
wire yet to be connected."
Subrahmanyam is considered by the Indian press as
well as Western academics to have the best access to
India's nuclear and security issues experts. We believe
New Delhi's Scientists
We believe that Gandhi is receptive to the advice of
scientists. US Embassy reporting suggests that he is
probably in fairly regular contact with key members
of the scientific community.
Raja Ramanna, chairman of the Department of
Atomic Energy and the Indian Atomic Energy Com-
mission, and scientific adviser to the Ministry of
Defense, 1978-80, consults with Gandhi regularly and
is one of his closest advisers on nuclear issues. Accord-
ing to the US Embassy in New Delhi, Ramanna
retains his longstanding reputation as a hawk on
from the failing civil nuclear program.
Ramanna has administrative and planning control
over both research and development and current
operations of India's nuclear establishment. As the
architect of the 1974 nuclear test, Ramanna has been
kept in office because of his long experience and
expertise despite the fact that he is beyond mandatory
retirement age. We believe that the Department of
Atomic Energy will have considerable difficulty meet-
ing its overly ambitious nuclear power goal of 22
indigenously developed power plants by the turn of
the century, and Ramanna may push more forcefully
for a nuclear weapons program to deflect attention
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V. S. Arunachalam, the scientific adviser to the
Ministry of Defense, is one of the key participants in
nuclear decisionmaking, according to the US Embas-
sy in New Delhi. The Embassy reports that Aruna-
chalam not only has Rajiv's attention on defense-
related nuclear issues and gets on well with Arun
Singh, but is also well connected to the South Indian
Brahman circle in New Delhi. By virtue of his
position, Arunachalam oversees some 70 defense lab-
oratories and would be an important contact point
between the Ministry of Defense and a program
guiding nuclear weapons research and development.
His ability to deal effectively with foreign defense
industrialists has earned him widespread respect and
allegiance within the Ministry of Defense. For over 15
years he has worked on the fringes of the atomic
energy program, and he has extensive contacts within
along well with Rajiv Gandhi. As one of five members
of the Planning Commission responsible for govern-
ment scientific programs, he has a major voice in the
allocation of funds. He is also chairman of the
Cabinet's Scientific Advisory Committee and, like
Ramanna and Arunachalam, has served as scientific
adviser to the Ministry of Defense. Menon is one of
India's most renowned scientists and represents India
on almost every international scientific committee and
commission. During the discussions with the United
States on nuclear assurances, Menon on occasion
substituted for Arunachalam.
We believe that Gandhi has retained Homi Sethna,
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, during
1970-83, as a personal adviser on nuclear affairs.
that establishment.
Arunachalam often represents India on technology
and nuclear applications issues and, the Embassy
reports, is a skilled proponent of his country's inter-
ests. In our judgment, Arunachalam's interest in
improving India's access to Western high technology
will make him reluctant to support a nuclear weapons
program that would sever the links he has so carefully
forged. He has been the bridge between the US
position and Raja Ramanna, the head of the Atomic
Energy Commission, on the nuclear assurances pack-
age in the Memorandum of Understanding with the
United States.' Arunachalam indicated to US offi-
cials that only he and Foreign Secretary Bhandari
could give the assurances package the backing it
needed to go through the necessary Cabinet commit-
tee meeting.
According to the US Embassy, M. G. K. Menon is
one of New Delhi's most important scientific advisers
on nuclear matters. We believe that he counsels
against nuclear weapons. Menon, another South Indi-
an, was close to Indira Gandhi and appears to get
ment to focus on Indian energy needs rather than a
weapons program. Retired in 1983, Sethna was a
close adviser to Indira Gandhi, who kept him as a
personal scientific adviser until her death.
We have not identified a unified opinion on nuclear
weapons within India's labyrinthine bureaucracy
whose support will be vital for the success of a
weapons program. Entrenched cadres of civil servants
who have to advise on and implement policy can
actively advance or undermine government aims. The
Department of Atomic Energy and the Ministries of
External Affairs and Defense will bear the major
burdens of planning and implementing policy if the
government decides to embark on a nuclear weapons
program.
