SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS REGIONAL POLICIES THROUGH THE 1980S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00126R001201650007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: NIE

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Secret
NOFORM1'
South ~4frica and Its
Regional Policies
Through the 1980s
Secret
NIE 73-84/S
December 1984
Copi 7
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
REL ...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to .. .
STAT
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N I E 73-84/ S
SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS
REGIONAL POLICIES
THROUGH THE 1980s
Information available as of ?_1 November
1984 was used in the preparation of this
Estimate. which was approved bs the
\ational Foreign Intelligence Board on
that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE '~OTE ...................................................................................... ~~
I;E~~ JL'DG`1E\TS .............................................................................. 1
DISCL; SSIO'~ ........................................................................................ S
The Setting ........................................................................................ .~
South .~frica's Perceptions and Goals .............................................. 6
The Regional ~Iilitar}- Situation ...................................................... 8
The South .~frican Defense Force ~S~DFI ................................. 8
`tilitar~~ Capabilities of the \eighboring States ......................... 10
Regional Economic Considerations ................................................. 11
South .~frica~s Internal Economic Situation ................................ 11
South .~frica's Economic Options ............................................ 11
Prospects for Economic Growth in the 1980s ......................... 1?
The Regional Economic Situation ............................................... 1_'
Prospects for the Regional Economies ........................................ l~
South .~frican Internal Politics ......................................................... 16
Outlook and Implications ................................................................. ?0
Outlook .......................................................................................... ~?0
Implications ................................................................................... ~?1
For Black .~frica ....................................................................... ~?1
For the Soviets .......................................................................... .,,
For the t nited States ................................................................ .,,
.?
Fort e ?'est ............................................................................. --
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate assesses the major changes in South .~frica and the
southern .~frican region in recent ~~ears, such as:
-The growth of South .~frica's military and economic strength.
-The corresponding political. economic. and militar~~ weaknesses
of the black neighboring states.
-The determination of South .~frica to project its power regional-
1~~, using military and economic threats and incentives. to
deprive South African insurgents of bases and safeha~?ens in the
neighboring states.
-The negotiation of a series of arrangements between Pretoria
and individual black .~frican regimes to solidify South .~frican
regional hegemon}?.
-The nest- constitutional changes in South .~frica that bring
Coloreds and Indians into limited partnership with whites.
The paper also addresses factors that ma~~ inhibit South .~frica's
power projections. including:
-Political divisions within the .~frikaner communit}~.
-Continued racial discrimination and sporadic violence in South
.~frica.
-.fin international embargo of arms to South .~frica and its effect
on the military.
-The long-term decline of told production in the Republic.
-The continued provision of Soviet weapons and advisers to
.~ngola and. to a lesser extent. Mozambique.
-The presence of Cuban combat forces in .~ngola.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the nature of South .~frica~s
regional accommodations and their durabilit}~ for the remainder of the
1980x. The Estimate also addresses in general terms the likely implica-
tions of these developments for the United States. ?'estern Europe. the
Soviet Union and its allies. and the rest of black .~frica..~lthough the pa-
per discusses the probable South .-lfrican relationship ~?ith an independ-
ent \amibia. it does not examine the processes b~~ which \amibia may
reach independence. nor does it deal with the intricacies of a Cuban
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~~-ithdra~~~al from .~ngola or the disengagement of South .~frican forces
from .~ngola.
~~
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in southern Africa
in the mid-19 ~ Os-and the resultant projection of Soviet and Cuban
po.~?er into the region-South Africa has attempted to shape the
regional political environment to meet its o~~-n securit} needs. Pretoria
has alread~? compelled some of its black-ruled neighbors to accept
bilateral security agreements through ~ti?hich it is attempting to impose a
"Pas Pretoriana" throughout southern Africa.' Although there may be
periods of tension bet~~?een South Africa and its neighbors. eve do not en-
visage ascenario developing during the rest of the 1980s in ~~?hich South
.-lfrican hegemon}~ declines to the point that neighboring countries
~~?ould feel less threatened by South Africa.
South Africa is the dominant military po~t?er in southern Africa. Its
forces are not only- larger and more efficient than those of any of the
neighboring black states. but are also highl~? motivated. well disciplined.
and thoroughly trained. Because of the international arms embargo
against South .-Africa, Pretoria has fostered an extensive indigenous arms
production capabilit}? and has procured some foreign equipment and
technology by both open and clandestine means. Although South Africa
lacks the capabilit~~ to produce high-performance aircraft and helicop-
ters. it will preserve its regional military dominance through the period
of this Estimate.
The armed forces of the neighboring black states suffer from poor
training. lo.v pay. inadequate housing, a lack of technical skills. severe
maintenance and supply problems. and general demoralization. Con-
tinuing t1o~-s of Communist military equipment to the neighboring
states have not compensated for these inherent deficiencies of the black
armies. but they are a source of concern to South Africa. even thouQ_ h
the military systems delivered so far are primarily defensive.
South African regional economic predominance is even more
striking. South Africa will experience only slo.v economic gro?-th for the
rest of the 1980s as a result of the static production in its dominant gold
industry. But its economic power is so great in comparison with the fal-
tering economies of its neighbors that the migrant labor. trade. invest-
ment. and transportation dependence of the neighbors on South .~frica
~~~ill prevail for many years to come. ~~'hether South .-Africa ~~~ill be
The term -'Pax Pretonana'~ is used in [his Daper to mean the youth Atncan poiic~ of forcing or persuading
neighboring governments. preferabh through formal agreements, ro cooperate with youth .~fncan
authorities to eliminate the ph)?sical Dresence of suspected anti-youth .lfrican terrorists on their territories.
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either ~~?illing or able to provide the considerable financial investments
that the neighboring states need is more doubtful. Pretoria is alread~?
seeking ~~- estern commitments of aid to ~~Iozambique and to an
independent \amibia. and will try to dra?- the `'Vest more deeply into
its regional schemes.
South .africa's pursuit of a Pax Pretoriana throughout the 1980s has
serious implications for African and non-:~frican states. :~lthourzh
Pretoria~s black neighbors are too weak to challenge South .~frican
hegemon~~. their weakness ??ill not stop their support for \amibian
independence. political support for black liberation groups. and maior-
it~ rule in South .~frica. Moreover. Pretoria's goal of a "constellation of
states' held together b~ security agreements and South .~frican econom-
ic dominance runs counter to black southern .~frica's own hopes of
distancing itself from Pretoria. Thus. the black-ruled states of southern
_~frica ~t~ill resist South .~frica's efforts to dictate their domestic and
foreign polic~? priorities..~s they come to realize that the~~ cannot fend
off South _~frica b~? themselves, they will seek. even more intensely than
they have in the past. the help of Communist and ~i'estern states to
bring pressure on Pretoria. although they will seek to keep `toscow at
arm's length ~~hile doing so.
.fit the moment, vloscow is especially apprehensive that South
.~frica's recent security agreement with Mozambique and bilateral talks
with .~ngola could diminish the need of those states for Soviet militar}~
assistance. Moreover, reverses for ~losco.+~ in these two countries
undermine Soviet efforts to support the South-West .~frica Peoples
Organization ;S~'~'.~PO) and the .~frican \ational Congress ~_~\C).
Despite ~Iosco~~?~s concern. the Soviets are restrained b~ the ~?ery
~~-eaknesses that beset their black .~frican clients. and the~~ lack the
leverage to push those clients beyond the political and military bounds
the clients have set for themselves.
?'hile ~Iosco~- ma~? have suffered some setbacks. there are no
indications that it believes the game has been iost. The Soviets believe
the~~ can count on South .~frican intransigence on \amibia's independ-
ence and on the growing effectiveness of the .~ngolan insurgents to
demonstrate the need for continued Soviet assistance in .~nszola. Thee
could also profit in the long run from the disenchantment of the reuion
with its subservience to South .~frica. Moscow will also continue to
portray the ~~'est. particularly the Cnited States. as collaborating with
South .~frica.
The protracted diplomac~~ of the L nited States on southern .~frican
issues over the last several years has great potential for advancing L-S in-
terests. On the other hand, there is a risk of reinforcing the ~~?idespread
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perception among Africans that the United States is acquiescing in the
South African-imposed order. Also, as South Africa perceives itself
stronger, it ~+~il] become less vulnerable to pressure. Thus, L'S influence
in both the Republic of South Africa and black Africa mae suffer.
Pretoria's aid for insurgencies in the region .~~ill fluctuate according
to overall South African militar~~ and political strategy . I: ntil the South
.~fricans can be confident that a Pax Pretoriana has taken hold. they
.ti-ill be reluctant to abandon the leverage that the insurgencies provide.
Pretoria hopes that continuing pressures ~~ill force the regimes in
Angola and 'Mozambique to come to terms with their internal oppo-
nents. An~~ resultant governments of national unite presumable would
reduce the Soviet and Cuban presence in both countries.
South Africa nog+~ admits that S~~'APO cannot be excluded from
participating in an eventual independent government in \amibia.
Pretoria will nonetheless tre to ensure that important posts go to non-
S~~~APO parties and that constitutional guarantees preclude cone-parte
or ~-larxist state. Such arrangements would help to retain strong South
African influence in the countre. As for the .~\~C. its militare capabili-
ties will continue to diminish in the wake of the \~komati accord with
Mozambique. South African securite forces will probable be able to
handle the military- challenge from the .~\C without too much
difficultS~ for the rest of the 1980x.
But the ongoing violence in South Africa, which increased sharpl~~
in august 1984, demonstrates once again that the white regime still
faces serious internal securit}~ problems. South African securite forces
are likeh~ to become increasingle preoccupied with random urban
terrorism and spontaneous outbreaks of violence. although the govern-
ment is not likele to face a serious threat to its stabilite for the period of
this Estimate.
South Africa's efforts to impose a Pax Pretoriana stem in large part
from its desire to remove its perceived external threat in order to bu~~
time to work out its o~s-n solutions to its domestic problems. President
Botha has restructured national political institutions and strengthened
the positions of the President and the few' senior \ational Parte
associates ~vho share his commitment to limited constitutional and
economic reforms as well as to an aggressive foreign polic}?.
Be this means Botha is creating the institutional framework for
making himself the most powerful leader in ~?Oth-centun' South Africa.
For the next few years at least he will dominate the political scene.
