CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 15, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SEe'RET
64Perereifirt4,1
ittd-AL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES
IN CHINA
, -zoned or rilftact Lai.ough
IS.A.STOttcm, 1;lirra VIteiGlikil of
t wrier.
ratt,:_41.74$4.3,2, ?
0'
Document No.
NO CHANGE in
DECLAS
C1as AT.
ORE 45
15 September 1947
Copy No.1.4_
'SECRET
nocul?. NO.
-1 LI
No cH/?A cti.n.
-
'VoECLAs:j-
r, 0: Ts
cLAss, ctigh.-L.
NEXTREview EVIL
AUTlinat&
W01110
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
"This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning of
the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its
transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
-
azeirEtzr
U.S.S.R.
Mg CONTROLLED By B. a. B. H.
CONTROLLED BY CHINESE
COMMUNISTS
1:=1 CONTROLLED BY NANKING
00YERNMENT
0 200 400 BOO 800 1000
STATUTE MILES
IMPLEMENTATION
OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES
IN CHINA
irgeiffr.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
1 .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
- ORE 45
15 September 1947 COPY NO 12
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA
1. Soviet Objectives in China
The long-range Soviet objective in China is believed to be identified
with the Soviet objective in all areas adjacent to the USSR: to extend the
control and influence of the USSR wherever and whenever possible by all means
short of war, and to reduce the control and influence of other major powers
in such areas. A more limited and more immediate Soviet objective -- rein-
forced by the urge to achieve security from foreign aggression -- aims toward
continuing control over the resources and development of Manchuria, and the
maintenance there of a regime sympathetic to the USSR. Manchuria forms a
vital strategic link with Korea and the Soviet Maritime Territory, and
possesses agricultural and raw material wealth that significantly complements
the expanding industrial potential of Eastern Siberia. At the same time,
denial to the Chinese National Government of Manchuria's substantial resources
and industrial potential tends to weaken China's ability to offer effective
resistance to further Soviet expansion. While Manchuria represents the major
direction of current Soviet interests, the USSR will continue to exploit the
opportunities for expanding its influence in other border areas of China:
Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang Province.
2. Recent Actions by the USSR to Further Its Objectives
Certain measures which the Soviet Union has taken to further its objectives
during the past two-years are clearly evident. They include: (1) negotiation
.of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945, whose terms assured the USSR a
position of influence in Manchuria; (2) management of the Soviet occupation
of Manchuria in the period August 1945 to late April 1946 so as to hinder
the movement of Nationalist troops, faalitate the establishment of Chinese
Communist control, and contribute substantially to the military potentiality
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by affording the latter an opportunity
to "capture" a large volume of Japanese arms and equipment; (3) the stripping
of Manchurian industries; and (4) effective denial of the Dairen area to the
Chinese National Government through a legalistic interpretation of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty. These measures, which are more fully described in Enclosure A,
have had the effect of strengthening the potential of the CCP or of weakening
that of the Chinese National Government. They have thus tended to promote a
balance of power between the opposing Chinese forces, and to intensify the
civil conflict and the attendant conditions of instability and chaos in China.
Although continuation of civil conflict and instability in China effectively
serves Soviet interests and aims, there is little further action that the USSR
need take to promote such conditions, so long as the Chinese Nationalist mili-
tary administration remains in its existing state of incompetence and
- 1 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
akeffee
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
disorganization. (Current Chinese Communist military successes appear to
stem as much from the qualitative and quantitative decline in the Nation-
alist military potential -- attended by the Communist capture of substan-
tial Nationalist military supplies -- as from Communist superiority in the
employment of forces.) Nevertheless, the USSR may have found it desirable
to extend some additional and inconspicuous aid to the CCP, if only to in-
sure the security of Manchuria and to hedge against the possibility that
the Nationalist potential might be increased by internal reform and by
military aid from the US.
