DISCREPANCY IN USE OF CRITERIA COUNTRY LISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R001100660008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 30, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO011 660008-8
DCI/ICS-87-0838
30 April 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Policy Branch
Office of Security
Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, IC Staff
SUBJECT: Discrepancy in Use of Criteria Country Lists
?,%; /9 -,,Q
1. During recent SC1 Forum focus on possible revision of DCID 1/20, 1 did
some shallow research on the manner in which different agencies and
departments view the grouping of countries that they consider "hostile" or in
some way threatening to our national security and to our personnel who hold
security clearances and SCI accesses. As you may already be aware, there is
no uniform agreement within government in identifying these countries. This
is not intended to bring your office directly into our attempt to arrive at a
list of countries to be considered dangerous for personnel holding SCI
access.
2. What I do want to accomplish is to inform you of some lack of
uniformity within the Office of Security. The Industrial and Certification
Branch, Clearance Division, is using a 1985 "Criteria Country" list compiled
by the Attorney General's office (attachment A). This list is used as a basis
for adjudication in investigations and waivers. Staff and Operations Branch,
Clearance Division, is using the list of countries found in the attachment to
DCID 1/20 (attachment B). A cursory review will reveal that the lists are not
identical. Since DCID 1/14 is the standard against which both staffers and
industrial contractors are adjudicated, it would seem reasonable and logical
that both groups of persons would be adjudicated by the same basic criteria,
with allowance recognized for the polygraph requirements.
3. Special Activities Division admits to using the Attorney General's
"Criteria Country" list in its work, but a spokesman quickly acknowledged that
the list was not taken as a "final authority" in the considerations of that
office. External Activiti Branch uses DCID 1/20 as its guide in business
relevant to its functions.
Regraded CONFIDENTIAL when
removed from Secret attachment
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
SECRET
4. Both lists are of utility, and it goes without saying that the Agency
can modify the official stance on any given countries dependent on changing
circumstances in many arenas, including political and intelligence
acquisition. The discrepancy cited in Clearance Division is presented for
your consideration and any action you deem appropriate.
Attachment:
a/s
2
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
SECRET
CC 1 SCMOI 25X1
Distribution of DCI/ICS-87-0838:
Original +1 - Addressee (w/att)
1 - CM chrono (wo/att)
1 - CCISCMO chrono (wo/att)
1 - ICS Registry (w/att)
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699R001100660008-8
OGA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699R001100660008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699RO01100660008-8
CONFIDENTIAL DCID 1/20-5
COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL, AND
ASSIGNMENT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A
HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
Attachment to DCID 1/20
(Effective 11 March 1985)
Listed below are countries and areas in which there is deemed to be a risk to SCI resulting
from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of persons who have, or who have
had access to SCI. All territory controlled by the listed countries is included, irrespective of
whether the national boundaries involved are formally recognized by the United States
Government. The use of vessels owned or controlled by a country listed is also included.
Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Bulgaria
Cambodia (Democratic Kampuchea)
Chad
China (People's Republic of [includes Tibet])
Cuba (except U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo)
Czechoslovakia
El Salvador
Ethiopia
German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
Guyana
Hungary
Iran
Iraq
Laos
Lebanon
Libyan Arab Republic
Nicaragua
North Korea (and adjacent Demilitarized Zone)
Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic)
Poland
Romania
South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)
Soviet Sector of Berlin (East Berlin)
Syria
USSR
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP89M00699R001100660008-8