JOINT CIA/DIA MEMORANDUM ASSESSING PRESENT VIET CONG MILITARY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82M00097R000800180012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 22, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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UNITED STATES
USIB -D -24. 7/2
22 April 1965
Limited Distribution
INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Joint CIA/DIA Memorandum Assessing
Present Viet Cong Military Capabilities
REFERENCE USIB-M-383, item 6, 14 April 1965
1. The attached memorandum on the subject has been prepared by
CIA and DIA as the response to the USIB's concurrence in the Chairman's
request for such a paper at the Board meeting on 14 April (see reference
minutes).
2. Accordingly, the attached assessment is circulated herewith for
the information of the United States Intelligence Board.
Attachment
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6/ JAMES S. LAY, Jit.r
Executive Secretgry
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Excluded from automatic
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21 April 1965
CIA-DIA MEMORANDUM
An Assessment of Present
Vie ong
ary apa ties
Introduction
This memorandum supplements a previous joint
memorandum entitled "Strength of Viet Cong Military
Forces in South Vietnam," issued 17 March 1965.
The latter presented some rather disturbing con-
clusions regarding the growing strength of the Viet
Cong, particularly in the northern provinces of
South Vietnam, and the inadequacies of the ARVN.
These conclusions remain generally valid. However,
since mid-March there have been a number of develop-
ments affecting the strategic balance in South Viet-
nam. In particular there have been signs that the
Viet Cong are feeling the effects of increased US
military involvement in Vietnam. Despite these
developments, we do not yet have evidence of a
significant change in the Communist posture in South
Vietnam, nor of a change in Viet Cong capability to
increase sharply their military activity. This memo-
randum reassesses the military situation in South
Vietnam taking these new factors into account.
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The Current Reduced Level of Viet Cong Activity
1. About early March, the tempo of Viet Cong
activity began to decline and, for the past four
weeks, has been well below normal. Since mid-March
the weekly rate of Viet Cong - initiated incidents
has not exceeded 450, as compared with the 1964
weekly average of about 550. Few actions in company
strength or greater have been noted. The drop be-
gan the week after US jet strikes within South Viet-
nam were initiated on 19 February. The subsequent
lull could mean that the strikes have confronted
the Viet Cong with serious problems.
2. The lull, however, may also be due in large
part to factors independent of recent US and South
Vietnamese actions. Following their intensive post-
Tet drive, which lasted through February, the Viet
Cong may have required time to rest, evaluate, re-
plan, and regroup. There is evidence that some
units have been retraining in the use of newly
acquired bloc weapons. There are also indications
that some units have been deploying over distances
as great as two or three provinces. These suggest
preparations for new attacks, possibly to coincide
with the rainy season in May. The nature and tar-
gets of such attacks could well be determined by
recent US build-ups and the deployment of ARVN units.
3. The present military situation may bear
some resemblance to the situation in late 1962 -
early 1963 after the initial increase in US mili-
tary aid to South Vietnam, Viet Cong activity
generally showed a drop, but it is now apparent
that the Communists were devoting considerable ef-
fort to assessing the new situation and devising
tactics to meet it. Although parallel conditions
may not now exist, the Viet Cong during that period
also continued to expand their military forces,
absorbing new infiltration and creating new units.
Effects of Air Strikes Directly Against the Viet
Cong
4. During the past six weeks, Viet Cong cas-
ualties have remained high and in the two weeks
ending on 10 April were significantly above aver-
age. Government troops have initiated most of the
,operations which produced these heavy casualties.
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To a considerable extent, recent government suc-
cesses are attributed to increased air support.
In some cases, the latter has assisted government
troops in penetrating Viet Cong strongholds pre-
viously denied them. It is confirmed that a sub-
stantial proportion of recent Viet Cong casualties
have been caused by air strikes.
5. Last week, a successful attack was mounted
on the U Minh war zone in the delta. Also, a govern-
ment foray into Zone D north of Saigon resulted in
the seizure or destruction of large food and ammuni-
tion depots. On 15 April, a massive air assault
was conducted in Tay Ninh Province in the area be-
lieved to serve the main Viet Cong headquarters.
Ground follow-up indicates extensive damage to a
Viet Cong complex which had consisted of over 100
permanent structures. The three operations above
are believed likely to have disrupted Viet Cong
timetables and, at least partially, some units.
Effect on the Viet Cong of Air Strikes on North
Vietnam and Laos
7. It is still too early to assess the degree
to which air strikes conducted since 7 February
against various targets in North Vietnam and Laos
have affected the Viet Cong supply situation in the
South. It seems likely that, thus far at least,
the strikes have had more psychological than mili-
tary effect on the Viet Cong.