Botha~s only potential political threat lies to the right, but even that
threat is manageable. because the \ational Party base ^o~;? includes
more of the English-speaking electorate. Botha seems well placed to
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enact his programs during the remainder of his scheduled term in
office. ~~?hich corresponds roughly with the period of this Estimate.
During the next five ~?ears. South .~frica will institutionalize
limited constitutional reforms. co-opting as mane Coloreds and Indians
as possible. and blacks residing in white areas. into a system that ??ill
give them only limited political rights but ?~ill hold out hope of much
greater economic and social advantages.
.~s more blacks are assigned citizenship in the homelands. South
.~frica's long-term political strateg~? ?~ill be to find a method to link the
homelands permanently to a ??hite republic through some federal or
confederal arrangement-a domestic version of the concept of a
constellation of states. Botha would like to see such a s}stem created be-
f ore he ]eaves office.
Efforts to create that system will be hampered. however. b~~ black
resistance. stemming from the government's inability or unwillingness
to meet black needs and aspirations. Government efforts to buy off
blacks will be stalled by slow economic growth.
If black expectations are not met, blacks will turn increasingl}~ to
~~iolence. Black abilities to challenge government policies are limited.
but the~~ do exist. Black dissatisfaction during the remainder of this
decade will not be sufficiently articulated. however. to bring about
maior changes. But it ma~? lead to enough unrest to force the govern-
ment into a steadil~? escalating use of force. ~>hich would add to its pari-
ah status in the international community and seriously- complicate L: S
and ~4'estern efforts to bring about peaceful social change in South
_~frica.
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DISCUSSION
The Setting
1. The southern African region is in a state of flux=
.~ turbulent period that began in the mid-19 i Os with
the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire is
evolving in new directions. currenth~ highlighted b~
Pretoria?s efforts to erect a structure of bilateral
agreements between the region's dominant power.
~~?hite-ruled South Africa. and its black-ruled neigh-
bors. Through these arrangements. South Africa hopes
to regulate the intricate strategic relationships of the
region.
?_. Many factors contributed to the turmoil that the
southern African states have experienced during the
last several years. These factors include:
- Marxist regimes with Soviet Bloc support came to
power in Angola and ~4ozambique in 19.3 fol-
low~ing Portugal's precipitate withdrawal from
Africa. In Angola. the liberation movements that
were excluded from power. particularly the \a-
tional L; pion for the Total Independence of
Angola iC1'ITA), mounted what has become a
serious insurgent challenge to the authority of the
new? Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola ~~IPLA) government.
- The Rhodesian civil war. growing in intensity
throughout the 19 ~ Os. finalh~ forced the white
regime to accept a negotiated end to the war and
the instal]ation of a black maioritl government.
-The restive black townships of South .~frica
erupted violently in June 19 ~ 6. In the subsequent
brutal crackdown by South African security
forces. many ~?oung blacks fled into exile in
neighboring countries where many were recruit-
ed into the principal South African liberation
movements, the African \ational Congress
.~\C1 and the Pan-Africanist Congress ,PAC;.
The .~\~C began to mount sporadic cross-border
For the Durposes of this Estimate. southern .~frica includes South
~fnca. Lesotho. Botswana. Swaziland. Zimbabwe. 1lozambique.
~ngoia. Zambia. \amtbia, and ~talawl. Zaire. particuiariv its
mineral-nth province of Shaba. is connected to the South .~fncan-
dommated regtonai rail system and is, therefore. treated as Dart of
the southern ~fncan economw scene. Tanzania a not in the
iOUthern AtnCa re$lon, ~Dllt l5 tnVOlved t^ re$lOnal pOI1t1Ca1 dt{alr5 as
d Frontline State.
guerrilla operations into South Africa from bases
in neighboring countries.
- The United \ations imposed a mandatory arms
embargo against South Africa in late 19". forc-
ing South Africa to accelerate its efforts to
become militarily and economically self-
sufficent.
v. South African anxiety about these developments
was heightened bs the eagerness of the Soviet Lnion
and its allies to exploit them. B~ the time Pieter
Willem (P. fit', i Botha became Prime Minister in 19"b.
South Africa's increasing isolation was apparent.
Botha's government attempted to formulate domestic
policies to deal with the overriding question of race
relationships within the country. However. the govern-
ment appeared during its first years in office to be
devoting most of its time, resources. and energy to
meeting the "total onslaught" that it argued was facing
South Africa on all borders-hostility from black
Africa carefully nurtured by the Soviet Lnion and its
allies. As the 19TOs ended. South Africa watched with
concern the increasing sophistication of the Soviet-
supplied weapon systems of its neighboring countries
and the growing militan capabilities of the Soviet-
supported insurgent movements. particularly the
South-~%est Africa Peoples Organization ,S~i'APO~
and the AtiC.
~. Pretoria was also concerned by efforts of its black
neighbors to decrease their economic dependence on
the Republic. The emergence of organizations such as
the Southern .~frican Development and Coordination
Conference SADCC~' did not in Pretoria s view bode
well for the South African concept of regional eco-
nomic cooperation. which in the early days of the
Botha era took form as a call fora "constellation of
states" with South Africa as the nucleus and the black
states as satellites.
5. In attempting to mold the southern .~frican
political environment to its liking over the last several
years. Pretoria has used a variable mix of political.
economic. and militan? pressures. which has had some
success. Some black .~frican states, even those that
The members of SADCC are Angola. Botsvana. Lesotho.
~'talawl. ~tOZam DlQue. ~waZllahQ. Ta nZanla. Zam Dla. dno
Zimbabwe.
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have received economic and military assistance from
either Eastern or ?estern countries. have not been
capable of resisting South African pressure. While
South .Africa has become stronger over the last decade.
its neighbors have been unable to cope effectively with
their growing economic and security problems. Thus.
one b~ one. the states of southern Africa have begun to
try to work out an accommodation with South .Africa.
South Africa's Perceptions and Goals
6. South .Africa sees itself as the dominant power in
southern .Africa. whose needs must be taken into
account. and as an African state that has wrongly been
excluded from continental affairs. South .Africa also
considers itself a geostrategic actor in southern .Africa
++?ith an important role to plan in the East-West global
confrontation. South .Africa is not interested in per-
suading others to adopt its ideolog}~ or in acquiring
additional territory . but it is determined to retain
economic and military preeminence in southern
.Africa.
'. South .Africans regional goals are in large part
dri+?en b~~ its domestic political situation. Its leaders
have sought to ensure continuing .Afrikaner domina-
tion. despite virtually universal condemnation of its
political and social order. In formulating its regional
policies. Pretoria is motivated by the need to buy time
to put its domestic affairs in order and to blunt the
attacks of both its internal and external critics. To
bolster ++?hite unity. Pretoria takes a hard line against
the A\C and those countries that, bs giving the A\C
aid and sanctuary. have enabled it to engage in cross-
border terrorism against South .Africa. Pretoria also
~+~ants to ensure that an independent \amibia will be
governed by a regime at least not overtly hostile to
South .Africa. But Pretoria aiso +vants to change the
nature of its relations with neighboring states. hoping
:hat in time these states ++?ill come to accept South
Africa s right to manage its internal affairs.
S. Immediate Goals and Tactics. South .Africa~s
immediate goal is to reduce or eliminate the capability
of neighboring states to support antiregime movements
operating in and out of South .Africa and to force them
to cooperate with South .African authorities to elimi-
nate the physical presence of suspected terrorists on
their territories. The South .Africans want these and
any future commitments codified in treaties. which
would also serve to give the appearance of closer
bilateral relations with South .Africa. The model for
these agreements seems to be the recently concluded
\komati .Accord ++?ith Mozambique. \o change of
regime or immediate thawing of relations with the
Republic have so far been demanded of neighboring
governments.
9. In connection with these nonaggression treaties.
South Africa will offer various inducements. South
.Africa has revealed the existence of a treaty. similar to
the \komati accord. that was made two years ago with
Swaziland sunder which Swaziland may ultimate])
receive some South :African territory to which it has a
longstanding tribal claimi. Botswana and Lesotho are
resisting strong pressures to conclude similar accords.
If these arrangements fall into place. Zimbabwe may
find itself under the gun to loin the others. although
we doubt that President Mugabe would enter into a
formal agreement.
10. The economic. political. and military weakness-
es of the neighboring states provide South .Africa +vith
easily exploitable opportunities to pursue its goals.
Economic difficulties have increased dramaticalli
over the past 10 to 13 years through a combination of
factors:
-Declining terms of trade for primary producers.
- Incompetent state intervention or inept ~~social-
ist" policies, particularly in agriculture.
- Destruction. during civil +vars. of transport and
other infrastructure.
-Shortages of technical and managerial expertise.
- Corruption in government bureaucracies.
- \atural disasters. including the drought no++
entering its third year.
The dependence of the other states of the region on
South .African suppiy routes is aiso expioitable. For
example. in 1981 Pretoria threatened to terminate a
trade agreement with Zimbabwe that inciucies prefer-
ential customs duties and some quota guarantees on
Zimbabwe~s exports to the Republic. and aiso threat-
ened to send home X0.000 Zimbabwean workers then
in South .Africa. Pretoria then precipitated a transport
crisis by threatening to withdra+~~ rolling stock on loan
to the Zimbabwe railroad. but backed off as a result of
outside pressure.
11. The political turmoil in neighboring states has
aiso provided fertile ground 'tor South .Afrcan med-
dling. For example. Zimbabwe has alleged that Pre-
toria has recruited and supplied some of the dissidents
operating in the troubled `tatabeleiand Province that
abuts South .Africa. ?'hile there is evidence of some
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South .African involvement. the ethnic discord in
Zimbabwe and the interpart} battles that reflect it are
a longstanding problem of indigenous origin. Zimba-
bwe's failure to resolve its internecine conflict will
continue to provide the Republic with opportunities to
destabilize the Mugabe government if South Africa
deems such action necessar}~ to fulfil] its regional goals.
1?'. South .Africa has been provided opportunities
for intervention by the militar} weakness of its neigh-
bors. Minimal amounts of aid to dissident groups can
create havoc for states such as Lesotho or Mozam-
bique. ;These states are also open to direct attacks in
Pretoria~s anti-A\C campaign, illustrated dramatical-
I~ in South .African raids on Maseru in December 1982
and the bombing of .AVC facilities in Maputo in Lta}?
