SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 19, 1958
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 1 1 ? 5 ? 5 8
19 August 1958
034640
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N? 259
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-5-58
(Supersedes NIE 11-5-57, SNIE 11-10-57
and portions of NIE 11-4-57)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES
AND SPACE VEHICLES
CONCLUSIONS
(The full text of this estimate is
being published separately)
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 19 August 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Direc-
tor of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to
the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
JoGeSECRET
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DECLASSPO..).
CLASS. ?HANGED
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? .
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and of per-
sons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination
may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
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b. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with appli-
cable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrange-
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3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain
it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be
requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22
June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified:
CONFIDENTIAL
This mater
the Na
WARNING
t ormation affecting
ens the United States
n the meaning of the onage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794,
mission or revelation of which in any manne
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTR1BUTION:
White House
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Department of State
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Operations Coordinating Board
Atomic Energy Commission
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES
AND SPACE VEHICLES'
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of
guided missiles and space vehicles, including earth satellites, through 1966,2 and to
analyze factors affecting Soviet operational capabilities in these fields.
FOREWORD
This estimate supersedes ME 11-5-57, SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROB-
ABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD, 12 March 1957, and SNIE
11-10-57, THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM, 10 December 1957, as well as those para-
graphs dealing with guided missiles (paras. 108 through 114) in NIE 11-4-57, MAIN
TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1957-1962,12 November 1957.
The new estimate, like its predecessors, is made in the light of our previous judg-
ments that the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and
is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date. It also as-
sumes that through 1966 there will be no international agreements on the control
of armaments or of outer space.
The estimate is intended primarily to reassess and update our estimates of
probable Soviet missile development programs, missile characteristics, and first oper-
ational capability dates. Some discussion is provided on factors likely to affect Soviet
acquisition of substantial operational capabilities with missile systems, and Soviet
capabilities to place various arbitrarily-selected quantities of ICBMs in operational
use are estimated. The reader is cautioned that Annex A of NIE 11-5-57 is no longer
applicable.
For the most part, changes in estimated missile characteristics and first
operational capability dates result from the accumulation over the past year of a
considerable body of new evidence. Of the 13 missile systems estimated as probably
available for operational use in 1958 or earlier, we now have direct evidence on the
existence of nine; we also have direct evidence on Soviet development of an ICBM.
The title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
2 For comparability with earlier estimates on this subject, the terminal date chosen for this estimate is
the same as that of its predecessor, NIE 11-5-57, SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PRO-
GRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD, 12 March 1957.
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For some of these systems the evidence is extensive, while for others we have only
limited information relative to characteristics and components. Serious intelli-
gence gaps remain, particularly with respect to the operational status of various
systems. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient evidence available on which to
base an estimate of the vulnerability of Soviet systems to specific electronic counter-
measures.
In making this estimate in a field where positive intelligence remains limited,
we have considered the available evidence in the light of estimated Soviet military
requirements, known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields, and US
guided missile experience. The entire study rests upon our belief, now well-sup-
ported by evidence, that a concerted and continuous Soviet research and development
effort in guided missiles was underway by 1948.
For guided missiles, except where noted otherwise, the operational capability
dates given are the earliest years during which we believe missiles could probably have
been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit, thus consti-
tuting a limited capability for operational employment. We estimate that when
they first become operational, the missile systems discussed herein will have a sys-
tem reliability of 40-60 percent, and that improvement will occur thereafter.' For
space flight activities, the dates given are the earliest possible time periods by
which we believe each specific accomplishment could be achieved.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The USSR has continued to press
ahead with its extensive guided mis-
sile research and development, generally
along the lines indicated in our previous
estimates. As a result of this effort, the
USSR now has available for operational
use a variety of missile systems. Soviet
achievements in ballistic missiles have
been especially impressive and have con-
tributed to early successes in the USSR's
space flight program. Substantial suc-
cess in developing surface-to-air missile
systems has also been achieved. Avail-
able evidence is not sufficient to indicate
equal emphasis and similar success in
other Soviet missile programs.
The term "system reliability" is here defined as
the percentage of missiles which function ac-
cording to specifications from missile launching
to detonation in the target area, excluding mal-
functions prior to launching.
