"SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY" REPORT ON YUGOSLAVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400140024-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 31, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence ?
Washington, CA0505
NIC-03236-88
National Intelligence Council 31 October 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution
FROM: Marten van Heuven
National Intelligence Officer for Europe
SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on Yugoslavia
1. We convened Intelligence Community analysts recently to discuss
Yugoslavia, survey the recent unrest there, and pose the question whether the
country can survive in its present form. Following is a "sense of the
Community" report of that meeting, prepared by Assistant
National Intelligence Officer for Europe. Thougn not a Tully coordinated
document, it has been circulated for interagency review and reflects the
general consensus of the Intelligence Community.
YUGOSLAVIA: WILL THE FEDERATION HOLD TOGETHER?
2. Summary. Yugoslavia faces its greatest threat to stability since the
1940s. The federal system itself is being challenged by Serbian party leader
Slobodan Milosevic, who has mounted an aggressive campaign designed to assert
Serbian dominance in the federation. Despite recent setbacks -- and
increasing opposition from other regional and federal leaders -- Serbian
nationalism remains a potentially explosive challenge to Yugoslav cohesion.
While the Yugoslav federation will probably stagger through in weakened form,
there is also a risk that heightened ethnic tensions will provoke widespread
violence or increased separatist tendencies, raising the possibility of the
country's dismemberment.
-- Yugoslavia is a pivotal state between East and West. The US has a
strong interest in seeing the country survive as a stable and
independent state and in encouraging its halting efforts toward
internal liberalization and closer links to the West.
Our ability to influence these events, though limited, would be
enhanced by a strong reaffirmation of US commitment to human rights
and the rule of law, economic freedoms via the market, and the
country's independence and freedom from outside interference.
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SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on Yugoslavia
3. Background: The Yugoslav National Question. Yugoslavia's creation
in 1918 was the product of two opposing conceptions: whether it was to be
a centralized state under Serbian domination or a loose federation of
autonomous national units. The issue was left vague, but the arrangement
favored the Serbs, who constitute just over a third of the population. The
constitution affirmed the "unity of the Serb, Croat, and Slovene peoples"
but ignored the Macedonians and treated Montenegrins as if they were Serbs.
The arrangement degenerated swiftly to dictatorship.
-- None of these fundamental national issues have been resolved in the
70 years of Yugoslavia's existence. They are at the heart of the
present crisis. The issues are strikingly similar to those of
1918.
4. After the Second World War, Marshal Tito's answer to the national
question was a federal arrangement that kept the Serbs in check. Unity at
the federal level was provided by the Communist Party and Tito himself.
(The slogan was "Yugoslavia: six republics, five nations, four languages,
three religions, two alphabets, one Party.") Tito was able to beat back
several threats to federal unity, but only at the price of accommodating
greater regional autonomy. Upon his death in 1980, Yugoslavia was neither
centralized enough for effective federal leadership nor decentralized
enough for market forces or genuine federalism to take hold.
5. Yugoslavia Post-Tito. Now there is no Tito, and hardly any Party,
to provide central authority and hold the country together. (The Yugoslav
army remains a guardian of federal unity, but it is ill-equipped to provide
political leadership.) The economy is in crisis, with inflation running at
more than 200 per cent and a huge foreign debt undercutting any attempts at
recovery. North/South divisions are sharper. The Northern republics --
Catholic, Western, and relatively prosperous -- go one way; the Orthodox
(and Moslem), Eastern, and poorer Southern republics, another. The North
is increasingly loath to subsidize the South, particularly at a time of
economic stringency and growing labor unrest. The national question has
become as much a matter of economic as of political autonomy.
6. The Current Challenge. Yugoslavia faces its greatest threat to
stability since the 1940s. The federal system itself is being challenged
by Serbian party leader Slobodan Milosevic, whose vision for Yugoslavia
appears closer to the 1918 arrangement than the Titoist model.