As set forth in Enclosure B, there is some evidence that supports, while
it does not conclusively prove, the thesis that the USSR has been extending
concealed aid to the CCP in recent months:- additional supplies of munitions
(probably of Japanese type), high-level technical assistance, North Korean
troops (largely for non-combat employment), use of Dairen port facilities
and of Soviet vessels to facilitate the movement of supplies between Com-
munist-held areas in Manchuria and Shantung. The evidence includes reports
from sources other than the Chinese National Government, which has been un-
restrained in its charges that the USSR has currently been supporting the CCP.
Soviet aid in recent months does not appear to have been of major sig-
nificance in Chinese Communist operations thus far, but may prove of greater
benefit to the Communists in forthcoming operations.
3. Role of the CCP in the Implementation of Soviet Policy
Examination of the developments in China, over a period of many years,
and of the character of Soviet measures described above, leads inevitably
to the conclusion that the most effective instrument of Soviet policy toward
China is the CCP. The Chinese Communists are ideologically sympathetic with
and oriented toward Moscow, and will continue to cooperate with the Soviet
Union so long as the CCP itself is engaged in a struggle for power in China.
A China completely dominated by the CCP, assuming that the latter re-
mained closely allied to the USSR, would ideally serve long-range Soviet
interests in China. However, it is doubtful that the USSR either expects
or hopes for a completely communized China for several years to come. The
Kremlin's machinery for asserting political control abroad is at present
severely taxed by Soviet commitments in Europe. This strain would be vastly
increased by the assumption of responsibility for supporting and directing
a Communist regime for all of China. In addition, China as a whole can
contribute little to Soviet economic needs in the near future. The USSR's
foreseeable requirements can better be met by the more highly developed
skills and industrial facilities of Europe. It is therefore 'unlikely that
the USSR would wish to place this additional burden on the world Communist
program until the situation in the West has become more stable.
It must also be considered possible that the USSR would actually prefer
a continuation of instability and the development of regionalism in China --
- 2 -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SE/
conditions that would accompany the Chinese Communist struggle for power --
to the final achievement of central power by the CCP. Such a preference
would be corollary to Soviet uncertainties about any strong central govern-
ment in China. Over the period of some three centuries, Tsarist and then
Soviet Russia's position in eastern Asia -- in terms of territory, political
and economic influence -- has tended to expand with the weakening, and to
contract with the strengthening, of a central political authority in that
area. The USSR might logically believe that the CCP, once it achieves cen-
tral power in China, will exhibit much the same degree of nationalism and
xenophobia that characterizes the present Chinese Nationalist regime. Mos-
cow may also entertain some misgivings as to whether the CCP would be able
to achieve and retain supreme control throughout China without making funda-
mental adjustments and compromises with non-Communist elements within and
outside China -- adjustments and compromises that might ultimately lead to
a "Communist China" bearing little resemblance to the puppet governments'
found in European Communist satellites.
Whether by force of circumstances or by preference (or both), the USSR
probably looks forward to a long period of instability in China. To inten-
sify that instability, the Soviet Union. will probably take at least incon-
spicuous steps in support of the CCP, whenever such support appears neces-
sary.
4. Future Developments
Only tentative estimates cam now be made of future Soviet actions to
further its objectives in China. The character and timing of such actions
will undoubtedly be closely associated with developments in US relations
with both China and the USSR, and can also be expected to respond to politi-
cal and economic trends in Europe as well as in Asia. The most natural
point of departure for making tentative estimates of future Soviet action
would appear to be the portrayal of conditions in China Cl) if US assistance
to the Chinese National Government is withheld, and (2) if US assistance is
extended.
If the Chinese National Government does not receive early assistance
from the United States, many months, and perhaps years, will elapse before
the USSR is confronted with the necessity of supporting Chinese Communist
forces beyond the limits of indirect or concealed aid of the type thus far
extended.
