THE NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A056900170001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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., .
'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains irifrmation affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.O: Secs. 793 and 194, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
s_F_C_R_E_T
SUBJECT The North Korean Air Force
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE
REPORT
DATE DISTR. /November 1960
NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES RD
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44
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at Defense Miaistr7 labor Party meting, a reso ut on was adopted and
later forwarded to all North Korean Air Force Units wider the name of KIM
Kvang Hyop (Minister of Defense) North Korean Armed Forces to be
completely pre d for combat This information was
trans+uitte to the Armed Forces by the North Korean Army newspaper. 50X
detailed study began in all North Korean Air Force units on '
attack and destroy atomic gun, and missile sites were also studied, however
locations of these sites in South Korea were not mentioned. the '50X
North Korean Air Force underwent air maneuver with aircraft from all
ivisiAns
and regiments participating. Object of the maneuvers was to block imaginary
bombers entering North Korea under he fighter plane protection, and training
on how to attack sea going vsssels. ommand of the Civil Aviation 50X
Bureau was turned over to the North orean Air orce an that the government
could maintain a closer control. Pilots and ground maintenance personnel
discharged from the North Korean Air Force in early 1960 have been recalled to
active duty and placed on duty with the Civil Aviation Bureau for servicing
and flying the five civilian aircraft assigned to the Civil Aviation Bureau
A1]. schedules previously serviced were ' cancelled -since the North Korean Air
Force has taken command, only scheduled flights still exi.etin 50X
is the Pyongyang to Chita (Russia): Pilots in flight training after two
flights in the YAK-18 are then given training in the MIG-17.
r%f FEB 58 1 1 GCi WHICH MAY BE USED.
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS
FORM MAY BE USED.
SEc?LAr 7-
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AA weapons were brought into North Korea from
Russia.
?AK-18, 0-47, others unknown. The 57 Regiment, 3rd Division received HIG-17
early 1960. (Number unknown). All North Korea Air Force stationed in
Manchuria were waved back into North Korea in mid-1959, including the Air
Academy in Yenchi. New propaganda line is for the North Korean people to
prepare themselves to support the South Korean people. Everybody should
produce more commodities which will be needed for support of the South Korean
people. KITS, I1 Song proposed to shorten the five year Economic Plan to a 5
0X
three year period and during this period produce more consumption conanoditiee.
The
regiment is
conposea - s an a. 16 aircraft from Wonsan airfield are kept
on alert status from sunrise to sunset each day. 8 of the alert aircraft bel
to the 26 Regiment and 8 belong to the 56 Regiment. They are relieved from
alert status during the night hours by the 58 Regiment at Sondok airfield.
Preparations to take over the alert are made during a one hour period prior to
sunrise. Switch in the units responsible for maintaining the alert is coordi-
nated by the 2nd Division cou4and post at Sondok airfield. Coordination is
accomplished by phone. An auxiliary command post is located at Wonsan. All of
the above mentioned aircraft mast be airborne within ten minutes of the time
that the alert is sounded. Four of the aircraft must be airborne within two
minutes. Two of the four aircraft must be airborne and at a 25 meter altitude
within one minute and 25 seconds. Pilots selected for alert duty are notified
one day in advance by regimental administration. Pilots did not take their
aircraft off until they were notified to do no. Unless they receive in-
structions they sat at read until instructed to 'take off or the alert was
cancelled. The duty officer notified other command posts in North Korea about
the flight plan of aircraft scheduled to fly. Aircraft are also under radar
surveillance.
5
n an 5
0)(
0X
or Is sounds pre-set frequency channel lifiers are ft.
pilots select re-designated channels.
A team from the North Korea Defense Ministry went to Wonsan
airfield or a one month period It was headed by a Lt General
KIM, Bong Yol (Deputy Defense Minister) and consisted of Arn;y and Air Force
representatives (Air Force representative was Lt Colonel PANG Chae Song).
Purpose of the visit was to is ct and instruct Ibnsan personnel (In:
a combat readiness test). Any discrepancies
noted by the team were immediately corrected.
The North Korea Air Force
v on roman s s are opera approximately 15 personnel who are
headed by a captain. These personnel are from the Division Communication
5
Battalion. command posts were subordinate to radar units.
0X
r~ AF FORM 112-PART II. JUN 48.
FEB 58 a WHICH MAY BE USED.
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS
FORM MAY BE USED.
1-HUM
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Wonsazf Airfield has facilities for overhauling aircraft an the 100 hour
inspection level. Major overhauling is accomplished at Sinuiju. North Koren
Air Force Fighter Divisions consists of two or three regiments each and are
dispersed over two or three airfields. Type of aircraft and number ofteach
in the North Koren Air Forces MM-15 - eight or nine; P110-15-BI.B - 180 to
207; KM-17 - five - BIB-LIMA ? 12; 1410-15 - 20; MIG-17 - 198 to 225; Item
LIMA - 28 - forty; item LIM - 28 - LIMA - 9; AN-2 - 7 or 8; YAK-18 - number
unknown; YAK-12 - 4; Item LIMA - 14 - 1; LIMA ITEM - 2 - 6. The 60 North 50X
Korean Air Force Regiment is to receive 1410-19 in place of MIG-17 that th
now have. Pilots of the r iment have Ledo sarooa study.
North Korean Air Force morale was
=:
good. the ority of the North Korean Air Force pilots were pro-
E
communist. the North Korean peoples relations with the Chinese
Cbmmunists and Soviets was friendly. Soviet personnel who
were assigned to the North Korean Air Force U. arters as P gineering and 50X
Aviation Advisors
They were civilian clothes
but wore military.
coordinates unknowq , Puicahang coordinates
unknown), Qhcngjin coo tes unknown), Unggi (coordinates unknown) and an
unknown place along the nest coast of Korth Korea. Radars are of two types,
the PAPA-20 and the PAPA-8. The PAPA-20's are at Kalna Pando, Sondok, 50X1
Chuam-sun and at the aforementioned unknown place along the West coast of
AF
I OCTM52 112a
REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11. 1 JUN p,
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
North Korea. The PAPA-20'a have a maximum range of approximately 400 kilo-
meters with an area of coverage extending between 500 meters and 15,000 meters
Area of coverage can be brought dorm to ground level if the reflector angle
of elevation is lowered. The PAPA-8's are located at the remaining areas
mentioned above. They have a maximum range of approximately 150 kilometers
to 200 kilometers with coverage extending from ground level up to an unknown
height. both radar types were used in conjunction with 50X1
each other during QCI activities with the PAPA-8 type transmitting its data 50X1
to one of the PAPA-20'6. Ia turn all radarxal data either to the PAPA-20
at Chuamr-ean or the PAPA-20 at Sondok. both type radars
could perform EW or QCI functions. The PAPA-8 radar at Wonsan airfield is
used only during periods of long range navigation training (if the aircraft
goes out of the PAPA-8 range it is picked up by the PAPA-20). During periods
of minor flying activities the PAPA-20 type radars at Kalma Pando and Sondok
alternate shutting down for several hours at a time but during periods of
heavy flying activity they both stay in continuous operation. Sondok, Lalma
Pando and Wonsan airfield radars are checked overhauled and repaired each
April and November of the year the time at whicb50X1
all other North Korean radars received this service.
an IL-28-L
aircraft had electronic equipment w ch could black out
radar returns thus concealing their sition from radar and automatic AAA. 50X1
all bombers had such electronic equip-
ment. IL-28 pilots are the most experienced pilots the North Korean Air Forcel
has. At the critique of the above maneuvers the crew of an IL-28- was 50X1-
criticised for using their electronic eclu i t on a radar site location
unknown). the officer on duty at the
radar site could DU&JAR a button but he
became confused. An electronic
equipment manufacturing factory is located at Tae= (coordinates unknown).