1985.' Onl} .Angola. with massive Soviet and Cuban
support. has made a maior effort to defend its territor}
against South .African military incursions.
15. South Africa?s neighbors are politically fragile.
\lany political structures are over]}? dependent upon a
single leader and have vet to work out mechanisms for
the peaceful transfer of power. flan}? of these leaders
have failed to develop effective securit}? systems, and
because of their incompetence, particular]}? their in-
ability to develop adequate economic policies, now
face increasing disaffection.
1~. South .African polic}~ toward exploitation of its
neighbors? weaknesses is ambivalent. While Pretoria
finds it useful to keep these states off balance. too
much pressure could be counterproductive. South
.Africa does not want to be surrounded b}? excessively
feeble states. Chaotic states cannot bu}? the Republic's
goods and would offer little prospect for South .African
investors. Such states cannot enforce the terms of the
nonaggression treaties South .Africa is demanding and
would provide a favorable environment for anti-South
.African movements. We believe the Republic will.
therefore. keep the pressure on but will tr}? to calibrate
it carefull}?: to the extent that these countries cooper-
ate with South .African regional plans. they will gener-
ally be left alone to work out their internal political
arrangements.
13. The Long-Range Obie~tive. The lcng-term
South .African obiective remains the Formal establish-
ment of the constellation of states that Botha has
advocated since he came to power. The constellation is
intended to replace the "cordon sanitaire" of Europe-
an white-controlled territories ..Angola. Mozambique.
and Rhodesiai that collapsed in the mid-19~Os. Pre-
rona has periodically raised the concept for public
attention. The constellation of states would be codified
by economic and political agreements that would
create a regional bloc essential]} controlled b} the
Republic. Among the advantages to Pretoria would be
at least indirect regional recognition of the indepen-
dent homelands. which would form part of the con-
stellation. b} the other states that South Africa would
like to have associated with it. namely. `fozambique.
Zimbabwe. Angola. \amibia. Malawi. Zambia. Bo-
tswana. Lesotho. Swaziland. and perhaps Zaire. Pre-
toria probabl}? assumes that the creation of such a
system would make it much more difficult for other
African states. or any other power. to intervene in the
region's affairs.
16. Pretoria's vie.+-s of the Marxist states in the
region will affect its plans for regional cooperation.
flan} South African decisionmakers would argue that
mutually cooperative arrangements can be ~.?orked out
regardless of the political systems prevailing in the
black-ruled states. Other South .African leaders are
more ideological]} oriented and would prefer a consis-
tent policy of hostility toward Marxist or socialist
regimes. The South .African public has been condition-
ed by years of official rhetoric to regard Marxism as a
direct and total threat to South .African stabilit} and
survival. It would therefore seem difficult for Pretoria
to associate freeI} with Marxist regimes. The results of
bilateral cooperation under the new? securit} agree-
ments may help to modif} South .African perceptions.
but the long-range South .African expectation is that
continuing pressures will force such regimes to modify
their composition by including non-`Marxist political
groups. such as L'\ITA or the \ational Resistance of
Mozambique ARE\AMO).
1". .Although South .Africa now seems willing to
become more closely associated with the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique ,FRELI'~1O1 government
of ~~tozambique. its long-range goal of a constellation
of states probably envisages modifications in the com-
position of regimes currently Marxist. In .Angola.
where South .Africa has been deeply committed to
C\ITA Eor years. Pretoria no doubt wants reconcilia-
tion behveen L'~ITA and the ~IPLA ?overnment.
.Although South Africa~s relationship .with and commit-
ment to RE\AMO in `(ozambique is less significant.
Pretoria is actively promoting talks bet.veen Maputo
and the insurgents. In \amibia. on the north vest
border. a SAA'APO 3overnment would also pose sym-
bolic problems for the Republic. The granting of
independence. in Pretoria s view. can include a possi-
bh dominant role for ~~V.APO: but Pretoria will try to
ensure that important posts ?o to other indigenous
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parties. and that constitutional guarantees preclude a
one-park or ~1arxist state. In other countries-Malawi,
Lesotho. and Botswana-Pretoria continues to favor
the more conservative elements in the socieh~. ??hether
or not the~~ hold power.
18. .~ngola is the maior policy problem for South
.~frica?s regional planners. The Marxist 11PL.?1 govern-
ment has over 30.000 Cuban troops and military
advisers as well as several thousand Cuban civilian
technicians assisting it in maintaining power. Their
presence is a problem for a regime that aims at total
dominance of the region. even though the?? pose no
immediate threat to the Republic (Cuban troops per-
form basically defensive functions in .~ngolai. Should
the Cubans be invited b~ a S~'~'.?1P0-led \amibia to
assist it in its security operations. however. the. would
be seen b~ Pretoria as a much more immediate threat.
Pretoria is intent upon managing \amibian independ-
ence in such a ova) as to prevent this. In the meantime.
so lone as the Cubans keep to their current posture.
their presence serves a useful purpose for Pretoria by
attracting L'S invo]vement in developments in south-
ern Africa and by iustifying South African arguments
of a Soviet-Cuban militar~~ threat to the region.
19. South African regional policies are based on
pragmatic self-interest and are supported by most of
the .vhite community. For the period of this Estimate.
the nonaggression pacts resulting from these policies
are likely to hold. The neighboring states are bitterly
aware of the risk they run in permitting the ABC to
use their territory . because the~? would not be able to
defend themselves against South African military ac-
~ion if they engage in behavior Pretoria feels is hostile
io its interests. and because they desperately need
South _~frican trade. aid. and investment.
The Regional Military Situation
The South African Defense Force (SADF)
_'0. South Africa is the dominant military power in
southern .~frica. Its militar~? forces are not only larger
and more efficient than any of the neighboring black
states. but are also highly motivated. well disciplined.
and thoroughly trained. The active-duty force num-
bers over 9~i.000: if needed. Pretoria could muster an
estimated 300.000 men in 30 days through a general
mobilization. The South .~frican Defense Force is
capable of mounting an aggressive and coordinated
military response to perceived threats.
'_1. \(ost SADF personnel are white South .-lfricans.
but because of competing demands from the military
and civilian sectors, increased use of nonwhite person-
nel on a voluntary basis is taking place. Onh white
males. however. are presently subiect to draft and
reserve obligations. The current system drafts about
25.000 white males and accepts a fey.- thousand volun-
teers i,white males and females. and a few black.
Colored. and Indian males ~ each year. Onl} about
8,000 nonwhites are no~v in the SADF ranks: but.
should Coloreds and Indians become subiect to the
draft as a consequence of the limited political partici-
pation for their communities under the neu? Constitu-
tion. these numbers could increase sharply . Some
Colored and black troops have already seen combat
and may assume more of the burden in the future as
an alternative to additional increases in the military
obligation of whites. These troops will also probable
receive more equitable treatment within the armed
forces than nonwhites normal]} eniol in civilian life:
the SADF'} pragmatic interest in improved perform-
ance has already led it to adopt policies designed to
promote greater racial tolerance among its troops.
'_?. Despite the increased importance of nonwhites
in the militar~~, the defense of the country will ulti-
mateh? remain the responsibility of the white popula-
tion. White males are now liable for two years of
active service followed bi 12 years of reserve duty .
during which -20 days must be spent on active duty .
Whites must then fulfill a continuing reserve obliga-
tion until the age of ~~.
23. Despite budgetary increases. there are problems
facing the SADF. among them the spotty quality of
leadership at the small-unit level. Career officers and
noncommissioned officers are seldom assigned below
the company level. even though counterinsurgency
warfare is fought at the section, team. squad. and
platoon levels. Thus. in \amibian and Angolan field
operations. the SADF has experienced incidents of
faulty mapreadine, disregard of authorit~~. false com-
bat reports. and the like.
2~. .mother leadership problem comes from South
Africa's military isolation. which has meant that al-
most all military training must be done in country. [n
recent years. the lack of contact with other military
establishments and staff colleges has resulted in gaps in
SADF knowledge about new concepts and methodolo-
gies. Training, particularly at the staff college level
and above. has suffered. The system is no~~~ producing
senior officers with parochial vision and Tittle or no
appreciation of the world beyond South Africa~s
borders.
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?a \onetheless. b.' Western standards, the quality
of SADF military training is at least adequate. The
training available is carefull.? planned and thorough,
with heave emphasis on field work. The large reserve
force ithe Citizen Force-CFi is organized for conven-
tional warfare. while both the standing army (Perma-
nent Force-PFD and the reserves are trained for
counterinsurgency operations where the government
believes the greatest near-term threat to its security
will arise.
?6. The SADF remains equipped largeh with obso-
lescent but serviceable equipment that is adequate to
meet the military threat it now- faces. While most of
the active units are equipped with modern weapons,
the basic machinegun remains the Browning 30 cali-
ber. and its main antitank gun is a lov-velocity 90-
millimeter gun. The SADF lacks modern antiaircraft
defense systems. except fora few Soviet systems
captured in Angola.
3'. Deficiencies in its arms inventor~? are the conse-
quences of the international isolation inflicted by two
I;nited \ations arms embargoes. voluntary in 1963
and mandatory in 19 T ~ . In the mid-1960x, South
African defense planners initiated policies designed to
reduce the country's dependence on foreign equip-
ment. The~? have since developed channels to foreign
countries and international armaments dealers in an
effort to circumvent the embargo by covert procure-
ment of weapons and technolog~?. South Africa has also
developed the largest indigenous arms industry in
Africa. The government-controlled .armaments Cor-
poration of South Africa ~AR~{SCORI has become one
of the countr~?'s largest industrial conglomerates.
Tasked specifically to develop and procure weapons.
ammunition. and technology based on the needs of the
SADF..~R~ISCOR covers the entire process of weap-
ons production from research through manufacture.
servicing, and repair. and currently meets the bulk of
the military s requirements for ground force equip-
ment. It also procures weapons from private firms.
.8. South .~frican efforts to circumvent the embar-
?o have had mixed results. South Africa is able to
produce a vast range of weaponry, much of which-
small arms. ammunition. and armored vehicles-is
important for counterinsurgency operations. With the
help of foreign technology. it has produced such
sophisticated items as the extended range G-5 1~~-mm
gun and missile-carrying patrol boats. The SADF
extends the life of its aging equipment by fabrication
and by paying high prices for spare parts on the
clandestine international arms market.