The US-Indian Memorandum of Understanding on Technology
Transfer, signed on 29 November 1984, was designed to further a
more cooperative technology transfer procedure for India by stan-
dardizing procedures for protecting US technology and establishing
a routine for the rapid clearance by the United States of Indian
export requests. Technology transfer items negotiated are subject to
nuclear assurances or pledges not to use the items in nuclear
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Some members of the nuclear establishment will
be disaffected if India undertakes a large nuclear
weapons program. Currently, the civil nuclear power
program consumes close to 75 percent of the entire
departmental budget, according to published depart-
ment reports. A nuclear weapons program would
probably drain resources from the power program,
causing scientists associated with it to lose status and
research opportunities. According to US Embassy
reporting, a number of scientists in the power pro-
gram support accepting international safeguards on
the power program to enable India to import Western
technology and know-how. Launching a weapons pro-
gram would cut them off entirely from Western
technology.
Ministry of External Affairs
Department of Atomic Energy
The Department of Atomic Energy, which has a
major nuclear policy role because of its monopoly on
technical and scientific expertise, is split between
weapons advocates and opponents:
? The majority of middle-level scientists at Bhabha
Atomic Research Center probably still hold the
views that they expressed in 1979-80 that India
should not start a nuclear weapons program even if
Pakistan's nuclear goals were far advanced.
younger scientists appealed to
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in mid-1980 for
India to change its nuclear policy and develop a
weapons option to counter Pakistan.
many Bhabha Atomic Re-
did not adopt their suggestion.
The Ministry of External Affairs is unlikely to lobby
for a nuclear weapons program.
Ministry is dominated by an antiweapons, pro-Nucle-
nuclear weapons program.
gotra, Foreign Secretary during 1983-85, recently was
quoted in the Indian press as saying that New Delhi
was making too much noise about Pakistan's nuclear
program, since it could never pose a significant threat
to India. We believe many officers are in a dilemma,
since they are only lukewarm supporters of improved
relations with Pakistan-the only alternative to a
Ministry of Defense
An Indian decision to embark on a nuclear weapons
program to counter Pakistani nuclear developments
would be supported by the military. We do not
believe, however, that the military is actively lobbying
for a nuclear weapons program or is likely to do so in
the near future.
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those dealing with territorial defense, with the Minis-
try of External Affairs, or the Prime Minister's
secretariat. The Defense Ministry is consulted only on
issues that relate to "military implications" of a
particular issue.
The military has outmoded training in nuclear theater
operations and little sophisticated understanding of
nuclear weapons,
The most advanced understanding we have observed
has come from newly appointed Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji. Sundarji has conduct-
ed theoretical work on strategic and tactical implica-
tions of nuclear weapons and, in 1981, organized two
highly unusual military seminars on nuclear weapons.
According to a US scholar, Sundarji has well-focused
views on doctrinal matters and the relationship of
nuclear to conventional weapons and would probably
be the military's point man in political discussions on
aspects of a nuclear weapons program.
Indian military officers are concerned about how a
nuclear program would be financed and controlled
and how it would affect conventional forces, accord-
ing to a US scholar:
? Military officers fear that the costs of a nuclear
weapons program and delivery system would absorb
a significant portion of the military budget, causing
conventional arms and readiness to suffer and lead-
ing to a probable overall reduction in forces.
? Operating in a nuclear theater would demand great-
er mobility and specialized protective gear, leading
to significant changes in the Indian Army's mecha-
nization efforts.
? The individual services are worried about which
service would assume control of the weapons. The
Army fears its influence would be diminished if
New Delhi approved air delivery of the weapons.
Nuclear policy in India has been shaped by an elite
group, but we believe policymakers will not ignore a
widespread clamor for nuclear weapons by the public,
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the press, and opposition groups-all of which play an
influential role in the debate as India confronts
evidence of Pakistan's nuclear intentions.
