SCC-XXIX DECISION DOCUMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001101450003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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riG9uKmnuurl rurC; u i rec Lur ur ueni rd I intie r r i pence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence- /
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Chief, Arms Contro Intelligence Staff
1. This "fast-track" memorandum is solely for your information.
package is important, but I think we have it very much under control.
2. We have been working intensely for the past several weeks with the
rest of the Executive Branch to coordinate and complete the decision document
(copy attached) for the next round (XXIX (29)) of the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC). This document is thick and dense reading but worth a few
minutes of review when you have the time.
4. This document was sent to the NSC Staff on or about Saturday, 28
September. Although I thought originally that the issues might be discussed
by the Senior Arms Control Group last week, if time permitted, it is now clear
that there will be no such discussion; rather, Mr. McFarlane will resolve the
questions with the President and issue guidance as needed.
5. As you will see by looking at the document, as well as by my list
below, the Executive Branch is once again highly fractured over its plans for
the SCC this autumn. This has been the case for the last several years for
the SCC and is likely to continue for some time. In the face of all of these
disagreements, we have done our best to ensure that the decision document
contains all of the information needed for a reasonably balanced, if not wise,
decision. In some cases, even when we were trying to be helpful as "a friend
of the process", our prooo xt was rejected by one or more policy agencies
at the working level.
JLVI\L I
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6. On behalf of US intelligence and for you, we have forced into this
paper a variety of words concerning the intelligence aspects of many of these
SCC compliance issues. We have done so reluctantly and only when it was
vital. In addition, on a few occasions, I have used your title again in order
that certain views are expressed which I believe are important for the
President and his National Security Advisor to have in order to fully
understand the issue. None of these inserts reflect new material or new
positions of significance; in fact, most of these points are repeats of what I
forced imilar document for you in the Spring, 1985 and twice in
1984.
7. Specifically, I have expressed for you views on US policy in the
following places and on these topics (see asterisks):
-- Page 11, paragraph 4:
-- Page 32, bottom full paragraph
and page 33, top paragraph:
-- Page 35, bottom paragraph
and page 36, top paragraph:
Encryption of Telemetry
8. In addition to policy matters, many of the issues contained in this
document have important intelligence assessment, and sources and methods,
implications attached to them and, thus, required comments by us. All of
these comments are either restatements from previous SCC Decision Documents or
clear extensions of those ideas. These comments can be found on the following
pages (see asterisks):
The value of destruction
procedures
SECRET,
Backfire Bomber
ABM Rapid Reload
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-- Page 28, middle paragaraph and
Page 30, middle paragraph:
Territorial Defense and
Concurrent Operations
-- Page 32, bottom half of page
and top half of page 33:
-- Page 36, top paragraph:
-- Page 39, bottom paragraph:
-- Page 42, bottom full paragraph:
-- Page 44, middle paragraph:
SNDVs
SAM Upgrade
Mobile ABM System
Components
9. This document is important because decisions from it will be used to
generate the draft instructions for the US SCC Component. Based on past
experience and what the NSC Staff told me last week, I believe we will get
everything we asked for here. I will be astounded otherwise.
10. I regret to tell you that this memorandum was delayed for several
days because of the press of business last week with Gorbachev's visit to
Paris. That delay was not significant, however, because the Executive Branch
was incapable last week (and this weekend) of dealing with this issue
anyway.
11. If there is anything further we can do to assist you here, please
call and let me know.
Attachment:
As stated
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vu.. ..u a , ....- ....a. a. v..va. A av~~.. a / va'~. v lI / VS LI 11I i LL
September 28, 1985
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC Session
Beginning October 9, 1985
Attached is a paper prepared by the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) Backstopping Committee containing issues for
decision regarding instructions for the next session of the SCC
beginning on October 9, 1985.
William B. Staples
Executive Secretary
Attachment
As stated
THIS MEMO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENT
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September 28, 1985
Decisions Regarding Instructions for the SCC Session
Beginnina October 9, 1985
Introduction
Decisions are needed to complete the instructions for the
next session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which
is scheduled to begin on October 9, 1985. Decisions on whether
to pursue certain issues and approval of approaches to take in
pursuing issues are needed as follows:
Section I. How to respond to the Soviet proposal for an
additional SLBM launcher dismantling procedure. (Pages 3-10)
Section II. Issues on which decisions are needed on whether to
pursue in SCC-XXIX and, if pursued, require approval of an
approach to take.
A.
A Certain SLBM's Throw-weight
(Pages
10-12)
B.
SS-16
(Pages
12-15)
C.
BWC
(Pages
15-16)
D.
Mobile
Missile Verification
(Pages
16-18)
E.
Backfire Bomber
(Pages
18-23)
F.
ABM Rapid Reload
(Pages
23-25)
G.
Deployment of Mobile ICBMs at Former
(Pages
25-27)
SS-7 Sites
Section III. Matters which all agencies agree should be pursued
in SCC-XXIX, but on which decisions are needed on the approach to
take.
A. Territorial Defense (Pages 27-30)
B. (Pages 31-33)
Section IV. Matters which all agencies agree should be pursued
and on which there is an agreed approach; approval of the
recommended approach is needed.
A.
Krasnoyarsk
Radar
(Pages
33-35)
B.
Encryption
of Telemetry
(Pages
35-37)
C.
SS-X-25
(Pages
37-39)
D.
SNDV Limits
(Pages
39-41)
E.
SAM Uoarade
(Paaes
41-42)
F.
Mobile ABM System Components
(Pages
42-44)
G.
Preaareed Messages for the Common
(Pages
44-45)
Understandina on Unexplained Nuclear
Incidents
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Section V. How to respond to compliance concerns previously
raised by the Soviet Union. SCC papers have been written with
consensus positions. Approval is needed for these positions.
Appropriate provisions have been included in the draft
instructions. (Page 45)
A. Article XII of the SALT II Treaty
B. ABM Testing Activities
C. Pave Paws Radars
D. SDI
E. Modernization of the Thule (and Fylingdales) Radar
F. Titan II Launchers
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I. How to Respond to the Soviet Proposal for an Additional SLBM
Launcher Dismantling Procedure
During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side proposed that an
additional SLBM launcher dismantling option, originally
negotiated in 1979, be made available, in addition to the 1974
SALT I Dismantling or Destruction (D or D) Procedures,* by means
of a Common Understanding. The Soviet proposal and possible US
responses are addressed in the SCC Backstopping Committee
decision paper on dismantling or destruction procedures,
forwarded to the NSC on August 30, 1985.
Options for Decision:
Option 1: Decline to negotiate/finalize the SSBN or any
other D or P procedures.
Option 2: Defer discussion of D or D procedures.
Option 3: Seek completion of the 1979 Procedures sufficient
only to create basis for establishing a system of SNDV
accountability. Any new procedures negotiated would apply only
until a new strategic agreement is reached, or until interim
restraint ceases.
Approaches
1. Decline Soviet Offer
State and ACDA believe that, if the decision is to decline
the Soviet offer, the approach should be alonc the following
lines:
The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the
Soviet proposal is not in the interest of the US. The US
Component would be authorized to ask the Soviet side why it had
made its proposal.
OSD and JCS believe that, if the decision is to decline the
Soviet offer, the approach should be along the following lines:
"Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or
Destruction, and Notification Thereof, For Strategic Offensive
Arms, July 3, 1974.
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The US Component would inform the Soviet side that, after
careful study of the Soviet proposal, the US does not believe
that chances to the 1974 Procedures are necessary or desirable.
The US Component would add that the US wishes to continue to
focus on the resolution of the compliance issues on the agenda of
the SCC.
State and ACDA believe that we should not rule out the
possibility of negotiatinv on other D or D procedures, even
thouch we would be rejecting the Soviet proposal.
OSD believes that the Soviet offer should he definitely
rejected.
2. Defer discussion of D or D procedures
All acencies agree that, if the decision is to defer
discussion of D or D procedures, the approach should be along the
following lines:
The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the USG
has riven the Soviet proposal careful study, and will continue to
do so, but believes that any discussion of the Soviet proposal
should be deferred until a later date in view of the brevity of,
and full agenda for, this session. The US Component would also
inform the Soviet side that this response should not be
interpreted as either acceptance or rejection of the Soviet
proposal. The US Component would be authorized to ask the Soviet
side why it had made its proposal.