?9. But these actions do not entire]} compensate for
South African inadequacies. The SADF lacks some
state-of-the-art military equipment, particularly high-
performance iet aircraft and helicopters. It has no
replacements for its iust-retired Shackleton long-range
reconnaissance aircraft. South Africa also believes it
needs to develop a submarine production capability .
Even the present level of self-sufficiency in arms
production has been costly . The research and develop-
ment and production costs of home-produced items
has led ARMSCOR to begin an intensive search for
foreign partners and customers to help sustain produc-
tion lines.
30. For the period of this Estimate. South Africa
will continue to develop an indigenous arms produc-
tion capability and to procure foreign equipment or
technology through open or clandestine means. Much
of this effort will be directed toward ~i-extern coun-
tries. particularly the United States. Some South Afri-
can weapon systems already have lost their qualitative
advantages over Soviet-supplied weapons in the neigh-
boring black-ruled states.
31. South Africa's aid to insurgencies for the re-
mainder of the decade will fluctuate. depending on
Pretoria?s perceptions of the advantages to be gained
from cooperation with the regimes in power and on its
own overall regional strategs~. For the next feu- ~~ears
at least, Pretoria will be reluctant to abandon the
leverage that involvement with opposition groups pro-
vides. South Africa probable will continue to aid
L'\rITA. but is unlikeh to renew its large-scale aid to
RE\'A~IO as long as the Mozambican Government
lives up to its side of the \ komati agreements.
32. As the .~\Cs sanctuaries in the re?ion are
closed out. one South African motive for waging cross-
border counterinsurgency campaigns will diminish.
although counterinsurgency training will continue to
have a high priority. The South African Police and the
Commandos locally based militia groups reported to
number ?_00.000 membersi will probably be able to
handle the .~\C externally based challenge without
much difficulty for the rest of the 1980x. But the South
African militar~? may increasingi~~ be forced to con-
centrate on internal security matters. Turmoil result-
ing from rising black expectations ma} be more
difficult to control. The threat from random urban
terrorism will grow. as both left- and riuht-~~?ing
groups may decide that violent confrontation is the
best means to focus government attention on their
demands. But the regime is unlikely to face a serious
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threat to its stability from such groups for the period of Table 1
this Estimate. Armed Forces Personnel in Southern Africa
Military Capabilities of the Neighboring States
33. \one of the neighboring states, individualh or
collectiveli. can challenge South African military
dominance. ~;onetheless. the South Africans are seri-
ousl~ concerned by the continuing deliveries of Com-
munist military equipment to neighboring states and
the presence of foreign troops and advisers in those
countries. The systems so far acquired by these coun-
tries. though. are for the most part defensive.
3~. At present. Lozambique. Botswana. Zimbabwe.
Zambia. Lesotho. and Angola have Soviet Bloc mfli-
tar) equipment. The major recipients have been An-
cola and Mozambique. Angola has received initial
shipments of St~-'O_ ~Fittezs'~ and tiIIG-23 iFloggers) jet
aircraft and \iI _-1 'O_3 (Hind) helicopters. Mozam-
bique has been supplied with MIG-21 iFishbedl jets
and ~tI 3-;? '_5 helicopters.
33. South Africa is concerned about the improved
air defenses in both countries. and the vulnerability of
its irreplaceable aircraft to missile systems nou? in
place, particularl~? in Angola. In addition, in its De-
cember 1983 incursion into Angola. SADF leaders
found that their armored cars were ineffective against
Soviet tanks. The Cuban presence in Angola, more-
over. restrains South Africa's abilih~ to project its force
far into that country.
36. But although South Africa's regional dominance
is not in danger of being challenged for the course of
this Estimate. the SADF is not a juggernaut. If the
arms embargo holds. with South Africa continuing to
be denied access to state-of-the-art equipment and
technology-particularly with regard to advanced jet
aircraft-and. if additional large-scale deliveries of
modern equipment improve further defensive capa-
bilities of neighboring states. South African cross-
border operations could be hampered. South Africa
does not face a serious conventional threat from
adversaries on its borders.
3'. The combined manpower strength of the neigh-
boring states? armies tar outnumbers the troops South
Africa can muster .see table 1), but these forces are
'.neffective. The African armies are poorly trained.
supported. housed. and paid. They lack technical
si:ills, and. not surprisingiv, are often demoralized.
These armies are also riven by tribal rivalries and. in
many instances. cannot comprehend the concept of a
national interest that transcends tribal boundaries.
Country Army Vavy Air Army Total
Air Force
These figures do not include either paramilitary forces ~eendar-
merie. police, militia. and border guard-except where notedi or
reserve strength.
e Botswana Defense Force is made up of five infantry companies.
Includes border guard.
c Includes 50 personnel in Army Patrol Boat Squadron.
< Although faire is addressed in other sections of this paper, it is not
considered Dan of the military composition identified with southern
Africa.
r Includes 12.000 South African Defense Force personnel inside
Namibia: but does not include an estimated 10.000 personnel in the
South-west Africa Temtory Force.
done of these deficiencies is likely to disappear during
the next decade.
38. But this imbalance between South .~frica and its
neighbors is double edged. If South .~frica is able co
persuade its neighbors that its intentions are peaceful.
the past trends of escalating violence and arms build-
ups could be halted or reversed. Much will depend on
South Africa~s future policies to~~ard support of insur-
gent movements in neighboring countries. [f it were to
cease to provide assistance to them-as it seems noti to
have done to RE~iAMO-the prospects are good. 1'et
ideology plans an important part in South .~frican
policy. U\ITA and RE\A~4O may appear. to some
South .~frican leaders, as more attractive than the
Marxist regimes now in power in terms of the kind of
regional political environment that South .~frica be-
lieves would be most beneficial for its interests.
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Regional Economic Considerations
Table
South Africa: Gold Holdings.
Production and Sales. 19 i 0-83
Gold in Gold Gold Sales
Government Production
South Africa's Internal Economic Situation
39. South Africa is likely to experience continued
low economic growth through the 1980x. The effect of
this trend on domestic and foreign policy will be
gradual. as economic constraints will not halt the
ruling \ationa] Party ~s determination to protect the
country~s security and to retain Afrikaner political
control. The financial pinch. however, will engender a
sense of insecurity among Afrikaners, perhaps demon-
strated in increased aggressiveness both at home and in
the region.
-10. Budgetary constraints, moreover. already have
had some impact and no doubt contributed to the
South African decision to accelerate the \amibian
independence process and to work out an accommoda-
tion with Angola. The budgetary drain will continue to
be a factor in South African planning for lamibia. but
~~?e do not believe that financial considerations alone
~~~ill determine South Africa's policy on \amibia.
~ 1. Economic growth projections will be unreliable
indicators for predicting the timing or magnitude of
racial unrest in South Africa. Pretoria's economic
policy makers are unlikely to interpret incidents of
racial unrest as a compelling inducement to ease
?ro.vth constraints as a way of dampening black
unemployment. Pretoria will continue to make deci-
sions with an eve primarily to maintaining the econo-
my~s solvency, with lower priorit.? for political and
social consequences.
~2. The Importance of Gold. Gold has been the
i:e. to South African economic growth. paying for half
of total annual imports. including those capital goods
critical to economic growth. But gold production. as a
result of an apparentl3 irreversible decline in the
nchest ore reserves. has declined fairly steadily for
more than a decade. slipping Erom a high of 1.000
metric tons in 19 ~ 0 to about 653 tons in 1981. Lower
gold output has shrunk the contribution of overall
mining receipts to real GDP from 18 percent in 19 ~ 0
to 11 percent in 1983. even though production of
minerals other than gold increased by about ~ 3 per-
cent. See table ?' '
~3. Foreign exchange shortages would have been
much more severe had there not been steep. specula-
tive increases in the price of gold in the mid-19 ~ Os and
in 1980. Increased earninQS from ?oid sales-from an
average of ?SLS billion a year in 1910-.3 to over S10
billion a year in the 1980s thus far-offset slightly
more than half of the increase in the average annual
cost of imports and net services from S3 billion in
19 ~ 0- ~ 3 to nearly X21 billion in 1980-83 ).
-14. Foreign exchange constraints have led periodi-
cally to fiscal and monetar~? policies that deliberately
sacrifice economic growth to stifle import demand.
This tight-fisted approach w?as the principal cause for
the decline in the average rate of economic growth
from ~.- percent in the 1960s to '_.S percent since
19; 0. Even if figures for the past three years of severe
drought and worldwide recession were to be factored
out. the average annual rate of South African econom-
ic growth ,19T1-80) still would be less than ~ percent.
~S. Slight increases in ?old production have oc-
curred since 1981. Output will continue to be largely
static. with perhaps a slight increase up to the late
1980x.
South .-*Jrica's Economic Options
~6. Unless gold prices again rise. Pretoria will not
be able to avoid future balance-of-pay ments predica-
ments that will lead it to constrict grow?th..~part Erom
hoping for new gold discoveries or for iar?e. sustained
price increases. South Africa has essentia115 only hvo
alternatives to periodic clampdowns on growth.
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4-. The first option-substantial increases in public
and private borrowing from ?'estern banks-probabl~?
already troubles economic decision makers in Pretoria:
South Africa's foreign debt has increased from about
S" billion in 1980 to more than 513 billion in 1984.
Further increases on any maior scale are unlikely
because:
- Thee would mark a significant departure from
the pattern of economic fine-tuning in effect
since the beginning of the decline in gold
production.
- They would provide a potential point of leverage
to foreign critics of the South African racial
system.
- They would clash with Calvinist-based .Afrikaner
views of heavy debt as immoral.
4S. Policymakers in Pretoria have long recognized
that their more desirable option would be to increase
nongold exports. The long-term performance of these
exports has been good. tiongold exports grew b~~ a
respectable average of ?0 percent annually during the
period 19.1-80. but have declined by one-fifth since
1980 see table 31. This decline-the first in ?3 years-
resulted from:
- Reduced demand resulting from economic reces-
sion in the principal markets: Western Europe,
the L nited States. and Japan.
- Severe drought in 1983 and 1984, which halted
corn exports.
This combination of factors has kept the growth of
nongold exports from offsetting the rise in the cost of
imports.