It is conceivable, but not now considered probable, that Moscow will
adopt a program of open and direct action in China before the necessity
arises, in order to divert US attention from Europe and to induce the US to
expend its efforts and resources on two major fronts. In June and July 1947,
there were several assertions, largely by Soviet citizens in Shanghai and
purportedly representing the views of Soviet officials there, that (1) the
mid-1947 evacuation of Soviet citizens and recall of Ambassador Petrov from
China marked the first steps in a "get tough with China" policy; (2) the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
USSR has decided on a policy of counteraction vis-a-vis the Nanking Govern-
ment and the US; and (3) the USSR will break off diplomatic relations with
China in late 1947 or early 1948, and concentrate all its attention on
Manchuria and Sinkiang. More recently, however, Soviet officials in China
have reportedly predicted that Petrov will return to China, and that there
will be no change in USSR policy toward China unless the US policy changes.
One of the controlling reasons why the USSR would tend to avoid direct
action before the necessity arises is believed to be the mere expense of
such a program. In addition, unconcealed intervention in China might also
promote the danger of a collision with the US, and would undoubtedly weaken
the Soviet position in international negotiations. The Sino-Soviet Treaty,
for example, stipulates that the USSR shall respect Chinese sovereignty,
shall not interfere in China's domestic affairs, and shall render moral
support and military aid entirely to the Chinese National Government. More-
over, the Soviet Union may perceive certain broad advantages in not com-
mitting itself to a program of direct action against the Chinese National
Government so long as Japanese peace treaty negotiations are in progress.
By avoiding overt action that would intensify the Chinese National Govern-
ment's fear of the USSR and destroy any Government hopes of gaining Soviet
cooperation in Manchuria, Moscow would be in a more favorable position
(1) to encourage Chinese Government opposition to any peace treaty proposals
that would strengthen Japan's position in Asia, and (2) to assume a role as
defender of Continental Asia against "US-supported Japanese imperialism".
If, on the other hand, the Chinese National Government receives US
assistance tending to strengthen the Nationalist potential for waging civil
warfare, it is believed that the Soviet Union will weigh alternative lines
of action more in terms of the security of its position in Manchuria than
in terms of the position or fate of Chinese Communist forces in China proper.
So long as the National Government appears incapable of re-establishing con-
trol in Manchuria, it is anticipated that the Soviet Union will continue to
avoid open action against that Government. But in the event that a very
substantial US military aid program to China and a major reform in the
Nationalist administration increased the Nationalist potential to the point
of threatening the status ouo in Manchuria, it is considered possible that
the USSR might resort to direct action to counter that threat.
At any time in the future the USSR may also find it opportune to in-
crease its emphasis on other border areas of China: Inner Mongolia and
Sinkiang Province. In these regions, the Soviet Union possesses the special
advantages of geographical position, actual local influence, and a "national
minorities" policy that strongly attracts the Mongol and Turki peoples of
eastern Central Asia. The USSR is, therefore, in a highly favorable posi-
tion to capitalize upon the principal causes of unrest among these large
and widespread non-Chinese groups: deep-rooted dissatisfaction with
Chinese rule, and appreciation of the relatively better circumstances of
the Mongol-Turki populations in adjacent Soviet or Soviet-controlled terri-
tory. Soviet influence is disctrnible in the encouragement which Chinese
-4- S5001PT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Communist and Outer Mongolian elements have given to Inner Mongolians in
the latters' attempts to.create an autonomous. government. It is also
apparent that the USSR has played an indirect, but effective, roll in
similar autonomous movements by native groups in Sinkiang Province, and
in the Outer Mongolia-Sinkiang border disputes.
