SPECIAL WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT ON "WILL GORBACHEV UNFURL A NEW INITIATIVE IN BERLIN?"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300060009-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 19, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
NIC-02162/87
19 May 1987
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on "Will Gorbachev
Unfurl a New Initiative in Berlin?"
1. Soviet leader Gorbachev's planned trip to Berlin in late May,
scheduled only two weeks before the President's visit to the city, raises
the possibility of a new Gorbachev-style "surprise" initiative related to
Berlin, the German Question, or European arms control. Some Soviet
officials have hinted vaguely that Gorbachev could unveil a dramatic
initiative during his trip, occasioned by the Warsaw Pact summit meeting.
Those hints come against the background of rumors and reports
suggesting that the Soviets may announce one of a variety of
initiatives, ranging from a withdrawal of some of their ground force
divisions in Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia being the country usually
mentioned) to a profession of support for the ultimate reunification of
East and West Germany.
2. NIO/EUR and NIO/USSR convened a special joint warning meeting of
community represenatives on 11 May to review the reporting and reach some
tentative judgments on (1) what the Soviets might want to achieve with any
new initiative, (2) the sorts of initiatives they might float to further
such objectives, and (3) the impact that different initiatives might have
on European opinion and on U.S. and Allied rights in Berlin. This
memorandum reflects the main judgments of that meeting, but it is not a
fully coordinated community product.
3. Soviet Objectives. At a tactical level, the Soviets could use the
occasion of Gorbachev's visit to upstage anticipated U.S. initiatives on
Berlin. A new Soviet initiative would also be consistent with the
Gorbachev regime's intent to keep the U.S. off balance through a continuing
series of new or reformulated initiatives, particularly on arms control.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DERV MULTIPLE
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There is virtual unanimity in the community that any Soviet
initiative at this time would be designed to support Moscow's current arms
control objectives. In particular, the Soviets are looking for a way to
defuse resistance in Europe, and especially in Bonn, to the sort of INF
agreement that appears to be shaping up in Geneva. More broadly, they are
attempting to create further pressures from Europe for flexibility in the
U.S. position in the START and Defense and Space talks, as well as INF, by
capturing the initiative on arms control issues and putting Washington in
the position of being the party that is seemingly impeding resolution of
remaining differences.
These considerations do not preclude Soviet gestures on the
German Question or on Berlin itself. It would not cost
Gorbachev much to affirm the desirability of inter-German
reconciliation or even the eventual removal of the Wall, and he
may offer some proposal to facilitate contacts between the two
halves of Berlin.
However, the Community does not anticipate a major substantive
initiative on Berlin -- certainly not one that would detract
attention from the Soviet agenda in arms negotiations. An
initiative on European security or arms control is much more
likely.
4. What Sort of Arms Control Initiative?
A Grandiose Proposal. Most likely may be a move by Moscow to
pull together several recent or long-standing initiatives by
the USSR and its allies into a single package that could be
billed as a plan for ensuring the peace in Europe. This could
include elements of the Pact's 1986 Budapest appeal on
conventional force reductions, a proposal for a nuclear- and/or
a chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe, and the recent
Polish proposal for an expanded MBFR negotiating framework.
The recent rumors suggest Gorbachev could propose the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from Central Europe. This
sort of proposal might be the most cost-free for Moscow, but
would be seen in Europe as just another round of Soviet
propaganda, and would thus be unlikely to have much impact.
A Unilateral Soviet Troop Withdrawal. The announcement of a
symbolic withdrawal of a division of two of Soviet troops from
central Europe could achieve more impact from the Soviet
perspective. Moscow recognizes that West European resistance
to its strategic arms proposals is fueled by concern about its
continuing superiority in conventional forces. Rumors have
persisted since last winter that the Soviets plan to withdraw
some portion of their troops in Czechoslovakia. There have
also been reports of a possible withdrawal of some Soviet
forces from the GDR -- ranging from hints of a token reduction
(along the lines of the 1979 withdrawal) to less plausible
rumors of a major pullback. Alternatively, a small unilateral
withdrawal could be combined with an offer of more substantial
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-- reductions in connection with a future East-West agreement. A
withdrawal of this nature would not significantly affect Soviet
military readiness in East Europe, and yet, if it proved to be
more than a sham, could pay political dividends in West Europe.
