PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700700001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 20, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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DATE T7 FILE
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Central Intelligence Agency
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
20 November 1987
Pakistan: Prospects for Political Stability
Summary
President Zia's domestic political opposition is badly
divided and not now capable of effectively challenging either him
or Prime Minister Junejo. The opposition has not been able to
profit from the Afghan sponsored bombing campaign. Moreover,
Junejo's Pakistan Muslim League will prevail in the municipal
elections scheduled for 30 November. Friction may be growing
between Zia and Junejo as the Prime Minister seeks to broaden his
authority, but we do not believe that the two leaders are close
to falling out.
Over the next two years, Zia and Junejo will be faced by
potentially serious challenges to Pakistan's long-term political
stability. Some accommodation with Benazir Bhutto that would
allow her party to be reintegrated into the political system
would go far toward meeting the grievances of the opposition.
The government also must address ethnic and sectarian discontent,
particularly in Sind Province with its Shia minority.
President Zia and Prime Minister Junejo benefit greatly from the
weakness and divisions of their domestic political opposition. The
strongest opposition party remains the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) led by
Benazir Bhutto. We believe, however, that the PPP has not regained the
momentum it forfeited in August 1986 when Bhutto sought and lost a test of
power on the streets with the government.
This memorandum was prepared by Pakistan/Bangladesh
Branch, South Asia Division, Office o Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Information as of 20 November was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries should be directed to Chief, South Asia Divisionr-
NESA M#87-20111
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The PPP has serious organizational problems that we believe blunt its
ability to capitalize on Benazir's personal popularity and the veneration
many Pakistanis feel for her late father. Particularly in the crucial
Punjab Province, the PPP has suffered a serious loss of second-rank
leaders--many to the ruling Pakistan Muslim League--according to the US
Consulate in Lahore. The impact of these losses was recently illustrated
by the PPP's humiliating defeat in a September National Assembly
by-election in Punjab that even Benazir admitted was conducted fairly.
Bhutto also has had little success in uniting other Zia and Junejo foes
who share little beyond their opposition to the government:
--The most recent effort to unite the extra-parliamentary opposition,
an "All Parties" conference convened in mid-August, was a failure,
according to US diplomats.
--Benazir has since begun to ease her party away from the Movement for
the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), an uneasy coalition of anti-Zia
parties which do not recognize the administration's legitimacy.
Benazir is also courting two opposition blocks in parliament:
--The Jamaat-i-Islami, a well organized, conservative religious party
that has feuded with Junejo over religious legislation and control
of the Karachi Municipal Corporation.
--The center-left Parliamentary Opposition Group, whose members have
been frustrated by their lack of influence in parliament.
Although both have been willing to flirt with the PPP, neither has shown
any inclination to quit parliament. We believe that their leaders suspect
th
t Bh
a
utto is merely seeking to exploit their discontent for her gain.
The Impact of the Bombing Campaign
Major opposition political leaders, such as Bhutto, have been reluctant
to exploit the increased Afghan bombing campaign for political advantage.
Through mid-November, we estimate nearly 300 persons have died and 1,300
have been injured by bombings--double the 1986 toll. We assess the
opposition does not want to spark a popular counterreaction, particularly
among Punjabis who might repudiate them for weakening the nation in the
face of an external enemy. The opposition's thinking undoubtedly is
influenced by the memory of the August 1983 MRD civil disobedience campaign
when Zia successfully discredited it after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
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Minor opposition leaders who have tried to turn the bombing campaign to
their advantage by visiting Kabul, endorsing Kabul's program of national
reconciliation, or calling for a change in Pakistan's Afghan policies have
found their opportunism ineffective or counterproductive. Awami National
Party leader Wali Khan, a pro-Soviet leftist who has long advocated
recognizing the Kabul regime and ending assistance to the Afghan
resistance, has been unable to broaden his appeal beyond a narrow following
in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Retired Air Marshal Asghar
Khan, the chairman of the Tehriq-Istiklal Party, visited Kabul in early
September. According to the US Consulate in Lahore, Asghar Khan thought
this move would revive his fading political fortunes, but it precipitated
the breakup of his party. Other opposition leaders including Bhutto, have
declined subsequent invitations to visit Kabul.
