ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE POLISH RIOTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 196
• Publication Date: December 1, 1970
• Content Type: IM

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.1 fri0&k. 4(-Tf" '/O - /`/
secrete
DIRECTORATE OF
I NTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Economic Background Of The Polish Riots
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
rkc purr
u0 NOT OI$TROY
ER IM 70-195
Decemter 1970
Copy No. i A.
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WARNING
This document contains Information nfltcting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 703 and 704, of tile US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re
edit by all unauthorized person is prohibited by Inw.
Ad.d?! 1?.~ ..,.-.A
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CENTRAL INTELLI'3ENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1970
Economic Background of The Polish Riots
Introduction
The Gomulka regime, which came to power in Poland
in October 1956 in the wake of the Poznan L.re .d
riots, did much to improve the living conditions of
workers and to advance the national interests of
Poland. Nevertheless, Gomulka was forced to step
down in December 1970 after now riots by workers
in response to sharp price increases for necessities.
How did the regime happen to adopt such an un-
popular measure and to announce it just before
Christmas? What lay behind the violent response
of the workers? What choices in dealing with the
workers has the now Gierek regime? This memorandum
proposes answers to these questions out of the
recent economic and political history of Poland.
Eight Days in December
1. The riots came in the wake of a resolution
adopted by the Council of Minister's on Saturday,
12 December that called for sweeping revisions in
the retail price structure, to take affect the next
day. On the following Monday, in protest against
the price hikes, an open demonstration erupted
among 1,000 or so shipyard workers in the city of
Gdansk on the Baltic. Riots continued, with angry
Note: T zo memorandum was produoad solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Offioe of Eoonomio Rssaaroh
and was ooordinated with the Offios of Currsnt
Intsliiganoa.
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housewives joining in, and quickly spread to the
northern cities of Gdynia, Sopot, and Szczecin;
lesser disturbances were reported to the south in
Lodz and Bydgoszcz, and scattorad work stoppage oc-
curred in several cities, including Warsaw. Polish
accounts on 17 December list at least 12 dead and
several hundred injured, including security police
and militiamen. Daily production losses of 25 mil-
lion zlotys in the Gdansk shipyards wore reported.
2. The Gomulka regime throughout the week held
out no hope of a rollback in prices, although the
former Party boss of Gdansk Province reportedly
promised the Gdansk shipyard workers pay increases
in 1971. Instead, the regime strongly defended
ito action as economically vital and proceeded to
quell the riots with armed force.
3. This inflexible position helped maintain
tension in major Polish cities and in turn led to
the downfall of Party Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka.
On Sunday, 20 December the Polish radio suddenly
announced that Gomulka would retire because of bad
health. Four of his politicae.' allies also were
forced out of office, includ,;4.ng Zenon Kliszko, the
Party's leading theoretician, and Boleslaw Jaszczuk,
Gomulka's economic adviser and a leading) apologist
for his economic policies. Gomulka was succeeded as
Party first secretary by Edward Giorek, tough,
efficient former Party boss of heavily industrialized
Katowice Province,, a member of the policymaking
Politburo who had long waited in the wings. He took
office along with four newly named members of the
Politburo, Poland's twelve-member policymaking body.
The Price Revisions
4. The Council of Ministers resolution of 12
December prescribed sharp price hikes for two major
categories of consumer goods, food and fuels, bus.
also for building materials and cotton and textiles,
together with substantial reductiorn in prices for
many industrial consumer goods and some adjustments
in family allowances. According to official claims
these measures on balance would moan only a temporary
2% loss in real income, even for the poorest workers,
who would be the hardest hit. But for most workers,
that was not the points they were not interested in
acquiring more clothes and durable* if they could
not also maintain and increase meat consumption.
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5. For the increase in the price of meats had
the greatest impact on workers' attitudes. Meat
prices, including pork and beef, rose by about
18%. This increase about equalled the last major
change in meat prices, a rise of 17% in November
1967. Other recent price increases -- in the price
of alcnc~+3 lase spring (culled both to conserve
potato stockMM fox livestock feed and to curb ex-
cessive drinking) acid in tobacco products in 1966-
67 -- also touched closely on items of special
interest to workers and the'r fgmilies.
6. As shown in Table 1, other basic foodstuffs
affected by the 12 December price hike included
lard, flour (wheat and rye), milk and milk products,
fish and fish products, and cakes and bake goods.