It produces four tube radios for the civilian market, electric light bulbs
electronic testing eq sent used b 50X1
and transformers.
Fig
the North Korean Air Force was mantured in the U.S.S.R.
air-
borne equipments Navigational aids -'(1 Each aircraft had two compasses,
one was an automatic radio compass and the other was either the KU-11 model
compass or a DTHK-5 model compass, (2) radio, (5) altimeter (4) speedometer,
(5) a watch (6) one; 500,000 sap which de icted lakes and an up-to-date
layout of North Korea railroad tracks, (7 a plastic triangular ruler with
a compass at the center and a centimeter scale along the sides for measuring
short map distances, (8) a slide rule, and (9) a measuring device for
measuring long map distancest Fire control - the MIG-17-PF has a radar
sighting mechanism that picks up aircraft at a five or six kilometer distance.
The pilot sights in on an aircraft by looking into a radar scope and manuever-
ing so that he places the radar image of the aircraft on the scope's cross
hairs. These aircraft are directed to their targets by the Air Control
Center and remain under the control center's direction until they are within
500 meters of their target. Air Control Center informs the pilot when to
fire his guns; Blind bombing - IL-28's are equipped with radar to perform
blind bombing missions. They have simulated and live bombing practice at a
coordinates unknown 50X1
all MID'-171,9 an an
unknown number o MIG-15-BISAMS had tail warn radar. The detecting
apparatus was the size of a small microphone and was located below the tail
light on the vertical stabilizer at a point ten to fifteen centimeters bell oxi -
AF
50X1-HUM
(SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956- 0-387562 I@--8M470-1
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the horizontal stabilizer. It has a four to five kilometer range. Pilot
to notified of a pursuing aircraft's presence by a squeal noise that 50X
between the aircraft closes.
the apparatus works
on the r c le of induct electrical waves whenever an aircraft is near
Switch on the
left hand side of the cockpit activates the apparatus. 7. Type of aircraft
and the number of each in the North Korean Air Force: MIG-15 - one battalion
of eight or nine aircraft. This battalion is subordinate to the five division
North Korean Air Force. These aircraft are powered by the RUD-45 engine.
MIG-15-BISON - 180 to 207. Based on 55 or 56 being assigned to the North
Korean Air Force Air Academy and 6 regiments of three battalions each being
equipped with theme each battalion had from 8 to 9 50X1
aircraft ass ned to it.
s e aircraft is powered
Thi-typ
by the VK-lA engine. MIG-I5-BISON-LIMA - estimated total of 12 aircraft.
Al]. assigned to one battalion. U MIG-15 total 20. Four are assigned to each
division (four divisions in the North Korean Air Force) and four assigned to
the Air Academy. This aircraft is a two seat trainer. MIG-17 - 198 to 225
total. Based on 6 regiments with an estimated average of 33 to 35 aircraft
each 28 - 25 to 40 aircraft to . One c an of this
in . IL- estimated tal
type aircraft has a TO&E strength of 5 aircraft. IL-28-L - 50X'
the North Korean Air Force had 8 or 9 of this type aircraft. AN-2 - 7 or 8.
YAK-18 - number unknown. YAK-4. IL-14-1. IL-2-6. Specifically the North
Korean Air Force has thirty five to forty bombers and 15 all weather aircraft.
The bombers are the above mentioned IL-28's and are assigned to Uiju airfield;
the all weather aircraft are MIG-17PF's and are assigned 5 each to the 58
Regiment at Sondok airfield, the 59 Regiment at Sunchon Airfield and the
61 Regiment at Hwangju Airfield. No aircraft in North Korea newer than the
FRESCO and BEAGLE. 9. the North Korean Air Force 64 50X1
Regiment is to receive MIG-19 to replace the MID-17 that they have at present.
pilots had already completed class room study of the MIG-19.
the North Korean peoples relations
with the Chinese Communists and Soviets was friendly.
A photo reconnaissance regiment is located at Sunan Airfield. The Regiment
of MIG-15 and IL-28's.
17. the North Korean Air Force morale was gao on o e,
being at its highest among the pilots and being lowest among the enlisted
men. Pay was considered good by the pilots and engineers but not too good
by the enlisted personnel. Food was considered to be good by the engineers
and pilots who received five hundred grams of rice for less than one North
Korean won but it was considered poor by ground personnel who received only
three hundred grams for less than one North Korean won. Ground personnel
with dependents experienced difficulty in getting along on the food ration.
Personnel were not satisfied with the length of time they were permitted 50X1
leisure activities. For enlisted personnel leisure time amounted to 30
minutes a da
a .
the majority of the North
Korean Air Force pilots were pro-communist. 18.
the
1
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AF FORM 1 1 2a REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11.1 JUN 48. CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
I OCT 52 I 1 WHICH MAY BE USED. _ e4r
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CL ?C~q T
cussirN:A-nm (SECURITY INFORMATION when A1I.A :..
majority of the North Korean people disliked the U.S. ike
was the result of 15 years of constant indoctrination. 19. the
NKPL issued a bulletin concerning peaceful re-unification of Korea. The
Bulletin was published through all news media. The bulletin said that an
effort must be made to unite the fatherland as soon as possible. It said
North Korea had attempted to send representatives to South Korea for discussion
but the South Korean government would not permit them in. The bulletin said
that all U.S. troops must leave South Korea and that then representatives from
North Korea and South Korea would then met in either Pyongyang or Seoul and
discuss means by which the cabinets of both sides could be combined. The
bulletin said that was to be the first step in the unification. After the
combination of cabinets the second step would be to have a free interchange of
propaganda from both sides. Subsequent to the second step the bulletin said
a Korea wide free election would be held. The bulletin said that the free
interchange of propaganda would result in everyone learning the truth and
electing the North Korean sponsored government.
CP'a) are 25X1
a aub-surface installation, at
Second
v 8 on , a wang~u coordinates
unknown operated by the No
Force Third Division) and at baechon (coordinates unknown North Korean yt Air
North Korean Air Force Fifth Division , t the
th hres six
ent t U u o rated a contro center 50X1 -H U M
The control center at Chuam-san is at North Korean Air Force I
Headquarters level. The remaining control centers mention k hove are at
division level. the Division 50X1-HUM
level control son control center so
that in the event anything happens to one of the division control centers center at Chuam-son can take over its funotion.
e coon son an alternate control center
11 other above mentioned divisions had alternate centers too.
in the Second Division Control Center
50X1-25X1
approximately 15 personnel. Two personnel wer serve working as a team in 50X1-HUM
directing the flight of North Korean Air Force aircraft. The first man on the
team plotted the courses and positions of aircraft. The second man on the
team looked over the shoulder of the first man and by radio, relayed to the
aircraft pilots, the information which the first man on the team had plotted.
The first man wore a head set through which he received telegraphic trans-
missions of aircraft course and position data from a P-20 radar site. A
third person worked on a map and charted "enemy" aircraft (aircraft in South
Korea) locations. He received information in the same manner that the first
member of the team mentioned above did. The map this man had was marked with
a 560 degree circle which was centered on Sondok. It was this man's responsi-
bility to keep track of "enemy aircraft" and notify alert pilots if any
approached within several kilometers of the demilitarised zone. If any air-
craft crossed the demilitarized zone he was to send up alert aircraft.
