COMMENTS ON GEORGE KENNAN'S MEMORANDUM ON POLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030026-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 14, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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I~-.:Lh .ORA DU 'OR Th : DlRSCTOR
14 August 1958
SUB J CT: ' C-*= s on George Kerutaa*s memorandum on
Poland
1. 1 am sorry to have delayed so
n Poland is so
cornruents on George l n iian'e mczno, I have hawked it around
the office a bit to see what some others thought. By and large
we all this ht it excellent, as you did. We share l u-au's
cautious optimism about the loag-range prospects of the Polish
economy. We have heard other reports of the extraordinary
freedom with which the Poles t&M, as distinguished fro
constraint In writing. We share Ieonan's views of the relation
of the western boundaries to the Polish political question. And
we agree that it would be foolish to believe that band is on
the road to real selfwmmarcipation fro
nd even more foolish to talk much of "liberatl '1,
tactics which might apse
forces
c{nceedingly del icate balance of
the balance
, how
out that country, especially any
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CLASS. CNtQOE-U TO. TS S C
NEXT R?VIEW DATE: -----
AUTH: Hit 10-2
2 D11ATERRA-gq- REVIEWER{
0104,
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optimistic assertion,
ails forth doubts and. fears.
two paragraphs that Jolty Huixenga (fresh back from
grata after he ;bad. Conte a&plarted our govAral agreement
"It is probably too early to entertain an a,
(his U (2)) of the prospects
ants bays raAde substantial gai
collectivi.
Satiion was tsrmiixoted. out the increase in agricultural output
and food sappia
t has been aecempa * ed by
Sharp parke is erea ses. I lm wags-pr a salans?ts bast evids
tightened for salaried workers, &xA this to one se
increased labor imtisciptias. alcoholism, black ? ark.tesari ,
etc. More broadly, it reams to be proud that a socialist
ac*ao y a an be iu fUfree and half-piaa . It is possible that.
the attempt to operate in "As want' will shy aaccontnats imbalASCAW
w4 ultimately Is" to an attasapt to groin parse sweep cootrc .
This to tars would be likely to have important political c
gnrnc as. I de sank may that the outlook is for economic crisis
but *sly that we, ought to reserve judgmeat.
*'Keimaneat memo Wives me with the feeling that sees
b political situation a greater degree
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is Justified. The retreat from the liberties s in October 1956 --
both for isdfvid ,l Palos and for Poland vis-a-vis the USSR
has continued. This "mot alienate n who have
sc c.pt*d Gormuulna's leadership a. the least ul alto r
The church-state conflict has been reap e
revisiouist o-psli.t sure
resivad as a main target.
d to provoke a sbaewd
acc.b
C
aati-
Polish -arty aed
practi c
of instability
nt sad we must C onto to raga rrd the Polish
as $,ect to+ t
l read Thtomws.''s Views, l c
Thus opWoxe of the. spate Of affairs in
sort of knife-edge that Poland. its*
. We air
,y, engaged In prodtirrttoa of
NIZ 12-6-58: The tlook Is Poland, which to s eduled for tAC
C oasideratioa on 9
r. By that time, if not before, are
it is
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sty
shall have made our e s as definite at we. can, and eon=it them
to paper.
4. One interesti a
in Polish minds, to have
bad+Ue East oriole appears
At the time
now and fairly extreme S vict
Polish
ire
in to have abated.
Ambassador beam thinks -.. as do we - that the danger of a big
Soviet-Polish crisis has pas
t for the time tieing.
5. A final specslatioa. ,eouao's last eyrie a in the
14 was in the ',fast and worst days of S . Is it
e that he found Poland & ,little
because be saw such a
:Th
Acti chairman
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Comment on George Kennan's memo on Poland
1. We in this office also think that George Kennan's analysis of the
Polish situation is excellent. It strikes a nice balance between the
oddities of the situation, such as the emanspated conversation of the
Polish intelligentsia., and the facts of life, which include the still
very disagreeable Communist proclivities of regime leaders. We share
Kennan's cautious optimism. concerning the long-range future of the
Polish economy. We agree that it w ould be foolish to believe that
Poland is on the road to real self-emanpation from the Soviet orien-
tation, and even more foolish to talk much of "liberation's, or to use
tactics which might upset the exceedingly delicate balance of forces
operating in and on Poland.