3. Seek Completion of the 1979 Procedures
Sufficient
Only to Create a Basis for Establishing
a
System
of SNDV Accountability
All agencies agree that, if the decision is
to
review
all
D or D procedures, the approach should be along
the
following
lines:
The US Component would inform the Soviet side that, taking
into account the Soviet proposal of April 12, the US believes it
would be useful for the sides to review in the SCC all
dismantling or destruction procedures applicable to systems
captured under the SALT II Treaty. The US Component would add
that such a review would be undertaken with the prior
understanding that it would encompass mutual agreement between
the Parties on the accountability of SALT II limited systems.
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The US Component would inform the Soviet side that the sides
should seek agreement to use a single set of agreed 1974 and 1979
Procedures to implement relevant provisions of the SALT I and
SALT II agreements under interim restraint policies of the
Parties. These procedures, once agreed, would be applicable to
all systems dismantled or destroyed since 1979. They would
include appropriate SALT II notification requirements, but would
exclude procedures applicable to the conversion of heavy bombers.
The US Component would make clear that this proposal is not to be
taken as a precedent for START.
The US Component would note that, in this context, the
Soviet proposal of April 12, 1985, with the bracketed US text,
would be considered with: (1) Soviet acceptance of the legitimacy
of US Titan II dismantlement procedures; and, (2) a ban on the
conversion of bombers to non-accountable types.
Agency Positions:
State supports Option 3. State believes that it is in the
US national interest to negotiate with the USSR on selected D-or-
D procedures. In return for US agreement to the Soviet proposal
to add a new SSBN D-or-D procedure to the 1974 SALT I D-or-D
procedures, the US should propose a D-or-D package to deal with
dismantling, destruction and conversion of heavy bombers to
pursue the issue of the Soviet violation of the SALT II SNDV
limit of 2504. This US proposal would be a positive step in
support of US policy by demonstrating our commitment to taking a
vigorous approach to Soviet noncompliance. It would also be
consistent with the President's new policy of interim mutual
restraint, would improve on the existing method for determining
the SALT-accountability for heavy bombers, and would not
interfere with START. Finally, any possible advantage to the
Soviets resulting from the additional SSBN D-or-D procedure would
be offset by the new heavy bomber procedures which could force
the Soviets to destroy up to 30 Bison bombers or other SNDVs.
In the President's June 10 decision to seek to establish an
interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the Soviet Union is
called upon, inter alia, to take positive concrete steps to
correct its non-compliance and to resolve our other compliance
concerns. The impact of this call is reinforced by specific US
proposals to resolve compliance problems.
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The crux of the present Soviet SNDV violation lies in the
fact that the USSR claims it has converted a number of Bison
bombers into tankers, while the Intelligence Community assesses
This problem could be dealt
with in the context of D-or-D negotiations. Whereas SLBM and
ICBM D-or-D is included in the SALT I procedures, SALT I provides
no procedures for heavy bombers. Establishing a system of heavy
bomber accountability based on the 1979 D-or-D procedures could
help resolve the current Soviet SNDV violation issue and help
prevent it from arisina in the future. Beyond the 1979
procedures, we would, specifically, ban conversion of heavy
bombers to non-accountable types such as tankers.
In order to take advantage of this opportunity to improve
the accounting for heavy bombers and pursue resolution of the
SNDV violation, the US must engage the Soviets on their proposal
to negotiate on SSBN D-or-D procedures. The Soviets have
proposed to add the 1979 "scoop-out" D-or-D procedure to the 1974
"trisection" procedure, presumably to facilitate conversion of
SSBNs to non-SALT-limited purposes. As a practical matter, the
additional procedure would apply only to the conversion of
Yankee-class submarines. Two Yankee SSBNs are currently being
dismantled, and only two more are projected to be dismantled in
compensation for new SSBN construction and thus will become
candidates for the 1979 procedure. The Soviets could use the
current procedure for converting SSBNs even if we reject their
proposal.
While it is impossible to project with certainty how many
additional, if any, of these submarines would be converted if the
1979 procedure were adopted, the small number of candidate
submarines is offset by the price the Soviets would have to pay
in heavy bombers or other SNDVs. The Soviets would have to
decide whether to D-or-D up to 30 Bison (which the Intelligence
Community assesses are bombers) or an equal number of other SNDVs
in order to return to compliance with the SALT II SNDV limit.
This requirement would offset any financial or procedural
advantage to the Soviets from the alternative SSBN conversion
procedure. We believe that this trade-off would favor US
interests.
Some argue that the new SSBN procedure would cost the US
more than the present procedure, thouah we do not plan to convert
any SSBNs. Fowever, the new procedure need not in any way affect
US operations, since even under the Soviet proposal we would
remain free to use the current procedure.
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Proposing the procedures we envision would not undermine
START. We would deal with two issues: bombers and SLBM
launchers. Neither issue would set undesirable precedents for
START. In addition, as part of the interim mutual restraint
regime, new procedures would not signal the Soviets that we do
not anticipate a START agreement soon. The Soviets understand
that the interim mutual restraint regime will end with a new
START agreement, if not before. Indeed, since D-or-D procedures
will be required under a new START regime, current procedures
that are in our interest may be extended beyond the period of
interim mutual restraint.
Finally, it is not appropriate to postpone engaging the
Soviets on D-or-D issues pending completion of the November DoD
report on interim mutual restraint. The policy of interim mutual
restraint is under continuous review and the November report is
the first milestone on what could be a long road. The USG may
wish to consider the desirahility of proposing other D-or-P
procedures -- in addition to a proposal on bombers and SSBN
conversion -- in the coming months. But the Soviet SNDV
violation warrants the immediate and limited response we propose
to make.
OSD and JCS strongly oppose negotiation or finalization of
the 1979 SALT II D-or-D procedures. These agencies therefore
support Option 1.
Adoption of the 1979 D-or-D procedures for SSBNs would not
be in the military interest of the United States. The US has no
plans for converting dismantled Poseidon SSENs to cruise missile
platforms or attack submarines, so we would not benefit from new
procedures. The 1979 procedures would, however, apparently
facilitate such ongoino and future Soviet conversion of
dismantled Yankee-class SSBNs. As the President stated, the
Yankee submarine reconfigured to carry modern, long-range sea-
launched cruise missiles "constitutes a threat to US and Allied
security similar to the original Yankee-class submarine," raising
"concerns about their compliance with the spirit of the
agreement." It is definitely not in our military interest to
finalize procedures that would aid the USSR in returning
dismantled SSBNs to operation as attack submarines or cruise
missile platforms, thereby increasing the threat to the United
States or its Allies.
There are no compelling reasons to adopt new procedures at
this time. SALT I D-or-D procedures have sufficed until now, and
will probably continue to do so for the indefinite future.
Moreover, cost analysis indicates the SALT I D-or-D procedures
are less costly for the US than were we to opt to shift to the
new procedure.
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Adoption of new, agreed D-or-D procedures would not resolve
the issue of the Soviet SNDV violation. The SNDV problem does
not lie in disagreement on the number of missile launchers or
bombers that have been dismantled. While the Intelligence
Community agrees that the Soviets have converted a small number
of Bisons from bombers into tankers (despite the absence of
agreed procedures), the Soviets are claiming as tankers other
Bisons that the IC asesses are really bombers. We do not believe
it is in our interest to "trade" Soviet dismantlement of SNDVs in
excess of the allowed limit -- which the USSF is obliged to do
anyway -- in return for agreement to SSEN D-or-D procedures that
could increase the threat to the US.
Nor would it be appropriate to seek resolution of Soviet
concerns on Titan launcher dismantlement by "trading" this for
agreement to the 1979 procedures. The procedures we are using in
Titan dismantlerrents are in full compliance with SALT
requirements. Consequently, it would not be in our interest to
finalize the 1979 procedures in order to gain Soviet admission
that US Titan dismantlements do indeed meet arms control
obligations.