The price hikes for cakes and baked goods, up 12%,
coupled with increases for some sweets, coffee,
jams, marmalade, fruit, and cheeses were particu-
larly galling in the pro-holiday season.
7. The resolution also provided for a 10% rise
in hard coal prices -- only a year after one of the
most severe winters in modern Polish history, with
the pouaibility of an equally severe one coming
up -- and a 14% price rise in lignite (brown coal).
Lignite, although less efficient than anthracite,
is a favorite house fuel among lower income groups
because of its cheaper, price. Building materials
jumped an average of 288 and include such popular
items as bricks, ceramic tiles, and sawn timber.
The price of cotton texttlea, for which Poland de-
panda largely on imports, also inerased signifi-
cantly. Cotton textile prices increased 15%; natural
silk, 57%; and linen fabric, 54%.
Q. The cumulative effects of the foregoing in-
creases for foodstuffs, fuels, building materials.
and textiles hr surpass the ber>Afits received from
simultaneously decreed price cuts in other goods
and from other adjustments offered by the regime.
The most important price reductions were for
pharmaceutical products, down 318; synthetic tex-
tiles, down 251; and consumer durables, mainly
popular household appliances. The retail prices
of TV sets, radios, refrigerators, washing machines,
sawing machines, and tape recorders were shaved by
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Poland: Major Revisions it i tail Prices
and ",stimated Shares of Retail Trade 1
Price increases
Price Change Share of Retail
December 1970 Trade 1969
Percent In",zeases) (Percent)
Foodstuffs
Flour, macaroni
16
1.4
naked goods
12
3.6
Meat and ineat products
18
9.'r
Lard
33
1:0
Fish and fish products
12
1.0
Nilk (winter price)
8
1.0 b
Nilk products
4
2.3
Of which:
Cheese
37
0.5
Sweets and cubed sugar
14
4.0
1
Coffee
92
0.7
Cotton textiles
15
1.3
Silk fabrics
37
0.3
Linen fabrics
54
N.A.
Overcoats
69
N.A.
Leather gloves
14
N.A.
Steel and metal goods
7-12
1.2
Aicycles and motorbikes
12
N.A.
Coal and lignite
10-14
2.8
biding materiEl*
28
2.0
minimum total
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Table 1
Poland: Major Revisions in Retail Prices
and Estimated Shares of Retail Trade 1
(Continued)
Price decreases
PAico Change Share of Retail
)acomber 1970 Trade 1969
(Parcont Ineroasos (Percent)
Drugs
Radios, TVs, tape recorders
Appliances
-31
-13 to -21
N.A.
2.4
1.8
1.3
Refrigerators
-16
N.A.
Washing machines
-17
N.A.
Vacuum cleaners
-15
N.A.
Sewing machines
-10
N.A.
Synthetics textiles
-25
1.3
1
Nylon stockings
-46
N.A.
Shirts and blouses
-16
N.A.
Razor blades
-38
N.A.
Phonograph records
-18
N. A.
Matches
-20
N.A.
Paints and laccuerr
-10
N.A.
Minimum total
a. Many prise changes affect it:aro or groups of items, not wh-oFa-
oal'egorisie of goods, and are excluded from thin table. Estimates
of the sharer of retail trade reflect data from 1969, from
Poland's ?tat.atioaZ yearbook for 1970, p. 331-332. These data
inolude soars to institutions as well as sales to individuals.
b. Frtimated by applying the shares of the various milk products
given in household budget studios to the figure for milk, mizk
produots, and eggs given in the retail trade data.
o. InoZudirt;g ail _ sugar and swaete.
d. 1naiiuding oil for heating and lighting.
e. Assumed to represent the unitemined residual in the category
of textile fabrics.
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significant margins -- from 10% for sewing machines
to 21% for tape recorders. Price cuts also affected
various other goods, much less important in the
budget of the average worker, such as matches, soaps
and detergents, phonograph records, paints and
lacquers, and Polish-made razor blades.
9. in the off}cial explanation of the price
revisions, it was conceded that, with the retail,
trade structure of 1970, the resulting increase
in expenditures would amount to 15.7 billion
zlotys, whereas the reduction would cut expendi-
tures by only 10.9 billion zlotys. But these changes
represent only a 3/% increase in ( ;penditures in
retail trade and a 2/% reduction in expenditures --
that is, they would involve on the average less than
a 1% price rise in net coat of retail trade pur-
chases and less than a 1% increase in the cost of
living.