Remaining personnel received reports from P-8 type radar sites and visual
ground observers. A Captain was in charge of the control center. His job
was supervisory. The alternate control center at Wonsan Airfield was staffed
by 5 or 6 personnel. the alternate control center 50X1-HUM
received the same radar reports that the division control center received but
not the reports of visual observers. in the event
something happened to the division control center the alternate control center
AF FORM REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11.1 JUN 48.
I OCT 52 12a WHICH MAY BE USED.
SEZ~c t~T ..~. x JnrvecJA77U/V when filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-O. 38111, 16-6847G-1
I
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CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
'50X1-HUM
would take over.
though both
types of radar can be used for ground control approach the P-20 sees rimary
alternate with
9 and the P-8 use
7
ddue to errors on the art of round control approach operators
four aircraft were lost last year there was fifty meters difference
in altitude between the operators altitude reading of the aircraft and the
aircraft altimeter reading. Two operators who were responsible for the above
ten d to death and shot and the other
crashes were put on trial, one was sen ce
was given a-20 year sentence. Ground control approach operator instructions
Ground control app roach operator for Wonsan
to pilots are tape recorded. PP
Airfield and Sondok Airfield is at Sondok Airfield in the control center.
round control a roach is rimer used dur' bad weather. 50
two radio beaoons, one located four Bred meters off the end
the end of the runway are used in
of the runway and one 4,400 meters off
conjunction with ground control approach to get the aircraft lined up with the
runway when on its let down and landing. Ground control approach operators
turn control of the aircraft back over to the pilots at altitudes ranging
between eight hundred motors and thirty-fifty maters depending on the weather.
When released it is up to the pilot to complete the landing. The control
center not,ties the control tower operator when an aircraft is going to land.
It is the control tower operator's responsibility to send the aircraft around
again if the approach is incorrect. Sunan, l~irim and 0ijui Airfields were
equipped for ground control approach after the Korean Armistice (date unknown).
Wonsan was equipped during 19'6- Sandak during 1957 and Pukchang and Hwangju
Airfields at an unknown date. instruct irons from North
Korean Air Arco Head carters that instructed units at Sunahon and Kaechon
Airfields unit at Airfield was included) to
undertake ground contr approach training 50)
those airfields a ao ha the o obi, of dl and control approach
operations. 8. Air Order of
Battle Wonsan Airfields Units at Wonsan Airfield, with exception to the
86 AAA Regiment (listed under Defense), are subordinate to the North Korean
Air Force Second Division which is commanded by Senior Colonel AN Yong Kuk
and located at Wonsan Airfield. Air unitsi
UN IT TYPE AIRCBAF? NUi 00$7WDSR
?
26th Regiment MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit) 27 Unknor;m
I5-15(Day Pursuit) 9 Maj KIM, Song Kak
First Battalion MIA-
MIG-15-BIS (Day Pursuit) 10 Opt OHOE, Pong Nak
Second Battalion
I5-HIS (Div Pursuit) 8 Ma j QIOE, Chol Chang
Third Battalion MIG-
Honer Guard for the Regimental colors.
Security Squads
Total 32 Unknown
56th Regiment MM-17
First Battalion K M-17 (Day Fighter) Unknown Cpt Name Unknown
50
17 (Day Fighter) Unknown Naj S IM, Hung
Second Battalion NIG-
MiD-17 (Day Fighter) Unknown Maj CHOE, Ki Song
Third Battalion
X1-HUM
hf I OCT 52 I I .a WHICH MAY BE USED. r + ~+t~j~~~
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? CLA..IFH:ATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled lnl
50X1-HUM'
Security Squads Assigned to the Regiment for the purpose of guarding the
Regimental colors and an honorary flag which was presented to the regiment for
its action during the defense of Pyongyang.
Communications Platoons Responsible for the maintenance and repair of
telephones, radios and radio beacons that are used in conjunction with ground
control approach. This platoon does not work on airborne communications
equipment. It is headed by an unidentified junior lieutenant.
UNIT MISSION OR OSE
Vehicle Control Cosapany
Security Company
Hospital
Management Platoon
Fuel Section
Rear Services
Compression Center
Battery Shop
Division Repair Shop
Detection Company
Search Light Company
Motor pool has 70 vehicles. By type and number
they area (1) 20 each fuel supply tank trucks,
(2) 15 each lubricating oil tank trucks, (8)'
unknown number of GAZ-Sl tow trucks which are also
used as buses, (4) 2 each jeeps, (5) 5 each radio
vans, (6) 1 each ambulance, (7) 6 each jet starter
units, and (8) 4 each oxygen trucks.
Airfield security. Company consisted of 70 each
personnel headed by a lieutenant, name unknown.
For base personnel. Staffed by 5 or 6 doctors and
10 each nurses. Has a 30 to 40 inpatient capacity.
Perform maintenance on the airfield proper.
Dos nosed of 30 each personnel and headed by a Junior
Lieutenant, Haas unknown.
Performs maintenance on all aircraft, instruments and
parts. Headed by a Captain, name unknown.
ProviAss fuel for aircraft and vehicles.
Supply food, clothes and quarters.
Store and supplies oxygen and air.
Maintains and supplies aircraft and vehicle batteries
Has facilities for overhauling and repairing aircraft
up to and including a 100 hour inspection.
Has the mission of operating two search radars.
Has the mission of operating two automatic tracking
searchlights.
UNIT TUB WBAP01i
NUMM OF OWS COMMANDER
56th AAA Regiment 100am AAA (Automatic LTC Name unknown
Radar)
FORM O REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11, 1 JUN 4, CLASSIFICATION
AF I OCT 52 1121 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 -0-387562 16-61470-1
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PAGE 11 OF Zo
UN IT TYPE WEAPON NUMBER OF GUNS
First Company loom AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
Second Company 100mm AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
Third Company 100mm AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
Fourth Company 100=m AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
Fifth Company 100mm AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
Sixth Company 100mm AAA (Automatic 4 to 6
Radar)
COMMANDER,
CPT Name unknown
CPT Name unknown
CPT Name unknown
CPT Name Unknown
CPT Nam unknown
CPT Name unknown
ores a r t aca :
First, Third, and Fourth Divisions probably
are Bated for the Second Division[
had about an
TTLF ACCID21T
Penchi Air AcAdsiy Kid-air collision
Choyangchon Third Battalion Lost Consciousness
(China). Air Aoa&W
Hosmun Third Battalion
Sinuiju
Wonsan &
Sondok
longdok
Yongdok
Air Acadsnpr
56 Regiment
Second Division
58th Regiment
2d Division
26th Regiment
Second Division
58th Regiment
Second Division
56th Regiment
Second Division
56th Regiment
Second Division
Mirim 26th Regiment
Second Division
Changjin- 58th Regiment
Ho Wake Second Division
Sunchon 25th Regiment
First Division
Pukahang 60th Regiment
First Division
Mirim 57th Regiment
Third Division
.During maneuvers
Bngins Stalled,
Hit dike
Mid-air collision
Air pocket, hit
mountain
Mid-air collision
Could not pull out
of dive
Mislead by GCA
operator
Did not trust
instruments. Did
not listen to GB?
Too fast approach,
hit tree
GCA operator fault
Mid-air collision
14.
the
many accidents as
Two Y A K - 3 1 I s
KEG-15-BIS
UNIG-15
Two IA-91s
UMIG-15 2 men
2 MIG-15-BIS
1 141G-17
UMIG-15
MG-17
MIG-15-BIS
KEG-17
TWO MIG-15-BIS
Pilot lost too much MIG-17
altitude. Hit mountain
Flight test went too MIG-15-BIS
fast, too low. Pilot
50X1-HUM
JUN 16,
I OCT 52 a WHICH MAY BE USE CLASSIFICATION
D. (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
S,~c.T' C f. C.uutu? no.ur.u
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OF PAGES
PAGE 12
WHM UNIT 'TIPIi ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
Uiju 56th Regient Pilot error, did not IL-28
Fourth Division believe instruments.
