POLISH RELIABILITY: A POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 22, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
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UFHPOL/POLISH SITUATION COLLECTIVE,
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RUFDNSI/CINCUSAREUR DCSI HEIDELBERG?GE//AEAGB-C(RE)/AEAGB-PDN//
RUSNNOR/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2-P(CM0)//
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WARSAW 8118
E.O.,12356: DFCL OADR
TAGS:: PGOV, KPRPr MCAP, PL
SUBJECT: POLISH RELIABILITY: A POLITICO-MILITARY ASSESSMENT
REF: A) 83 WARSAW 9552, 8) WARSAW 10798, C) 83 WARSAW 10930
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
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2,..SUMMARY: POLISH RELIABILITY WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT
DEPENDS ON AN INTERPLAY OF' OBJECTIVE:(HILITARY STRUCTURE 40
RELATED) AND SUBJECTIVE (POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL)
FACTORS. THE. PRESENT MIX OF THESE FACTORS PRODUCES A
PICTURE: OF DECLINING POLISH RELIABILITY BOTH PER SE AND
IN SOVIET PERCEPTIONS. THE DECLINE IN RELIABILITY IS
POTENTIALLY AGGRAVATED BY SOVIET INSISTENCE'ON ACCELERATED
POLISH FORCE MODERNIZATION WHICH, WITHOUT ACCOMPANYING
LOANS OR GRANTS, WILL'HAVE A FURTHER ADVERSE EFFECT ON
THE POLISH ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND HENCE ON RELIABILITY.
MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS ARE:FACED WITH A DILEMMA:
RELIABILITY WILL ALSO BE DECREASED IF THEY DO NOT PRESS
FOR-FORCE MODERNIZATION A$, . THE` POLISH. ARMED FORCES L'AG'
EVEN FURTHER BEHIND IN MILITARY CAPACITY,.THIS
DILEMMA HILL,BE AN IMPORTANT, THOUGH CONCEALED, FACTOR
AFFECTING POLISH SELECTION OF SOLUTIONS'FOR EASING ITS
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CRISIS.
3. GENERAL: THE RELIABILITY. OF THE USSR'S WARSAW PACT
ALLIES IS A PERENNIALIPROSLEM PERPLEXING NO DOUBT TO
SOVIET.AND WESTERN POLICY-MAKERS AND OBSERVERS ALIKE.
IT IS GENERALLY CONCEDED IN.THE,WEST (AND THE:SOVIETS
MIGHT AGREE) THAT THE RELIABILITY OF ONE OR ALL OF,THE
PACT NATIONS WILL BE DEPENDENT ON THE,~CIRCUMSTANCES SUR-_
ROUNDING THE,EVENT.OR EVENTS IN WHICH THE RELIABILITY IS
PUT,TO THE TEST. THIS "SCENARIO DEPENDENCE" IS TAKEN
AS AN,AXIOM OF THIS REPORT, WHICH TRIES TO LOOK.AT THE
GENERALISTATE'OF POLISH RELIABILITY AS IT,EXISTS TODAY,
BUT'. WITHOUT REGARD TO ANY PARTICULAR STRATEGIC OR
POLITICAL= CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THIS. THE' AIM IS BROAD, GENERAL
CONCLUSIONS.BASED ON A FEEL. FOR THE TEXTURE AND NATURE
OF THE: POLISH-MILITARY SCENE (FOR THE:,M'ILITARY IS THE
FOCUS IN QUESTIONS OF-RELIABILITY) RATHER THAN ON THE
MARSHALLING OF SPECIFIC FACTS.
4, AIM OF: THE REPORT: WITHOUT ' ATTEMPTING' TO BE.EX-
HAUSTIVE, THIS REPORT ASSESSES WHAT THE INTERACTION OF
OBJECTIVE:, AND- SUBJECTIVE: FACTORS AFFECTING. RELIABILITY
HAS PRODUCED IN TERMS OF PRESENT POLISH RELIABILITY
WITHIN THE PACT. THE FACTORS THEMSELVES ARE SUMMARIZED,
JUDGEMENTS MADE ABOUT POLISH RELIABILIITY PER SEr, SOVIET
CONFIDENTIAL
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i Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
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PERCEPTIONS OF POLISH RELIABILITY ESTIMATED, AND SOME;
Iy, CONCLU$IQNS.MADE ON POLISH RELIABILITY IN AGGREGATE AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE'FUTURE.
5. FACTORS INFLUENCING RELIABILITY: THE'RELIABILITY
OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES, LIKE MOST ANY OTHER MILITARY
IN THE WORLD, DEPENDS ON THE COMBINATION AND INTER-
ACTION OF A MULTITUDES OF FACTORS. FOR THE; PURPOSE OF,
THIS REPORT, THEY MAY BE'SEPARATED INTO TWO BROAD
CATEGORIES: OBJECTIVE FACTORS (E.G., COMBAT CAPABILITY
AND READINESS,OF UNITS; NATURE AND STATUS OF MILITARY
MATERIAL: PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL' FITNESS OF!RECRUITS
ND SOLDIERS;,ADEQUACY OF COMMAND,, CONTROL, COMMUNICAT-
ION AND INTELLIGENCE; SUPPLY.AND TRAINING OF SUPPORT
UNITS; ETC ETC') AND SUBJECTIVE FACTORS
? (E .G. ATTITUDE
OF THE'POPULACE TOWARDS THE . MILITARY;' SELF-IMAGE OF THE'
MILITARY AND ITS STSTUS IN SOCIETY; DOMESTIC OR
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL.'CURRENTS AND CROSSCURRENTS, AND'
THEIR IMPINGEMENT ON THE MILITARY; ATTITUDES OF-ALLIES
TOWARD THE NATION AND.ITS ARMY,, AND VICE VERSA (THIS
MAY BE THOUGH OF AS 'LOYALTY");' SOCIAL:COHESION IN THE.