10. The government sweetened the kitty for con-
sumers somewhat by easing credit restrictions an
installment purchases of some durables and by'cut-
ting back monthly subscription fees on TV sets from
40 zlotys to 30 zlotys.
Revised Incentives in the Shipbuilding Industry
11. A twin cause of the disturbances, one that
may explain the coincidence of the most severe
disruptions in Poland's shipyard cities of Gdansk.
Gdynia, and Szczecin, is a new system of material
incentives proposed for the Polish shipbuilding
industry. Promulgated by the Council of Ministers
as Order No. 80/70 on 31 October, the revised in-
centives are scheduled to take effect on 1 January
1971.
12. The proposed scheme of incentives, never
before tried in Polish industry, aims to tie workers'
bonuses by means of complicated formulas to the
"profitability" of final output. About 80% of
Polish ships to be produced in the upcoming five-
year plan have been targeted for sales abroad,
and apparently the sales prices received from
foreign buyers for Polish-made ships will determine
whether the workers in production units gain or
lose, and by how much. The uncertainty of such
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rewards by all accounts has caused widespread con-
cern among the rank and file, who have become ac-
customed.to viewing bonuses more as a matter of
right than as something to be earned,
13. Shipyard workers have much to lose. Their
wages average 30% higher than those of industrial
workers in general and have been increasing more
rapidly. They object to having their bonuses de-
pend heavily on factors outside the control of
individual workers and brigades, such as interna-
tional market conditions for ships, on the imagina-
tion of architects and engineers in the country's
maritime design offices, and on the sAlesmanship
of Polish exporters. Polish snipbuilding in the
past has not met world standards, except for some
colliers, fishing trawlers, and small-size general
cargo ships. Most have been saleable only in the
Communist world and then only through price con-
cessions. Part of the fault lies ii,a the still
primitive sales and service organization of Polish
industry
14. As every shipyard worker must surmise, even
higher profit margins could mean lower bonuses.
It is a widely held belief in Polish blue collar
circles that wage and incentive reforms generally
favor bureaucrats and white collar workers, who
make up about one-fourth of the 37,000 employees in
the shipbuilding industry. Hence, some workers
doubtlessly fear that any new scheme of income dis-
tribution could work to their disadvantage, not-
withstanding official claims from Warsaw that ex-
isting differences between white and blue collar
workers are to be narrowed in the 1971-75 plan.
15. Part of the reason for the uneasiness of the
shipyard workers may have come from the failure of
the Gomulka regime to explain the proposed reforms
properly. In a speech made in mid-November, the
Secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee,
Wlodzimierz Stazewski, said*:
In connection with the repeated working
out of this system and the amendments
introduced into it, there has been no
* Glos Wybrzeza, No. 275, 29 November 1990.
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possibility yet to got the perso%nel
thoroughly acquainted with its principles.
Therefore, certain things are unclear in
people's minds and some enterprises aro
anxious about what this new system will
bring. These obscurities and anxieties
should be dispelled as soon as possible
by a matter-of-fact and lucid explanation
of the basic principles to come into force
in the shipbuilding industry and by the
explanation of their economic and social
contents.
The Rationale of the Price Changes
16. The price changes introduced in December
1970 and others made since 1967 reflect a long-
standing recommendation of the planners to dis-
courage increases in the consumption of heavily
subsidized goods and services -- especially
goods incorporating agricultural products or im-
ports -- and to encourage expanded consumption of
industrial products, which have been greatly over-
priced. This view was reflected as early as August
1968 in an article by Grzegorz Pisarski, editor of
Zyoie gospodarose, Poland's economic newspaper.*
He noted, for example, that "securing equal growth
in food production requires two to three times
higher expenditures than growth in the production
of clothes; shoes; and metal, chemical, and rubber
products." He acknowledged that some low income
groups were still not well fed and that an improve-
ment in quality and an increase in prc'cessing were
still needed. He recommended, first, a greater
dii`ferentiation of food prices to reflect demand and,
second, a shift of effective demand toward non-
food articles by price changes and by increasing
the supply and range of good quality clothing,
electrical and electronic equipment, and automobiles
and other transportation equipment. In general, he
observed, food consumption was already high: "com-
pared to countries with a higher national income
per capita., food consumption in our country is main-
tained at a definitely higher level," while the
supply of non-food products was relatively low. He
went on to note that any general Shift in prices
would perhaps benefit the well-to-do and would at
Zycie gospodarcze, 11 August 1968.
