CAPTAIN RALPH METCALF, USN, REPRESENTING THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A006200040029-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 23, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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Toal r
23 December 1954
MEMORANDUM FOR TBE RECORD
SUBJECT: Captain Ralph Metcalf, USN, representing the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
In the opening minutes of the first agency meeting on NIB, 100-5
(China Trade Controls), Captain Metcalf began with some very harsh
comments on the subject draft. He said it was slanted and that
its conclusions rested upon practically no intelligence. As the
discussion developed, he went on flat-footedly to allege that the
paper had been purposely slanted in behalf of the UK and that he
thought the reason why mention of the UK had been minimized in the
paper was that the Board had already decided to recommend release
of the paper and knew that release would be impossible if the paper
were full of derogatory references to the British. I remonstrated
at the time and the meeting proceeded.
At about this point he tabled a redraft of the entire paper
(copies of which will be available in the development file) which
he said represented an objective presentation based upon evidence.
As time went on it became apparent that his principal source of
information, which he continuously referred to as authentic evi-
dence, were the interrogation reports of a Hungarian refugee woman
who had at one time worked in the Hungarian trade control depart-
ment. Our colleagues from OIR, notably Fried, were very familiar
with this material as were others around the table. No one present
seemed to hold this witness in Captain Metcalf 's high degree of
esteem. He also noted that he had "checked his draft outll with
officers of the ISA office/SecDef. I asked him what kind of an
intelligence organization was this. He did not rise to the bait
but went on to say that he had also checked it out with the people
in OSO/SecDef. I asked him what these initials stood for and when
he told me "Office of Special Operations" I inquired was this also
another intelligence organization. He took these two cracks of
mine, which I fancied to be possessed of long barbs, with such
equanimity that I honestly believe he may not be aware of the im-
propriety of checking an intelligence paper out with a principal
policy user.
In his comment on the subject draft, Captain Metcalf also
noted that many items in the terms of reference had not been treated
in the draft and went on to indicate that he believed that a coor-
dinated terms of reference was in fact the outline of the intended
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paper. Abbot Smith rose to this one and pointed out that terms of
reference could in no sense be construed as the outline of the
paper; that this matter had been discussed in dozens of agency
meetings, and that he, Smith, had actually explained it to Admiral
Layton at a Princeton meeting -- how estimates were made and why
terms of reference could not be considered an outline of the
finished estimate.
At the time of the break-up of the afternoon session on the
paper, I addressed the room, recalling that Captain Metcalf had
earlier in the day alleged a purposeful slanting of the paper and
an omission of derogatory reference to the UK so that the paper
could be released to the British. I asked Captain Metcalf if he
would like to withdraw these remarks. He said he would withdraw
them but was still puzzled as to why a paper on this subject would
be written as this one was. I called his attention to his own sub-
stitute draft paper and asked him whether he thought his own were
entirely objective.
He asked to see me after the meeting and came in to my office to
pursue an old point and take up a new one. The old point bore on
the terms of reference serving as an outline to the paper. Again I
explained to him that a terms of reference frequently asked questions
to which an affirmative answer mould be of great importance; to which
a negative answer would be of no importance. I told him that when
such questions were answered negatively, they were not as a general
rule mentioned in the Board draft text. Indeed, I could only think of
one case (Italian scientific and technical capabilities) where negative
findings had seemed important enough to warrant a statement in the
estimate.
The new business had to do with enlarging terms of reference to
answer specific questions asked by future consumers. He noted that
in the last Indo-China paper, Mr. Amory had presumably expressed the
Planning Board's desire for an estimate of what would happen if the
Indo-China elections were postponed as a result of Western action. He
pointed out that some of his consumers in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, notably in the ISA area, had also asked questions while
the estimate was in process and wanted to have them answered by the
IAC community.
It seemed to me that he and Layton are probably piqued by what they
fancy to be discriminatory action against the interests of their prin-
cipal consumers. Looking back at some of the sentences and paragraphs
-2
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which Metcalf had wanted included in estimates and which found no
takers around the table, it seems to me that the principal reason
for Board resistance was that his suggestions partook too strongly
of the nature of policy recommendations or were of a degree of de-
tailedness considered improper for an NIE.
Whatever the reason, I think there is trouble brewing on this
front which we should be on guard for.
^
3
SHERMAN KENT
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