SE/
- 5 - SEipec
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
ENCLOSURE A
KNOWN ACTIONS TENDING TO PROMOTE SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA
1. Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945*
The basis for the Sino-Soviet Treaty was laid at the US-UK-USSR Con-
ference in Yalta. The Treaty itself was negotiated at a time when the USSR
was in an extremely strong bargaining position, with Soviet occupation troops
due to establish effective control throughout northeastern China, and with
the Chinese National Government faced with the possibility that too vigorous
objections to Soviet demands would result in Soviet support of the Chinese
Communists. The USSR was thus able to obtain important special rights in
Manchuria for a period of 30 years, including: (1) joint use with China of
the Port Arthur Naval Base Area, which encompasses most of the former Kwan-
tung LeaSed Territory; (2) lease of one-half of all port installations in
Dairen (which the Chinese Government agreed to declare a free port); and
(3) joint ownership and operation of the "Chinese Changchun Railway", com-
prising Manchuria's two main trunk lines--the Chinese Eastern and South
Manchurian railways--that join at Harbin and link Central Siberia, Vladivo-
stok, and Dairen. Auxiliary rail lines, subsidiary enterprises, and lands
directly serving the main trunk lines, if built or acquired during Russian
or Sino-Soviet administration, were also to be jointly owned and operated.
It is obvious that even if Manchuria were under actual control of the
Chinese National Government, the Soviet Union would still be assured of a
strong position in that area, economically and strategically. However, other
actions taken by the USSR, which have helped prevent Nationalist re-entry
into Manchuria, and generally weakened the Nationalist potential relative to
that of the CCP, indicate that Soviet objectives in Manchuria extend well
beyond the above-named Treaty rights.
2. Soviet Occupation of Manchuria (August 1945 to late April 1946)
During the Soviet occupation, the Chinese National Government attempted
to move troops into Manchuria to re-establish Chinese control, but was
hampered and delayed not only by local volunteer forces in the area, but
also by Soviet occupation authorities. Nationalist freedom of movement and
* As used here, the "Sino-Soviet Treaty" includes: (1) the basic Treaty of
Friendship and Alliance; (2) the separate Agreements on Port Arthur,
Dairen, the Chinese Changchun Railway, and the presence of Soviet troops
in the "Three Eastern Provinces" (Manchuria); and (3) the separate Notes
on Soviet Aid to the Central Government of China and Chinese sovereignty
over Manchuria and Sinkiang, and on Outer Mongolia.
- 6 - sElOPT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
activity was severely restricted and Manchurian port facilities were denied
to the Government. On the other hand, the movement of Chinese Communist
troops into Manchuria apparently was permitted with freedom. It is known,
for example, that several thousand Chinese Communist soldiers arrived in
Mukden on 6 September 1945, by rail from North China.
After a delay of several months, the USSR decided to withdraw its forces
completely from Manchuria by the end of April 1946. Partial evacuations
from certain areas had taken place earlier, with little or no prior notifica-
tion to the Chinese National Government. The latter did obtain, on 22 March
1946, a Soviet note giving the target date for complete withdrawal, but that
note contained no area-by-area schedule for evacuation. Chinese Communist
forces were thus placed in a highly favorable position to replace the de-
parting Soviet occupation forces, thereby gaining physical control over most
of Manchuria.
Intelligence reports correctly emphasize the importance of the "capture"
of great supplies of Japanese arms and eauipment by the Chinese Communist
forces after they replaced the Soviet troops in Manchuria. Somewhat less
Well known is the fact that at least part of such Japanese supplies fell
into Chinese Communist hands even during the Soviet occupation. A trained
US observer personally saw unarmed Communist troops enter the Japanese
arsenal in Mukden while it was completely under Soviet control and Soviet
guard, and subsequently saw those troops emerge fully armed. (Other sources,
including a Japanese, a Manchurian ex-puppet officer, and a Czech refugee in
Dairen, cite similar episodes in Soviet-controlled areas containing Japanese
Army materiel.)
3. Soviet Stripping of Manchurian Industries
The selective removal of industrial machinery from Manchurian factories
by Soviet forces as "war booty", and the subsequent looting of such installa-
tions by local mobs and later by Chinese Communists, cut the heart out of
Manchuria's highly developed industrial structure. Soviet forces apparently
made no attempt to preserve order. Soviet removals provided the USSR with
substantial quantities of carefully chosen equipment, and the stripping and
looting made certain that Manchurian industry could not be reconstructed
auickly or without large capital outlays.