Milosevic aims at reasserting Serbian control over Serbia's multi-
ethnic "autonomous provinces" of Kosovo and the Vojvodina. He also
wants to increase Serbia's weight within Yugoslavia as a whole -- by
changing the balance of power within existing institutions, assuming
power himself, or even altering the make-up of the federal system.
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SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on Yugoslavia
-- His methods are unconventional, not to say unconstitutional.
Operating from a power base among local and county bosses in Serbia,
he has seized control of the Serbian media and organized nationalist
demonstrations directed against Albanians and other ethnic groups.
- Milosevic draws support mainly from within Serbia but also among
Serbs in neighboring republics, where he is projecting himself as an
alternative to the weak federal government and a way out of the deep
economic crisis.
-- Escalating labor unrest fuels the process by further undermining the
federal government's authority, though it may soon turn on Milosevic
as well.
7. Milosevic's increasingly aggressive campaign has sparked a backlash
from other regional and federal leaders. He succeeded in ousting the
leadership in the Vojvodina but failed in similar attempts in Kosovo and
neighboring Montenegro. And his challenge galvanized opposition from Party
leaders in other republics, who joined forces at the October 17-19 Party
plenum to condemn Serb nationalist excesses and reject Milosevic's demand
for a purge of the Party Central Committee (which he planned to pack with
supporters). Other federal institutions have also shown more determination
in meeting the Milosevic challenge head-on:
-- The Federal Executive Council and State Presidency convened a rare
joint meeting, at which they strongly reaffirmed their support for
economic reforms.
-- The Federal Assembly passed constitutional amendments giving Serbia
somewhat greater authority over its autonomous provinces but leaving
intact the consensual decision-making system at the federal level.'
8. Although Milosevic has been turned back for now, his challenge is
by no means over. The forces that propelled his Serb hegemonist drive are
still at work and now have a momentum of their own. At a minimum, we can
expect Milosevic to mount further demonstrations within Serbia and continue
to exert pressure on Kosovo for the removal of its leadership. Should he
push harder -- through larger, more provocative demonstrations or actions
outside the Serbian republic -- the danger to stability would rise
sharply.
9. The Year Ahead: Three Scenarios.
-- #1: The Federation Staggers Through. Given Yugoslavia's recent
past, this is probably the most likely for the near term. It would
have Serbia consolidating power within the Serbian Republic but not
beyond. Other republics would continue largely to go their separate
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SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on Yugoslavia
ways, albeit with wary eyes focused on Milosevic; jointly agreed
reform programs would prove insufficient to reinvigorate the federal
system. Central authority would be the lowest common denominator of
what individual republics chose to accord federal institutions. The
economy would deteriorate further; labor unrest would increase;
ethnic tensions, especially in Kosovo, would remain potentially
explosive. It would be a weak and unstable situation, but one which
could hold for some months or even years to come.
#2: Toward a More Genuine Federalism. There is now a small window
of opportunity for this more hopeful evolution. Leaders in the key
republics, shocked out of complacency by the Milosevic challenge,
could take their federal responsibilities more seriously and work
toward a more viable federation on the basis of decentralization and
market reforms. The effort would require an accommodation of some
Serbian demands but would not necessarily entail institutional
change. Neither this nor any other scenario would offer quick
solutions to Yugoslavia's economic crisis nor provide a formula for
eliminating ethnic conflicts, some of which are simply intractable.
But decentralization would facilitate economic recovery via the
market and help contain the country's growing regional diversity.
#3: A Centralized, Serb-Dominated Federation. This scenario would
have Milosevic rebounding to force his will on the Kosovo and then
the Montenegrin leaderships, and ultimately on the federation as a
whole. Banking on his strengthened position and the collapse of
alternative federal leadership, he would try to present the Slovene
and Croat leaderships with a fait accompli. The Army, under this
scenario, would discard its initial opposition; its Serb-dominated
officer corps would redefine its federal role along Milosevic lines.
Milosevic would take over leadership of the federation, which would
exist in name but not in substance. (A "Serb-dominated federation"
is probably an oxymoron, like "fried snowballs.") Though not an
inconceivable scenario, it is hard to see it evolving without major
violence or toward anything but an authoritarian regime. Separatist
tendencies would increase sharply, particularly in Slovenia and
Croatia; they could either tear the country apart or lead to
forcible suppression.
