WAR AND PEACE IN THE SPACE AGE, BY LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030031-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 25, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030031-3 /
DOCUMENT NO.
NO OUNCE IN CLASS.
ECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: IS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
ha TO.2
APR 1980
DATE: REVIEWER: 018645
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
25 July 1958
SUBJECT: War and Peace in the Space Age, by Lt. Gen.
James M. Gavin
1. This book deals with three things: (a) General Gavin's
life and military experiences, (b) how the US came to lag be-
hind the Soviets in missile and earth satellite development,
and (c) military organization and strategy for the "space age."
It goes over ground which is by now pretty familiar from the
writings of Henry Kissinger and others. Its relevance to our
work is indirect; there is virtually no comment on or discussion
of intelligence.
2. The thesis is pretty much as expected: limited war,
tactical use of nuclear weapons; air transportability of troops,
supplies, weapons. There is a useful discussion of the poten-
tialities of reconnaissance satellites. A chapter on Soviet policy
and strategy is orthodox. There are urgings for reform of our
military policy, more expenditure, better understanding, and
above all for more effort in scientific and technological research
and development.
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3. The book is not very inflammatory, save perhaps for
some harsh remarks about Defense Sec retary Wilson a few
acid comments on Defense Department decisions leading to
our "missile lag" behind Russia, and some interesting material
on the influence of business concerns in determining US weapons
expenditures.
4. Two or three particular remarks of interest:
'gibe manned bomber/ will become obsolete as soon
as surface-to-air missiles carrying nuclear warheads are
on site in numbers. It is important that we realize this is
the determinant of the manned bomber's date of obsolescence...
not when either side has ICBM's to replace it. The ICBM is
the consequence of manned bomber obsolescence, not the
cause."
Page 4
"I have no concern for the defense of Western Europe
if nuclear weapons are not used...With all of Western
Europe and most of the satellites arrayed against her, I do
not think Soviet prospects of conquering Europe by nonatomic
means are very bright, and they realize this. The tactical
nuclear war is the real danger..." pages 147-8
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"...there is a considerable quantity of intelligence
to support the view, a view held by a number of people in
the intelligence business, that in the competition to develop
Long-Range Striking Forces. the Soviets have led us to be-
lieve that they were building a sizable long-range bomber
force, whereas, in fact, they were investing most of their
national product for their long-range forces in long-range
ballistic missiles. The Soviets merely built and displayed
before Western observers sufficient long-range manned
bombers to cause apprehension, and consequent reaction
on our part. We in turn embarked upon a very expensive
long-range manned bomber program." page 24
5. There is an interesting suggestion for "technological war
games", with teams representing nations A and B being given
current problems in technology, providing each other with false
information, making decisions in the light of information supplied
by a control group, etc. (pages 243-245)
6. I attempt no summary of General Gavin's recommenda-
tion as to US strategy, save to report that he thinks it a mistake
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to station IRBM's in the UK because the UK is too far forward
(they should be in southern Lurope and Africa); and that he
thinks it folly to deprive the West Germans or any allies, of
nuclear weapons. And of course he believes in preparing for
limited wars.
7. The book is scheduled for publication on 25 August.
ABBOT E. SMITH
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