NATION AS A WHOLE; ETC, 35:) THSE SETS OF FACTORS
CORRESPOND ROUGHLY (IN REVERSE ORDER) TO THE TWO ELEMENTS
IN THE, TERM "
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6. MIX OF CATEGORIES: NEITHER OF THE CATEGORIES NOTED
ABOVE IS PURE: IN EACH THERE EXISTS AND FUNCTION ELEMENTS
PROPER TO THE OTHER, AND NEITHER IS NECESSARILY DOMINANT'
IN THE RELIABILITY-JUDGEMENT EQUATION . HOWEVER, IN
CONFIDENTIAL
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IS NOW,PASSING THROUGH SUBJECTIVE FACTORS SEEM
GENERALLY TO BE MORE,I+MPORTANT'THAN OBJECTIVE!FACTORS.
ON THE OTHER HAND, OBSERVERS NOT IN CONTACT DAILY WITH
THE:TEXTURE OF POLISH SOCIETY (TO BRING--THE MATTER
DOWN TO THE CONCRETE) TEND TO GIVE SOME SUBJECTIVE'
FACTORS MORE WEIGHT THAN THEY DESERVE. A CASE IN POINT
IS THE WEIGHT GIVEN TO THE.POSTULATED DISAFFECTION AND
DISSENT'OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF-RECRUITS WITH
RESPECT'TO THE PRESENT POLISH LEADERSHIP. THIS APPARS
TO LOOM LARGE'IN THE MINDS OF ANAYSSTS, BOTH IN WESTERN AND
CONFIDENTIAL.
II' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
 { Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
CONFIDENTIAL
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EASTERN, BUT APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE~EFFECT ON THE
CABABILITIES OF THE ARMY TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY.
7. OBJECTIVE FACTORS: OVER THE LAST 6 YEARS, INCLUDING
THE4 YEARS SINCE THE EVENT..IN GDANSK IN 1980, THE
COMBAT, CAPABILITIES OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES, BOTH IN
THEMSELWES.AND IN RELATION TO THE~CAPABILITIES OF REST
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OF THE' WARSAW, PACT ARMED FORCES, HAVE SLOWLY DECLINED
AND CONTINUE TO.DECL'INE~, POLISH MILITARY EQUIPMENT IS
ALREADY'AT LEAST TWO GENERATIONS BEHIND`.SOVIET AND EAST,
GERMAN GEAR (E.G. POLISH T-55.TANKS,,QT?64 APCS AND
TOWED ARTILLERY, VERSUS SOVIET T-64/72/80 TANKS,.BMP
IFVS AND SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY), WHILE OTHER PACT-
COUNTRIES AREACQUIRING MORE MODERN EQUIPMENT FASTER.
MOREOVER, WHAT THE POLES DO.HAVE.IS DETERIORATING
THROUGH LACK F ADEQUATE M T
A
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CTICAL UNITS (BATTALIONS, REGIMENT), WITH OPERATIONAL
UNIT (DIVISION AND ARMY).FIELD EXERCISES --
EXCEPT SOME FEW COMMAND POST.EXERCISES BOTH ALONE AND
COMBINED WITH,OTHER PACT ALLIES -- UNOBSERVED OVER THE
PAST 4-5 YEARS. FINALLY, POLISH FORCE.40DERNIZATION
IS PROCEEDING..AT A SLOW PACE'. THE INTRODUCTION OF
T-72 TANKS AND BMP IF,VS IS VERY,SLOW, AND.ALMOST NO
NEW SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY HAS BEEN INTRODUCED.
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9
ENANCE AND REPAIR. THE
SERIOUSNESS QP THIS.PROBLEM,CAN BE JUDGED BY ALMOST
DAILY HORATORY ARTICLES ON THE'SUBJECT IN THE ARMY
NEWSPAPER. POLISH UNIT TRAINING HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY
SHORTAGE OF MONEY AND FUEL, AND, THE"ARMY, AS ADMITTED
IN- ' REPEATED ARTICLES BY THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER OF
THE-ARMY OVER,THE LAST 18 MONTHS, HAS ADOPTED.THE
,EXPEDIENT OF USING OLDER EQUIPMENT IN TRAINING TO EASE
WEAR AND TEAR.ON NEWER WEAPONS AND VEHICLES,.TO THEPROBABLE
DETRIMENT'OF,SKILL.ACQUISITION ON THE'PART OF
SOLDIERS. POLISH FIELD EXERCISES HAVE CONCENTRATED ON
TA
~~ ONLY. IN ARMY AIR DEFENSE MISSILES (SA-8) AND IN AIR-
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jj' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
ARNING RADARS (OF DUMESTIC PRODUCTION) HAS SOME IM-
PROVEMENT BEEN NOTED IN THE PAST 2-3 YEARS.
8. OBJECTIVE FACTORS AND'THE ECONOMY:. THE DEBILITATED
POLISH ECONOMY TODAY CANNOT COPE',WITH THE RESOURCE
INVESTMENT IMPLIED IN GENUINE MILITARY MODERNIZATION.
CONFIDENTIAL.
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/09: CIA-RDP87R00529R000300310019-8
CONFIDENTIAL
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