Prosvects for Economic Growth in the 1980s
~9. The South .African Government will continue to
restrict economic growth periodically to minimize
current account deficits. timed largely by speculative
swings in gold prices..An increase of 5100 an ounce in
gold prices. for example. would raise the value of
annual gold production by 82.1 billion at the current
rate of output. The chances for a significant increase
in Sold prices-back to the 5800 to 5900 levels of
1980-are poor. however. without an inflationary
surge in the t'nited States and other industrial nations.
or some other unpredictable tiactor such as a maior
intensification of conflict in the Middle East. default
b~ one or more of the principal debtor nations, or
faltering of the t'S economic recoven~. Given the
Table 3 Million CS 5
South Africa: Major Exports
Estimated.
b Vot available.
unpredictabilit~? of gold prices. South .Africa~s annuai
rate of real economic growth in 1984-90 is likely to
average only about ?.~ to 3.0 percent.
The Regional Economic Situation
~0. Despite the limitations for sustained growth
predicted, South .Africa's economic growth during
19 i 8-83 averaged more than four times the pace of the
combined average rate of its 10 nearest regional
neighbors-.Angola. Botswana. Lesotho. Malawi. ~lo-
zambique. Swaziland, Tanzania. Zaire. Zambia. and
Zimbabwe isee table 4i. South .African GDP accounted
for three-fourths of the regional total in 1983. Zimba-
bwe was second. with a GDP less than one-tenth of
South .Africa's total, and only one-third as large on a
per capita basis. South .African GDP. moreover. to-
taled three and a half times the combined output or
the members of the Southern .African Development
Coordinating Conference. the regional trouping of
nine of South .Africa's neighbors-excluding Zaire-
that w?as designed to reduce their economic depend-
ence on South .Africa, and this gap will not narrow
significantly during the period of this Estimate.
51. Regional Economic Linkages. Business initia-
tives by South .African companies and public corpora-
tions and the attraction of job and marketing opportu-
nities in South .Africa have created a web of economic
ties between South .Africa and most southern .African
black states. While the regional economic ties are
beneficial to both South .Africa and its neighbors. the
vast difference in size and degree of self-sutficienc~
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Table 4
Selected Economic Comparisons of
Southern .African Countries
GDP 1983 GDP per Average Annual
iBi!lion CS Sl Capita. 1983 Real Growth in
(L'S Sl GDP. 1978-83
lPercent~
Other southern 26.6 290 0.6
Afrca
Total Trade, Employment in Populations 1983
198'3 (Billion '.Manufacturing (Million persons
US Si iThousand persons
+ Estimated.
s Data are for 1981.
= SADCC includes all of the listed countries except South Africa and
Zaire.
between the former's economy and the collective
economies of the others makes the ties much more
important to the smaller countries.
5=. Transvort Ties. .Al] of the southern .African
nations except Lesotho are linked by rail to eight ports
in South .Africa and \amibia. Lesotho. an enclave
within South .Africa. uses truck routes from South
.African ports. The five landlocked countries on the rail
system-Botswana. 14ala.vi. Swaziland. Zambia. and
Zimbabwe-and the Shaba Region of Zairap are forced
to rely mainly on South .African ports, because guerril-
la activity and poor maintenance on the rail links to
the .Angolan port of Lobito and to ~lozambique?s three
ports seriously reduce the capacity of these alternative
outlets. Zaire's port at Matadi. and Tanzania?s at Dar
es Salaam. which is connected to the common rail
system, could not handle more than their present
traffic without substantial upgrading of facilities.
3S. ~ontransvort Ties. The three maior nontran-
sport ties-trade. investment. and migrant labor-are
net earners of Foreign exchange for South .Africa. In
:980. South .Africa netted S1.S billion from these
relationships ;see table 3'i. South .Africa is the source of
about one-third of the regions imports. including
practically all of the imports of Botswana. Lesotho.
and Swaziland. although most of the neighboring states
have their largest export market overseas.
54. Remittances to the black states b. more than
?00.000 migrant workers in South .Africa totaled 5-100-
300 million in 198. Such remittances are maior
sources of foreign exchange for Botswana. Lesotho.
Malawi. ~4ozambique. and Swaziland. For South .Afri-
ca. access to foreign migrants provides a much larg-
er-and thus cheaper-pool of labor than would
otherwise be available. This is particularly important
to the mining sector. which relies on migrants for
slightly more than one-fourth of its black labor force.
,See table 6.1
5~. South .Africa is also the maior source of capital
investment in the region. taking in more from divi-
dends and profits on the operation of the branches and
subsidiaries of South .African companies in these
neighboring states than is returned in the corm of ne?
funding for capital investment.
~o. Botswana, Lesotho. and S~. aziland are the most
dependent: Botswana for investment and technical
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Table ~
South Africa: Trade with Selected
\eighboring States
1980 19&,
(Million L'S Si
/Million CS ~~ Share of
Partner-
Countr.
Trade
rPercent~
To southern
Africa C.v78 3?_
From southern
AFnca
Of which:
Angola
Estmated
= Data are for 1979
Data are for 1981
\ot a.?ailable.
and managerial inputs to mining ,one-fourth of GDP),
Lesotho for remittances from migrant labor three-
fourths of GDP`. and Swaziland for revenues from
tourism and for investment probably more than three-
fourths of GDP`. South Africa also provides an element
of grant aid to all three through the Southern .~frican
Customs Cnion SACt`. an organization created to
promote regional trade during the colonial period.
Table 6
South Africa: Origin of Foreign
Mine ~'~'orkers
Since 1980. mine workers have made uD about two-thirds of the
total number of migrant workers in South .Africa from the southern
African region. according to our estimates.
s Dashes indicate less than 5.000 workers.
c Estimated.
Allocations from SAC/;, including the grant aid. make
up more than half of the total government revenues of
Lesotho and Swaziland and about one-third of
Botswana's.
~ ~ . Mozambique's experience since independence
in 19.3 illustrates the importance of South Africa to
the smaller regional economies. Before independence.
fees from port and rail shipments. remittances from
migrant labor including a large element of grant aid;.
and tourist spending totaled a South African transfer
to Mozambique of more than 5200 million annually in
foreign exchange, roughly offsetting the latter~s chron-
ic overseas trade deficit. After independence. mutual
political distrust and a steep decline in the reliability
of Mozambican transportation facilities ; Eollo~~?ing the
19"5--6 departure of Portuguese technicians- induced
South Africa to reduce its trade shipments through
Maputo, cut hiring of migrant labor. and virtually end
tourist travel. The severing of these revenues was a
maior factor in ~4ozambique s subsequent disastrous
economic performance. Renewal of economic ties with
South Africa was thus one of the principal incentives
for Maputo to sign the \komati mutual securit~?
agreement in March 198-1.
38. The Zimbabwean economy is the most sensitive
in the region to swings in South African consumer
spending, as sales of manufactured goods in the rela-
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tively large South .African market account for more
than one-fourth of total Zimbabwean exports. This
linkage. and the similarity of South .African and
Zimbabwean mineral exports and weather patterns.
tend to result in tandem economic growth trends for
the two economies.
59. .Among the other states. Llalaw?i. Zaire. and
Zambia import South .African manufactured goods
and look to South .African companies for technical
expertise. investment capital. and entrepreneurial ini-
tiati~?es..Angola and Tanzania disclaim any significant
economic relations with South .Africa. but scattered
reporting indicates that South .African canned foods
and other processed goods appear from time to time
on their store shel~~es and on black markets. Angola
relies on DeBeers Corporation of South .Africa to
operate its diamond mines.
Prospects for the Regional Economies
60. .Average economic growth bs South Africa's
regional neighbors probable will rise marginally dur-
ing the last half of the 1980x. but it is unlikely to match
or exceed the expected ?.~- to 3.0-percent growth rate
in South .Africa. The entire region will suffer from the
impact of stagnant gold production in South .Africa.
decline in expansion of South .African demand for
migrant labor and imported commodities, and a re-
duced availabilit~? of South .African venture funds for
capital investment. Botswana. Lesotho. and Swaziland
will be hurt because the rate of growth of customs
revenues Hill fall as South .Africa cuts imports.
ol. .Although Zimbabwe and ~[ozambique can look
forward with fair confidence to improved growth.
these prospects are derived from the likely end of the
three-year drought rather than any surge in develop-
ment. ~[ozambique also may benefit to some extent
from the \komati Accord if the government can bring
the insurgency under control.
63. ~laia.vi and Swaziland have good prospects for
maintaining the 3.0- to 3.3-percent average annual
rates of growth that they generally have been able to
achieve since the mid-19 ~ Os. thanks to policies that
encourage economic relations with South .Africa and
take advantage of thetr limited agricultural potential.
\[aiaw?i and to a lesser degree! Swaziland 'nave been
grappling with transport problems caused by the
deterioration of Mozambican rails and ports. problems
that could ease over the next fe.v years as a result of
the \komati .Accord. Economic performance so tar
indicates that the austerity measures imposed as a
condition for debt relief will not significantly reduce
Malawi's growth rate.
63. Angola would benefit from an end to civil w?ar
or a surge in international oil prices. but prospects for
growth during the rest of the decade are uncertain.
64. Economic growth in Botswana and Lesotho
almost certainh will average sharph lower rates
through the rest of the 1980x. Their past high growth
has been the result mainl} of large investments b~
South Africa's DeBeers and Anglo-.American corpora-
tions in mining and-in Lesotho-of substantial wage
increases b. South .African mines to migrant workers.
\either can expect new mining investments. and both
will now suffer the consequences-through their
membership in SACt'-of Pretoria's gold-related eco-
nomic curbs.
65. Prospects for Increased Regional Ties. The
creation of SADCC in .April 1980 and of Pretoria s
counterorganization in September 198-the Southern
.African Development Bank ;SADBI. of which South
.Africa is the sole member so far-have resulted in no
significant changes in the economic ties between South
Africa and its regional neighbors. These tw?o organiza-
tions were established with conflicting coals. ?'hile
SADCC aims to reduce South .Africa's economic and
political regional leverage. SADB's goal is to strength-
en Pretoria's regional influence through increased
economic ties. SADCC is unlikeli to be successful
since its economic strength will reflect the limited
prospects for growth of its members.