2. By itself, each of the guided missile or
space programs estimated as a future de-
velopment appears feasible both as to
technical achievability and date attain-
able. However, some programs may be
slowed or even halted by the competition
of other missile or non-missile delivery
systems, unforeseen development or pro-
duction difficulties, rapidity of obsoles-
cence, changing military requirements,
and/or broad considerations of Soviet
national policy. On the other hand, a
significant advance in one or more of the
programs might be possible if a scientific
breakthrough is achieved.
3. Surface-to-surface missiles. We be-
lieve that the Soviet ballistic missile de-
velopment program has emphasized reli-
ability and simplicity, rather than minia-
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turization or extreme refinement of de-
sign. System mobility appears to have
been a basic consideration since the
early developmental stages. In develop-
ing longer-range systems, maximum use
has been made of proven components.
4. Since 1954 the USSR has probably had
available for operational use ballistic mis-
siles with maximum ranges of about 100
nautical miles (n.m.) , 200 n.m. and 350
n.m. We believe that, depending upon
various operational factors, nuclear, high
explosive (HE) or chemical (CW) war-
heads would be used with these missiles.4
In addition, the USSR probably now has
operational a very short range anti-tank
missile equipped with shaped-charge HE
warhead.
5. An extensive Soviet program to devel-
op a 700 n.m. ballistic missile is indicated
by a long series of test firings, averaging
about two per month since 1955. We esti-
mate that this missile probably became
operational in 1956. On the basis of
about a dozen test firings over the past
year, we estimate that the USSR will
also probably have operational in 1958 a
modification of the 700 n.m. missile, capa-
ble of an 1,100 n.m. range. Nuclear war-
heads would almost certainly be used in
both these missiles, although we do not
exclude the possibility of CW use in the
700 n.m. missile.
6. Intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). Since August 1957, the USSR
has test fired at least four and possibly
six missiles to a distance of approximately
3,500 nautical miles. We believe this rep-
Estimated nuclear warhead capabilities for these
and other missiles discussed in this estimate are
given in Annex C (limited distribution under
separate cover).
resents the development of an ICBM sys-
tem which, when first operational, will
probably be capable of delivering a nu-
clear payload to a maximum range of
about 5,500 n.m., with an accuracy (CEP)
of 5 n.m. and a system reliability of about
50 percent. By the early 1960's reliabil-
ity will probably be considerably im-
proved. At the beginning of the period
1962-1966, the CEP could be about 3 n.m.,
and could be reduced to about 2 n.m. later
in the period.
7. Available evidence is inconclusive as to
the designed payload-carrying capacity
of the Soviet ICBM, which we have pre-
viously estimated as about 2,000 pounds.
Recent evidence and re-analysis may in-
dicate that the USSR is developing an
ICBM with a 5,000 pound payload. Seri-
ous logistical and operational problems
are associated with missiles of the sizes
necessary to deliver 2,000 or 5,000 pounds
to a range of 5,500 n.m.; these problems
would be greater in the case of the heavier
payload. In the light of this considera-
tion, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM
is designed to carry a nuclear payload of
about 2,000 pounds, although there is a
possibility that it is designed to carry
about 5,000 pounds.
8. The USSR will probably have a first
operational capability with ten prototype
ICBMs at some time during calendar
1959; the possibility should not be disre-
garded, however, that in the latter part of
1958 the USSR may establish an ICBM
capability with missiles comparatively
unproven as to accuracy and reliability.
9. We believe that Soviet planners intend
to achieve a sizeable ICBM operational
capability at the earliest practicable date,
although we have no direct evidence on
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Soviet preparations for ICBM produc-
tion and deployment. We estimate that
the USSR has the technical and indus-
trial capability to produce ICBMs, com-
plete launching facilities, establish logis-
tic lines and train troops at a rate suffi-
cient to have an operational capability
with 100 ICBMs 5 about one year after its
first operational capability date (i.e. some
time in 1960) , and with 500 ICBM's 5
two or at most three years after first op-
erational capability date (i.e. some time in
1961, or at the latest in 1962) . This im-
plies that the USSR could achieve an op-
erational capability with ten or more, but
less than 100 ICBMs by the end of 1959,
depending upon when during the calen-
dar year the first operational capability
is achieved.