Hit mountain.
15. North Korean Air Force Doctrines Tactical in nature. First priority
to a are fields. air diction.
In . 50
support of ground forces the first objective was air superiority after which
*the pilot acted according to the situation. Important targets that had been
destroyed are to have visual or photo reconnaissance missions run against them
regularly to determine if reconstruction or repair is occurring. In the event
such a target is being reconstructed or repaired it will be bombed again. The
primary target for a fighter plane after airfields is a convoy. The North
Korean Air Force principle of attacking a convoy is to bomb the lead and rear
before attacking the center. Within a convoy the first riority is POL. 50X'
16. Supplies for trainings Fuel supply unknown. one five rounin
of 23 ma ammunition are issued to a fighter pilot for each type of firing
practice he receives. This includes both fast-and slow firing. F -1
the average number of hits on simulated F-86 and B-47 type targets is 6 out of
15. In the event a pilot fails to get a passing score the first time he must,
refire. If he fails the second time, he is given a failing mark in that type
firing and passes on to the next type training. Pilots do not get the oppor-'_
tunity to practice fire 37 mat rounds because it is too expensive. Each fighter
pilot receives bombing training. They each drop two fifty kilograms practice
bombs as part of their training. Prior to dropping his bombs, each p of es
a sims1ated bomb drop using a nose camera to determine his accuracy. 50
thought bombers used live NeAU during part of their training. 20. North
Korean Air Force personnel aro,recolving only defensive radiological chemical
training. The 50
defensive nuclear trailing concerns the protection of personnel and aircraft
from an atomic bomb blast and the the ical training concerns the protection of
personnel from gas and the decontamination of an area. 21. 5
the North Korean government claimed it did not need and did not have
nuclear weapons. Eelsom+for not needing nuclear weapons was said to be that
if another war broke out it would not be a limited one but take in the whole
world and be fought between the east and west with rockets. 22.
the North Korea early warning net was good. The only weak point
in.the North Korean Radar slystem was on the North Korea in
Diamond Mountain area between Kosong and Chorwon. the
mountains in that area stopped radar beams disallowing full coverage. Radars
are supplemented with visual ground observers in the mountainous areas
aircraft fuel was primarily
brought into North Korea rail across the Tureen river.
WARNING: This document contains information effecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the
Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., Sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law. it may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by other than United States Air Force
Agencies, except by permission of the Director of Intelligence, USAF
AF
FOR
I OCTM52 1 1 2a
REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11, 1 JUN 40.
WHICH MAY BE USED.
(SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-0-387562 16-58470-1
X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
CLA.SlICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
I V
PAGE 13 OF 2 O PAGES
is a su -surface installation. 2. Sunan, Mirin, Uiju, Wonsan, Sondok, LOA I
Pukchang and Hwangju airfields have ground control approach systems. 3. The
58 Regiment at Sondok airfield has 5 MIO-17PF all weather fighters. 4. All
MIG-17's and some MIG-I5-BISONS are equipped with a tail warning radar. 5.
North Korean Air Force pilots have recently been instructed to delay their
approach an aircraft flying in the vicinity of the demilitarised zone. Purpose
of this delay is to allow the South Korea side aircraft to cross into North
Korea. Pilots are to further entice such aircraft deeper into North Korea by
pretending to flee. At the proper time the pilots were told to get behind the
South Korean side aircraft, follow a pursuit course and fire at the signal of
the control center. A slogan used in conjunction with these instructions was
"don't be cheated". 6. President Eisenhower's plane was tracked by North
Korean radar on his recent visit to Republic of Korea. 7. Ground control
approach operator errors have caused four North Korean Air Force planes to
crash during the last year. 8. Wonsan airfield has underground fuel storage
tanks. 9. the pilots in the regiment that is charged wit150X1-HUM
the defense o Pyongyang have volunteered to fly their airplanes into any
matador missiles launched at Pyongyang.
50X1-HUM
Normal navigation instructions are given
to the pilot by the division OP on radio channel number 2. However, in the
event a pilot gets lost he utilises a pre-designated emergency radio channel
to contact a navigation facility. Contact is made by calling out the code
word of the navigationalihcility on which the pilot desires a course heading
and ging his aircraft nwaber. The emergency channel is changed daily and
the code word for the navigational facility every five days. Navigational
facilities locate lost aircraft with a pelengator (direction finder) which
points out the direction from which the radio transmission is coming. The
pilot is then given the directional head" he must take to reach the naviga-
tional facility. radio frequenc is
they were pre-set. xes containing frequency settings were placed into a 50X1-HUM
aircraft before flight and removed afterwards. The boxes were maintained by
the classified document section. Aircraft radios have four channels. 2. At
Wonsan airfield four aircraft are on strip alert. The pilots stay on strip
alert for the period extending from one hour before daylight to one hour after
sundown. Only pilots with approximately one year flying time (or more) pull 50X1 -HU M
strip alert. Be Flight schedules are ed between stations the division
control center by radio communication.
IPOL as
having come from Baku, U.S.S.R. With exception to rubber brake cylinders for
aircraft tires that are manufactured both in the U.S.S.R. and North Korea.
all parts used came from U.S.S.R. This brake cylinder is called
"Minchne" o a e. at the North Korean Air-Force Air
w tire that were manufactured in China
the above
mentioned tires were manufactured near Peking, Mina. All North Korean Air
FORM REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART II. 1 JUN Y. CLASSIFICATION
AF I OCT 52 112a WHICH MAY BE USED. ^ (SECURITY INFORMATION when felled in)
f~?! U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIS 1au--n-an ? 18-ON4To-,l
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CLASSIFICATN)M (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in) s ` 1
PAGE 14 OF Z O PAGES
Force aircraft come from the U.S.S.R. They arrive in North Korea dis-assembled
Assembly takes place at Pyongyang. Means of transportation to North Korea
unknown. S. Alerts begin when a flare (color is changed daily) is shot in the
air. At this time two pilots who are already sitting in their aircraft, suited
and helmeted, put on their o37gen masks. ?,thile the pilots are doing this a
technician standing on a ladder at the side of the cockpit switches on starting
switches. When the aircraft is started either the pilot or the technician callo
out to a man at the starting battery to unplug. (Battery plugged in during
entire period of alert). The technician then takes down the ladder and the
pilot closes the cockpit also begining his taxi onto the runway from the alert
ramp which is located adjacent to the end of the runway. At the runway the
control tower operator gives the code word "light" and the pilots start their
take off run. Pilots must be airborne and at a 25 meter altitude before 1.5
minutes have elapsed. No communications checks are made during period of alert
but the pilot must constantly monitor messages coming over his earphones (the
control tower operator makes spot checks to test pilots wakefullness). All
oomanamlcations cheeks are made by technicians one hour before the standby alert
begins. In the event the alert is cancelled while the aircraft are still on
the ground the control tower operator notifies the pilots by telling than to
make a 180 degree turn which signifies the alert is over. The control tower
operator has no authority to cancel an alert without notification from the
division control center or a higher headquarters. Simultaneously with this
activity, two other abort pilots who are not required to sit in the aircraft
(but must always be within the bear vicinity of their aircraft) run to their
planes and repeat the same progess described for the first two alert pilots.