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least have little effect on their standard of living,
while involving a loss for poor families. "This,"
he said, "is one of the most important reasons why
we have delayed changes in the price structure
postulated long ago." And he went on to discuss
various ways of minimising these effects.
17. As Pisarski claimed, working class families
in Poland eat as much -- in quantity -- as working
class families in many West European countries.
In quality and range of choice, Polish food on the
whole is inferior. Moreover, Polish housewives must
spend more time shopping for food and preparing it
than housewives in Western Europe, and many more of
them must hold down jobs to make ends meet. in addi-
tion, many heads of households work at two jobs;
moonlighting probably is more common in Poland than
anywhere else in the world. But working class families
in Poland eat large amounts not only of bread and
potatoes but also of milk, meat, fish, butter, and
other fats and vegetables -- more, for example, than
working class families in West Germany, and nearly
as much of several other foods, as shown in Table 2.
Shipyard workers probably eat even more. The relatively
high demand for food by Polish workers is in good part
explained by the larger number of working members in
the family, the greater percentage of workers doing
heavy manual labor, the colder climate, the less
comfortable living conditions, and they relative
scarcity of housing and durables on which to spend money.*
18. The Gomulka regime initially gave a high
priority to raising food consumption of urban work-
ers. In 1956, members of the prewar industrial
workforce "had ample reason to believe that they were
* It s ou be noted that food consumption by manual
workers and their families is close to the national
average in Poland, but in West Germany is substan-
tially below the national average. Even so, average
consumption for all Poles is higher in calories and
fats than for the West Germans, and animal protein is
nearly seven-eightheof the West German level. I,i; is only
when quality, assortment, and processing are taken into
account that the Polish diet can be seen to be markedly
less desirable than the diet in West European countries.
For example, in 1964, average Polish food consumption
(excluding tobacco and beverages) valued in sehiZZinge
was 83% of the !footnote continued bottom of p. 111.
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Table 2
Per Capita Food Consumption
in Middle Income Families
of Manual Workers in Poland and West Germany 1
169
Kilo1!ams 1
Poland
West Germany
Flour
15.9
5.6
Bakery goods
109.4
51.5
Noodles
1.9
2.5
Rice, groats, oats
5:6
5.8
Potatoes
146.1
50.1
Vegetables and vegetable
products
59.3
31.0
Fruit and fruit products
35.6
45.3
Meat and meat products
47.2
37.3
Fats (except butter)
13.9
8.9
Fish and fish products
6.7
3.5
Milk (liters)
106.6
71,6
Butter
6.7
5.4
Cream
6.3
6.5
Cheese
6.8
7.1
Eggs (units)
171
168
Sugar and confectionery
25.9
18.2
a. Based on sample surveys. The data for Poland
are for families of manual workers in the middle
income range, whose incomes are 1% higher than the
average for all families of manual workers, The
data. for West Germany are for middle income fami-
lies of manual and white collar workers, with
incomes 8% above the average for manual workers.
For both Poland and West Germany, statistics ex-
clude restaurant meals, which amount to 6% of food
expenditure?e in Poland, 9% in West Germany, Polish
data include and West German data exclude consump-
tion from private plots.
b. Unless otherwise indicated.
10
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were worse off than before the war."* Thereafter
their living cunditioiis imprevod markcaly, as-
pocially in zeapect to food consumption, until
the early 1960s. The growth of food consumption
then tapered off, and since the mid-1960s there
has ben little net increase. As shown in Table 3,
consumption by workers' families of some important
items, including meat, fat (except butter), sugar,
end vegetables actually dropped a little from 1965
to 1969. An earier drop in consumption of cereal
products continued, the normal accompainment of a
rising standard of living. The mein offset was a
fairly small increase in consumption of dairy prod-
ucts -- butter, cream, cheese, rnd eggs. Especially
important was a drop in consum^ ? ..on of pork, a key
item in traditional Polish dies. The additional
poultry and fish supplied in place of pork are
regarded as poor substitutes by Polish workers.
19. Little or no decline in food consumption
took place in 1970, judging from retail sales data
through September. Per capita sales of meat,
butter, and potatoes declined, and there were a
few significant increases, the most important
being for fats (other than butter), fish, and
some dairy products. In effect, changes in the
pattern of consumption in 1970 continued those
from 1966 to 1969.