Adoption of the SALT II procedures would not represent a
vigorous approach to Soviet non-compliance. On the contrary, it
could signal that we intend to observe SALT II for many years to
come in spite of ongoing, uncorrected Soviet violations. NSDD-
173 stated that US decisions on continued SALT observance would
be made in light of Soviet corrective actions, reversal of the
Soviet military build-up, and active Soviet pursuit of arms
reductions in Geneva. To enhance the status of SALT II in the
absence of these factors could imply tacit US acceptance of
Soviet violations.
Finally, adoption of the 1979 procedures could have an
adverse impact on START. To finalize them after ignoring them
for almost six years would signal that we do not anticipate a
START agreement for a number of years to come -- a signal we do
not wish to send. In addition, their adoption could prejudice
the procedures we want to negotiate in the context of START.
ACDA supports Option 2. ACDA believes that the US should
defer responding to the Soviet proposal on SLBM conversion
procedures until the US determines what package of D-or-D
procedures would be appropriate for a continued period of mutual
restraint. Parallel to the development of the DoD report to the
President on mutual restraint and proportional responses, the SCC
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Backstopping Committee, together with the ACVC, should be tasked
to develop recommended D-or-D procedures that would be in the US
interest to negotiate with the Soviets, taking into account SALT
I and SALT II D-or-D procedures, should the President decide to
continue with some form of mutual restraint. In the interim, we
will continue to draw on the 1979 D-or-D procedures, as
appropriate, to judge Soviet compliance on SALT II.
The SCC Commissioner supports engaging the Soviets on this
subject in SCC-XXIX. His views and recommended approach follow:*
The US decision concerning a response to the Soviet proposal
should be taken in the context of the June 10 decision on interim
restraint, the upcoming November 19-20 meeting, the report due on
November 15 regardinq US responses to Soviet non-compliance, and
the recent decision to abbreviate the upcoming SCC session.
Most important, I believe that the US approach should seek to
maximize achievement of US interests in:
-- pressing for resolution of compliance issues as stated by
the President in connection with his two reports to the Congress
on Soviet non-compliance;
-- confident monitoring of Soviet strategic systems and in
maintaining an agreed data base on such systems; and
-- avoiding prejudice to positions and objectives on
dismantling or destruction, and monitoring and verification
thereof, being taken or to be taken by the US in current
negotiations.
In the latter regard, I believe that the greatest risk of
prejudice to those positions and objectives lies in allowing,
during this period of negotiations on new agreements, continued
Soviet use of unilateral approaches to criteria for
accountability based on procedures for dismantling or destruction
that are obsolescent, incompletely agreed, or simply lacking.
In my view, an approach to this subject along the following lines
at the upcoming session of the SCC would be consistent with all
of the above.
*Quoted from his memorandum of September 18, 1985, to the
Chairman, SCC Backstopping Committee.
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-- the US is not interested in discussing the Soviet
proposal by itself as a limited approach to the broader problem
of D or D procedures;
-- the US would be interested in a more comprehensive
approach to the matter of procedures to be followed during this
current interim period. Such an approach could lead to agreement
on procedures that provide the necessary basis for agreement on a
data base, could help to resolve several matters currently on the
SCC aaenda, and could help to preclude more such issues arising,
pending conclusion of a new strategic arms agreement;
-- the US is only interested if the Soviet side agrees that
it would be useful to negotiate interim procedures with the
objective of providing appropriate criteria for establishing and
maintaining an agreed data base regarding strategic offensive
arms; and that
-- if the Soviet side is positively disposed to such an
approach, the US will present a proposal for interim procedures
at SCC-XXX, and will expect a proposal from the USSR at that same
time.
The DCI is not taking
a position,
intelligence
material, on which policy option is chosen for this issue.
II. Issues on Which Decisions are Needed on Whether to Pursue in
SCC-XXIX and, if Pursued, Require Approval of an Approach
to Take.
A. A Certain SLBM's Throw-weight
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The background of this issue is contained in an SCC Working
Group Paper prepared for SCC-XXVIII, dated April 10, 1985, and
circulated at a higher level of classification.
This matter was considered by the SCC Working Group prior to
SCC-XXVII (Fall '84) and SCC-XXVIII (Spring '85), and a USG
decision was made not to raise it in those sessions
The President's finding on
this matter, contained in an annex, is classified codeword and
judges the Soviets to be in technical violation on this issue.
There are two issues for decision: (1) whether this issue
should be raised in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if raised, what approach
should be taken.
Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not raise this matter in SCC-XXIX.
Option 2: Raise this issue as a matter of concern and
request clarification in a manner sensitive to intelligence
sources and methods.
Consensus Approach:
(see Codeword Annex)
Agency Positions:
State, JCS, ACDA, the DCI and the SCC Commissioner support
Option 1. They believe this matter should not be raised in view
of sources and methods considerations.
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OSD supports Option 2.
OSD notes that the President has judged that the SLBM is a
technical violation of the political commitment to the SALT II
Treaty. While the missile clearly violates the Treaty, it is not
really as destructive as the SS-19. However, the legitimization
of the technique used on the SLBM, if applied to a larger Soviet
missile such as the SS-18, could result in a missile that
violates the Treaty both in a technical and substantive sense.
Since accepting Soviet behavior in the case of the SLBM threatens
to unravel the critical throw-weight definition of the SALT II
Treaty--and indeed of our START proposal--OSD believes that this
issue must be raised with the Soviet Union as a serious
compliance concern.
OSD believes that the sources and methods problems involved
in raising the SLBM issue are manageable. For example, we have
announced publicly for a decade which Soviet missiles are MIRV-
capable and which carry PBVs and which do not. However we have
made the determination, the Soviets must be used to the idea that
we are able to do so independently of whether telemetry is
encrypted or not. They cannot expect that such a basic fact
about one of their missiles will. go unnoticed. Significant
aspects of this missile system are treated at the secret level in
other intelligence publications on compliance.
OSD believes that if it is decided to raise this issue, the
approach should be as follows: The US Commissioner would advise
the Soviets that the US wishes to raise as a matter of concern,
request clarification, and seek corrective action from the
Soviets regarding the new liquid fuel propellant SLBM first
flight tested in June 1983. In particular, the US would note its
serious compliance concerns and seek clarification regarding the
compatibility of that SLBM, which has an "other appropriate
device" for dispensing and targeting two or more RVs, with
Article IX, Paragraph 1 (e) of the SALT II Treaty. The US
Component would report any Soviet response to Washington for
consideration before proceeding with any further discussion on
the issue.
B. SS-16 ICBM
The question of possible SS-16 ICBM deployment has been
raised in each of the past six SCC sessions. The Soviets have
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stated that they have no SS-16 ICBMs in their operational missile
forces; that they have not produced, tested, or deployed the SS-
16 ICBM since the signing of the SALT II Treaty; and that they
are not doing anything contrary to the SALT II Treaty. During
SCC-XXVIII, the US side added to its position a request that the
Soviets dismantle facilities at Plesetsk historically associated
with the SS-16.
The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress
contains the following finding:
The US Government reaffirms the judgment made in the January
1984 Report. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous and
we cannot reach a definitive conclusion, the available
evidence indicates that the mobile missile activities at
Plesetsk in the four areas historically associated with the
SS-16 are a probable violation of the USSR's legal
obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of SALT II
prior to 1981 when the Treaty was pendinc ratification, and
a probable violation of a political commitment subsequent to
1982.
The issues for decision are: (1) whether to pursue the
question of SS-16 ICBM deployment in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so,
what approach to take.
Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not pursue the question of SS-16 ICBM
deployment in SCC-XXIX. The US Commissioner would be authorized
to note that this issue remains open in the SCC.
Option 2: Continue to pursue the question of SS-16 ICBM
deployment in SCC-XXIX.