The latter two pilots not be airborne and at a 25 motor altitude within two
=utter, S. Step by atsp 50X1-HUM
procedure for GCIt ,After getting airborne and reaching a 25 meter altitude
the pilot calls out the code word for the division CP and relays his aircraft
number. He then says the node words "motor number two" and switches his radio
from channel number one to channel number two. The division control center
switches .to channel number two simultaneously with the pilot and the operator
repeats the code words "motor number two". Along with the abgve, the pilot
also charges his guns and switches on a semi-automatic sighting mechanism.
After the channel awiteh is pads the division control center operator takes
over direction of the aircraft, instructing the pilot what altitude, heading,
and speed he should maintain. After changing radio channels the pilot does
not speak again until he has sighted his tar et. At that time he says "I
have sighted the enemy, may I shoot?" the control center 50X1-HUM
at North Korean Air Force Headquarters level monitored all aircraft radio
transmissions and if they wished to take over control from the division 50X1-H U M
control center they c led out a code word which transferred control to them.
The division control center stops trans*itting. as soon as the code word is
said. The code word is changed daily. The division control center maintains
continuous verbal contact with the aircraft even if the pilot is following
instructions exactly. During exercises, aircraft work in pairs, one simulates
aneq, the other friendly. Step by stop procedure for navigation exercises,
they are (1) navigation of a pre-planned course, and (2) blind navigation.
Neither of the two exercises takes place without an escort aircraft whose
pilot is responsible for grading the ability of the pilot taking the exercise.
At a briefing that takes place before the exercise pilots are given the code
words to use in raising a navigational facility. The latter type navigational
exercise differs from the former in that the pilot does not know the course
he is to fly. Both types of exercises are the same as that for 0C1 except for
the continuous verbal contact that takes place during GCI exercises and the
pilot's announcement that he has sighted the snowy. During navigational
AF I OC M52 112a REPLACES MAY FORM 112-PART 11.1 JUN N. CLASSIFICATION
T WHICH BE USED.
S6C,~E7-
(SECURITY ,50X 1-H U Mwh.. filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-C1-387562 16-68470-1
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PAGE ZS
OF Z O
exercises oomaunication is not continuous. Gunnery exercises: Direction
given to the aircraft and communication is the same as procedure given for UCI.
For live gunnery exercises ground targets that are silhouettes of the F-86 50X1-HUM
and B-47 are used. For simulated exercises two aircraft are sent aloft as a
team, one aircraft simulating an esew aircraft and the other a frien .
Cameras are used to score pilots. 7
all non-alert aircraft flights must be forwarded there prior to
the the combat ations center was subordinate
to the operations section, North Korean Air Forc Headquarters, because the
schedules had to be routed through that section.
8. The MIG-17PF is equipped with nose
and to radar. other G- an an unknown number of MIU-15BIS are
equipped with tail warning radar. The nose radar in the KM-17PF has a
aaxiaua range.of 12 kilometers but is usually used at 5 or 6 kilometers
distances. t was very accurate but unable to give figures. 50X1-HUM
Accuracy increases a a ice from the to et decreases. The tail warning I
radar had a range of 4 or 5 kilometers. any aircraft flying to 50X1-HUM
the rear of it was picked up and the pilot notified by a squealing sound that
grew progressively louder as the range between aircraft decreased. North
Korean Air Force Z-28 and IL-28L bomber aircraft are equipped with blind bomb-
ing radar 9. Air 50X1-HUM
Schools: (1) The North Korean Air Force Air Academolr, It has courses avail-
able under the broad headings of The Flight Course, The Engine Course, The
listed Mate Training Institute, The Officers Training Institute and an
unidentified course arcs of study that personnel attending the flight course
and the engine course :runt attend. The breakdown of courses provided under the
broad headings listed above with the number of hours training given in each
is as follows: Flight Course - Principals of the aircraft engine - 70 hours,
aircraft characteristics and aerodynamics - 50 hours, aircraft instruments -
50 hours, radio - 50 hours, weapons - 20 hours, communications - 15 hours,
general tactics - 50 hours, Air tactics - 60 hours, infantry firing -10 hours,
.infantry regulations - 40 hours, flight regulations - 15 hours, theory of
flight - 70 hours, air firing - 70 hours, navigation - 60 hours, bombing - no
time spent in this type training by source. Period of training unknown.
Dine course - total period of time agent in this course is three years.
Personnel specialize in either weapons, radio, engines or instruments; 50X1-HUM
enlisted mien training institute - personnel spent six months training in
weapons, radio, engines or instruments while there; officers training institute
- flight oommanding personnel team
- engineer team -
technician team - staff amt. Personnel assigned to this type training take
either a short term course of training lasting three to eight months or a long
term course lasting three years. Specific time spent in each phase of training
unknown. Unidentified course - physics - 20 hours, algebra - 20 hours,
Russian language - 10'hours, Korean history - 40 hours, party history - 70 hourt
philosophy - unknown, public economy - unknown., party politics - 40 hours,
Russian Communist party history - 60 hours. The Air Acadenq+ also administers
flying training and for this se a battalion of YAK-18 and MIG-15BIS
aircraft are assigned there. lit 50X1-HUM
took a student pilot eight months to complete flying training but if a backlog
of personnel waiting to take training existed a period of three years could
elapse between the time a student pilot left class room study and the time he
completed flight training.
in order to alleviate this situation the North Korean Air
Force stopped recruiting personnel for flight training.
caused a shortage of personnel taking flight training.
REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART 11, 1 JUN U. CLASSIFICATION
I OCT 52 112a WHICH MAY BE USED. S '4eET
This stoppage has
the
50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
(SECURITY IN60X1 -HUM.. filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1956--0-387562 16-66470-1
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"IG
PAGE 16 OF Z Q PAGES
1~ __1 ix Force was trying to solve this problem 50X1-HUM
(2) North Korean Air Force Division training. Each North
Korean Air Force Division administers a three month course to recruits. This
trainin
ro
r
i
t
g p
g
am
s no
a permanent program. It is organized each time 50X1-HUM
recruits are assigned to a division and dissolved when training is completed.
party politics being included in the
acadenW
5 Artillery 50X1-HUM
radar at the artillery
The follow listed is on Wonsan
co a experience.
"691ment - Commander Lieutenant Colonel, flew MIG-15
c , amount of experience unknown; Vice Commander, Lieutenant Colonel,
flew MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Vice Commander, Lieutenant
Colonel, flew M3D-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; let Battalion
Commander, Major, flew MIG-15 in combat, flew in combat seven times, time
period unknown; First Battalion Commander.. Senior Lieutenant, flew MM-15 in
combat, amount of experience unknown; Captain, 2d Battalion Commander, flew
MIG-15 in combat, amount of experience unknown; Captain 2d Battalion Vice
Commander, flew a MIG-15 in combat, flew in combat one time, damaged one
aircraft. Five six Regiment Commander Lieutenant Colonel, Flew MM-15 in
combat tens of times, credited with shooting down one aircraft; Vice Regimental
Commander, Major, flew AIG-15 in combat tens of times, period of time involved
unknown; Vice Regimental Commander, Major, flew 1410-15 in combat tens of times,
period of time involved unknown; Captain, First Battalion Commander, flew
MIG-15 in combat, period of time involved unknown; Major, Second Battalion
Commander, flew MICA-15 in combat tens of times, time period involved unknown,
shot down three aircraft; Captain, 1st Battalion Vice Commander, flew BIG-15
in combat tens of times, period of time involved unknown, shot down fo
aircraft and had three of h of shot down. 50X1-HUM
3. The 56 Regiment at Wonsan is presently
empliasisin g a g in ground support and sea target attack. They are also
taking training in air-to-air combat. The 26 Regiment at Wonsan is emphasizing
formation flying with 16 experienced pilots also taking air-to-air combat
training. Two battalions of the 58 Regiment at Sondok are emphasizing eight
flying training and the third is emphasizing weather and night flying training.