66. .Although most of South Africa~s neighbors will
continue to spurn membership in SADB. attractive
financial incentives bi? Pretoria may induce one or
more of the smaller members of SACt~ to loin before
the end of the decade. Pretoria can offer incentives
without significantly adding to its bud?etary expendi-
tures. For example, according to press reports, tt is
planning to make available about 3300 million a ~ ear
in development money to SADB. almost as much as
Lesotho?s GDP. but onls? about 1.~ percent of Pre-
toria~s 320 billion annual budget.
6.. Most economic forces will tend to strengthen
South .African regional preeminence. Refurbishment
of Mozambique s rail and port system. for example. as
a result of the \komati .Accord and increased foreign
aid. could be the most dramatic regional economic
accomplishment during the period. Ironically. how-
ever. the renewed profitability of ~lozambique?s rails
and ports probably would depend on Pretona s ..ill
ingness to transfer to ~[aputo tonnage now? shipped
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through Durban from its mines in the Transvaal.
LL'hile this would enable Pretoria to reduce its own
shipping costs. it would make South Africa the maior
user of the port of Maputo b~ a large margin. thus
undermining SADCC?s maior goal of reducing its
dependence on South African transport.
South African Internal Politics
65. South Africa in the mid-1980s is undergoing
maior social and economic changes. which are begin-
ning to be reflected in the country's political institu-
tions. The government's success in coping with its
domestic problems will directly influence South Afri-
ca~s role as a regional power.
69. The ruling \ational Part~~ ~1P~ is an important
indicator of these societal changes. Its constituency has
become more urban. better educated. wealthier. and
mane of its members seem less resistant to change.
Those who have been less willing to consider netw ways
have been read out of the party. and other Afrikaner
cultural and social institutions are also becoming seri-
ously divided. Alternative institutions are also being
formed. The ~P has lost large numbers of the white
.working class to parties on its right. particularly to the
Conservative Party founded in 1982 by Andries Treur-
nicht. the former cabinet minister and leader of the
Transvaal \ P ~ the largest provincial party organiza-
tion s. On the other hand. the \'P is picking up strength
among the netw professional elites. including the En-
glish speakers. and in general the ~P in 198.1 appears
to occupy the center of the political debate.
"0. Botha over the last five years has been simulta-
neoush consolidating his own power base and prepar-
ing an agenda for drastic modification of South Afri-
can national institutions. These changes are primaril~?
designed to protect white, and primarily Afrikaner.
control of the political and economic systems. but also
to strengthen the executive branch of the government.
Ls the netw President. Botha is in a better position to
push through his political program. For the next Eew
tears. Botha can be expected to dominate the South
African political scene.
-1. Botha has already radicalh? revised the South
African decisionmaking system. reducing the authority
of the \ational Party and the Parliament while simul-
taneousl~~ enlarging the national security bureaucracy.
In the past Eive years. Botha and a coterie of advisers
rom the military. police. and inteiligence services. as
well as a few trusted cronies from the \ational Party,
have streamlined the government by reducing the
number of departments from 39 to'__' and the number
of Cabinet committees from 20 to four. The military
and civilian components of the South African intelli-
gence establishment have also been modernized in an
effort to make it a more effective tool of the President.
~?. The most important Cabinet committee. the
State Securit. Council ;SSC.. plays a key role in
coordinating police on national security. interpreting
its mandate broadly . SSC membership includes the
countr~?'s principal decisionmakers-the Ministers of
Defense. Foreign Affairs, Justice. and Lam and Order:
the senior Cabinet member: the commanding general
of the defense forces. the Commissioner of Police: the
director of the civilian intelligence service. and senior
civil servants. President Botha ser~~es as the chairman.
-3. Although military influence has increased un-
der Botha. the military does not dominate national
securit. decisionmaking. Political power remains firm-
ly in the hands of the President and a fetw senior
\ational Party associates.
-~. During the nest two to five years. as South
Africa institutionalizes limited constitutional reforms.
executive decisionmaking twill continue along the lines
that Botha has developed. The restructuring of the
white Parliament into a tricameral. multiracial legisla-
ture with Colored and Indian participations will
almost certainl~? lead to a further concentration of
power in the hands of the executive president. Botha
and his successors will continue to use the SSC as a
senior forum to coordinate security police. but politi-
cal power will remain firmly in the hands of the
Afrikaner elite.
The new South African Constitution teas approved b~
the white electorate in a referendum in November 19fi3
and became effective on 1 September 195-k. It provides
for athree-chamber Parliament, inciuding two nett
houses for the Colored and Indian population groups.
Elections for these two chambers were held in mid-
198d. Under the constitution. the office of the state
president teas expanded and strengthened. P. ?~ Botha.
formerly the Prime Minister, assumed this office. The
new Parliament met briefly in September for its first
session and will resume meeting in early 1985. Botha
has now named one Colored and one Indian parliamen-
tarian to his new Cabinet as ministers without portfolio.
The new Constitution does not provide for black partic-
ipation in the parliamentary system. but Botha has
appointed a Cabinet committee to study this problem.
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-5. Botha~s goal is simple-the continuation of
white control-but his plan for achieving it is com-
plex. In effect. he will attempt to co-opt as many
Coloreds and .Asians as possible, and blacks residing in
white areas. offering them limited political rights
along with the hope of greater economic and social
ad~?antages-better education and health facilities.
access to more skilled professions. and control over
their community affairs. Entrenched resistance among
conser~?ative whites to reform must be overcome in
order to realize even these goals. Botha began to warn
his countrymen in 1983 that thee must "adapt or die."
He himself seems committed to carrying out his
~ ersion of political and social reform.
-6. done of this alters the government's commit-
ment to continuing separation of the races..Apartheid.
as it now exists in South .Africa. consists of both grand
and petty apartheid. Pette apartheid-the network of
rules and reQUlations that serve to separate the races in
the use of certain public facilities-is alreade dying.
and Botha is prepared to eliminate as mane of the
humiliating aspects of separate development as possi-
ble. Some progress along these lines has alread}? been
made.
--. But grand apartheid is an overarching design.
enshrined in .Afrikaner thinking, that mandates the
physical separation of the races. It demands different
residential communities for each race and. eventually,
self-governing, independent homelands for as many
blacks as are not needed to perform economic func-
tions within white areas. Most blacks. under \~ational
Party doctrine. will become citizens of homelands and
thereby lose their citizenship rights in South .Africa.
-S The ?overnment has been forced. primarily by
economic circumstance. to make some adjustments in
apartheid policies over the years. While influx controls
have been strengthened. the legal rights of many
'oiacks to reside in "w~hite?' urban areas have been
confirmed b~ . for instance. the provision of 99-year
ieasehoid rights in certain black townships. \loreover.
the President and many of his advisers are probably
~~?illing to make some adjustment on issues such as the
laws governing marriage and immorality, if they
calculate it will not prove too politically damaging
with conservative .Afrikanerdom. But the relocation
and resettlement of black communities continues. even
as the new constitutional reform program moves
for.vard.
'9. Despite the 3overnment?s ambitious plans for
economic development of the homelands. they remain
economically um~iabie. Their primary sources of reve-
nue are and will be from subsidies be the South
.African Government and from wages of the unskilled
laborers employed be the commerce and industry of
white South .Africa. Political independence. therefore.
does not detract from the homelands' dependence on
the white economy.
80. South .African long-term political strategy seeks
to find a method b~ which the homelands could be
permanentle linked to a white republic through some
federal or confederal arrangement. President Botha
presumable would like to see the creation of such a
system during his term as executive president. How?e~ -
er. South .Africa will probable not be able to carr. out
its ultimate design for the homelands within the next
five years. and this scheme is essential for its ultimate
goal of the wider regional constellation of states.
81. But even while the government remains com-
mitted to confining as mane blacks as possible to the
homelands-and the next fe.v years will see a steade
continuation of resettlement and relocation-it must
also deal with those blacks w?ho cannot be assigned to
homeland residence. The country ?s continuing eco-
nomic development depends on black labor-and
increasingle skilled workers at that-taking the fobs
that a growing economy creates and that the small
white labor force cannot fill. The government has
reluctantly acknowledged this dependence. even
though this trend undercuts the rationale for separate
development. But the entre of blacks into the white
economy, and thus into "white" South Africa. means
that the~? will not be able to claim the political rights
of homeland citizens.
82. The crux of government approach to the urban
black problem is to build a skilled black work force
that will develop in a tightly controlled system. thus
driving a wedge between the poor. rural blacks of the
homelands and a rising urban middle class. The issue
of a national role for blacks has not het been thrashed
out. and probabh~ will not be be the end of the decade.
Government officials. however. have recognized the
permanent presence of blacks in white areas and have
even publicly hinted at a South .African citizenship for
them. The logic of the reform process that Botha has
begun would seem to lead eventually to the inclusion
of some blacks in the parliamentary system-most
likely in the form of a separate chamber similar to
those now occupied by Coloreds and [ndians. ~iove-
ment toward incorporation of some blacks into the
parliamentary system will depend in part on the
viability of the current tncamerai arrangement in the
next 'rive ~ ears. and the extent to ~~ hich Coloreds and
Indians press for this change.
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S3. Ho~~~ will blacks respond to these government
plans for them? The influence of black groups within
and without the countr~? is limited in its abilit~? to
affect government policies. but it cannot be entirel~?
discounted. Black interest groups are divided along
ideological. ethnic. and even generational lines. \\'hites
can and often do play one off against another. A key
dividing factor concerns the role of whites in the
struggle for nonwhite rights. The banned African
\ational Congress. founded in 191?, is a multiracial
organization that encourages white participation in its
antiapartheid activities. Although man}' leading offi-
cials of the A'~C are members of the exiled South
African Communist Parh. the .?\\C officially does not
espouse any single ideology .Apolitical charter adopt-
ed by the .~\C in 1953 is mildly socialist, and
em?isions the eventual establishment of a government
in which all racial groups in South .Africa are repre?
sented. Historically. the Pan-Africanist Congress. an
A\C-offshoot. was the primary advocate of an alter-
native view that ruled out any white role in antigov-
ernment protests. In the black politics of the mid-
1950s. the traditional division is represented by the
Lnited Democratic Front iL'DF?. an alliance of several
hundred groups from all races. and the \ational
Forum Conference. an alliance of black groups that
are dedicated to "black consciousness'' concepts that
~~?ere a driving force behind the 19 ~ 6 unrest that
began in Soweto.