20. A leveling off in supply --di.ot in demand --
explains the decline in consumption of meat, fats,
sugar, and vegetables in workers' families. Agricul-
tural output, which rase substantially in the late
1950s and again in 1965-66, leveled off thereafter
average Austrian ZeveZ
In
raw products, the value of average Polish consumption
was even higher relative to the Austrian ZeveZ; in
proaesaec, foods, Zess than one-half -- just one
instance of the difference in composition. The dif-
ference between average Polish and West German diets
would be somewhat greater.
Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth. in pastern
Europe (A Comparison with Western Europe)," New
Directions ir the Soviet Economy, Part IV, Washington,
1988, p. 888.
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Table 3
Average Per Capita Food Consumption in Poland in Families-
of Manual Workers Outside Agriculture
Kilograms
1565
19c.6
1967
1968
1969
Flour
18.3
17.3
16.7
16.4
16.1
Bakery goods
114.1
116.0
111.9
110.9
109.3
Noodles
1.9
1.7
1.9
1.8
1.8
--Rice, groats, cats
5.7
5.9
6.3
5.7
5.7
`
Potatoes
137.2
145.5
141.2
138.5
141.7
CO
~
Vegetables and vegetable products
57.7
58.7
60.8
56.0
56.5
Fruit and fruit products
25.5
38.0
34.0
37.3
34.0
S
n'
Meat and meat products
48.2
47.1
44.5
43.4
44.3
F--
~
t~7
Fat (excluding butter3
14.8
14.9
14.6
14.0
13.6
r
Fish and fish products
5.4
5.3
6.1
5.8
6.3
Milk (liters)
107.3
102.5
102.5
104.6
104.8
Butter
5.5
5.6
6.0
6.3
6.4
Cream
5-8
5.6
5.9
5.8
5.9
Cheese
6.3
5.9
6.5
6.4
6.7
Eggs (units)
138.9
148.9
125.5
158.9
163.5
Sugar and confectionery
29.7
31.0
25.4
25.9
25.6
a. Unless otherwise sndicated.
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and dropped in 1969 and 1970. For meat the pattern
in different in that production held up in 1969 --
on the basis rf good inventories of feed -- and
only began dropping for 1970.
21. The increnne in supply in the late 1950e
was aided by US deliveries of agricultural product"
on a very long-term Lntorest-free credit (under
Public Law 490, Title 4) from 1957 to 1964. With
these deliveries, Poland was able to raise meat
production fast enough to nffoed both an incic:ease
in moat exports -- an important source of hard
currency -- and a rise in domestic consumption to
an acceptable level. The US decigio:i to stop
deliveries at the and of 1964 put a squeeze on
Polish consumption and exports that could have had
serious iim odiato affeccrs, had it not been for soma
Soviet help and a providential rise in domestic
output in 1965-66.
22. Even with this help, Polish leaders were
faced with some hard decisions on exports versus
consumption after 1966, when output leveled off.
Apparently they decided to hold both at about the
same level. Total agricultural and food exports
held fairly steady, although most exports vsrirad
sharply -- they were out in 1968, mainly as a result
of a drop in domestics pork production, jumped for-
ward in 1969, and declined again in 1970. Meanwhile,
agricultural and food imports increased. Per capita
consumption increased somewhat, but only because of
a continued rise in peasant consumption, already much
higher than urban consumption in most respects. 'rho
exceptions are meat and fish, of which peasants
still eat somewhat loss than workers, althc.sgh the
gap narrowed rapidly in the 1960n to loss than St.
23. Unfortunately, while the quantities sup-
plied remained almost stable, affective demand
continued to rise. Nonagricultural employment
went up by 3/% per year in 1966-69, partly because
of substantial now additions to the labor force
and continued migration from agriculture, but also
because enterprises, eager to fulfill output plans,
stepped up hiring of women. At the samtt time,
average wages rose by more than 4% per year, and
the wage bill was 3ttl greater in 1969 than in 1965.
Most other incomes, including payments to peasants,
- 13 -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
SPICYR 1-1,
ose less rapidly; teen so, total int2istAo Vont up
31% over the four years.*
24. tire rapid yrt th of 1n&- s durinj !Y66-61
Wan not by any NO-Ann t atahed by pi lee 1"Creat as..