The Fifth Division is emphasizing training in ground or sea forces attack and
ground support. 4. Nature of combat offensive training for bombers unknown.
For fighters, training in bombing and strafing airfields (the runways in
particular), ships, trains, bridges, and convoys in that order of emphasis is
taking place. A 15 degree angle of attack was being stressed for t
type targets at the time source defected. S.
types of defensive training in the North Korean Air Force: Defense against 50X1-HUM
interceptors attacking an North Korean Air Force bomber formation, defense
against an attacking bomber formation, defense against attacking aircraft while
getting airborne, and defense against attack while airborne. 6.
the average jet fighter, pilot flying time in the North Korean +orce was 50X1 -HUM
7 to 8 hours per month and a maximum of 12 hours nor month. Average monthly
jet bomber, pilot flying time unknown. they were greater than 50X1-HUM
for jet fighters because bombers had greater range. 8. Pilots in the 56
Regiment at Wonsan average 60 hours each of training flights yearly. The
proportionate breakdown of training flights for that unit is unknown. The
26 Regiment at Wonsan had the following training schedule for 50X1-HUM
the year: (1) Square angle fight touch and go landings) - approximately
20 tiles lasting six minutes each, 2) Formation flying - 6 hours, (5)
S E e 2 c T i.,....v.~a a r 1-,u cmAitV/Y when hied in)
U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING CWFlrc ion-_-&HTO-!
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PAGE 17 OF 2 C PAGES
Bombing - 5 hours, (4) Air-to-air firing (simulated, cameras used) - 7 hours,
(5) Navigation - 4 hours, (6) Intercept - 2 hours, (7) Air-to-air combat -
5 hours, (8) Strafing - 2 hours, (9) 0oaaany formation flying - 5 hours and
(10) Special flights (acrobatics) - 4 hours.
Air crews receive
20 hours of political indoctrination per month. Length of classes varies
between 30 minutes and 2 hours in duration. Total hours of indoctrination per
month has decreased since the beginning of the year. At the beginning of this
year greater emphasis was placed on the "re-enforcement of combat preparedness"
with still greater emphasis occurring after 19 April 1960, when the South
Korean political situation developed. At that time personnel were told that
the time was near for the re-unification of Korea and North Korea must be
re ared to give military aid if south Korea requested it. 10. E:
defense tactics presently being used by the North Korean Air Force
against surface vessels and bomber and fighter formations have been used by
the North Korean Air Force since it was first originated. North Korean Air
Force aircraft are supposed to break both types of formations. In the event a
fighter escort is along with a bomber formation intercept aircraft are to give
full attention to the bombers, attacking them directly. If enough interceptors
are present, diversionary aircraft would attempt to pull the escort away from
the bombers thus giving the remaining interceptors an opening for attack.
North Korean Air Force utilizes a "ladder" formation for defense against
fighter formations. This formation is aade up by two elements of the formation
flying at the same altitude and one element of the formation flying overhead
at a higher altitude. The lower elements of the formation intercept the
fighter formation and the upper element keeps alert for aircraft flying the
main fighter formation. Aircraft attacking surface vessels approach their
target horizontally to the surface of the water at an altitude slightly
higher than the top of the vessel being attacked. Bombs are released at a
point 50 meters before reaching the target vessel. After releasing bombs'
the pilot (s) maintain the same altitude, turning out left or right at an
unspecified point beyond the target vessel. Aircraft will make another pass
if target vessel not destroyed. If the target vessel is close to the aircraft,
base it returns at low altitude, if distant, at a high altitude. 11. All
26 Regiment pilots are assigned Kang-Nung Airfield as a target. There are
42 pilots in the regiment. An alternate to et was scheduled to be ass
12.1 5
it was common knowledge in the North Korean Air Force
that bombers had a long range bombing miss
all all aircraft in the 26 Regiment were to be used in bombing
_________________
Kmny.-Nune Airfield. The 26 Regiment had 28 aircraft in it
e 56 Regiment at Wonsan and the 58 Regiment
is responsible for air defense of the sea area in the 2d Division at Sondok
have primary mission of air-to-air combat and the attack of sea targets
respectively in that order. The 58 Regiment is responsible for air defense of
the sea area in the 2d Division area of responsibility. The 56 Regiment is
responsible for air defense of the area south of Wonsan. The 26 Re iment is
responsible for air defense of the area north of Wonsan. 18. 5
no recovery is planned for home bases because pilots are s c e
return to a pre-designated alternate airfield in the event their home base is
destroyed. In training flights Wonsan pilots have been instructed to return
to th Sunchon or Pukchanx field if Wonsan is destro ed. 14. 5
one fuel storage area and one weapons storage area. Both storage areab
AF
0X1-HUM
0X1-HUM
FORM REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART R. I JUN 16.
I OCT 52 112a WHICH MAY BE USED.
CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
S0V ` ! U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956-0-387562 16-4i8170-1
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Ste` CwtT
50X1-
PAGE 18 OF 2 O PAGES
were at Wonsan Airfield. Fuel storage area contains aircraft and vehicle fuel
and lubricants. The aircraft fuel is called T-1 and is used by all jets in
North Korean Air Force.
with exception to three aircraft fuel storage tanks located on the
surface a storage tanks are subsurface. The weapons storage area contains
sn- 100- and 250 rams and 7.62 amt 23 mm, and 57 mm uns and ammunition.
I North Korean
Air Force prop driven aircraft use type ruel, none in s red at target.
15. Prior to the standdown cited previously the last standdown occured
during April 1960 and was approximately 5 days in duration. The reason for
this etanddown was that an aircraft in the 1st Division crashed. The accidert
was attributed to pilot error. He lost altitude too quickly in making his
letdown and as a result crashed into a dike. The recent standdown was caused
by an aircraft from the 58 Regiment at Sondok crashing into a mountain. The
crash occurred in May 1960 and was attributed to two causes: (1) Poor prior
ground control approach training for the pilot, and (2) Poor conduct on the50X
part of the ground control approach operator. He released control of the
aircraft to the pilot without getting him clear of cloud cover.
that North Korean Air Force standdowns occur after every airomaft accident. 50X
Purpose of the standdowns is to thoroughly inspect all aircraft in the North
Korean Air. Force. The pilot of the plane that crashed during May 1960 had
just returned from leave and had taken the aircraft up for an inspection flight,
16. higher ranking pilots than the average were involved
in most North Korean Air Force aircraft accidents. The principal reason for
this being that higher ranking pilots, because of their rank, can avoid 50X
following a North Korean Air Force operational procedure of brie "
Dilate on fl ht instructions and conditions prior to take-off.
any time large scale manuevers are held in South Korea a standdown
for the purpose of alert occurs.
1 th ass nod to his battaliono
Interceptor pilots are restricted from firing on an aircraft
without al of division control center or a higher headquarters. 25.
Aircraft usually did not fly when cloud cover
was below three hundred meters in altitude or visibility was less than two
kilometers. Each North Korean Air Force airfield has a varying number of
local restricted flying areas that are reserved for use by special flights
(acrobatics) and air-to-air combat training flights. Wonsan has five such
restricted areas. They range in size from 15 kilometers times 20 kilometers
for acrobatic flight training areas to 50 kilometers times 50 kilometers for
air-to-air combat training flights. Wonsan local restricted flying areas are
at the following distances and headings from the airfield: (1) 22 kilometers
distance at 286 degrees heading (2) 20 kilometers distance at 206 degrees
heading, (3) 20 kilometers distance at 124 degrees heading, (4) 22 kilometers
distance at 024 degrees heading, and (5) unknown heading east at 30 kilometers
distance. In addition to these local area restrictions the demilitarized zone,
the China/North Korea border, the U.S.S.R./North Korea border, the Pyongyang
City area, the Supung Power Plant area, the Hamhung fertilizer plant, and the
Chongjin Power Plant area are restricted flying areas. During the period when
the North Korean Air Force Air Academy was located at Penchi, China, North 50X1
Korean Air Force aircraft were permitted to fly along Chinese side of the
river section of the border
the reason North Korean Air Force aircraft were not permitted to f over the
Hamhung fertilizer factory was because the North Korean Air Force did not want
to risk an aircraft accident in which the aircraft crashed into the factory.