The Soviet action in removing key equipment from Manchurian industry,
effective Soviet retention of Dairen as a closed port (described below), and
credible reports that substantial quantities of soybeans, grains, and coal have
been moving to Siberia from Communist-controlled areas in Manchuria, all support
the belief that Soviet policy is aimed at Making Manchuria a de-industrialized
source of food and raw materials for the Soviet Far East. A de-industrialized
Manchuria, of course, also presents a minimum military threat to the USSR.
- 7 - SIET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Se
4. Denial of Dairen to the Chinese National Government
The USSR has consistently refused to allow the Chinese National Govern-
ment to send troops to the port of Dairen. Chinese Government objections
have been countered by legalistic Soviet claims that the USSR has the right
to extend to Dairen its military jurisdiction over the Port Arthur Naval
Base Area until the Japanese peace treaty is signed.* In taking this
attitude, the USSR has been fully aware of the Chinese National Government's
unwillingness to assign a civil administration to the area without military
support, an unwillingness resulting from the virtual land blockade of the
Dairen-Port Arthur area by Chinese Communist forces and from the presence
within that area of Soviet and Soviet-puppet troops.
? By its effective denial of Dairen to the Chinese National Government the
USSR greatly hindered that Government from supplying the rest of Manchuria
with "take-over" troops and supplies during the period of Soviet occupation
and withdrawal. Since the spring of 1946, the Chinese Government has been
similarly impeded in its efforts to reestablish control in Manchuria.
? Relevant sections of the Sino-Soviet Treaty are: (1) "The Chinese Govern-
ment entrusts to the Soviet Government the defense of the (Port Arthur)
Naval Base"; and (2) "In peace time Dairen is not included in the sphere of
efficacy of the (Port Arthur) Naval Base regulations.. .arid shall be subject to
to the military supervision or control established in this zone only in case
of war against Japan." The Soviet argument that the "war against Japan"
will not end until the Japanese peace treaty is' signed has been bitterly
attacked by the Chinese .National Government.
- 8 - St
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
ENCLOSURE B
EVIDENCE OF RECENT SOVIET AID TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
The elimination of most means of direct observation at logical Soviet-
Chinese Communist points of contact has made it increasingly difficult to
establish proof of the extent of current Soviet aid to the Chinese Com-
munists. An attempt has been made here to present, where possible, evidence
from sources other than Chinese National Government officials. Indications
of recent Soviet aid wnich has been of some significance to the Chinese Com-
munists and which has strengthened the position of the USSR, particularly in
Manchuria and Korea, are set forth in following paragraphs.
1. Additional Supplies of Munitiol,
Additional supplies of munitions may have been made available by the Soviets
to the Chinese Communist Forces since the Soviet evacuation of Manchuria in
April 1946. Although no US observer has yet ascertained that any Soviet-made
materiel has been used by Chinese Communists in current offensives, there is
some evidence that the Soviets have made available additional supplies of Japa-
nese Kwantung Army stocks which they removed from Mancnuria and which they are
now returning in exchange for foodstuffs. Reports since January 1947, largely
from Nationalist sources, have indicated that the USSR has revived rail traffic
between Harbin and the USSR under a barter trade agreement with the Chinese
Communists. This trade had reportedly reached an export rate of 180,0GO tons
monthly or over 2 million tons annually. Manchurian exports have consisted of
soybeans, wheat, beef, pork, kaoliang, millet, and furs, which have been ex-
changed for imports of coal, kerosene, perfume, matches, cigarettes and other
commodities. It has been suggested that the "other commodities" include mili-
tary supplies. One Chinese observer reports that in June or July 1946 he saw
cases marked "grenades" and "artillery shells " in one car of a heavily guarded
train returning from the USSR.