Public Opinion
The public at large favors a nuclear weapons pro-
gram. According to an Indian public opinion survey
published in July 1985, 72 percent of the literate
urban population believed India should develop its
own independent nuclear capability. A majority of
those surveyed believe Pakistan is likely to develop
nuclear weapons in the next few years and that India
should follow suit. A recent India Today survey on
Gandhi's first year gauged the Prime Minister ap-
provingly as "probomb." We believe the rural elector-
ate-traditionally conservative-mirrors these views.
Opposition Parties
More political parties are becoming involved in the
nuclear debate. The conservative Jan Sangh has
always favored nuclear weapons, and last summer the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP;-an offshoot of the Jan
Sangh-revived the demand, making it a plank in its
political platform. The regional populist party Telugu
Desam, the BJP, the Lok Dal, and various members
of the Congress Party demanded in Parliament late
last summer that the government launch a weapons
program. India's Communist parties do not agree on
nuclear weapons. According to the Indian press, the
pro-Moscow Communist Party-India calls for India
to stand firmly by its traditional opposition to nuclear
weapons. On the other hand, the Communist Party-
Marxist has said that India must retain the nuclear
weapons option.
The Press
Increasing allegations by the Government of India on
the progress of Pakistan's nuclear program are caus-
ing some of the press to move away from a traditional
dovish stand. Newspapers in English and the vernacu-
lar call for New Delhi to guarantee India's security
with nuclear weapons. The Times of India publishes a
column by Subrahmanyam that showcases the hawk
viewpoint. On the other hand, the Indian Express and
India Today counsel caution and diplomacy as an-
swers to the nuclear dilemma. According to an aca-
demic who follows Indian affairs, Gandhi is a devoted
reader of India Today. The pro-Moscow Patriot
favors retention of the weapons option as an Indian
nationalist symbol, although it supports disarmament
as global policy. The Patriot blames Pakistan's pro-
gress on the United States and implies active US
assistance to Islamabad for the nuclear program.
Bhabani Sen Gupta, an influential journalist, leading
spokesman for the antiweapons forces, and research
professor at the Center for Policy Research, publishes
a regular column in the influential newsmagazine
India Today. According to a US scholar, Sen Gupta's
views-especially on issues of regional security-are
well known and respected throughout India's foreign
policy community. Academics who have interviewed
Sen Gupta believe that he, like many moderates,
supports a strong defense for India and would endorse
a nuclear weapons program if India faced a threat to
its existence. In a public debate on the issue of nuclear
weapons in May 1985, Sen Gupta supported a policy
of ambivalence on nuclear weapons-leaving both
Pakistan and the West guessing. Sen Gupta, however,
prefers to emphasize nonnuclear options-diplomacy
and accelerated economic development-rather than
weapons acquisition to ensure a strong polity.
The nuclear debate in India is likely to intensify over
the next year. We cannot predict with any certainty
what path decisionmakers will take. Pressures to
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launch a nuclear weapons program are sporadic and
generally responsive to external events such as the
Chinese nuclear test in 1964 and the international
stop well short of any verifiable agreement
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nonproliferation debate in 1969-70.
Lack of a consensus and India's traditional slowness
in coming to grips with intractable issues, in our view,
argue against a dramatic decision. Longstanding
democratic institutions and strongly held opinions will
ensure that all parties will have an opportunity to
make a case for the policy option they support.
Indian decisionmakers will also be cautious because of
the costs and risks involved in a decision to become a
nuclear weapons power. Gandhi's plans for India
include steady modernization, which requires positive
political and economic relationships with the West,
but a nuclear weapons program would have adverse
economic and political costs:
? Funding a major nuclear weapons program would
require a shift of resources from some domestic
programs, creating additional pressures on Gandhi's
efforts to reduce growing budget deficits.
? Soft loans from the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank would be more difficult to get
in the face of US opposition.
? Indian access to high technology and scientific and
technical exchanges-keys to reaching Gandhi's
goal of taking India into the 21st century-would be
impeded.
? Gandhi's recent rapprochement with the United
States on sales of military equipment would be
jeopardized.