AF I OCTM52 112a
REPLACES AF FORM I12-PART 11. 1 JUN 46.
WHICH MAY BE USED.
5 c.E?T
25X1
25X1
(SECURITY Ix50X1-HUMhen filled in)
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 2 16-69470-1
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-5:. Eci2eT
- or r-bpi) while was flying over the sea of Japan was made by two
MIG-15BIS based at Wonsan Airfield. The pilots were Captain KIM, Byong Hyon
and Jr. Lt YI, Sok 1Iun. The latter pilot was promoted as a result of this
action. The reason for the attack was that the P-4M was flying along the
North Korean coastline and a standing directive directed that all aircraft
flying along the coastline would be intercepted. Reason for the directive is
that aireraft flying along the coastline are collecting intelligence informa-
tion about the coastline. the P-4M was intercepted 70 to 80 50X1-HUM
kilometers off the North Korean coast at.a 300 meter altitude. The action was I
not terminated until the P-4M had reached a distance of 150 kilometers out
from the coast. when the CGI operator notified the interce150X1-HUM
pilots that the P-4M should be in sight they had their aircraft at an 8,000
meter altitude and as a result could not see the P-4111 until they dived down to
a lower altitude. When they dove to a lower altitude radio contact with the
control center was lost and messages had to be relayed by way of two other
alert aircraft that had been sent up to altitude. Radar surveillance of the
P-4M was not affected by low altitude. The original plan of attack was to
have the interceptors attack simultaneously from either side of the P-4M but
fear of collision caused the pilots to attack singly in trail. When the P-4M
was sighted by interceptors they identified it as a B-26 and made their gun
sight settings for that type aircraft. This identification error caused 50X1-HUM
rounds fired in their initial bursts to fall short of the target. The North
Korean Air Force Commander, Colonel General CH'AE Kwang re rimannded the s
for not succeed' in shootinz down the aircraft- 1
Attitude towards foreign flights over either North Korea, Communist China, or
Soviet Far East territory is to either shoot the aircraft down or force it to
land. The North Korean policy in relation to aircraft flying south of the DMZ
is to attempt luring them into North Korean territory in pursuit of North
Korean Air Force aircraft and to then either shoot them down or force them to
land if circumstances permit. 50X1-HUM
North Korean newspapers published news stories about the B-47 that
,y6G4e,ET
50X1-HUM
(SECURITY, ?-? .~?..?..+ when filled in)
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1956- -0-387562 16--81470-1
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50X1-H
20 OF 20
was shot down recent
the aircraft that
snox, e JJ-47 own was super-sonic. The North Korean newspapers claimed
B-47 had penetrated deep into Soviet territory,
50X1-HU
50X1-HUM
N
(SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19%--O-387562 16--4M70-1
SEfc2-OCT
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ScCc.z ET
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PAGE 2 OF PAGES
the fuel capacity without drop-tanks
1,410 liters.
the amount of fuel cons- climbing to 3,000 meters and
flying 185 kilometer
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Approximately 1,000 liters, which left about 300 liters to spare (at 50X1
550 kph). I
As the K-50 runway is only 1,400 meters long, the aircraft will be barely
able to get airborne after running the entire length of the airfield. It
may be possible to shorten the take-off distance by lowering the win
711.20 degrees; however
the length of the runway at Wonsan Airfiel
2,0C(. meters.
the runway temperature at Wonsan Airfield at time of take-off
Approximately 30 degrees centigrade.
the runway temperatur
is not so important in take-off as it is in landing, because of the
horizontal expansion of one (1) meter.
the take-off distance at Wonsan today
50X1
slightly more than 1,000 meters.
it was with a full fuel load.
Although the gauge shows only up to 1,050 liters, the actual fuel supply
is 1,410 liters. Fueling is made until it reaches 30mm from the top of
the filter in the fuel cap. The fuel gauge functions from 1,050 liters.
the designation of the fue
50
X
is called T-1. It is a petroleum fuel.
the fuel system
FORM
AF I OCT 52 1 1 2a
REPLACES AF FORM 112-PART It. I JUN 46, CLASSIFICATION
WHICH MAY BE USE
(S8 ?ITY INFORMATION when filled in)
U ti GOVERNMENT VRINIIN(, 11F1 11j I- 0 16/56.' 16 6.470 1
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SEC 7
-]is capable of a maximum of 11,560 rpm. The maximum can be obtained by
turning the switch "KPAP" to the left of the forward instrument panel to
non".
the engine started
By ground power equipment (24V).
There is a plug located on the fuselage behing the wing. The connection
on the aircraft is male and that on the ground power equipment is female.
INDICATIONS OF 1rjARLIKE INTENT
1. Organization Readjustments in NKAF: The North Korean Air Force has
carried out a number of organizational changes to avoid complexity of tine
chain of command, expedite mobilization in case of emergency, and to overcome
difficulties encountered by the inadequacy of equipment. Thus, the 4th
Bomber Division, which failed to secure the authorized T/E strength of L-24
and therefore could not continue to operate as a full-strength division, was
reorganized into the 36th Regiment, directly subordinate to the North Korean
Air Command around last may. Also, the Civil Aviation Bureau under the
Ministry of Transportation was made subordinate to the Air Command early in
1960, and the entire complement of five (5) LI-2s was transferred to the Air
Force, probably with a view to increase the to istical and milita trap ort
capability of the Air Force. 50X1-HUM
Lne
curric um and light training courses of the North ::orean Air Officer
Academy have been reorganized to place more emphasis on flying; exercises:
In :arch 1958, a plenary meeting of the North Korean Labor Party was
convened to discuss reinforceing the system of centralization and to
re-align the central control system more in line with the requirements of
reality, and as a result, the Political Department in each unit of the North
Korean Armed Forces was reorganized as the Party Committee, with radically
expanded functions. Under the new system, operational and management plans 50X1-HUM
for each unit are to be worked out by the unit personnel themselves. subject
this Party Committee has authority to handle matters.. even relative t
o
operations, logistics and personnel administration. 50X1-HUM
General principles are debated by Party Committee members elected by all
the subordinate units, and their recommendations are submitted to higher
headquarters for approval. All basic decisions are taken by higher head-
quarters, except in emergencies when such matters are entrusted to the
discretion'of the sub-unit commanders, subject however, to subsequent approval
by the Party Committee.
50X1-HUM
2. Changes in E ui ment: Early in 1959, the entire 57th Regiment of the
3rd Division was converted to MIG-17s, and the equipping of the 60th Regiment,
1st Division (stationed at Sunchlon) with NIG-19s planned within 1960. Early
in August 1960, the 60th Regiment was said to be preliminary to conversion of MIG-
S~C.r,~~ . UK/7 Y INPORMAT/ON when filled in)
T. U DOVE RN M[ 1 PRIN 114 t, ,Ff, k ", 0 18!6.' 16 6647() 1
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S,~C eE-T
? CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATION when fil1Gd in.1,._--
the "basic policy" of the North Korean Air Force
utilizing MiG-15BIS and MIG-17 type aircraft for interception purposes, and
to introduce new MIG-19s to replace older MIG-17s for purposes of pursuit and
attack.
due to certain unknown shortcominaR
1bo North
evo ing much effort and attention to modern-
ization of aircraft equipment, and this trend has been increasingly evident
since early in 1959.
to accomodate the 26th Regiment, 2nd Division; however, for unknown reasos,50X
was ited at Chlongjin, Hamgyong Province, and was assigned a number of
fighters on alert to harmonize the air disposition in the Northeast area.
