CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, 1963-1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A023200010008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2014
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 8, 1964
• Content Type: NIE

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?
CONTROLL D DISSEM
? NIE 11-14-63 ADVCON
8 January 1964
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1963-1969
? Soviet Theater Forces
? Naval General Purpose Forces
? Contribution of East European Satellites
? General War Capabilities against NATO
? Limited War Capabilities
? Trends to 1970
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate
as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The com-
plete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.
Central Intelligence Agency
SECRET
CONTROL *D DISSEM
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC and
NSA.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 8 January 1964. Concurring were the Director ot
Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; and the
Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
CLASSIFICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
34518
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
8 January 1964
SUBJECT: NIE 11-14-63: CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE
FORCES, 1963-1969
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the role and capabilities of Soviet general purpose
forces over the next six years, especially against the NATO area in
Europe.
FOREWORD
As considered in this estimate Soviet general purpose forces
include: (a) theater forces, i.e., ground combat and tactical air
forces plus their associated command, support and service elements
up through the level of military districts and groups of forces;
(b) naval general purpose forces, i.e., naval forces subordinate
to fleets and separate flotillas, including naval air forces, but
excluding strategic attack missile submarine forces; and (c) mili-
tary airlift and sealift elements. In addition, Soviet command
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
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and service elements providing general support to all components of the
Soviet military establishment are considered where appropriate. Those
Soviet forces which perform other military missions, notably long-range
striking forces and, air and missile defense forces, are the subject of
other Rational Intelligence Estimates,* and are discussed herein only
insofar as they might be used in support of theater operations.
It should be emphasized that, in discussing Soviet theater forces
and their capabilities, we do not take account of the actions of
opposing Western forces. In particlonr, we do not assess the effect
on Soviet theater forces of an initial strategic nuclear exchange.
It is obvious that such an exchange would profoundly affect the
ability of Soviet theater forces to carry out their assigned missions
in a general war.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Soviet requirements for general purpose forces are the subject
of a continuing debate within the Soviet leadership. Russian and
NIE 11-8-630 "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack," dated
18 October 1963 (TOP SECRET) and Memorandum to Holders of
NIE 11-3-620 "Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
Through Mid-1967, dated 20 November 1963 (TOP SECRET).
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Communist tradition alike prescribe the maintenance of large ground forces
in being as well as a large mobilization potential. Conservative elements,
both military and political, argue that this tradition remains valid, even
in the circumstances of a nuclear general war. Khrushchevl however, with
some military and political support) stresses the deterrent effect of
medium) intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles and
argues that Soviet requirements for general purpose forces are conse..
Tiently reduced. This debate remains unresolved, but in general, the
trend in the size of Soviet general purpose forces over the years
since Khrushchev dame to power has been downward. (Paras. 1-7, 12, 15)
B. We estimate that the personnel strength of Soviet general
purpose forces now includes 1.6-1.8 million men in theater ground forces)
about 400)000 in naval units, and about 150,000 in tactical and military
transport aviation. In addition, there are roughly 400,000 men perform-
ing command and general support functions for the entire military
establishment.* General purpose forces are estimated to include:
110-140 line divisions; about 350 torpedo attack and cruise missile
Thus the total manpower in the Soviet military establishment is
estimated to be approximately as follows.:
COmmandand General Support 400,000
General Purpose Forces 2,150,000-203500000
Ground 10600,000-1,8001000)
Air 150,000)
Waval 4000000)
Strategic Defense Forces 400,000
Strategic Attack Forces 300,000
TOTAL 3)250)000..3,450,000
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submarines; about 180 major surface ships; about 3,400 tactical fighters
and light bombers; and about 375 naval jet medium bombers. (Fares. 150
18-19, 211 320 62-64, 67-68)
C. The Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern, with a
large number of combat strength divisions backed up by a large mobiliza-
tion potential. All presently existing divisions have been at least
nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized rifle, or
airborne. The modernization program has made heavy demands on resources
in short supply in the USSR, and we believe that Soviet ground force
capabilities are still adversely affected by quantitative and qualita-
tive deficiencies in equipment. (Pares. 8-101 22-25, 39-40, 42-43)
D. During the past several years, the Soviets have reduced the
total number of their divisions and have also reduced the proportion
maintained at high levels of combat readiness. We estimate that 60-75
Soviet divisions are now maintained at combat strength, i.e., at 85
percent or more of total authorized wartime personnel strength. The
remainder are at either reduced strength (60-70 percent of authorized
personnel) or at cadre strength (25 percent or less). Even at full
wartime strength, Soviet divisions are considerably smaller than US
divisions. The authorized wartime strength of tank divisions is about
91000 men, and of motorized rifle divisions, about 11,000. Most divi-
sions are organized into armies, which are also quite srall by US
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standards. The nondivisional combat and service support elements presently
maintained are probably considerably short of wartime requirements. (Paras.