2. One of the best parts of Kennan's remarks is his passage on
Germany, and on the question of the Western boarders of Poland. We
agree with his analysis. I have heard it argued, however, from premises
like those of Kennan, that if we could get Poland's present western
borders accepted by the Germans we would thereby appreciably ease
the Soviet pressure on Poland. This I do not believe. The other
forces binding Poland to the Soviet Union are too strong. Indeed,
if we showed our hp.nd in such a move it might persuade the Soviets
that we were meddling too easily in Polish affairs, and they might
undertake some unpleasant retaliation.
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u ~..J
3. In. this office, there is some ten ncy for the old to divide
from the young on the question of Ge any. On the whole, our young
men think that the Germans have hot their bolt, andhave now got
enough sense to keep the pce. The old men of the Board still tend
to distrust the German; and to harbor misgivings about them, and
to suspect that soar day they cause another disaster. I do not know
whether the Bo d's view represents the wisdom of age or just the
survival of prejudice. But we do not blame the Poles for being
alarmed y the Germans.
4. One interesting aside -- the Middle East crisis appears, in
Polish minds
to have taken th
h
t
ff W
,
e
ea
o
arsaw. AT, the time of the
Nagy execution, the Poles were highly nervous and sompbfficials antici-
pated some new and fairly extreme Soviet move against Polish non-conformity.
But these fears now seem to have abated. Ambassador Beam thinks -- as do
we -- that the danger of a big Soviet-Polish crisis has passed, at least
for the time being.
Our esfimate on Poland -- NIE 12.6-58: The Outlook in Poland --
e
is c ently b
ing prepared and is scheduled for IAC cansideration on
9 eptemb
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13 August
FROM: J. Huiz
1. I think there are two additional lines of comment on the
Kennan memo which you might include:
a. It is probably too early to entertain an optimistic
view (his II (2)) of the prospects of the Polish economy. It
is true that the peasants have made substantial gains since
collectivization was terminated. But the increase in agricultural
output and food supplies in the free market has been accompanied
by sharp price increases. The wage-price squeeze has evidently
tightened for salaried workers, and this is one source of the
increased labor indiscipline, alcoholism, black-marketeering, etc.
More broadly, it remains to be proved that a socialist economy
can be half-free and half-planned. It is possible that the attempt
to operate in this way will only accentuate imbalances and ulti-
mately lead to an attempt to reimpose sweeping controls. This in
turn would be likely to have important political consequences. I
do not say that the outlook is for economic crisis, but only that
we ought to reserve Judgment.
b. Kennan's memo leaves me with the feeling that he sees in
the Polish political situation a greater degree of stability than
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is justified. The retreat from the liberties won in October
1956 -- both for individual Poles and for Poland vis-a-vis the
USSR has continued. This must alienate many who have thus
far accepted Gomulka's leadership as the least painful alternative.
The church-state conflict has been reopened. The Bloc's anti-
revisionist campaign must surely have had the Polish party and
regime as a main target. While I do not think the Soviets had it
in mind to provoke a showdown crisis, it is likely that they intend
to conduct guerilla political warfare against the Poles until an
acceptable degree of conformity to Soviet ideology and practice
is restored. The point is that important e0 of instability
continue to be present, and we must continue to regard the Polish
scene as subject to unexpected and even violent developments.
2. With respect to your comment in Para. 2: I think you under-
estimate the favorable effects of a Polish-German border settlement.
It is not so much that this would liberate the Poles from Russia all
at once. But it would basically modify the power environment in which
Polish policy operates, and would give it much greater chance to exercise
small options for an independent line, the cumulative effect of which
could be important over a period of time. The real futility in discussing
the advantages of a Polish-German border settlement lies in the fact that
this can come only after an internal German settlement, and this latter
seems as remote as ever.
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3. Your Para. 3: I do not know whether you would count me here
among the young or old. I confess to feeling a little old, but in any
case I do not wish to be associated with either the young or old view
of Germany as stated here. I have always argued in the Board's dis-
cussions of a possible future German threat that consideration9of German
goodness or badness,'sense or foolishness are irrelevant. What matters
is that the power position of any future Germany has been wholly trans-
formed., as compared with the world of pre-1939. This is due both to the
nature of weapons developments and to the enormous comparative growth
of Soviet power, a power which is applied principally, moreover, to
defending Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe against all comers. Germany
must be thought of as a power on the scale of France or Britain and her
capacity for mischief correspondingly reduced. In these terms, it is
hard to see how policies of adventurism and menace could ever again
present themselves to Germans as a plausible alternative.
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