WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300070028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 24, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #03580-87/1
24 August 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
A Warning and Forecast meeting on Sub-Saharan Africa was held on
18 August 1987. The attached report has not been coordinated with
meeting participants but is being circulated to them. If they believe
their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant
additional concerns, I'll report further to you.
Attachment:
NIC #03580-87
This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from Attachment.
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NIC #03580-87
18 August 1987
1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics
at the monthly warning meeting on 18 August.
2. Brief Items:
(a) Chad - Aozou Fighting. CIA led the discussion of prospects for
further Chadian gains against remaining Libyans in the Aozou Strip,
particularly those at, Aozou Airbase.
-- President Habre is committed to dismantling Aozou Airbase. Recent
Libyan air attacks from it add urgency to achieving this goal, and he
is disposed to launching an offensive as soon as possible.
-- Logistical constraints may retard Habre's timing somewhat, however.
Chadian resupply activities have been slowed by a malfunctioning C-130
and cessation of French C-160 flights to the north.
-- In the meantime, the Chadians will mop up Libyan forces that twice
failed in counterattacks against Aozou village.
Habre's strategy may be once again to lure Libyan forces into leaving
their strongholds on offensive missions, so that his troops can ambush them and
follow their retreat through emplaced defenses such as minefields. INR
suggested that Habre might wait as long as a month before attacking Aozou
Airbase, wanting time to prepare fully and erode Libyan morale through
harassment. Most analysts believed that he will take action sooner than that,
however, since he cannot afford a war of attrition now that Libyan supply lines
are shorter than his.
Warning Note: We continue to believe that Habre will succeed in taking
Aozou Airbase, but again caution that his margin for error is narrow and his
forces could sustain serious damage should they miscalculate. Moreover, even
if the airbase is disabled, Chadian forces in the north will still be
vulnerable to airstrikes launched from southern Libya.
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(b) Angola: Is a South African Incursion Imminent? DIA's presentation
emphasized that a South African cross-border attack from northern Namibia to
assist UNITA could occur with little warning.
-- A recent deployment of Mirage aircraft to northern Namibia was probably
for reconnaissance over southern Angola.
-- G-5 artillery pieces are out of garrison and may have been moved across
the border, erha s for use in the Cuito Cuanavale area should Angolan
troops appear able perhaps
drive successfully on Mavinga.
-- South African Defense Forces have built up generally in northern
Namibia for annual training activities, providing potential cover for
an incursion.
DIA believes that if the South African's calculate that their intervention is
required to stall an attack on Mavinga, ground rather than air forces may be
the preferred instrument. They probably wish to avoid risking scarce air
assets, particularly in light of Angola's new air defense capabilities in the
battle zone.
Warning ote: With the Angolan government offensive against UNITA picking
up s edam, the likelihood of South African intervention is rising. South Africa
can bring to bear significant force on short notice. The most likely target
would be Cuito Cuanavale, especially if Mavinga seems seriously threatened.
(c) Mozambique - Rising Insurgent Activity. DIA in its presentation
indicated that RENAMO has intensified its efforts in recent months:
-- Only Zambezia Province has seen a decrease in incidents of hostility.
Elsewhere, RENAMO is stepping up initiation of hostile contacts.
-- Both the Mozambican and the Zimbabwean military forces in country are
suffering rising WIA.
-- Attacks on facilities in the Beira Corridor are increasing.
Warning Note: RENAMO seems now to be in a position to launch its seasonal
offensive almost anywhere in the country once the rains begin this fall.
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(d) Mauritius - Election Prospects. CIA predicted that the election to
take place on 30 August will be close--and fairly conducted--but that the party
alliance led by Prime Minister Jugnauth will retain power. The outcome will
hinge on campaigning over three issues:
-- Both Jugnauth and his principal opponent, Paul Berenger, head of the
opposition Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), are taking credit for
Mauritius' impressive economic performance since 1982.
-- The MMM is exploiting the scandal in which several police and
government officials were caught dealing in drugs.
-- Berenger, a white, is attempting to compete for support within the
Hindu community.
The advantages of incumbency as well as Berenger's tenuous ties with
Hindu voters will likely tip the scales toward Jugnauth. Should the MMM
unexpectedly win, domestic policy would see few changes, but Mauritius would
shift somewhat leftward in foreign relations by:
-- asserting louder claims to Diego Garcia,
-- moving a bit closer to Soviet positions on global and regional issues,
-- and possibly renewing relations with Libya.
Warning Note. None.
3. Main Item: South Africa - Strikes, Bombs, and Nuclear Isolation. CIA
led the discussion on internal developments, which produced consensus that:
-- The mineworkers' strike is unlikely to end soon. While both management
and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) leadership would like to
extricate themselves from the confrontation, NUM won't settle without
wage increases and the mine owners believe that layoffs and their
one-month stockpile allows them time to sap the workers' will.
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-- The government is reluctant to intervene and would probably initiate a
harsh crackdown only if strike violence threatened to get out of hand
or if the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) called for
sympathy strikes. Should this occur, of course, South Africa would be
on the brink of another round of widespread violence.
-- The government seems also to be exercising restraint in the wake of the
30 July ANC bombing that injured 68 outside a military headquarters in
Johannesburg. While a stern warning was issued to the governments of
Zambia and Mozambique, South Africa for now is likely to be more
selective than in the recent past in making cross-border strikes,
hitting only hard targets.
-- President Botha seems to be seeking a relaxation of tensions, both
domestically and abroad, to facilitate carrying out his reform
program. By pushing back the next general election, he has bought
himself three more years to convince whites that his is the best
course. He is also seriously contemplating the release of at least one
imprisoned ANC leader, not only as a gesture to promote black-white
dialogue but probably as well to gain favorable publicity in the West.
The upcoming Commonwealth meeting as well as President Reagan's
Anti-Apartheid Act report to Congress this fall are no doubt on his
mind.
CIA also led a discussion on the threatened suspension of South Africa
from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):
-- The IAEA General Conference beginning 21 September will be heated, with
both South Africa and Israel the targets of growing expulsion movements
motivated largely by political considerations.
-- Were South Africa suspended despite US efforts, Pretoria would perceive
yet another example of the futility of relying on Washington.
-- Suspension would have little practical effect for South Africa,
however. It already has a virtually self-sustaining nuclear fuel
program, so, if anything, the absence of IAEA involvement would add to
South Africa's freedom of maneuver. Nonetheless, the South Africans
value international contacts with experts in this field (particularly
with regard to nuclear safety) and want to stay in the IAEA.
Warning Note: If current strike activities expand and provoke substantial
government intervention, widespread and perhaps sustained violence will likely
erupt. South Africa stands a good chance of suspension from the IAEA, which
would be a damaging precedent for the international "safeguards" regime.
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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa
warning meeting:
EXTERNAL:
DIA/DI0
DIA/DE-4
DIA/DB-8D
DIA/JSI-5B
Air Force
Navy
State/INR
NSA
DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/OIA
DDI/OIR
DDI/LDA
NPIC
FBIS
DDO/AF
ICS/OHC
O/NIO/Warning
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/06: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300070028-2