5. An Initiative on the German Question. Events of the last few weeks
Honecker's decision not to visit West Berlin and sharp GDR criticism of
West Berlin governing mayor Diepgen -- have dampened speculation about a
major Soviet initiative on Berlin or the German Question more broadly.
Given the importance the Soviets attach to their own prerogatives in
Berlin, a move to alter the status quo is very unlikely. Nevertheless,
even a modest initiative could have a major impact. Inter-German relations
is the issue of major concern to the German public to whom Moscow is
attempting to appeal. Although Berlin does not play the sensitive role of
barometer of East-West relations it once did, any significant conciliatory
gesture on the status of the city or on relations between the two Germanies
could have the same sort of impact of European opinion about Soviet policy
that some of Gorbachev's bolder moves on the domestic front have apparently
already had. An initiative on Berlin could be aired anytime between now
and when festivities marking the city's 750th anniversary wind down in
October. The problem for the Soviets, however, will be to craft an
initiative that succeeds in advancing Soviet interests in Bonn without an
equal or greater setback elsewhere on the continent:
Statement of Principles on Inter-German Relations. The easiest
step for Moscow might be a statement indicating support in
principle for improved relations and expanded contacts between
West and East Germany. There have been signs over the last few
months of an easing of Moscow's earlier resistance to East
Berlin's efforts to expand official exchanges. At the extreme,
such an initiative could include a vague statement of support
for the idea of German reunification--a move that International
Department first deputy chief Zagladin recently hinted at. The
community is virtually unanimous in stressing Soviet
unwillingness to reopen the German Question in any meaningful
way. And most analysts doubt that Gorbachev will risk even a
rhetorical gesture on reunification, due to the negative
reaction the Soviets would expect from France, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and other countries -- including the GDR
Itself.
A Proposal for Expanded Contacts Between the GDR and the FRG.
A specific proposal for a modest expansion of human contacts
between the two Germanies is a more plausible scenario, and
would be consistent with Moscow's positions in the CSCE
negotiations. Such a step could allow Gorbachev to hint at a
major shift in German strategy without raising the specter of
German reunification or tampering with post-war agreements.
Some step that would sanction expanded ties between Bonn and
West Berlin cannot be ruled out, but we judge this much less
likely than an initiative sanctioning expanded contacts between
Bonn and East.Germany. Such a move would run counter to
long-standing Soviet determination to weaken ties between the
FRG and West Berlin while strengthening those between the GDR
and East Berlin.
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III
A Crack in the Berlin Wall? A vague statement on the
desirability of eventually removing the Wall would not cost the
Soviets much; the Honecker regime itself has occasionally
expressed such pious hopes. But we judge any substantial
measures-to be extremely unlikely. Some modest first step that
would appear to herald more significant gestures down the road
is a more realistic possibility. While West Berliners (even
more than the FRG population at large) are strongly supportive
of the Western presence in Berlin, they would like to have more
freedom of maneuver to expand exchanges with their counterparts
in the Eastern part of the city. There are a number of steps
that could fit within this general framework; one of the more
plausible would be an announcement that Moscow is prepared to
expand the number of crosspoints along the Wall. This step
would have the appearance of facilitating contacts while still
allowing Moscow and East Berlin to control access and egress
from the Eastern sector.
Allied Access to Berlin. We judge any new initiative directly
affecting Allied (or Soviet) access to Berlin as highly
unlikely. A conciliatory gesture might serve Moscow's
objective of appealing to German opinion, but would raise
questions that Moscow clearly does not want to raise about its
continued adherence to the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement
governing the city's status. On the other side of the coin, we
believe the Soviets will continue to look for opportunities to
circumscribe Allied rights in Berlin, but believe a new
initiative in this direction would be counterproductive to
Soviet aims at present and would be implausible in the context
of a Gorbachev visit to Berlin or a Warsaw Pact summit.
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SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report
Outside Attendees
Gloria J. Kroll
Andrew Cook
Anita Friedt
Robert K. German
Patrick Murphy
George M. White
Inside Attendees
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NIC-02162/87
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DIA/DE-1
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State/INR/SEE
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? NIC-02162/87
SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on "Will Gorbachev
Unfurl a New Initiative in Berlin?"
Distribution:
(Outside Distribution)
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(Robert German)
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