10. Surface-to-air-missiles. For several
years the USSR has had in operational
use a fixed surface-to-air system which
we believe is now capable of employment
against aircraft at ranges up to 20-30
n.m., with greatest effectiveness at alti-
tudes of 30,000 to 60,000 feet. This sys-
tem is known to be employed in a dense
and costly complex of 56 sites around
Moscow; targets of lesser importance will
probably be provided with considerably
less elaborate surface-to-air missile de-
fenses. We believe the Soviets also have
available for operational use a surface-
to-air missile with similar characteristics,
except for improved capability to inter-
cept small, supersonic targets. It is
probably suitable for employment either
with the Moscow system or with a semi-
mobile system.
5 These numbers are selected arbitrarily in order
to provide some measure of the Soviet capacity
to produce and deploy ICBMs; they do not rep-
resent an estimate of probable Soviet require-
ments or stockpiles.
11. Neither of the above systems is likely
to be effective against very low altitude
attack. We therefore estimate that the
USSR is developing and will probably
have in operation in 1959-1960 a surface-
to-air system with a maximum range of
about 15 n.m., effective at altitudes from
50 feet to at least 40,000 feet. We esti-
mate that for improved defense of critical
areas, the USSR will probably have avail-
able in 1960-1961 a surface-to-air system
with effectiveness at altitudes up to 90,-
000 feet and a maximum range of 75-
100 n.m.
12. We estimate that in 1963-1966 the
Soviets will probably achieve a first op-
erational capability with a surface-to-air
system of limited effectiveness against
ICBMs. Such a system could possibly
have some effectiveness against IRBMs.
A surface-to-air system with limited ca-
pability to counter reconnaissance satel-
lites could and possibly will be developed
for use in 1960-1964; a more sophisticated
system could be integrated with an anti-
ballistic missile system at a later date.
13. Air-to-air missiles. Three short-
range systems which employ HE war-
heads are now estimated as operational.
Two are believed to have radar guidance
with ranges of 5-6 n.m.; the other, with
a range of up to 21/2 n.m., is believed to
use infrared guidance. Most currently
operational Soviet fighter aircraft types
could be modified to employ these mis-
siles. In 1960 the USSR will probably have
available a 15-20 n.m. air-to-air missile.
14. Air-to-surface missiles. The present
operational system is capable of carrying
a nuclear or HE warhead at subsonic speed
to a range of about 55 n.m. against well-
defined targets, such as ships. With dif-
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ferent guidance, the system could be em-
ployed against land targets. We esti-
mate that the USSR is probably develop-
ing and may now have operational an air-
launched decoy to simulate medium or
heavy bombers. We believe that the
USSR will probably develop and have op-
erational in 1960-1961 a supersonic mis-
sile with improved guidance and a range
of at least 100 n.m., suitable for employ-
ment against a wide variety of targets.
15. Naval-launched missiles. The Soviet
navy probably now has the capability to
launch subsonic cruise-type missiles from
a few converted submarines of conven-
tional design, although there is little di-
rect evidence of submarine-launched mis-
sile development in the USSR. We esti-
mate that the current system could de-
liver nuclear warheads against land tar-
gets within about 200 n.m. of the launch-
ing submarine. These cruise-type mis-
siles could be launched by a submarine
only after surfacing. We believe, how-
ever, that in 1961-1963 the USSR will
probably have a submarine-launched bal-
listic missile system available for first op-
erational use in a prototype submarine of
new design. This system will probably be
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead
from a submerged submarine to a range
of about 1,000 n.m.
16. We estimate that during 1959-1960
the USSR will begin equipping its sur-
face fleet with surface-to-air missiles
having a maximum range of 20 n.m., with
effectiveness at altitudes from 50 feet to
at least 40,000 feet. A Soviet shipborne
surface-to-air system for use against tar-
gets at higher altitudes and longer ranges
will probably become available in 1960-
1961. These systems, while primarily for
air defense, could be modified for employ-
ment against surface targets. Late in
the period of this estimate, the USSR will
probably also have available a missile sys-
tem for use in anti-submarine warfare.