Over the next year we expect Gandhi to continue to
seek a dialogue with Pakistan. His self-confidence has
been bolstered by domestic successes over the past
year, and the informal agreement he reached with Zia
in December 1985 not to attack each other's nuclear
facilities may encourage him to try to negotiate a
broader solution to the nuclear dilemma.
Even so, the intense mutual suspicions between India
and Pakistan are likely to undermine, if not prevent, a
negotiated agreement. We believe Pakistan's need to
secure what it perceives as its ultimate defense against
If New Delhi cannot reach a negotiated agreement
with Islamabad, we believe that India will adopt a
small-scale covert weapons program. Such a program
would allow New Delhi to maintain plausible denial
and avoid risking the loss of access to Western
economic and technical assistance. This option would
also be easier for Indian policymakers since it would
not require major resource diversions.
If Pakistan tests a nuclear device, an event we regard
as unlikely, Indian domestic pressure would almost
certainly force New Delhi to launch a declared nucle-
ar weapons program and perhaps to test a bigger and
better device than that of Pakistan. In this atmo-
sphere, the combination of New Delhi's basic suspi-
cions of Pakistan and India's drive to be seen as the
major South Asian power could make the region
highly unstable.
Rajiv's genuine interest in finding a political solution
to the issue of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent,
combined with his advisers' inability to reach a
consensus on the Indian nuclear option, may leave
some role for the United States, especially in light of
gradually improving Indo-US relations. Indian policy-
makers have long declared that the nuclear issue can
only be solved bilaterally with Pakistan, but they also
maintain that the United States must play a major
role in blunting the Pakistani program. Subrahman-
yam has suggested in the Indian press that the United
States can promote mutual confidence by providing
New Delhi with intelligence on the status of Pakis-
tan's nuclear program. Under Rajiv, Indian officials
have proved willing to listen to and discuss the issue
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with other parties. We speculate that the late Decem-
ber agreement between Rajiv and Zia not to attack
each other's nuclear facilities may have been prompt-
ed, at least in part, by US importunings in late 1985
that the nuclear issue be resolved between India and
such a strike would cause the collapse of President
Zia's government, perhaps bringing to power a more
pliable regime.
Pakistan.
Other analysts within the US Intelligence Community
believe the December pledge, although congruent
with US interests, resulted solely from Rajiv's long
campaign to start a nuclear dialogue with Pakistan.
These analysts point out that Gandhi's highly publi-
cized concerns about Pakistan's nuclear program and
his desire to develop confidence-building measures
predate US involvement in the current round of talks.
K. Subrahmanyam's idea for a confidence-building
pledge not to attack each other's facilities first ap-
peared in the summer of 1984 and was repeated in the
Indian press in July 1985.
Indian policymakers may calculate that a small covert
program-dubbed in New Delhi "the Israeli
option"-would allow them uninterrupted coopera-
tion with the United States and the West. In such a
case, US nonproliferation policies would not be jeop-
ardized publicly. If Pakistan tests a nuclear device,
however, we believe India would not let its interest in
closer ties to the West stand in the way of its own
publicly acknowledged program.
Some analysts believe that India will eventually seek
to halt the Pakistani program by launching a preemp-
tive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities. These
analysts argue that India will be compelled by its
drive for regional hegemony to ensure that Pakistan
remains unable to threaten India's national security.
According to this scenario, New Delhi would order its
military forces to bomb the Kahuta uranium enrich-
ment facilities and the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear
Science and Technology. These analysts argue that
Other analysts believe that the probability of this
scenario is low, largely because the traditional indeci-
siveness and caution exhibited by most Indian policy-
makers mitigate against such dramatic action. Some
argue that the probability of a preemptive strike is
particularly low under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi,
who has said publicly that such a move would not
ensure the eradication of fissile material and compo-
nents. A preemptive strike would almost certainly
begin a war between India and Pakistan and would
scuttle Gandhi's desire for better regional relations as
well as continued leadership of the Nonaligned
Movement.
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Rajiv Gandhi's Key Nuclear Advisors
Hardliners Moderates
Gopalaswamy
PARTHASARTHY
Romesh
RAMANNA BHANHA
Arun
SINGH
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