PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01117R000401040008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 13, 1986
• Content Type: REGULATION

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13 May 1986
CONFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DATE
DIRECTIVE NUMBER
PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS
The ability to maintain and protect secrets is essential to the viability
and credibility of the United States intelligence effort. In order for the
United States to receive maximum benefit from intelligence information, it
must be widely disseminated among government departments and agencies. Such
material often is inherently capable of divulging information that could
compromise the intelligence sources and methods that provided it.
The revelation of classified information to persons not authorized to
receive it is prohibited by law (Title 18, U.S.C. Section 793-794). The
unauthorized disclosure of agent identities and of classified information
concerning cryptographic systems and communications intelligence activities is
also prohibited (50 USC 421-426 and 18 USC 798 respectively). Persons
authorized access to classified information agree, as a condition of access,
to obtain official approval before any public revelation of such information.
These requirements notwithstanding, the public exposure of classified
information has become commonplace. The disclosure of classified intelligence
information is especially damaging to the national security. The compromise
of such data frequently damages our ability to gather information and conduct
intelligence activities vital to the national defense, foreign relations and
economic interests of the United States. The replacement of compromised
sources and methods is costly, imposing a needless burden upon the American
taxpayer. Often, the damage is so severe as to be irreparable.
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The protection of intelligence sources and methods is the statutory
responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), under the terms
of the National Security Act of 1947. This directive establishes national
policies and procedures to enable the DCI to protect information relating to
intelligence sources, methods and activities and provides mechanisms to
investigate the unauthorized disclosure of such information.
INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS
The Director of Central Intelligence is hereby designated the focal point
within the Executive Branch responsible to the President for combatting
unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources or methods. The heads of
federal departments and agencies will report to the DCI the unauthorized
disclosure of information relating to intelligence sources or methods and
shall ensure timely preliminary investigation of such disclosures which may
have occurred in their organizations. The objective of such investigations
will be to identify the authorized recipient of the classified intelligence
information responsible for its unlawful disclosure. The DCI is authorized to
request investigation by any government element in which an unauthorized
disclosure of classified intelligence information may have occurred, and the
head of such element is required to respond in a timely manner to the full
extent of the organization's capabilities and provide the results of the
investigation to the DCI. In particularly egregious cases, the DCI will
request the Attorney General to direct the FBI to open an investigation.
To provide prompt, effective support to this effort, the Attorney General
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will establish a
special joint investigative unit dedicated to investigating compromises of
classified information related to intelligence sources and methods. This unit
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CONFIDENTIAL
will be responsive to requests directed to the Attorney General by the DCI.
Upon authorization of the Attorney General, it will conduct investigations
independently or concurrently with investigative units of the various
departments and agencies.
The consensual and collusive nature of most unauthorized disclosures of
intelligence sources and methods makes them particularly difficult to
investigate successfully. In those cases of unlawful disclosure of
intelligence information which are especially damaging to sources and methods,
and in which the likely sources of the disclosure can be reduced to a suitably
small number, the investigation will be supplemented by the selective use of
polygraph examinations. The scope of such polygraph examinations will be
limited to determining the identity of the individual who disclosed the
classified intelligence to an unauthorized person or persons. The DCI is
authorized to request the use of selective polygraph examinations in
investigations involving the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence source
and method information, and department and agency heads are required to
respond in a timely manner to the full extent of their organizations'
capabilities. Examinations may be conducted by qualified examiners of the
agency receiving the request or by those of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In cases under the cognizance of the DOJ/FBI special unit,
polygraph examinations will be performed by the FBI. Participation in
polygraph examinations for this purpose will be voluntary. Investigative
findings shall consider all available information and the results of all
investigative efforts undertaken. Refusal to take a polygraph examination may
be considered in conjunction with other evidence in determining action to be
taken in cases of unauthorized disclosure. Such refusal shall not serve as
the sole basis for action against any individual.
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Departments and agencies, or elements thereof, originating or receiving
classified intelligence information will exercise the utmost care in
protecting it and will report to the DCI by the most expeditious means any
apparent unauthorized disclosure thereof. The DCI will report to the Attorney
General all such compromises which are potential violations of law. In
selected cases, the DCI will request the Attorney General to order an
investigation by the Department of Justice/FBI special unit. Nothing herein
precludes departments and agencies also reporting compromises of classified
intelligence directly to the Attorney General, in accordance with E.O. 12333
or other applicable law.
Departments and agencies will advise the DCI upon the initiation of
internal investigations of the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
information and will provide the DCI in a timely manner updated information on
the status and disposition of such investigations. Focal point officers of
sufficient rank to perform this function effectively will be appointed by the
heads of departments and agencies receiving classified intelligence
information.
The DCI will maintain and perform analysis of data on unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence sources and methods. Reports on the numbers,
frequency, nature, severity, status of investigation and other aspects of such
compromises will be produced for the Attorney General and other officials
requiring such data. An annual report to the President will be produced by
the DCI.
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COORDINATING POTENTIAL OFFICIAL DISCLOSURES
No public disclosures that include or are derived from classified
intelligence information, including "background briefings," shall be
considered authorized unless they are made in accordance with the procedures
established by this paragraph.
In order to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of intelligence source and
method information, departments and agencies contemplating release of any
classified intelligence information will establish procedures to ensure the
coordination of such information with the DCI prior to its disclosure to any
person not entitled to receive it. The DCI will establish a mechanism to
receive requests for the release of classified intelligence information
bearing on sources and methods and to respond in timely fashion with the
declassification of the intelligence, advice on how the release can be
accomplished without damage or with a reasoned denial of authorization to
release the information. The DCI will coordinate with appropriate senior
officials of the Intelligence Community in formulating responses to requests
for release. In all cases involving release of classified intelligence
information, documentation will be maintained to identify the material
released, by what authority, and to whom. A network of officials of
departments and agencies, coordinated by the DCI or his designee, shall be
established and maintained to facilitate pre-release advice and guidance. A
denial of release by the XI of source and method information will be binding
upon all officials of the government and may be reversed only by the President.
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DEFINITION
Intelligence information: for the purposes of this directive, is
classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources or
methods, and which is designated and clearly marked or represented as
intelligence by: (a) markings designating it as subject to control as
sensitive compartmented information, (b) dissemination and handling
restrictive markings established by DCID 1/7, or (c) an intelligence codeword
which restricts dissemination to specifically named persons or organizational
entities. This includes briefings, films, tapes or other presentations of
information derived from material requiring such markings.
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