Consensus Approach
If the decision is to continue to pursue the matter of the
deployment of the SS-16 ICBM in SCC-XXIX, all agencies agree that
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the approach should be along the following lines (this approach
is substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would (1) again state the finding of the
President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress which reaffirms
the finding from the January 1984 Report, (2) reiterate that US
concerns on this matter remain, (3) strongly press the Soviets to
provide unambiguous information which can be validated by NTM
regarding the location and disposition of SS-16s in existence at
the time of the signing of SALT II, (4) repeat briefly other
points made in previous discussions of this issue, including
asking the Soviet side whether it can provide some alternative
means of assuring the US that SS-16 ICBMs are not deployed at
Plesetsk, and (5) continue to press the Soviets to dismantle the
facilities at Plesetsk traditionally associated with the SS-16 as
one means of alleviating US concerns that the SS-16 is deployed
there. If the Soviet side does not present significant new
information regarding the SS-16 ICBM, the US Commissioner is
authorized to cease discussion of this matter for this session.
In the process, he should make clear to the Soviet side the US
assessment of their highly negative contribution and that the
issue remains open in the SCC.
The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC
Working Group paper "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Possible SS-16
ICBM deployment: Overview and update," March 15, 1985, and the
update of that paper, dated September 3, 1985.
Agency Positions:
State, JCS, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option
1. They believe that, pending evaluation of recent intelligence
information, further pursuit of this matter at this time would
not be productive.
OSD supports Option 2. OSD believes that evidence of the
replacement of the SS-16, a probable violation of SALT II, with
the SS-X-25, a clear violation of SALT II, is not corrective
action. We should pursue this issue if only to possibly obtain
additional information about the Soviet modernization efforts at
Plesetsk.
OSD believes that the timing and nature of the Soviet
activities at Plesetsk clearly strengthen the President's finding
that the Soviets have probably violated the SS-16 deployment
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prohibition.
The DCI notes that OSD's interpretation of the activities at
Plesetsk is one of the possible interpretations; it seems clear
that the policy decision is not directly contingent upon a
specific interpretation of Soviet activities at Plesetsk.
C. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
The US has noted that Soviet actions with respect to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and other
agreements could affect future progress in the limitation and
reduction of strategic arms in every SCC session since the Spring
of 1981, nine sessions in all. The Soviet side has maintained
that this is not an appropriate subiect for the SCC to consider
and that it is strictly abiding by the 1925 Geneva Convention and
the BWC. During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side stated that it was
not authorized to accept the US side's statement.
The issues for decision are: (1) whether to repeat the
message regarding Soviet actions with respect to the BWC in SCC-
XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.
Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not repeat the message regarding Soviet
actions with respect to the BWC in SCC-XXIX.
Option 2: Repeat the message regarding Soviet actions with
respect to the BWC in SCC-XXIX.
Consensus Approach
All agencies agree that if the decision is to repeat the
message in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following
lines (this approach is unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention,
the US Component would, in a manner consistent with that in which
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it was done in recent SCC sessions, reaffirm the view that Soviet
actions with respect to this and other agreements could affect
future progress in the limitation and reduction of strategic
arms. In conveyina this view, the US Component would take care
to avoid implying that resolution of the BWC issue is a
prerequisite for any specific actions or decisions in other
areas.
Agency Positions:
State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1.
State believes that though this compliance issue is important, it
should not be raised in the SCC because the mandate of the SCC
does not extend to the 1925 Geneva convention and the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention. State and ACDA note that, at SCC-
XXVIII, the Soviet side refused to accept the US statement. They
believe that no constructive purpose would be served by
continuing to repeat this message in the SCC and that it should
continue to be vigorously pursued through other diplomatic
channels.
OSD and JCS support Option 2. OSD believes that evidence of
Soviet BWC violations is stronger than it has ever been and,
hence, there is no reason to depart from our practice of raising
this issue in the SCC.
D. Mobile Missile Accountability and Verification
In SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side advised the US side of
deployment of 18 SS-25 mobile ICBMs. Given the Soviet
notification of deployment, questions have arisen regarding the
meaning of "deployment" in the context of mobile ICBM
accountability. The US Component was not instructed to address
this subject during SCC-XXVIII. A Soviet advisor, however,
during SCC-XXVIII, stated in response to a question from a US
advisor that deployment in the context of mobile missiles
"...meant practically the same thing that future deployment of
the tIS Midqetman missile meant. ...it meant 'bringing into the
same state of readiness as would be the case with strategic
missiles.' 'Deployment' of mobiles may not be agreed upon, but
both sides understood what it meant."
The issues for decision are: (1) whether to raise the
subject of mobile missile accountability and verification in SCC-
XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.
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Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not raise the subject of mobile missile
accountability and verification in SCC-XXIX.
Option 2: Raise the subject of mobile missile
accountability and verification in SCC-XXIX.
Consensus Approach:
All agencies agree, except as noted below, that if the
decision is to raise the subject of mobile missile verification,
the approach should be along the following lines:
The US Commissioner would make the following points with the
Soviet side with regard to the accountability of mobile ICBMs:
-- In SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side advised the US side on
the basis of "good will" of the deployment of 18 SS-X-25
mobile ICBM launchers. The US side has in the past
advised the Soviet side that we view the testing and
deployment of this second new type of light ICBM as a
clear violation of the Soviet Union's SALT II
commitment. We have not changed our view, but in view
of the Soviet "good will" report, we must ask the
following questions:
-- It is the understanding of the US, consistent with
Article VI of the SALT II Treaty, that the launchers of
mobile ICBMs become accountable when they reach the
final stage of construction, specifically after they
have been brought out of the facility where their final
assembly has been performed. Is this the understanding
of the Soviet side?
-- If the Soviet side agrees that mobile ICBM launchers
become accountable in accordance with the provisions of
Article VI, the US Commissioner would indicate that this
introduces a new verification problem that should be
addressed. In this regard, he would ask the Soviet side
how they would ensure verification by national technical
means of the numbers of mobile ICBM launchers that are
brought out of final assembly facilities.
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-- If the Soviet side does not agree that mobile ICBM
launchers become accountable in accordance with the
provisions of Article VI, the US Commissioner would
request that the Soviet side provide its views
concernina when these launchers are to be considered
accountable and seek guidance from Washington.
OSD and JCS believe that the US should not seek Soviet views
regarding when the USSR considers SS-X-25 launchers to be
accountable since the SALT II Treaty addresses this question.
State believes that it would be useful to seek Soviet views
reaardina when the USSR considers SS-X-25 launchers to be
accountable to confirm that their view is the same as ours and to
set the stage for the question on verification.
Agency Positions:
OSD, JCS, and ACDA support Option 1. They believe this
subject should be dealt with in the NST. OSD believes that
entering into a discussion of this issue in the SCC could
prejudice our ability to achieve our verification goals in the
START talks.
State and the SCC Commissioner support Option 2. They note
that the question of mobile missile accountability is an integral
part of the SNDV compliance issue and is properly handled in the
SCC, as well as in the NST. Given the Soviet notification of
deployment, failure to pursue this question would be tantamount
to acquiescing in the Soviets' unilateral criterion of
accountability and would totally ignore the critical problem of
verification. State believes that such a discussion would not
prejudice START because it would be undertaken in the context of
SALT II.
E. Backfire Bomber
The Soviet Backfire statement, which is an integral part of
the SALT II Treaty commitment, states that the Soviet side will
not increase the production rate of this airplane as compared to
the rate of June 18, 1979. As noted in Secretary of State
Vance's June 21, 1979, submittal letter of the SALT II Treaty to
the President, Soviet President Brezhnev confirmed to the US that
the Backfire bomber production rate would not exceed 30 aircraft
per year.
The Backfire statement also contained the Soviet commitment
that it did not intend to give this airplane the capability of
operating at intercontinental distances, it would not increase
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the radius of action of this airplane in such a way as to enable
it to strike targets on the territory of the USA, and it did not
intend to give it such a capability in any other manner,
including by in-flight refueling.
The following are relevant findings from the President's
Report of February 7, 1985:
Production Rate
The US Government judges that the Soviet Union is obligated
to produce no more than 30 BACKFIRE bomber aircraft per
year. While there are ambiguities concerning the data,
there is evidence that the Soviet BACKFIRE production rate
has been constant at slightly more than 30 per year.