8-10) 15-17, 22-28, 37-40, 42-43)
E. Currently there are 22 combat strength Soviet divisions and
about 1,200 Soviet tactical aircraft in East Germany And Poland. Without
prior buildup, this force could launch a limited objective attack, de-
signed to maximize the chance of achieving surprise. We believe, how-
ever, that the Soviets would seek to assemble a considerably larger
striking force if they intended to launch a campaign against Western
Europe. Reinforcements could be drawn from western USSR and from the
Satellite forces. We estimate that under noncombat conditions a
50-60 division striking force, including some 5-15 Satellite dtvisions?
could be assembled and organized for operations against Western Europe
within about 30 days after a Soviet decision to do so.* In addition,
such a force might include some 2,000 tactical aircraft and be backed
In terms of manpower, these divisions and their support would
? include:
Soviet ground troops normally stationed
in East Germany and Poland 330,000
Soviet ground troops from Western USSR 480,000
Satellite ground troops 100,000-300,000
1
TOTAL 910,000-1,110,000
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up by a theater reserve of ground units. The Soviets would not expect
to reinforce on such a scale without detection* (Farm. 91-94)
F. In recent years, Soviet theater, forces have acquired important
tactical missile capabilities, including unguided rockets and ballistic
and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic chemical bombs and warheads have
been provided for tactical use; we believe that their release is kept
under strict political control. (Paras, 14, 33-360 49-55)
G. With the provision of tactical and air defense missiles for
the support of theater forces, the strength of Tactical Aviation was
sharply reduced but has remained fairly stable since 1961. The number
of tactical aircraft seems low in relation to the size of the theater
ground forces. Moreover, most tactical aircraft are obsolescent*
Fighter-bombers have been conspicuously lacking, although such a
type is now being introduced. Theater force air defense is limited
by the lack of surface-to-air missile systems for law altitude defense
and for rapidly moving situations. (Paras. 31-32, 45-46, 48)
H. Until recent years, the Soviet Navy has been equipped and
trained for a primarily defensive role. Much of the impetus for change
has come from the USSRIs concern over the threat posed by carrier task
forces and US missile submarines. To counter the former forces at
sea, the Soviets have introduced cruise missiles carried by bombers
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and submarines. Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities are negligible
in open ocean areas and probably will remain quite limited, but capa-
bilities for reconnaissance against carrier task forces have been improved
by employment of aircraft of Long Range Aviation. The Soviet submarine
force poses an increasing threat to Free World shipping, primarily in
the northeastern Atlantic and northwestern Pacific areas. Soviet
surface ships are largely dependent upon land-based air cover and
their capabilities are correspondingly restricted. (Taxes. 60-61,
70-75 95, 113)
I. There are an estimated 940,000 men in the East European
Satellite ground forces (excluding Albania). These forces have about
62 divisions at various levels of strength and effectiveness. We
lieve that about half of these divisions are sufficiently manned and
equipped for early employment in conjunction with Soviet forces. Their
political reliability-would remain an uncertain factor in some circum-
stances. (Paras. 78-83)
J. During the past year, the Soviets appear to have modified some-
what their expectation that any major conflict in Europe would either be
nuclear from the start or would inevitably escalate. Their recent writings
indicate that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear
war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare
remain formidable, efforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear
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operations have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities.
The USSR's capabilities for limited warfare in areas remote from its
borders remain severely limited. (Pares, ID0-104)
K. For at least the next few years the size and composition of
Soviet general purpose forces will probably be governed by Compromises
In a continuing debate within Soviet ruling circles rather than by any
clearly-defined strategic and political concept. Economic considerations,
Sino-Soviet relations, and developments within NATO will be critical
factors influencing the future of Soviet theater forces.. In our view,
the chances are good that the number of personnel and divisions in
theater ground forces will decline moderately over the next six years.
Modernization of ground, naval, and air general purpose forces will
tend to correct current deficiencies. (Faros. Ty 105116)
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