17. Soviet space programs. We believe
that the ultimate foreseeable objective of
the Soviet space program is the attain-
ment of manned interplanetary travel.
The program is supported by extensive
Soviet research efforts in a number of re-
lated fields, including rocket propulsion,
electronics, space medicine, astrobiology,
astrophysics and geophysics. Present ac-
tivities appear to be directed toward the
collection of scientific data and experi-
ence applicable to future space accom-
plishments, the ICBM program, and basic
scientific research. Soviet requirements
for space vehicles have probably been
established for fairly specific scientific
and/or military purposes in accordance
with a planned step-by-step progression.
18. Soviet success in ballistic missile de-
velopment and earth satellite launchings
to date leads us to estimate a considerable
Soviet capability for early accomplish-
ments in space including: surveillance
satellites, recoverable aeromedical satel-
lites, lunar probes and impacts, lunar sat-
ellites and planetary probes to Mars and
Venus (1958-1959) ; "soft landings" by
lunar rockets and recoverable manned
earth satellites (1959-1960) ; a manned
glide-type high altitude research vehicle
(1960-1961) ; heavy earth satellites and
manned circumlunar flights (1961-1962) ;
and manned lunar landings (after 1965) .
While each individual achievement ap-
pears feasible as to technical capability
and earliest date attainable, we doubt
that the USSR can accomplish all of these
space flight activities within the time
periods specified.
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SIMPLIFIED TABULAR SUMMARY'
Probable Soviet Guided Missile Development Program
Arbitrary Operational Maximum Payload Design
Designation Date Range Weight and Type Altitude
Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SS-1 * 1954 100 n.m. 1,500 lbs. Nuclear,
HE, CW
85-2 * 1954 200 n.m. 2,000 lbs. Nuclear,
HE, CW
SS-3 * 1954 350 n.m. Up to 5,000-6,000 lbs.
Nuclear, HE, CW
58-4 * 1956 700 n.m. Up to 5,000-6,000 lbs.
Nuclear, poss. CW
55-5 * 1958 1,100 n.m. Up to 3,000 lbs.
Nuclear
SS-6 ICBM * 1959 5,500 n.m. 2,000 lbs., poss. 5,000
lbs. Nuclear
Ground-Launched Anti-Tank Missile
SS-a. t. prior to
1958
Submarine-Launched Missiles
SS-7
cruise-type
SS-8
ballistic
1955-56
1961-63
6,000 yards 20-40 lbs. HE
200 n.m.
1,000 n.m.
2,000 lbs. Nuclear
1,000 lbs. Nuclear
Ground-Launched Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-1 * 1954 20-30 n.m. 500-800 lbs.' 30,000-60,000 ft.
SA-2 * 1957 15-30 n.m. 500-700 lbs.' 20,000-60,000 ft.
SA-3 1959-60 15 n.m. 150-250 lbs.' 50 ft.-40,000 ft.
SA-4 1960-61 75-100 n.m. 500 lbs.' Up to 90,000 ft.
SA-5 1963-66 limited effectiveness against ICBMs
Shipborne Surface-to-Air Missiles
SA-6 1959-60 20 n.m. 150-250 lbs.' 50 ft.-40,000 ft.
SA-7 1960-61 75-100 n.m. 500 lbs.' Up to 90,000 ft.
Air-to-Air Missiles
AA-1* 1955-56 5 n.m. 70 lbs. HE
AA-2 1955-56 2Y2 n.m. 25 lbs. HE
AA-3 1958 6 n.m. 50 lbs. HE
AA-4 1960 15-20 n.m. 150 lbs.'
Air-to-Surface Missiles
AS-1 * 1956-57 55 n.m. 3,000 lbs. Nuclear, HE
AS-2 1960-61 100 n.m. 3,000 lbs. Nuclear
Detailed summaries of each missile category, including all estimated characteristics and other perti-
nent data, are presented in Tables 1-5 in Annex A. A summary of estimated Soviet capabilities in space
flight is presented in Table 6.
2Nuclear warheads would increase the kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and will be re-
quired for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However, HE warheads will be effective
in most applications.
* Those missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current intelligence are indi-
cated by an asterisk following the missile designation.
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