8~. The AvC is the most popular black organiza-
tion according to various polls but has been in exile for
over 20 years. Its interlocking ties with the outlawed
South .African Communist Party' and its dependence
on Soviet Bloc military aid have produced further
tensions within the organization. Furthermore, as
South .Africa forces the neighboring black states to
curtail .A\C activities on their territories. its guerrilla
capabilities will be weakened. The .ABC is now faced
with the need to strengthen its internal political base.
or perhaps risk the loss of credibility as the one black
force that can threaten white supremacy. The ABC
probably has a rudimentar~? in-country political appa-
ratus. but needs to do much more to build political
appeal to blacks of al] classes and ethnic backgrounds.
S3. .As the .A \ C moves toward an internal option. it
could come into conflict with black groups already
.~ ithin the country, who also oppose the government.
\onetheless, there will be other pressures that ma1?
unifi? black groups as they press to win concessions
rom the state. The A \ C has some '_.000 to x.000
trained guerrillas in various countries throughout
southern .Africa. especially .Angola. There are hun-
dreds of members in exile who hold positions in the
group's political wing. The .~\C's internal member-
ship cannot be estimated. \'irtualh all of the A\Cs
military support comes from the Soviet Bloc, while
most of its nonmilitary funding comes from Scandana-
vian states. the Organization of African t~nih (OAL'i,
and the Lnited \ations. The AtiC also maintains
numerous large camps in southern .Africa for South
African refugees.
86. In recognition of this. South African security
forces will continue and intensify. if necessary. their
efforts to liquidate the A\C both at home and abroad.
But systematic repression, particularh as there will be
a spillover to other elements of the black community.
ma~? further alienate the very blacks the ?overnment
hopes to co-opt. Therefore. despite the apparent diplo-
matic and military success of South .African efforts to
neutralize the .~\C. it is still a potential rallying force.
and it retains strong support both at home and abroad.
8". Another major sector of black society is orga-
nized on particularistic ethnic lines. principall.
through the Zulu-based Inkatha movement of Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi. Inkatha has tried to expand its
claimed 1-million membership by recruiting in black
townships. where many different ethnic groups may
reside. Inkatha?s successes in such expansion have been
small. because mane blacks fear Zulu dominance and
consider Buthelezi. the Chief Minister of the I:~.?azulu
homeland, a government collaborator. \evertheless.
Inkatha does wield considerable influence.
88. Beyond these broad. multipurpose groups are
many others with narrower interests. which may or
may not have ties to the major political ?roups..Among
these are such groups as black labor unions. profession-
al associations. and student groups. The black labor
unions are of great importance in the Botha strategy
for co-opting a skilled black labor force. Thee have
grown rapidh in membership since they were legal-
ized in 19 ~ 9 and now total about 600.000 members.
But the entire black work force is much larcer and
thus the potential of these unions is much greater. even
if rural workers continue to be excluded. Security
forces in South .Africa closeh monitor union activity.
Those that are alleged to have hes to the .~\C or other
liberation groups must be extremely cautious if they
are not to provoke strong control measures on their
activities. ~onetheiess. such careful government moni-
toring suggests official concern about their political
potential.
S9. Black politics are likely to be turbulent for the
rest of the decade because of ?overnment inability or
unwillingness to meet black demands. Government
plans for a political dispensation are still in the ~ en
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early stages, and in ans case fall far short of black
expectations. In addition. the government u-ill proba-
ble be stalled in its plans for economic co-option. The
South African economy is in recession and its gro~~th
potential limited. These facts could work on blacks in
two wal?s: those who have gained some economic
advantages b~ participating in the system may, in a
time of general retrenchment, be resigned simply to
protecting these gains. But the vast maiority of blacks
have little to protect and will be more inclined to
challenge the government openly -perhaps even vio-
lentl~ . In particular. black students u?il] continue to be
in the forefront of nonwhite confrontations with the
government. Students have mounted the most visible
and ~?ioient protests. Therefore. even if the economy
improves. the government ma~? still face serious black
dissatisfaction. Rising expectations create ferment: if
they are inadequately satisfied. violence could again
ensue.
90. Botha~s policy of economic co-option. to create
a quiescent black middle class that will settle for
iimited political rights. is thus inherently flawed. and
probably will give way to further coercion. The
government will adopt more sophisticated methods of
control-the recent decline in the number of ban-
nings. for instance, suggests its intention to adopt less
overtly repressive measures, and it is unlikely that a
resurgence of black deaths in detention will occur.
Such measures may defuse external criticism but they
also indicate that the regime is firml~? in control. Black
dissatisfaction during this decade will not be suffi-
ciently articulated to bring about black participation
in national political institutions.
91. These are the internal political dynamics that
will characterize the remainder of Botha s tenure as
South Africa s chief executive. How long that will be is
uncertain. The life of the present "white" Parliament
expires in 1986. and Botha could choose to hold
elections for all three chambers at that time. .fin
alternative would be to extend the life of the present
~~ bite chamber until 1989. Botha could leave office
earlier. if political or personal motives were compel-
ling. But he would be unwilling to do so until he could
be certain his successor would be supportive of the
policies he has introduced. Probable contenders that
can be identified all have some liabilities.
9??. \or does it seem likely that Botha will be forced
from the office of president which he assumed in
September 198-1. .~frikaners would be reluctant to
engage in such proceedings. probably moving against
Botha only if he were seriously physically disabled,
suffered a series of major foreign policy reverses. or
ran into serious domestic political problems. \one of
these seem likely before 1989. South .~frica has not
had a scheduled transfer of power for nearly ?5) ears.
The previous two changes of prime ministers have
occurred in crisis situations. one an assassination and
the other a resignation under fire due to a maior
government scandal. Therefore. the ~P may not be
anxious to face a leadership change during a period of
political transition.
93. \onetheless. this prognosis should not be read as
implying that the South .~frican power establishment
??i11 not face maior problems for the rest of the decade.
The political and economic trends of the late 19-0s
and 1980s ultimately work to the disad~?antage of its
white minority rulers. The departure of the right wing
from the \ational Party has probably meant an
irreparable split in Afrikanerdom.
94. Botha came into office with a reputation as a
hardliner on racial questions. However. as a Cape
Province politician. he immediateh propounded a
"reform" agenda. focused on providing limited politi-
cal rights to the Coloreds. He has systematically
consolidated his power over the last five years. dismiss-
ing from the party and government those ~?ho he
thought might challenge his control. while winning
allies from nongovernment elites-business and bank-
ing communities, universities. and the press. many of
whom are English speakers. The ~?hite political parties
to the left no~? seem in disarray and his onl~? potential
political threat lies to the right: but even this. given the
ne~~ political balances. is probable manageable. as
party and Parliament diminish in influence under the
Botha constitution.
90. Botha then would seem well placed to imple-
ment nis policies during the remainder of his term in
office: that is. during the period of this Estimate. The
problem appears to be one of direction rather than
control: perhaps even Botha does not nave a iinai
agenda but intends only to deal with each ne? racial
challenge on an ad hoc basis. But South .~frican blacks
are unlikely to defer their demands on the system until
the present or a successor regime demonstrates its
willingness to negotiate with them. Black expectations
will be supported by friends and supporters abroad.
Botha?s new political system has not worked to resolve
the crucial issue in South .~frican domestic poiitics-
that of equal rights for blacks. For the period of this
Estimate. black discontent will continue to fester. with
occasional ~?iolent outbursts. and 'nave resonance be-
yond South .~frica s borders. South .~frican regional
policy, therefore. will ultimately be hostage to South
.~frican unwillingness to govern equitably at home.
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Outlook and Implications
96. The regional intentions of the South African
Government are not likely to change during the period
of this Estimate. The government will continue to
pursue a strategy of neutralizing any potential threat
to South African security from the neighboring black-
ruled states. It is possible that Pretoria will face
situations in the remaining years of the decade that
could weaken its ability to proiect power throughout
the region in order to protect its national security .
Factors that would lead to a decline in South African
hegemony and a return to regional tensions reminis-
cent of the late 19 ~ Os include:
- Unexpected improvement in the economies of
the neighboring black African states.
- Reduction in the sociopolitical divisions within
these states.
- The rise of new-. more intransigent black leaders
in the neighboring countries.
- A victory b~ the right wing in South Africa that
negates President Botha's policies.
- ~taior increases in military assistance. in men or
arms. from the Communists that redress the
military weaknesses of the neighboring black
states.
- The grow-th of serious internal black unrest in
South Africa that diverts military personnel and
resources to internal securit~~ functions and
weakens the militar5?'s capabilities to wage ag-
gressive external operations.
It is unlikely that an~? one or combination of the above
~.?ill develop to the point that South Africa will be
unable co cam out effectivels? its current regional
policies. The chances of a dramatic improvement in
the economies of the black .~frican states in the time
frame of this Estimate are remote at best. Indeed, the
probable stagnation or decline of these economies will
add to the endemic tribal and ideological rivalries that
weaken the political cohesion of the neighboring
states. The possible appearance in the next five years
of new?. more intransigent black leaders would be
offset by the persistent internal political and social
disarray and the economic imperatives of getting
siong in some fashion with South .~frica. Even a
~lctory of the right wing in South Africa. a remote
prospect. would not greatly affect the regional policies.
though it would introduce a harsher tone to the
relationships. Increases in military assistance b~ the
Communists might stiffen the resistance of black
African leaders to South African demands. but unless
sizable Communist combat forces were to arrive-a
most unlikely development-South African hegemom
would not be threatened. \ew. serious black unrest
within South :~frica is. indeed. a likely prospect and
might divert military personnel and resources from
regional duties. but we fudge that the will and capabil-
ities of the South African security forces will be
sufficient to contain the internal unrest and maintain
the regional policies. Pretoria will. therefore. be able
to maintain its effort of imposing a Pax Pretoriana
upon its weaker neighbors.
9.. Throughout the 1980s South Africa is almost
certain to remain the dominant military power in the
region and will also dominate the regional economy b~
'virtue of its far greater wealth. technological superior-
it~ . and control over the main transportation links
between the black-ruled states and the outside world.
The combination of military superiority and economic
incentives will be a strong inducement to the black-
ruled states to live with the terms set b~ South Africa.