Toksan Airfield was newly built (ground work completed in March 1957)
and equipment of the 4th Division and the Air Officer Academy. The latter 50X
vale AVUL"411 'yeah air rorce transr-erred a number of units from
anc ur a into North Korea. Involved in the.shift were the entire personnel
Unit Shifts from Manchuria to North Korea:
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Korean Air Force officers above the rank o Regimental Commander were purged
(discharged) as anti-Party elements as part of a move aimed at strengthening
the centralization of government control and preparation for war. In this
purge were involved three officers, including WANG, Ryon and HO, Min
Kuk. After this purge a propaganda drive was started calling this
purge a "step forward" toward war preparedness.
5. Training: Intensive training is being continued in oversea flights,
ground attacks, and joint air-ground maneuvers. After the April Revolution in
South Korea, training activities became more intensified. The North Korean Air
Force is regarding all sides of North Korean territories as possible approaches
for attack by the United Nations air forces.
6. Joint Russo-Chinese-North Korean Maneuver: Unknown numbers of
Russian, Communist Chinese and North Korean ground forces conducted a joint
exercise in what was called a "Command Staff Joint Exercise". The maneuver
was conducted in ~ianchuria for approximately 15 days 50)
was unknown whether air force also partininatind in i+ I
In case of emer eneyl the so-called Red Guards (a kind or militia
reserve) were organized
This organization
conducts tactical and
changes of sectors Between the I and II Co North Korean 5C50X I
4. Personnel Reshuffle:
1, A
I
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SE( UF'1TY INFORMATION when filled in)
U '~ c.UVt H~. MIS 1 1-111 ?056 0 38756.' I6 6847(1 1
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CLASSIFICATION (SECURITY INFORMATInnr xa_ ar._I
combat training several hours each week. As of August 1960, Red Guards in
the cities (Wonsan and else where) were fully equipped with basic infantry
weapons, but in the village Red Guards, only part of the members were thus
armed. The Red Guards are organized in parallel with the regular armed forces,
and are applied to the same combat tactics.
7. Economic l4obilization: Payment of taxes in-':ind is one of the
continued basic policies o th 7Korean regime. xes was somewhat increased ~'The amount of such
metals was continued as ever. and compulsory supply of scrap
o Korea ganda drive compelling the populace to increase their productivedoutputpfor
the ostensible purpose of "extending relief" to the South Korean residents,
and the puppet regime also stepped up'its production boost drive. It also
plans to implement a new seven-year people's economy drive, starting in 1961.
8. Political Changes:
no goernml
except for limited rash fles in the North Korean Cab
inet. Then p rgre shofiles
Provincial Party cadres
vv-ttcu uii a Tornado of terror through-
out ;North xorea. The purpose of this purge was believed to be the strengthen-
ing of control by KLL;, Il Song and the undesireable elements were purged as
"good-for-nothings". In conjunction with the purge, the North iiorean regime
started an intensive propaganda drive to urge the populace to practice
austerity and sacrifice.
The hidden purpose of the austerity and productivity drive, ostensibly
aimed to build up-surplus stockpiles to help the South Korean people, was
believed to be the building up of war stockpiles.
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__S-Ay-r. SECURITY INFORMATION when h/ "n)
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Status of North Korean Air Fnrew
a. T-1 (equivalent of JP-4) is supplied in annual allotments, subject to
further requisition in case of shortage. For approximately 15 days during the
summer F---], training had to be interrupted due to exhaustion of fuel stocks_
50X1-HUM
b. T-1 supply was generally considered adequate, but effort is being made
for fuel conservation. Failure to accomplish flight missions becomes a sub{--j
for reprimand for "waste of fuel". 150X1-HUM
after a MIG-17 of the 58th Regiment crashed on the mountain-
yside during diving practice. Flying was au en d f
approximately one week after the aco n
e entire period of f]i ht 111i 11j, ension folio the MU-11 17 crash
was devoted to technical instruction.
J
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CLASSIFICATION
C44
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four 4 fighters were kept on alert, with two (2) on
cockpit alert and the other two (2) on strip alert, while two (2) additional
squadrons were in stand-by. (Until last year, stand-by consisted of either
one (1) squadron or one (1) flight) At night, two (2) MIG-17 interceptors
(referred to as PF were put on alert at Sandok Airfield. the 50X
year 1960 was designated by the North Korean Air Force as the ear o Combat-
Readiness".
There was a complete absence of training flights 50X
owing to the clean-up and policing in preparation for the August 15 50X
celebrations. In the 5th Division (based at Kaeach'on and Kusong) a ground
smash-up involving a MIG-15BIS took place and a training program
of one (1) week's duration was initiated 50X1
f.
Regiment conducted a training
and 11_MIG-15BIS of the 26th 50X
g. Disposition of North Korean Air Force Units:
(1) North Korean Air Force Headquarters: Halfway between Mirim and
Sandong (referred to as 564th Air Unit).
(2) 1st Division - 60th Regiment: Sunch'on (conversion to MIG-19e
planned)
59th Regiment: Pukch'ang
25th Regiment: Sunch'on
(3) 2nd Division: Headquarters: Sandok (884th Air Unit)
58th Regiment: Sandok
26th Re$iment% Wonsan (36875th Air Unit)
56th Regiment: Wonsan
(4) 3rd Division:' Headquarters: Hwangju
57th Regiment: Mirim
61st Regiment: Hwangju
- 27th Regiment: Tonggang
(5) 4th Division: Headquarters: Deactivated early in 1960
36th Independent Regiment: Uiju
24th Reconnaissance Regiment: Sunan
(6) 5th Division: Headquarters: Kaech'on
54th Regiment: Kusong
55th Regiment: Kaech'on
I OCT 52 112
1.a WHICH MAY 8E USED.
(SECURITY INFORMATION whl.n filled in)
U. S GOVERhMI hf PRINTING OFFICE 1956 0 !e 10 t14470.1
1-HUM
I
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1-HUM
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(7) Command Squadron: Mirim
(8) Air Force Academy located at Ch'ongjin (moved from Penchi in
Manchuria in July 1959) with a branch school at Hoemun.
h.y.J orth Korean Air Force Personalities:
(1) Commanding General: Lt Gen CHOE, Kwang - former Superintendent,
North Korean Army University - assumed command 24 October 1958.
(2) Deputy Commanding General (Political): Maj Gen CHOE, Chong Kon,
younger brother of CHOE, Tong Kon, former propaganda chief of the party
Central Committee.
(3) Deputy Command General (Plying): Vacant
(4) Deputy Commanding General ,Technical): Maj Gen KIM, Ung Soo
(5)Commander,, 2nd Division: Senior Colonel AN, Yong Kook
(6) Commander, 3rd Division:. Colonel CHOE, Ki Hyung
(7) Commander, Command Squadron: Senior Colonel PAK, Chong Sik
(8) Superintendent, Air Academy: Senior Colonel HAN, Tae Sook
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A
- ART II. I JUN 4E, ssricwrioN
OCT 52 a WHICH MAY BE USED. _SEC~7- SECURITY INFORMATION when filled in)
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