Na t ntionati ear. lier, the ragit raise] rotax l
prices of twat b;t 17% in 1061 thinly to d&tVcnsat4
for a daolina in supplias. athgt Signifi!ant re-
tail prime increases in the Period for rloods %m-re
for fish {1)%) and tobaodo (29t). Prtdea also grant
up for nr products in the fray "rlkat -- twat,
+s,tga, and vejetablas -= by 94'9*. Pricaa or a
aervi+ es, heaviky tutbaldlte(l in Poland, krnre also
rnitierl, notably rent Ca Whoppity 90$ but ot: a
#mail bases) and public transport (164). taut otter?:11
the price rise vaa only but 0* for food, it for
other f a, anal 141 for services -- an increase of
about 94 tot +onstoption on bite whole 4urinj the
four years.
',5. Polish consumara, to bFg ?'t
spent a
substantial part of their inureaaed putthasino
potter on ulothas, t1urable#* and nervicea, incluf3in *
those for wbith prices had risen. In nominal pracf4s*
the total incr'eaae in no-ht' d plitc-hases of IoO'do Vas
14# in 1066-C )o and ex nti tug-rea for aervit-P-0 U-ote vp
by 4$t. A* a result, an thwilh purchases of fo , + ,
b varutges, and tobacco chick teprasentsd a ~%
40% of total purchasca of o&s by houa+sholtis.o ,...
roan by only 2l%,4.-* overall expatvt3it~raa on ,4a
aJ aervi+ s roses by 10*. 1 o a the !It in reape
ir, iiv ? did nut sl ate si ificaivt
axcasa purchasitoj ptar in the hand of u*Otkarg.
fA4A -1 T.14nrs t=3 saw a~~e $ ~~ ~, ~ any mash rc~~ a..
Lion rose, but rex:.ainat mall rglative to total
inowV4. Taoa fn4 ta, reflector co T ably 4, help
further to explain vhy the pdantvers, and the ldatera
themaelvep. Who tr ditio.n4l,ly thitfk *t.att iy in t',er,++a
of balanoas, stern not. I-eat ly -wooer as ut lb-
flationar'y presauraa, the lass ao b ca~Af a t?tqlig#v
R'jtlt af` ~a.? mT y.9?J J,a01t' l17 ; irk 1~'i ! 4 y J* 4ff.
? 3 r,~, t~ A ~4A~ +7iEO e, t `a 'r r~lff i 6 `~. Pi1 x.~yt.
fi r t h .6 A. r 4 ;f
**"to i tsar $~96~r 3fm, cr +11yrO40 Or a,,#; i.,
ierc Qd r al per 4GI i~t Ar e+t+ o !?~ # oi'"#; i A >t=
iM1 : ' .1*7i~ - ~ #i~t!'11E Aar cr ?r~ #t;ct`a 1cr ~^s~ :ash.
as #vo ,parr. 41 ("Ore4o fa r ce ~~a ,
- 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
SfAa(.9 tT
TAW* 4
hoy it* a ah4 rb t 1turjg? or t~ ,a t~ =l fh Pcolshxl
__
D 1
1960
9 6 . 50
r pay h ,o to %rot t ro ah O I -yae 30.' 41.9
Uat i a iii 1#~3ahahl *rtiAAho 4.3.I
fiat ar ht lpe-x o tPRet flhj
Ih+ # ftt) 4Q. 4' .
y,other not aartvihda ? si ,p ) 9yg~j *.P 1zq.4
Pehi 1 iho I. 3 L a
~lfat iaay hta Ate)
n~",4vA~~#a i a $3. 1?1
Itat ?ana r cr Jit?
a14 6110*hr-a*2f
Iht*r*a'4 f sS vlh s a#?CAI 213
#A?'t i 4~alaa
1a1Yatt i l
L ;"f
i 'yam. R{y/, d... r
Pt lvato trade
"r # oark4t a l a {` J
i.1+ trie ar are a y E
.~rafa rt -an :` #d"tlt~,y~i 4tY #f.lt f:;
#SIwaY L M6" a*.& I t 7t r J.: a w rf ..
rt
. r good# aft-4 tataicoQ
TOW agrv1cVa
_Is -
I%F
w
f 'd 3" ? 5 f. Y~ s 3
4,1.' Y ')
S%4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
 eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/31: CIA-RDP85T00875R001600030196-2
"it VV
~ ~3 !~?~'rr 4s1