98. nonetheless. the implementation and preserva-
tion of South -Africa's polic~? of regional dominance are
not likel}? to be as easy as the initial arrangements with
Swaziland and Llozambique have suggested. If South
Africa proves to be a generous partner in trade. aid.
and development, external concern about South Afri-
can hegemons? could be defused. Pretoria may also
gain at least indirect diplomatic recognition from
more black governments. although it is highls unlikely
an~? others will establish formal diplomatic ties.' But if
the black states waver in the security commitments
they have made to Pretoria. South .~frica will be
prepared to punish them through preemptive military
or covert ;destabilizationi action or by squeezing them
economically. ~1uch will depend on how South .~frica
fulfills the commitments it now seems ready to
undertake.
99. The black states are unlikely to become suffi-
ciently strong, either in military, economic. or political
terms. to challenge South Africa. Therefore. Eearin?
renewed South African destabilization efforts. they
will be unlikely to abrogate unilaterally their security
agreements with Pretoria. The weakness of organiza-
tions such as the SADCC. even if much ~ extern and
international assistance is funneled to them. means
they will provide much less direct benefit to most
~taiawt is the only biaci: state to maintain diplomatic reianons
with South AEnca.
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southern African states than would direct cooperation
with Pretoria.
100. `lost southern African states have client rela-
tionships with one or more ~~-extern or East European
powers. Black states seeking to avoid South African
dominance will no doubt appeal to former rulers and
current patrons. Such appeals are unlikely to succeed.
~t~estern trade with. aid to. and investment in southern
Africa may increase but not to the extent that western
influence will displace South African economic domi-
nation of the countries that are on its borders.
101. Also. although Moscow- is clearly concerned
about recent trends in southern Africa which it be-
lieves are not advantageous to its interests in the
region. it has not translated this concern into increased
offers of economic assistance and there are no indica-
tions it intends to do so. The Soviets will continue
cooperation in the military sector with those countries
where there are ongoing programs. even though the
resources of the Soviet L'nion and its East European
and Cuban allies are limited. and southern Africa is
not now- given a high priorit~~ in the list of maior
foreign police concerns.
10?. Establishment of the constellation of states .will
depend on South Africa's ability to convince those
associated with it that it is in their interest to do so.
South .~frica does not seem to have a coherent plan for
implementing its policy obiectives. At present. South
.~frica's regional design runs counter to black Africa's
hopes to distance itself from Pretoria. The economic
and political benefits to the states now linked with the
South African sphere of security agreements are un-
likely to be sufficient to match the diplomatic pres-
sures and internal opposition they are likely to pro-
~ oke. Pressures from the rest of Africa on the southern
states to avoid closer identification with South Africa
will be strong, reinforcing the natural inclination of
Mack leaders to retain their personal and political
inoependence to the extent possible. They will resist
South .~frican efforts to dictate their internal and
foreign police priorities.
Implications
For Black .~'rica
103. Black .~frica now- faces a situation in southern
Africa where South African strategic dominance seems
assured. If most .~frican leaders understand the neces-
sih for South .~frica~s black neighbors to capitulate to
Preroria s demands. they tear the political and eco-
nomic consequences of the new regional order. Black
Africa has already been compelled to reassess the
position of the southern African liberation movements.
SV~'APO is being counseled by some states on South
Africa's border to negotiate with Pretoria. A\C activi-
ties in neighboring states are being systematically
restricted b~ host governments. and the rest of black
Africa is unable to come to the direct assistance of the
A\C. Although black states may obiect strenuoush to
the weakening of the A\C~s military wing. they are
unable to compel states bordering South Africa to host
ANC insurgents and run the risk of future preemptive
South African military actions. Economically. long-
standing plans to reorient the transportation and com-
munications network away from the Republic have
not gotten off the ground. thus inflicting a serious
setback on African plans for regional development.
For the time being, black Africa seems po..~erless to
challenge Pretoria~s hegemony .
10.1. In the meantime. black Africa remains com-
mitted to the goals for southern Africa that it has
consistently endorsed in the OAt'. the \onaligned
Movement. the United \ations. and other internation-
al forums to which it has access. Africans demand
independence for \amibia as the final step in eradi-
cating the last vestige of colonialism from the African
continent and insist on the removal of the apartheid
system in South Africa and the eventual installation of
maiority rule. They support the two liberation move-
ments in their efforts to bring about these changes.
105. Black Africa places a high premium on main-
taining cohesion on maior African issues. On southern
African issues. the rest of the continent defers to the
Frontline States-Tanzania. Zambia. Zimbabwe. Bo-
tsw`?ana. Angola, and ~4ozambique-in setting the poli-
cies. The Frontline has been basicalh supportive of
the L'S-led initiative to bring \amibia to independ-
ence under the auspices of t-\ Resolution -135. but
dubious about the ability of the t-S police of construc-
tive engagement to bring about fundamental change
in South African domestic police. Black .~frica is
unhappy with the slow' pace of the \amibian neuotia-
tions and critical of moves to link \amibian independ-
ence to Cuban troop withdrawal Erom .~ngola.
106. Recent developments in southern .~frica do
not change black Africa's positions on these issues. but
as the Africans realize their inability to deal with
South .~frica themselves. they will seek. perhaps more
intensely than they have in the past. external assistance
in tn?ing to realize their obiectives. Black .~frican
dependence and weakness has been highlighted by the
emerging configuration in the southern part of the
continent.
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10.. The Soviets view recent developments in the
region with concern. Moscow is clearh apprehensive
that South Africa~s recent agreements with .Angola and
Mozambique could weaken the Soviet position in these
key states and undermine its efforts to support
S~t'APO and the A\C. but it has not condemned the
accords publicle. The Soviets are particularly dis-
turbed b~ the .Angolan and yfozambican decisions not
to seek or accept Soviet advice. despite their estab-
lished position as both countries' principal arms suppli-
er. Moscow has not written off either regime. however.
and will tre to limit the damage to its regional interests
b~ assuring that the bilateral securite accords do not
lead to a broader accommodation with South Africa.
105. The issue of Cuban troop withdrawal will be
one litmus test. Both Havana and Moscow would
consider such a request b~ the ~(PL.A government a
direct blow to their prestige and influence. But thee
mae believe that they can count on South African
intransigence on \amibia and the growing effective-
ness of the t'\ ITA insurgence to deflect this threat.
Moreover. to the extent closer cooperation with South
.Africa offers some respite From militarS pressures.
allowing both Luanda and Liaputo to concentrate on
their desperate economic crises. Moscow may even
find aspects of the new relationship acceptable. The
Soviets are unlikeh? to sit be and watch their influence
erode. Moscow will continue to work behind the
scenes to sustain black .African suspicions of South
.African-and t'S-intentions. The success of these
efforts could depend on how able the South .African
leadership exploits the opening that its policies of
"thump and talk" have provided for it.
109. In the interim. the Soviets will tr}? to channel
additional assistance to SAA?.APO and the .ABC when
possibie. Thee will tre to reinforce black .African
anhpathe toward Pretoria be publicizing the various
aspects of South .African apartheid policies whenever
possible. Thee will espioit opportunities such as the
willingness of Jonathan in Lesotho to permit an in-
creased Soviet presence despite the dangers posed to
Lesotho be the South .African reaction to this i. Thee
will continue to press for a L'\ solution on \amibia.
and will tre to hold the United States to account if that
process is long delayed. There are no indications that
the Soviets believe they have lost the game.
1 i0. The t"nited States' record of protracted and
ntense dipiomace on southern .African issues over the
last several ~ ears has placed it in an exposed position.
~i'ashington is viewed as having a high degree of
diplomatic credibilih with black states and South
.Africa, and as a result is seen as the onle possible
mediator with Pretoria. Thus. the i:nited States risks
being seen as acquiescing in the South .African-de-
signed system for the region. This close identification
will work in the LS interest onle insofar as this system
provides positive benefits to the regional states.
111. But the new arrangements are inherentle frag-
ile. and could easih be disrupted b~ any number of
factors. Thus. for instance. if the RE\A`lO and
t"VITA insurgencies persist. weak regional govern-
ments will blame continued South .African support.
and the L-nited States will be held to account for not
forcing the South .Africans to cease their assistance.
Continued economic decline in the area-whether
caused be natural or political disaster-will similarie
provoke a call for t'S help. But while L~S involvement
in southern .African matters will continue. t-S ability to
influence regional developments. which now? rests on
its acceptability as a mediator to all parties. may
decline. t"S ability to influence South .Africa is far less
than most black .African leaders believe it is. The
South .African leadership is determined to exploit to
the fullest its potential as the dominant militar} and
economic power in the region. A~ hile Pretoria will be
willing to cooperate with the t'nited States in areas of
common interest. particularly with regard to the Sovi-
et and Cuban presence in the area. it would not
welcome L'S involvement in internal matters..As South
.Africa perceives itself stronger. it will become less
vulnerable to external pressure. Thus. t'S influence in
both the Republic and black .Africa mae suffer.
11?. The establishment in the short term of an
imposed South .African regionai order mae introduce a
semblance of peace to the southern African region.
But Pretoria~s obiective of 'oecoming the center of a
regional grouping around which buck satellites ?ill
revolve introduces a new political and economic di-
mension. The black states will have less flexibility to
determine their ow,n policies. Their relations with non-
.African powers will be constrained be the need to
accommodate South .African interests.
113. The cement that is to hold the communih
together-an intricate network of economic links-
will demand large financial inputs. But South .Africa s
resources are limited. and it cannot respond adequate-
ie to the development needs of the black states. South
.Africa has already raised the question of ~;'estern
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assistance to Mozambique and to an independent
\amibia; it will try to persuade the Lnited States and
~~'estern Europe of the benefits to be derived from
participating in the ne~~ southern African institutions
it seeks to develop. Such involvement would. however.
tie the A~'est overtly and directly to South .African
regional policies. Moreover, the envisaged new region-
al arrangements are inherently fragile. If black expec-
tations are not fulfilled on both economic and security
grounds. black leadership is likely to blame the West.
as ~~~ell as South .Africa. If black leaders are seen by~
opponents within the various ruling circles as being
subservient to Pretoria, their prestige and legitimacy
mas~ be called into question. In these conditions. even
a considerable improvement in economic conditions
might not be sufficient to deter challenges to estab-
lished authority b~~ elements driven to assert black
independence from South .African domination. The
prospects for peace and stability in the area thus could
eventually be undermined. To the extent the ~~~est is
perceived as an ally and supporter of South .Africa. its
prestige in black .Africa will suffer.
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