Arctic Staging
The US Government judges that the temporary deployment of
BACKFIREs of the Soviet Air Force (SAF) to Arctic bases in
1983 and 1984, bases used by Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA)
BACKFIREs since 1975, is cause for concern and continued
careful monitoring. By such temporary deployment of SAF
BACKFIREs, the Soviet Union acted in a manner inconsistent
with its political commitment in the June 1979 BACKFIRE
statement not to increase the radius of action of this
aircraft to enable it to strike the US territory, based on
the US estimate of that radius of action.
During SCC-XXVIII, the US side stated we had evidence of
Arctic staging of Backfire aircraft and a Backfire production
rate in excess of 30 per year, and reauested clarification and
appropriate corrective action.
The Soviet side responded that the Backfire's optimal
operational radius of action is 2200 km; it is not fitted with
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refueling equipment; it is not equipped for cruise missiles
capable of a range in excess of 600 km; and it has not, in any
other manner, been given the capability to operate at
intercontinental range. Therefore, the aircraft cannot reach the
continental US from any point on USSR territory, and concerns
about Arctic staging are "totally groundless." As for the
production rate of the aircraft, the Soviet side stated, "under
instruction," that the rate does not exceed 30 per year.
Based on recent analysis, the annual Backfire production
rate for 1984 and the first six months of 1985 is estimated to be
about 28 aircraft. The uncertainty in this estimate is plus or
minus several aircraft per year. However, the evidence that
Backfire production did exceed 30 per year in earlier years
remains.
Our understandina of Backfire C capabilities continues to
evolve.
(While the preponderance of evidence weighs against an
operational refueling capability, it is prudent to think that the
Soviets designed and manufactured the Backfire C to have the
potential for aerial refueling.
Based upon recent analysis, all intelligence agencies agree
that the Backfire is an intermediate range bomber. All agencies
also agree that under certain conditions, the Backfire has a
limited technical capability to conduct strikes against targets
in CONUS. On a one-way, subsonic all high-altitude mission, the
Backfire could cover all or almost all of the continental US
using either Arctic staging or aerial refueling. On a two-way,
subsonic all high-altitude mission, even usina both Arctic
staging and aerial refueling, the Backfire could only cover about
half of the continental US.
The issues for decision are: (1) whether to pursue the
Backfire auestion in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, which approach to
follow:
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Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not pursue the matters of Backfire bomber
production and intercontinental capability in SCC-XXIX. The US
Commissioner would be authorized to note that these matters
remain open in the SCC.
Option 2: Continue to pursue the matters of Backfire bomber
production rate and intercontinental capability along the lines
pursued in SCC-XXVIII and continue to seek Soviet clarifications.
Consensus Approaches:
1. Do not Pursue but Authorize to Note That These Matters
Remain Open.
All agencies agree that if the decision is not to pursue the
matters of Backfire bomber production rate and intercontinental
capability in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the
following lines:
The US Commissioner would be authorized to note that the
matters of Backfire bomber production rate and intercontinental
capability, raised during SCC-XXVIII, remain open in the SCC.
2. Pursue as in SCC-XXVIII.
All agencies agree that if the decision is to continue to
pursue the matters of the production rate and intercontinental
capability of the Backfire bomber as in SCC-XXVIII, the approach
should be along the following lines (this approach would be
substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would review the exchanges on the matter of
Backfire production rate at SCC-XXVIII, noting that Soviet
responses were insufficient to clarify US concerns. The US
Component would again remind the Soviet side that the US
considers that the USSR has a political commitment to abide by
General Secretary Brezhnev's commitment of June 1979, to
President Carter that the production rate of the Backfire bomber
would not exceed the rate as of June 1979 which he indicated was
30 per year at that time. The US continues to have evidence of
Soviet activities that appear to be inconsistent with this
commitment. The US Component would again seek clarification of
this situation and Soviet views.
The US Component would reiterate that the US considers that
the USSR has a political commitment to abide by its statement
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that the Soviet Union would not give the Backfire bomber the
capability of operatinq at intercontinential distances and that
it would not increase its radius of action in such a way as to
enable it to strike targets on the territory of the USA; nor did
it intend to give it such a capability in any other manner,
including by in-flight refueling. The US continues to have
evidence of Soviet activities which creates US concerns that
these activities may be inconsistent with these political
commitments. The US Component should again cite incidents of
Arctic staging of USSR Backfire bombers. The US Component would
seek clarification of this situation and if appropriate seek
corrective action.
The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC
Working Group paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Backfire
Bomber Production and Operating Capablity," dated March 28, 1985,
and the update of that paper dated September 3, 1985.
Agency Positions:
State, JCS, ACDA and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1.
They believe that, based on recent intelligence information,
these issues should not be pursued at this time. They believe
current intelligence information does not support a continued
Backfire production rate in excess of 30 per year. State, ACDA
and the SCC Commissioner note that the incidents of Arctic
staging raised previously have not recurred.
OSD supports option 2. OSD believes that Backfire has the
capability to strike the US. Nothing in recent intelligence
changes the validity of the President's decisions concerning
Backfire noncompliance. Indeed, some of this intelligence
strengthens the evidence of intercontinental strike capability.
Thus, OSP believes we should continue to pursue the issue as it
has been pursued in SCC-XXVIII.
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questions the wisdom of taking a
policy position in anticipation of what the upcoming draft
Compliance Report will contain or lead to as the resulting
Presidential decision.
F. ABM Rapid Reload
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The matter of Soviet ABM rapid reload activity was raised
with the Soviet side for the first time in SCC-XXVIII. The US
side stated that evidence suggests that, during 1983, ABM
launchers were reloaded in a relatively short 25X1
period of time, causing concern in the context of Article V of
the ABM treaty. The Soviet side responded that the Soviet Union
is not undertaking any rapid reload activities involving ABM
interceptor missiles. In a later conversation, the Soviet
Commissioner stated that the Soviet side understands rapid reload
in the same manner as the sides understood it during negotiation
of the ABM Treaty.
The Soviet Commissioner also recalled a 1975 SALT II
conversation regarding rapid reload of ICBM launchers in which
Ambassador Johnson had said that he had in mind a matter of
minutes, perhaps an hour or two, certainly not days. The Soviet
Commissioner noted the US statement that rapid reload activity
had been observed in 1983 was unclear; it could be 25X1
understood in various ways, for example, that only one hour or
one day had elapsed after the launch of a missile, when the
launcher was reloaded, or perhaps a full year.
The President's Report, February 7, 1985, to the Congress
included the following finding:
The US Government judges, on the basis of the evidence
available, that the USSR's actions with respect to the rapid
reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as
concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to
develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's
reload capabilities are a serious concern. This and other
ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
There are two issues for decision: (1) whether to continue
to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if pursued, approval
of the consensus approach.
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Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX. The US
Commissioner would be authorized to note that this matter remains
open in the SCC.
Option 2: Continue to pursue this matter in SCC-XXIX.
Consensus Approach:
All agencies agree that if the decision is to raise this
matter in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following
lines (this approach would be substantively unchanged from that
pursued in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would reiterate its concern along the lines
expressed in SCC-XXVIII, express US dissatisfaction with Soviet
failure to provide information which would clarify its
activities, and repeat the US request for clarification of Soviet
activities observed during 1983 involving the apparent reload of
ABM launchers in a relatively short period of time, in
particular, how this activity is consistent with the provisions
of Article V of the Treaty.
The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC
Working Croup Paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: ABM Rapid
Reload," dated April 5, 1985, and the update of that paper dated
September 3, 1985.
OSD believes that, if the decision is to pursue this matter
during SCC-XXIX, this issue could be better pursued by providing
the Soviet side a date on which the reloading of ABM launchers at
Sary Shagan in a relatively short period of time occurred. With
reference to Amb. Johnson's statement quoted by the Soviet side,
the US Component would indicate that this serves to approximate
the time that elapsed during rapid reload activity observed by
the US in 1983.
OSD believes, in addition, that the US Component should be
authorized to explore further the Soviet side's understanding of
the term "rapid reload" as it is used in the ABM Treaty.
State and ACDA believe that it would not be useful, and
might be harmful, to discuss the meaning of "rapid" with the
Soviets before the USG has an agreed position on its meaning.