10. Alternative Scenario: Widespread Violence. Milosevic's active
encouragement of Serbian nationalism has increased the danger of violent
confrontation. Given Yugoslavia's volatile past, it is surprising that
greater violence, or the emergence of domestic terrorism, has not occurred
already. Although ethnic tensions seem to have abated for now, a spark
could touch off a cycle of violence and repression that could overwhelm
security forces, paving the way for widespread bloodshed and breakdowns in
public order.
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SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on 'Yugoslavia
Kosovo remains potentially explosive. Heightened Serbian pressure
could lead to an escalating cycle of violence and repression going
well beyond the level of the 1981 riots. Leaders in other republics
would be inclined to leave matters to the Serbs, but violence on
a wide scale would inevitably become a federal matter.
If the 800,000 Serbs in Croatia began to mount demonstrations on the
scale of those already taking place in Serbia, there could be a
recurrence of the bloody Serb-Croat clashes of the wartime period.
Similar clashes could erupt in multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Yugoslav Army has strongly condemned nationalist demonstrations
and, for now at least, could be expected to respond to a federal
call to restore order. But its capacity to maintain discipline in
the event of protracted, violent national conflict is uncertain.
11. Soviet Attitudes. However benign Gorbachev's approach toward
Yugoslavia may seem, there is little doubt that the Soviet leadership would
like to restore lost influence and certainly would not like to see the
country tilt further toward the West. Like us, Moscow is concerned over
rising instability and has reservations about Milosevic's challenge to the
federation. But while Moscow has sought to improve relations and expand
contacts at the federal and republic levels, its ability to influence
internal developments is limited. So long as the Yugoslav situation does
not deteriorate markedly, Moscow will stay in the background. At least
three evolutions would portend more direct Soviet economic and political
involvement: a major realignment at the federal level (toward Serbian
domination, e.g.), prolonged and severe instability, and/or a much greater
Western economic and political role in Yugoslavia.
12. Implications for the United States. US interests in Yugoslavia
are largely negative: to deny Yugoslav territory to the Soviet Union and
its allies for strategic uses, to keep Yugoslavia from returning to closer
political relations with the East, and to avert major instability that
might heighten East-West tensions and risk US-Soviet competition over the
allegiance of a successor regime. We also have a stake in protecting our
investments and in drawing the country toward greater cooperation with the
West on counterterrorism and other issues. And it is in US interests to
see the Yugoslav experiment succeed, or at least not to fail. Tito's
defiance of Moscow and his efforts to build a viable, independent state
acquired a symbolic importance -- in Eastern Europe and indeed globally --
far beyond the country's intrinsic geopolitical weight. However chaotic
and uneven Yugoslavia's record post-Tito, the country has evolved generally
toward internal liberalization and closer links to the West. It is in our
interest to see these trends continue and see the country survive as an
independent state under conditions of greater stability and unity.
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SUBJECT: "Sense of the Community" Report on Yugoslavia
13. The Limits of US Influence. Yugoslavia looks to us for political
and especially economic support. While the country's acute economic needs
give us a degree of influence over its economic policies, our ability to
help is dwarfed by the magnitude of Yugoslavia's economic problems. There
is in any case little we can do to influence the outcome of the challenge
raised by Serbia to Yugoslavia's federal structure. Attempts to do so
would probably be counterproductive.
-- Siding with or against Milosevic appears a no-win proposition. It
would be seen as interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and
would be more likely to backfire.
-- Such efforts, either alone or with our European allies, would
increase the likelihood of Soviet involvement. The risks of
US-Soviet confrontation in the Balkans would increase.
14: The approaches most likely to serve US interests are ones based on
US values and longstanding policy toward Yugoslavia:
-- respect for liberty, human rights, and the rule of law;
-- support for economic freedoms via the market; and
-- commitment to the country's independence and freedom from outside
interference.
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Marten van Heuven
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