The Local Bodies Elections
The PPP sees the municipal elections scheduled for 30 November as its
best opportunity to regain momentum. The PPP did well in the 1979
elections, winning more than two-thirds of the races. In 1983, however,
the party adhered to a decision by the MRD to boycott local elections. PPP
leaders concede this was a major tactical error because it caused a mass
exodus from the party. Determined not to repeat their mistakes, PPP
leaders have announced the party will back "democratically minded
candidates"--an effort to evade restrictions on party lables in the
balloting. US diplomats note this decision was taken without first seeking
the approval of the PPP's allies in the MRD, further alienating the PPP
from them; some have already announced that they will not participate in
e e7 e
o
th
ct
ns
Two facets of the municipal elections are likely to work to the PPP's
disadvantage. The elections will be fought on local issues and will be
cast largely in terms of popularity contests between local community
leaders, thus blunting the coattail effect of Benazir's strong personal
appeal. The local and municipal councilors who will be elected are
dependent upon the provincial and federal governments--firmly controlled by
Junejo s Pakistan Muslim League (PML)--for their funds, increasing the
voters' incentive to elect candidates known to enjoy PML suaport and
t
i
empt
ng non-PML victors to join that party.
The best hope for the PPP is that the government may be overconfident.
The PML also suffers from organizational problems
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The Zia-Juneio Relationship
Tensions are growing between the President and Prime Minister, but we
believe they are far from a break.
A break is unlikely because it would be too costly for both Junejo and
Zia. Junejo knows that he is beholden to Zia for his rise to power.
Although he may be uncomfortable with this reality, we speculate that he
believes an open rupture would force the Army to side with the President.
For his part, Zia is probably disappointed that Junejo has not proven a
more effective leader. Nevertheless, Zia has staked much of his prestige
on the success of the parliamentary system he created. Removal of Junejo
t-i
_
ail
would be an ad
m
on
f f
u
Over the Longer Term
The government will have to come to terms with Benazir Bhutto and the
PPP, even if her party does not do well in the local elections. For
example, opinion polls, which we suspect understate the party's appeal,
have consistently shown that one-third of the public supports the PPP. We
believe Benazir has been pursuing a policy of legitimization by stifling
the radicals in her party and rejecting the politics of confrontation. She
has also rejected the radicals' advice to break sharply with the',
government's Afghan policies and to denounce its ties to the United States.
We believe this strategy is aimed at building PPP legitimacy in Punjab
prior to the 1990 elections. Benazir is gambling that she can position
herself as a moderate nationalist, compelling Zia and Junejo to either drop
their antipathy to her or be forced by public pressure to let the PPP into
the syrst
em
Zia and Junejo must also address Pakistan's simmering ethnic and
sectarian conflicts. Although we do not believe that these societal
divisions threaten the breakup of the country, they have the potential to
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seriously debilitate Pakistan. Two developments illustrate this trend that
we believe is likely to continue:
--The rise of the anti-Pushtoon Muhajir Quami Movement that promotes
the cause of Muhajirs, Muslims of Indian origin, and has been a
major factor in repeated rioting between Muhajirs and Pushtoons in
Karachi during the last year.
--The transformation of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Figh-e-Jaffria in 1987
from a Shia pressure group into a political party that has spawned
the creation of small, militant Sunni parties in reaction to Shia
Troubled provincial/federal government relations in Sind and the North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) are also likely to be a destabilizing factor.
A recent assessment by the US Consulate in Karachi concludes that the
federal government has been quite successful in lowering discontent against
it in Baluchistan, primarily through development programs and a wide
measure of autonomy to local leaders. Partly as a result of their refusal
to compromise with the PPP, Zia and Junejo have not pursued a similar
policy in Sind Province. Since 1983, rural Sind has grown increasingly
ungovernable and alienated from Islamabad, according to US diplomatic
reporting. The record is mixed in the NWFP where concerns generated by the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan have probably driven Pushtoons closer to
the federal government. Controversial programs such as the projected
Kalabagh Dam--attacked as a Punjabi scheme to divert water from the
NWFP--are a reminder that tensions can easily be revived.
Zia and Junejo also could face serious economic problems during the
next two years. Pakistan relies heavily on agricultural products for
export income; adverse weather would reduce already low foreign exchange
earnings. Remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf are expected to
remain at a depressed level--last year remittances fell 11 percent.
Returning workers are likely to aggravate unemployment problems, especially
because Gulf workers are more skilled than the average local Pakistani, and
returning workers would be looking for highly skilled jobs that a,re in
short supply.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/20: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700700001-4
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SUBJECT: Pakistan: Prospects for Political Stability
NESA M#87-20111
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
1 - Richard Armitage (DOD)
INTERNAL:
1 - DCI/DDCI/Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/NESA/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - DC/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/SO/P
1 - C/NESA/SO/A
1 - C/NESA/SO/S
1 - analyst
DDI/NESA/SO (20Nov87) 25X1
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