JCS defers to the views of the Intelligence Community on the
matter of providing a date to the Soviet side.
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Agency Positions:
State, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1.
They believe that nothing will be aaine by raising this issue,
since that activity has not been repeated and since we have
already put the Soviets on notice regarding the activity of
concern.
OSD and JCS sunoort option 2. OSI) believes that failure to
pursue the rapid reload issue, in the absence of any attempt by
the Soviet side to resolve our concern, would signal the Soviets
that it is no longer a matter of serious concern and that Soviet
protestations of innocence are an acceptable resolution of our
compliance concerns.
The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and
methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made
to pursue this issue with the Soviet Union, to do so with minimal
risk.
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25X1
Instead, the DCI believes the US could
and should say to the Soviets that the Soviets themselves must
surely know from their own ABM testing personnel the dates in
question during 1983; the number cannot be large. In addition,
the DCI is opposed on principle to providing the Soviets 25X1
again, the Soviets surely 25X1
must know from their own ABM test pro ram personnel
And the Soviets can be engaged on
topic of reload intervals, from the negotiating record, without
the actual numbers. Thus, in both cases, further exposure of US
intelligence details should not be required.
G. Deployment of Mobile ICBMs at Former SS-7 Sites
Construction of mobile ICBM bases, probably for the SS-X-25
ICBM, at former SS-7 ICBM launch sites in the Soviet Union has
raised concerns that these former ICBM sites might be used in a
manner inconsistent with the political commitment of the Soviet
Union under the Interim Agreement and its implementing Protocol
on Procedures which prohibit use of facilities remaining at
dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites for storage, support, or
launch of ICBMs. In both SCC-XXVI (Sprinq '84) and SCC-XXVII
(Fall '84) the US side noted the US concern regarding the
potential inconsistency of these activities with the provisions
of the Interim Agreement. The Soviet side responded in SCC-XXVII
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(Fall '84) that the facilities in question were not being used
for storage, support, launch of ICBMs, or any other purposes
contrary to the provisions of the interim Agreement and the
Protocol thereto. During SCC-XXVIII, the Soviet side, "by way of
good will," stated that 18 launchers for mobile missiles had been
deployed and confirmed informally that these were launchers for
the SS-X-25.
The President's February 7, 1985, classified Report to the
Congress contained the following finding:
The issues for decision are: (1) whether we should pursue
this matter in SCC-XXIX, and (2) if so, what approach to take.
Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not pursue this matter pending the US
assessment of relevant intelligence information.
Option 2: Remind the Soviet side that use of remaining
facilities to support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be a
violation of Treaty commitments.
Consensus Approach:
All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this
matter in SCC-XXIX, the approach should be along the following
lines:
The US Component would remind the Soviet side of the proper
implementation of Paragraph 4, Section II, of the Procedures
Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction and
Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms. The US
Component would note that use of "remaining facilities" to
support ICBMs at deactivated SS-7 sites would be a violation of
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Soviet commitments. The US Component would inform the Soviet
side that the US is continuing to monitor closely current Soviet
activities at former SS-7 sites.
OSD would request, in addition, that the Soviet side confirm
that SS-X-25 mobile ICBM launchers hay been deployed at bases
constructed at
Agency Positions:
State, OSD, JCS, and ACDA support Option 2. State, JCS, and
ACDA believe Soviet activities are questionable and that there is
utility in continuing to signal our concern in this "low-key"
way. OSD notes that subsequent to warning the Soviets on this
issue in the SCC, we have seen a pattern of use of former
facilities at nearly all SS-X-25 sites. We must continue to
pursue this issue.
The SCC Commissioner supports Option 1. The SCC
Commissioner believes that we have already made the Soviet side
well aware of our concerns in this regard and that restating
those concerns, in view of the cortinuing assessment of
intelligence information regarding Soviet activities at these
sites, may unnecessarily reveal US uncertainties.
The DCI is not taking a position, based on intelligence
material, on the policy options for this issue. The DCI notes,
however, given the apparent significance of this issue, that
asking the Soviets for more information about the status and
location of their deployed mobile IBCMs would seem in the US
interest.
III. Matters Which all Agencies Agree Should be Pursued in
SCC-XXIX, But on Which Decisions are Needed on the
Approach to Take
A. Territorial Defense and Concurrent Operations
During SCC-XXVIII, the US side reviewed concerns about ABM
and ABM-related activities which suggest that the Soviet Union
may be preparina an ABM defense of its national territory.
Listed among those concerns were the construction of LPARs,
including the one at Krasnoyarsk; concurrent operation of air
defense components and ABM system components*; R&D on new air
"Concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM system
components were raised with the Soviet side only in conjunction
with Territorial Defense.
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defense missiles with capabilities against some types of
ballistic missiles; the possible development of mobile ABM
components; and ABM rapid reload activities. Our expectation of
corrective action or detailed explanations regarding these
activities was made clear.
The Soviet side responded that the US has no grounds for its
statements. On concurrent operations, they noted that past
instances of certain contemporaneous but independent operation of
air defense and ABM systems at Sary Shaaan have been explained.
The DCI notes that since 1972 the Soviets have engaced in
three separate categories of concurrent activities
Activities in each category can be important to ABM, much less
SAM, research and development. The Common Understanding signed
in June 1985 limited further activities of the first type. Since
the signing, we have noted no instances of such concurrent
activities. However, we continue to be aware of instances in the
other two categories.
The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress
addresses the matter of AB!" Territorial Defense and made the
following finding:
The US Government judges that the acareqate of the Soviet
Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar
construction, concurrent testing, SAM Upgrade, ABM rapid
reload and ABM mobility) suggests that the USSR may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
The complete finding for each item can be found in the
section of this parer which addresses that item.
All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. A decision is required on the approach to take.
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Options for Decision:
Option 1: Do not pursue the matter of territorial defense
as an issue in itself, but in the context of other ABM issues.
Option 2: Pursue the matter of territorial defense in SCC-
XXIX as an issue in itself.
Consensus Approaches:
All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this
matter in the context of other ABM issues, the approach should be
along the following lines:
The US Component would make clear, in addressing each
specific ABM Treaty compliance question, that the Soviet activity
in question, when considered with other Soviet ABM-related
activities, suggests that the Soviet Union may be preparing an
ABM defense of its national territory. The US Component would
stress that it is incumbent upon the Soviet Union to provide
explanations, or to take the necessary corrective action
(depending upon the issue), which will allay our concerns.
All agencies agree that, if the decision is to pursue this
matter in SCC-XXIX as an issue in itself, the approach should be
along the following lines (this approach would be substantively
unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would again review all the findings related
to ABM territorial defense contained in the President's
unclassified February 1, 1985, Report to the Congress and
emphasize the totality and interrelationship of the following
Soviet activities which may contribute to an ABM territorial
defense: (a) the LPAR construction program particularly the
Krasnoyarsk radar, (b) the possible development of mobile ABM
components, (c) incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM
components, (d) evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM
upgrade, and (e) Soviet rapid reload capabilities. The US
Component would repeat that these activities have engendered
serious concerns within the US that the Soviet Union may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
The US Component would again request an explanation
regarding how these activities are consistent with Treaty
commitments. The US Component would also repeat our request that
the Soviet side provide adequate explanations regarding these ABM
activities.
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The US Component would again stress that, during ABM Treaty
negotiations, the Parties understood that LPARs were the key
elements in providing a base for a territorial defense in that
LPAR construction is clearly one of the long lead time items
necessary for the deployment of such a defense. In this regard,
such a blatant violation of the important Treaty limitations on
LPARs, as the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar can most
certainly be characterized, is not only of the highest concern in
itself but can only lead the US justifiably to regard other
Soviet ABM-related activity, some of which may be ambiguous in
terms of Treaty compliance, with suspicion. The US would stress
that, in this light, the Soviet Union must bear the burden of
explanation regarding how these activities are in compliance with
Treaty commitments. It is therefore incumbent upon the Soviet
Union, in addition to taking the necessary step of dismantling
the Krasnoyarsk radar, to provide corrective actions or, at a
minimum, to give clear and detailed explanations regarding this
other activity. This is necessary in order to initiate a process
which will allay these suspicions and achieve a mutual trust that
is essential to our attempts to achieve new agreements in the
future.
to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk.