The increased firepower of the Chinese Communists during the mid-1947
battle for Ssupingkai, which has been confirmed by US observers, may indicate
the acquisition of new supplies of munitions by the Communist forces. The
editor-in-chief of the independent Ta Kung Pao, however, has made the logical
point that this is not necessarily proof of Soviet aid, but may simply denote
a more active employment by Chinese Communist forces of the large supplies
abandoned earlier by the Japanese and of supplies captured from Nationalists
in current campaigns. General Sun Li-jen. Deputy Commander of the Nationalist
Forces in Manchuria during the mid-1947 Communist offensive, has made no claim
other than that the Communists were using captured Japanese materiel.
Outside of Manchuria there have been continuing reports, some from neutral
observers, that Soviet small arms and Japanese machine Runs, carbines. mortars
SE/T
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SE
and artillery have been transported in Soviet vessels from Dairen to the
Chinese Communist forces in Shantung through the Communist-held port of
Chefoo. No evidence is yet available from Shantung which confirms the
use of this materiel.
No other evidence has yet been secured which would suggest or confirm
the fact that Chinese Communist successes or advantage in any area can be
attributed to any large-scale current receipt from the USSR of Soviet-made
or Japanese materiel. It should be noted, however, that appropriate lines
of communication from the USSR to Manchuria and from Dairen to Shantung
still exist and that Soviet movement over these lines of communication has
been confirmed.
2. High Level Liaison and Technical Assistance
Liaison between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists at a high level
undoubtedly exists. However, no proof of its actual implementation has yet
been authenticated by US observers. Prior to the Soviet witndrawal from
Manchuria, US observers transmitted reports of several conferences between
high-ranking Chinese Communists and Soviet military commanders, but these
reports emanated originally from Chinese National Government sources. The
latter claimed, for example, that: (1) Lin Piao, Chinese Communist Com-%
mander-in-Chief in Manchuria, and two other Chinese Communist commanders,
were seen in Mukden wnere tney attended a conference with local Soviet
commanders on 30 January 1946: (2) other Chinese Communist conferences
were held in Kirin, Antung and Tung-Hua, the latter ones attended by the
Soviet Commander of the Mukden area.
In addition, a document containing an agreement allegedly reached be-
tween Chinese Communists and Soviet officials at Red Army Headouarters in
Mukden on January 9, 1946 was made available in May 1946 to American cor-
respondents by "a high Chinese official". The US Consul General at Mukden,
in commenting on this document, conceded that the Soviets "are hardly
innocent of involvement in Manchurian affairs" but observed that the docu-
ment itself seemed to indicate that it might be something "invented after
the fact" to incriminate the USSR and aimed at enlisting US sympathies on
the side of the Chinese National Government against the USSR and the
Chinese Communists. US Embassy Nanking concurred with these observations,
and was of the opinion that the document constituted a "Kuomintang plant".
There continues to be a great deal of speculation but no confirmation
as to the nature of possible high-level liaison undertaken from Manchuria
by Li Li-san. Li Li-san. who fled to Moscow after a. split with Mao Tse-
Lung in 1931, returned to Mukden in Manchuria in July 1946. If it is
established that Li actually is an effective political adviser to the
Chinese Communist military forces and that he is a part of or the leader
of a strong pro-Soviet clique within the CCP, it is probable that Li
personally provides a significant channel for Chinese Communist-Soviet
liaison.