8. Nevertheless, the knocking out of certain
key bridges and the bombing of chokepoints such as
the Mu Gia Pass have almost certainly caused some
difficulties in moving supplies. Similarly, the
harassing of convoys by armed reconnaissance mis-
sions undoubtedly adds to the difficulties of moving
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supplies, but we have no information from which we
can really assess the over-all effect. Neverthe-
less, it appears that the movement of men and materiel
continues; it would be virtually impossible to cut
off all supply effort through the air strikes.
Infiltration from the North
9. The latest official compilation of total
infiltration of personnel from North to South Viet-
nam during 1964 was reported by COMUSMACV on 17 April
1965. This compilation carried a total of 8,130
infiltrees in the confirmed, probable, and possible
categories. Evidence of still additional infiltra-
tion during 1964 will probably develop and the final
figure will probably be substantially higher.
10. So far, there is no hard evidence to in-
dicate whether the 1964 infiltration rate is being
maintained in 1965. There is usually a gap of at
least three months, and often considerably longer,
between the arrival of an infiltration group in
South Vietnam and its detection. The fact that the
infiltration communications network in South Vietnam,
which is controlled from North Vietnam, is function-
ing normally at present suggests that infiltration
is continuing. Truck traffic from North Vietnam into
southern Laos is also continuing, according to re-
ports from road watchers in the area. The intelli-
gence community believes that a substantial part of
the materiel carried into Laos via this method even-
tually reaches the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.
12. The introduction of a regular PAVN unit
into South Vietnam would indicate an intention by
Hanoi to assume a more direct role in supporting
Viet Cong military action in South Vietnam. A move
in this direction by Hanoi was already evident in
the reported infiltration to South Vietnam during
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Nor (Jr. ardunr.
1964 of substantial numbers of young, native-born
North Vietnamese draftees and volunteers. Prior
to 1964, almost all the infiltrators were southern-
ers regrouped to the North in 1054-55.
The Manpower Situation
13. Evidence indicates that a number of Viet
Cong main force units involved in recent engage-
ments have a high percentage of infiltrated North
Vietnamese draftees or of new South Vietnamese re-
cruits.
14. Up to the present, casualties suffered by
the Viet Cong--numbering about 00,000 killed and
captured from the beginning of 1962 through March
of this year?have not prevented the growth of Viet
Cong main force strength. The bulk of Viet Cong
casualties probably comes, as do those of the gov-
ernment, from irregular forces, of which the Viet
Cong have a roughly estimated 100,000.
15. Many seasoned main force units have not
been reported engaged in the fighting of recent
weeks, and are believed to be substantially intact.
Available information rather suggests that those
units which have suffered most heavily in the past
few weeks may have been new ones. If true, how-
ever, this does suggest that much of the recent
Viet Cong manpower increase may be more quantita-
tive than qualitative. Furthermore, it suggests
that the Viet Cong, like the government, has man-
power problems.
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Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition
16. The recent information also suggests that
Viet Cong main force units are continuing to im-
prove the quality of their armament. Units in all
corps areas have been found to possess the new
family of Chinese Communist 7.62-mm. weapons. Ac-
cording to some units in the delta have
been so re-equipped only within the past two months.
Viet Cong possession of 75-mm. pack howitzers is
now accepted in several areas, and there may be
some 105-mm. artillery pieces in the northern prov-
inces. Most of these weapons were reported to be
in South Vietnam before the interdiction effort
against targets in North Vietnam began.
17. The significance of this increasing use
of bloc weapons may be twofold. It points to im-
proved firepower, but also to increased dependence
on outside supply. More intelligence is now avail-
able on the methods and routes of supply by sea,
as well as overland, and in at least two cases, in-
filtration of weapons by sea has been disrupted.
We assume that newly augmented coastal patrol ef-
forts, with increased US participation, will com-
plicate sea supply, but at this time we are unable
to assess the degree to which the over-all Viet
Cong supply position will be affected.
Viet Cong Morale
18. There are, however, other signs of Viet
Cong difficulties, some of them developing well
before the air strikes began in February. Popula-
tions in Viet Cong - dominated areas have been re-
ported restive under increased taxation by the Com-
munists in the past year. Military defections to
the government have shown some increase, including
over 400 in March and about 130 in the week ending
10 April
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21. Some of the current Viet Cong concentra-
tions began to develop months before the US began
tactical air strikes in South Vietnam and the at-
tacks against North Vietnam. It is not possible
on the basis of current evidence to determine
whether the US air effort in both South Vietnam
and the North has affected the planning which pro-
duced these concentrations. The Viet Cong may in-
deed feel under increased compulsion to demonstrate
their strength at this time. The present lull may
only indicate that further preparations for attacks
are being carried out. In any case, Viet Cong
efforts to erode government control in the country-
side will continue and are likely to be stepped up.
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