Agency Positions:
State, JCS, ACDA, and the SCC Commissioner support Option 1.
State, JCS, and ACDA believe that not all of the ABM issues
should be raised in depth, and therefore a thorough reiteration
of the territorial defense issue as expressed in the President's
Report to Congress would not be possible. Nonetheless,
territorial defense is a part of each of the individual ABM
compliance issues about which we believe we should express our
concern again.
OSD supports Option 2. OSD believes that pursuing the issue
of territorial defense as we did in SCC-XXVIII is important to
express our concern over the totality and interrelationship of
Soviet ABM activities that cause concern about Soviet compliance
with this fundamental limitation of the ABM Treaty.
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IV. Matters Which All Agencies Agree Should be Pursued and
on Which There is an Agreed Approach; Approval of the
Recommended Approach is Needed
A. Krasnoyarsk Radar
During SCC-XXVIII, the US side cited the Krasnoyarsk radar
as a violation of legal obligations assumed under the ABM Treaty.
The US characterized the Soviet contention that this radar will
be for tracking objects in outer space and national technical
means of verification as implausible, and informed the Soviet
side that corrective action, to include dismantlement of the
radar, is required.
The Soviets reiterated specifics of the radar's alleged
space track mission, and provided reasons as to why the radar
could not be used in a ballistic missile early warning or ABM
role. The Soviets protested the US finding of a violation, on
the grounds that no such determination is possible before the
radar begins to function, characterized US arguments as
subjective assessments and conclusions, and characterized as "out
of the question" the suspension of construction or dismantling of
the radar.
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The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress
contained the following finding:
The US Government judges, on the basis of evidence which
continued to be available through 1984, that the new large
phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk
constitutes a violation of legal oligations under the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated
siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by
this Treaty. Continuing construction and the absence of
credible alternative explanations, have reinforced our
assessment of its purpose. Despite US requests, no
corrective action has been taken.
All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is needed.
Consensus Recommendation:
All agencies agree the US Component should pursue the
question of the Krasnoyarsk radar along the following lines (this
approach would not be substantively changed from that used in
SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would again: (1) reiterate the finding of
the President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress that the
radar under construction in the vicinity of Krasnoyarsk is a
violation of the ABM Treaty, (2) state that the US has very
serious concerns about the potential interrelationship of this
radar with an ABM system under development that could be rapidly
deployed in defense of national territory and with other related
Soviet ABM activities, (3) repeat briefly other points made in
previous discussions of this issue, (4) emphasize in the
strongest terms that corrective action, to include the
dismantlement of that radar, is required, and (5) express
disappointment with Soviet contribution, thus far, to resolving
this matter.
The US Component would continue to press the Soviet side on
this matter but would focus on the President's findings and avoid
detailed technical discussions, for example, of the alleged space
track role.
The US Component would not renew the offer to discuss with
experts the application of the Krasnoyarsk radar to manned space
programs.
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The US Component could respond along the lines of previous
instructions if the Soviets make new and significant information
available.
If the Soviet side does not present significant new
information regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar, the US Commissioner
would be authorized to cease discussion of this matter for this
session. In the process, he should make clear to the Soviet side
the US assessment of their highly negative contribution and that
the issue remains open in the SCC.
B. Encryption of Telemetry
Attempts to resolve the problem of Soviet telemetry
encryption continue to make little progress in the SCC or
elsewhere. The US side has requested that all encryption of
telemetry cease, and has also suggested that the Soviets revert
to telemetry transmission practices in effect at the time SALT II
was signed. The Soviets have asked the US to designate those
channels of telemetry required for such verification. Thus far,
the US has been unwilling to provide those parameters.
The President's February 7, 1985, Report to the Congress
contains the following finding:
The US Government reaffirms the conclusion in the January
1984 report that Soviet encryption practices constitute a
violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981
and a violation of their political commitment since 1982.
The nature and extent of such encryption of telemetry on new
ballistic missiles, despite US requests for corrective
action, continues to be an example of deliberately impeding
verification of compliance in violation of this Soviet
political commitment.
All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.
The DCI believes that current Soviet encryption practices
are not acceptable and that the USG should say so again in a
clear, definitive way. The DCI believes, moreover, that the US
should tell the Soviet side that this encryption activity, as
well as other activity of similar significance (i.e.,
concealment), must stop if existing arms control accords are to
be preserved and if future arms control arrangements are to be
created. And finally, the DCI believes the US should make clear
that compliance and verification are the pacing elements of arms
control today.
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the DCI believes that this issue should again be
treated "low-key" as was done in SCC-XXVIII. US intelligence
defers to the Commissioner's judgment on the timing of treatment
of this issue in this session." (For clarity, "low-key" is
compatible with the strong message in the previous paragraph.)
Consensus Recommendation:
All agencies agree that the US approach should be along the
following lines (this approach is substantively unchanged from
that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would repeat the President's finding from
the February 1 Report to Congress regarding Soviet telemetry
encryption which impedes verification and call for a halt to such
encryption. The US Component would again note that the expanding
pattern of Soviet violation of the concealment prohibition of
SALT II is of great military and political significance and that
continuation of Soviet concealment activities will make it
difficult, if not impossible, to verify compliance with future
arms control agreements and will lower confidence in the
potential utility of those agreements.
The US Component would continue to press the Soviets to
revert to pre-1979 practices, along the following lines used in
SCC-XXVIII:
The US component would again (1) inform the Soviet side
that Soviet telemetry encryption practices in effect at the time
of the signing of the SALT II Treaty (June 1979) were carefully
evaluated by the US side with respect to our ability to monitor
ballistic missile systems limited by SALT II; (2) emphasize that
the Soviet Union has, since the time of the signing of the SALT
II Treaty, significantly altered its telemetry encrvption
violation of the political commitment to the Treaty; (3) indicate
that the Soviet ability to construe SALT II provisions in order
to "change the rules in the middle of the came" is a major
shortcoming of the Treaty and contrary to the spirit with which
we signed it in June 1979; and (4) state that, therefore, in
order to reduce obstacles to reaching new agreements, the Soviet
side should revert to the telemetry transmission practices in
effect on that date.
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The US Component would again qualify this response along the
following lines:
C. SS-X-25
The Soviets continue to maintain that the RS-12M (SS-X-25)
is not a new type missile. At the beginning of SCC-XXVIII, the
Soviets informed us that 18 SS-X-25 mobile ICBM launchers had
been deployed.
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The President's Febrary 7, 1985, Report to the Congress
contained the following findings:
a. Second New Type: The US Government iudges
that the SS-X-25 is a prohibited
second "new type" of ICBM and that its testing, in addition
to the testing of the SS-X-24 ICBM, thereby is a violation
of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the
"new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty.
On June 10, 1985, in promulgating his decision on continued
adherence to a policy of interim restraint, the President cited
the SS-X-25 as an example of irreversible Soviet noncompliance
with the Treaty.
All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.
Consensus Recommendation
All agencies believe that the approach in SCC-XXIX should be
along the following lines:
The US Component would (1) reiterate the findings of the
President's February 1, 1985, Report to Congress which states
that the SS-X-25 is a second "new type" ICBM in violation of the
political commitment; (2) state that this violation is
irreversible because knowledge gained cannot be eradicated, and
(3) reiterate the President's statement of June 10, 1985, that,
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"Since the noncompliance associated with the development of this
missile cannot, at this point, be corrected by the Soviet Union,
the United States, therefore, reserves the right to respond
appropriately, and the United States will do so in a
proportionate manner at the appropriate time." The US Component
would not pursue the matter further.
D. SNDV Limits
The President's Report to the Congress on February 7, 1985,
included the following finding:
The US Government interprets the Soviet commitment to abide
by SALT II as including the existence of a cap on SNDVs--at
the level of 2504 existing at the time SALT II was sinned.
The Soviet Union has deployed SNDVs above the 2504 cap in
violation of its political commitment under SALT II. Such
activity is indicative of a Soviet policy inconsistent with
this political commitment.