- 10 - SIOOIET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SE,
Although Chinese Nationalist claims of Soviet participation in battle
have not been substantiated, there has been some indication of Soviet
training and technical assistance which may have been of direct help to
Chinese Communist forces. In June 1946 the US Consul General Dairen re-
ported that the morale and efficiency of the Chinese police in Dairen had
visibly increased and that "it is obvious that they are carefully and
systematically trained". Again in September 1946, he reported that the
Soviet military in Dairen were training the Chinese police in the use of
the rifle and bayonet. Although the movement from Dairen of these trained
Chinese has not been confirmed. Chinese Nationalist sources have indicated
that these trainees in groups of several hundreds have been sent to Chefoo
and Antung for service under the Chinese Communists. A US oil company
official, who left Dairen in July 1947. reports that the transfer of trainees
to Chinese Communist forces is "generally known". As yet there has been
no conclusive proof that Soviet-organized training centers for Chinese Com-
munist forces are maintained in Northern Manchuria and Siberia, as reported
by Chinese Nationalist sources and by repatriated Japanese. These reports
include claims that: (1) twelve Soviet training centers for Chinese Com-
munist Forces, including a Soviet-organized aviation school headed and con-
ducted by Soviet-trained Chinese. Koreans and Japanese. are located in
Northern Manchuria: (2) Soviet military training centers for Chinese Com-
munist Forces are located at Chita. Siberia and near Lake Khanka. about
125 miles north of Vladivostok.
3. Employment of Korean Troops
During the pait several months, US observers in China and Manchuria
have been unable to substantiate Chinese National Government charges that
many North Koreans are engaged in actual combat in Manchuria on the side
of the Chinese Communists. These charges include: (1) an assertion that
more than 100,000 Koreans trained in Northern Korea were recently in action
with the Chinese Communists in Manchuria: (2) a statement by General Chen
Cheng, Nationalist Chief of Staff, that it was "a universally acknowledged
fact that Russian-trained Korean Communists are fighting on the side of
the Communists in Manchuria".
However, US observers in South Korea, particularly those with the G-2
section of the XXIV Corps, have transmitted sufficient evidence to justify
the conclusion that some form of aid is being provided by North Koreans
in Manchuria. Determination of the extent and character of such aid is
difficult because (1) Manchuria itself has a large Korean population--
1,400,000 Koreans were reported in Manchuria in 1944--and (2) it is possi-
ble that some units of the Korean Volunteer Army (formed from Korean anti-
Japanese guerrillas under the auspices of the CCP during the Japanese
occupation of Korea) are still with the Chinese Communist forces. The
available evidence from all sources suggests that the North Korean elements
that have joined with Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria have thus far
been kept in the background and away from the fighting fronts. Presumably,
they have been engaged in training and in performing garrison and service
functions.
- 11 - SI.
'Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SE/
Indications of possible cooperation between the Chinese Communists and
the Soviets in North Korea date back to the fall and winter of 1946-1947.
After the surrender of Antung to the Chinese Nationalists in October 1946,
the presence of Chinese Communist troops in North Korea was frequently re-
ported. In March 1947 the XXIV Corps estimated that there were from 50,000
to 75,000 Chinese Communist troops in the Soviet Zone. Usually reliable
sources indicated that North Korean railroads were used for transporting
these troops during December 1946 and January 1947 and that the functions
of billeting and supply were shared by the Soviet Army Command and the
North Korean Peoples Committee. Although the nature of Chinese Communist
activities in North Korea during this period has not been definitely estab-
lished, it was reported that they were in training and that they were using
the area as a base for operations against Chinese Nationalists in eastern
Manchuria.
Recently the XXIV Corps has secured information, chiefly from interroga-
tions of refugees from the North Korean Peoples Army, which tends to estab-
lish that North Korean troops have been moving into Chinese Communist-con-
trolled areas of northeast Manchuria. (The USSR has not admitted that there
is a North Korean Peoples Army, but considerable reliable evidence of its
existence and development is available.) XXIV Corps reports include:.
(1) a statement from a former officer of the North Korean Peoples Army that
battalions of the Army had been fighting together with the Chinese Communists
along the Manchurian frontier; (2) a statement that Peoples Army forces sta-
tioned in North Korea were sent to fight off Nationalist troops along an
east Manchurian rail line; and (3) claims that liaison between the North
Korean Peoples Committee and the Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria was
established in the fall of 1946 to control the assignment of North Korean
troops to the Chinese Communists. The fact that no trained tactical units
of the North Korean Peoples Army have as yet been located in North Korea
itself appears consistent with several reports that upon completion of
prescribed training in North Korea, Korean troops are transferred to Man-
churia and absorbed into the Chinese Communist forces.