During SCC-XXVIII, the US side informed the Soviet side of
its concerns. The Soviet side responded that the 1979 levels
"... had never been exceeded." In a letter dated August 5,
1985, the Soviet Commissioner added that "...with the entry of
new heavy bombers equipped for cruise missiles capable of a range
in excess of 600 kilometers, heavy bombers of old types
("Myasishchev") were converted into tanker airplanes. Conversion
was carried out in accordance with practice used before the
signature of the SALT II Treaty. As a gesture of good will, I am
informing you at the same time that we are destroying some of the
"Myasishchev" tanker airplanes as their usefulness is exhausted."
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All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.
Consensus Recommendation
All agencies agree that the approach should be along the
following lines:
If the Soviet SNDV count is over 2504, based on intelligence
information and the Soviet notification in October, the US
Commissioner would again note the commitment of the Soviet Union
to abide by the provisions of the SALT II Treaty and that that
includes the commitment to limit their SNDVs to the number they
had on the date of signature of the SALT II Treaty and included
in the agreed data base on strategic arms of that date. The US
Commissioner would again note that for the Soviet side this
number is 2504. The US Component would note the response
provided by the Soviet Commissioner on August 5, 1985, and state
that the US continues to have evidence which indicates that the
number of SNDVs deployed in the Soviet Union and accountable
under the provisions of the SALT II Treaty has exceeded 2504 in
violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment.
The US Commissioner would be authorized to engage the Soviet
side in dialogue on the Soviet Commissioner's letter of August 5,
1985, along the following lines: r
-- The US Commissioner would state that, on the basis of
information available, the US side does not accept the
Soviet side's contention that Bison aircraft have been
converted from bombers to tankers.
-- The US Commissioner would also draw from the following
questions:
-- Describe the "practice" by which the Soviet Union said
it has converted Bison bombers to tankers.
-- How would such tanker aircraft
be
distinguished from
Bison bomber aircraft? Are they to
be
distinguished from
Bison bomber aircraft on the basis
of
functionally related
observable differences (FRODs), and
if
so, what are the
FRODs?
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-- How many aircraft does the Soviet side claim to have
converted?
-- What procedures does the Soviet side follow to destroy
Bison aircraft?
If the combination of the Soviet notification and current
intelligence information indicates that the Soviets are at or
below 2504, the US Commissioner would be authorized to ask the
questions listed above but would request guidance from Washington
on the overall SNDV issue.
The US ('omoonent would be authorized to draw upon the SCC
Working Group paper, "Preparation for SCC-XXVIII: Strategic
Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Limit," March 13, 1985, and the update
of that paper dated September 3, 1985, as appropriate.
E. SAM Upgrade
The President's February 7, 1985, Report contained the
following finding:
The US Government judges that the evidence of Soviet actions
with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess
compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM
Treaty. However, this and other ABM related Soviet
activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM
defense of its national territory.
During SCC-XXVIII, the US side expressed concern about
research and development at a test range, historically associated
with the development of surface-to-air missiles, on new air
defense missiles with capabilities against some types of
ballistic missiles and requested clarification regarding how this
activity is consistent with Article VI (a) of the ABM Treaty.
The possibility that this activity could result in "Drovidina ABM
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Soviet side responded that the allegation was conjecture, that
the Soviet side did not know precisely what the US concern was
based on, and, therefore, could provide no substantive response.
The Soviet side denied that it is conducting any work on air
defense systems that would be contrary to the ABM Treaty.
All agencies agree that this subject should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.
Consensus Recommendation:
All agencies agree that the approach in SCC-XXIX should be
alona the following lines ( except for the authorization to
specify the SA-X-12 designator, the approach would be
substantively unchanged from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would reiterate its concerns regarding
Soviet research and development, at a test range historically
associated with surface-to-air missiles, on new air defense
missiles with capabilities against some types of ballistic
missiles and express dissatisfaction with Soviet responses
provided thus far. The US Component would again cite the
provisions of Article VI that prohibits giving systems other than
ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles
and the provision against testing such systems in an ABM. mode and
again request clarification regarding how this research and
development program is consistent with these provisions. The US
Component would again emphasize the importance of the SAM upgrade
issue in the context of other Soviet actions which suggest that
The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and
methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made
to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk.
F. Mobile ABM System Components
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The President's Report, February 7, 1985, to the Congress
included the following findings:
The US Government fudges
that the USSR's development and testing of components of an
ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable
at sites requiring relatively little or no special-purpose
site preparation, represent a potential violation of its
legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. These and other ABM-
related Soviet activities suggest that the USSR may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
All agencies agree that this matter should be pursued in
SCC-XXIX. Approval of the recommended approach is required.
Consensus Recommendation:
All agencies agree that the approach should be pursued along
the following lines (this approach is substantively unchanged
from that taken in SCC-XXVIII):
The US Component would again indicate the US concern, as
stated in the finding of the President's Report to Congress, is
that the USSR's development of components of an ABM system, which
apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring
relatively little or no preparation, represents a potential
violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty, and that
this and other ABM-related Soviet actions suggest that the USSR
may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.
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T The U Component would repeat that the Soviet
assertions that the Soviet Union is not developing mobile ABM
components and its statement that the US had evidently observed a
radar used as instrumentation equipment and for national
technical means of verification were accompanied by no supporting
evidence. The US would again state that the US will continue to
believe this to be an ABM radar possibly associated with the
development of a rapidly-deployable, mobile ABM system, until and
unless provided with unambiguous information to the contrary.
The US Component would be authorized to draw upon the SCC
Working Group Paper, "Preparations for SCC-XXVIII: Soviet Mobile
ABM System Components," dated may 6, 1985, and the update of that
paper dated September 3, 1985, in pursuing this approach.
The DCI believes there are risks to intelligence sources and
methods in this issue but it is possible, if a decision is made
to pursue this issue with the USSR, to do so with minimal risk
G. Preagreed Messages for the Common Understanding on
Unexplained Nuclear Incidents.
At the final meeting of SCC-XXVIII, the US side stated that
the US continued to believe that new messages specifically
tailored to the Common Understanding on Unexplained Nuclear
Incidents would facilitate urgent communication between the two
governments in situations covered by the Common Understanding,
and added that the US may return to this question in the future.
The Soviet Commissioner stated that the sides, "if necessary, may
return to the question of working out an additional message or
additional messages...." Subsequently, at the plenary table, the
Soviet Commissioner asked if he understood correctly that, in
connection with this Common Understanding, the Parties would be
using, if necessary, the appropriate messages already contained
in the (1976) Protocol. The US Commissioner confirmed that this
was correct.
Consensus Recommendation
All agencies agree that this item should not be pursued in
SCC-XXIX.
Consensus Approach
All agencies agree that our approach should be along the
following lines:
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The US Component would not raise this matter at SCC-XXIX.
If the subject is raised by the Soviet side, the US Component
would be authorized to repeat the position taken in SCC-XXVIII
that the preagreed messages contained in the 1976 Protocol
continue to be sufficient for the time being. The US Component
would retain the option to return to this matter in the future.
V. How to Respond to Compliance Concerns Previously Raised
by the Soviet Union
Instructions will be drafted for the following issues
previously raised by the Soviets and on which US positions have
been established. Should the Soviets present new material not
covered by instructions, the US Component would seek Washington
guidance.
A. Article XII of the SALT II Treaty: The deployment of
Pershing II and GLCMs in Western Europe.
B. ABM Testing Activities: These activities involve the
Homing Overlay Experiment, the Designated Optical Tracker, Queen
Match, and the Signature Measurements Radar.
C. Pave Paws Radars: The Soviets raised issues regarding
the characteristics and coverage of these radars.
D. Strategic Defense Initiative: The Soviets have raised
this issue in several past sessions of the SCC as a violation of
the ABM Treaty.
E. Modernization of the Thule and Fylingdales Radars: The
Soviets raised concerns regarding the construction of the Thule
radar.
F. Titan II Launchers: The Soviets have accused the US of
violating ICBM launcher dismantling or destructing procedures.
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