Such transfers would logically serve to further Soviet aims in several
ways: (1) they would provide some assistance to the Chinese Communist
forces; (2) they would give the North Korean troops experience in or near
actual areas of combat; (3) they would alleviate the problem of supplying
food to troops from the food-deficit areas of North Korea. In connection
with the North Korean food shortage, a small number of Koreans captured
by Nationalist forces in the mid-1947 Manchurian operations have told a
US Assistant Military Attache that they had joined the Chinese Communists
voluntarily and only for "economic reasons, such as unemployment, inade-
quate food, etc." However, it should be noted that the North Korean food
situation itself is partly the result of Soviet withdrawals of food from
that area, for shipment to Vladivostok and Dairen.
It would obviously be to Soviet advantage if the transfer of North Koreans 1
to Manchuria had the character of a natural and voluntary movement, rather
- 12 - SIT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
SI'
than one forced upon the North Koreans. However, in view of the intense
nationalism of the Korean people, and their traditional unwillingness to
cooperate with neighboring countries, considerable indoctrination would
be necessary to encourage Korean-Chinese Communist cooperation. There is
evidence that Soviet authorities in North Korea have been engaged in just
such an indoctrination effort. The XXIV Corps has transmitted reports
that Koreans along the Yalu River (separating Korea from Manchuria) have
.been told that General Hodge, Rhee Syngman and Chiang Kai-shek--all ex-
treme reactionaries according to Soviet propaganda--have actually agreed
to attack North Korea in the near future.
4. Use of Dairen Port Facilities and Soviet Vessels
It is evident that the Chinese
from the active junk trade carried
Soviet-controlled Dairen. An even
least to the Chinese Communists in
provided by the movement of Soviet
port of Chefoo.
Communists have derived some advantage
on between Chinese and Korean ports and
more important form of assistance, at
Shantung Province, appears to have been
vessels between Dairen and the Shantung
The US Consul General Dairen has reported that on 23 June a Soviet
vessel left Dairen for Chefoo (normally a one-day trip) with trucks, tires,
and auto parts on board. One day later, CNRRA and UNRRA personnel at Chefoo
noted the arrival of a Soviet vessel at that port with a cargo which in-
cluded trucks as well as Chinese passengers. According to the Chefoo sources,
the same vessel had also put in there on 7 June, and on that trip had carried
pig iron and "wooden cases". Unloading on both trips was reportedly carried
out at night by Chinese Communist soldiers "with the utmost secrecy". It
was further claimed that the Soviet vessel apparently had timed its arrivals
at Chefoo so as to take advantage of the presence of a CNRRA vessel as
security from Chinese Nationalist air attacks.
There is no doubt that the Chinese National Government has been deeply
concerned about the Dairen-Shantung traffic. In connection with this move-
ment, the Nationalist commander in Shantung Province has stated that if
Dairen were restored to the Nanking Government, the war in Shantung could
be shortened by 6 months. Further indication of the importance which the
Chinese National Government attaches to the Dairen-Shantung traffic is
found in that Government's order of 20 August 1947, which declares that
the port of Dairen is closed to foreign shipping. This order was issued
despite the fact that: (1) in the Sino-Soviet Treaty the Chinese Republic
agrees "to declare Dairen a free port open to the commerce and shipping of
all nations" and (2) the US had sent a note to the Soviet Government on
14 August again calling attention to the Soviet delay in opening Dairen to
international commerce as a free port.
There has been a reported increase in Soviet shipping on the Dairen-
Vladivostok route, a route which may be a channel of direct assistance to the
Chinese Communists. However, this increase may represent only the normal
shipping requirements of the Soviets in the Dairen area and the normal increase
which could be expected during the months that Vladivostok is an ice-free port.
- 13 - sEd0(
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9
B. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF/CE
1898?R?VM?
I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003000080001-9