SECURITY POLICIES GOVERNING THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001300060002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 22, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING SLIP.
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.i88.4.0723X
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
U-4392/0S-4
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340- 1251
2 2 FEB1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Security Policies Governing the Dissemination of Intelligence
Information
Reference: DCI Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of
Intelligence Information," 27 February 1987.
1. The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on contractors to develop
large all-source data bases, sophisticated telecommunication systems, and state
of the art ADP storage, data integration, retrieval, and computational
capabilities. Strict compliance, however, with DCID 1/7 severely limits the
development, maintenance, and use of these sophisticated systems, and Allied
access to this critical data as well.
2. DCID 1/7 requires the consent of the "originator" for release of all
material carrying the ORCON, NOCONTRACT, NOFORN, or PROPIN caveat. In large
DoD intelligence data systems, the data bases have historically carried the
caveats of the data being entered, even though there is no reference to source
nor audit to a source on the data being entered. Subsequent effort, therefore,
to identify the source of each data item to pursue "release authorization" has
proven not only impractical, but also impossible in many circumstances. In
June 1986, therefore, DIA proposed a specific change to the DCID 1/7 which
recognized (1) the role of appropriately cleared contractors working under
authorized government contract; (2) the fact that no source reference was made;
and (3) would permit release of all-source data base information to those
specific contractors. During discussions of that proposal, your staff raised
the additional issue of DIA releasing data base information caveated NOFORN.
To date, my staff has been unable to reach accord with your staff on these
significant policy issues.
3. In addition to the difficulty in releasing automated data base information
where there is no source attribution, there are also clear cases where con-
tractor release is sought for data that does, in fact, clearly identify the
source. In late 1985 this Agency sought authorization to release automated
message traffic to contractors involved in the joint DIA/CIA SAFE program. In
January 1986, the DCI Security Committee agreed to this access, but with the
stipulation that government personnel be present at all times. This guidance
has proven to be wasteful and impractical due to personnel constraints.
DoD/DIA does not have sufficient resources to support major systems development
or enhancement initiatives without reliance on contractors who possess the
required security clearances.
Z- /07-yr
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4. In summary, strict compliance with the provisions of DCID 1/7 severely
limits use of available technology to improve intelligence support to
operational forces. I would appreciate your support in a joint effort to
review the existing policy with the objective of establishing a new policy
that adequately protects sensitive intelligence sources while authorizing
Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs) to make controlled and
auditable release of NOFORN, NOCONTRACT, ORCON, and PROPIN intelligence
information where sources are unidentified and unidentifiable. In the
interim, request authority as the SOIC for DIA, to grant release of caveated
intelligence in DIA data bases where the originator cannot be determined.
Secondly, standard and practical procedures must be established for
authorizing system development contractor access to source identified
intelligence data where operationally required. In this regard, specifically
request that DIA be relieved from the requirement that government personnel be
present when SAFE contractors have access to NOCONTRACT and ORCON information.
Executive Director
2
STAT
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DCl/ICS-87-0785
19 February 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Staff, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Proposed Revision of DCID 1/7, "Security Controls on
the Dissemination of Intelligence Information"
1. Attached for your approval is the SCI Forum-proposed revision of DCID
1/7 which specifies the markings that can or must be placed on documents, or
surrogates thereof, containing intelligence information; the rules governing
when such markings can be used; and the rules for use of the marked
documents. With the exception of one paragraph, discussed below, the draft is
not contentious. The Community feels so strongly that a revised draft is
needed that the military members of the Forum support reissuance despite their
continuing dissatisfaction with the contentious paragraph. The attached copy
of the existing version, with its indicated changes and the explanation of
those-changes, -shows-the -limited-nature-of the-revisions.
, , ?
2. The contention involves paragraph 8c, which sets forth the
restrictions in releasing intelligence information, identified by NOCONTRACT,
to government contractors and consultants. The proposed revision carries
forward the old rules unchanged but the DoE) services and DIA oppose those
rules. Their opposition is based principally upon limitations impacting on
their ADP and telecommunications systems, both heavily supported by
contractors. Nevertheless, DoD and DIA members support the need for a revised
version of DCID 1/7 and have committed to looking anew at the NOCONTRACT rules
without waiting until the whole of the DCID is again in need of revision.
Thus, as discussed earlier, your approval memoranda carry an acknowledgment of
the issue and directs a reexamination.
3. I believe that we should use this opportunity to break the pattern of
modifying the security-related DCIDs by review of the whole of each relevant
DCID. A practice of modification of parts of the DCIDs (as is the practice
with the Imagery Policy Manual) will allow far more efficient work and should
STAT.
25X1
25X1
STAT
i DCi
EXEC
BEG
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permit the security rules to be much closer to current than seems to have been
past practice. The number of changes required in both 1/19 and 1/7 apoear to
support this view. The proposed memorandum carrying your approval of this
revision sets the stage for this change in procedure.
4. In sum, I recommend that you approve the revision of 1/7 and sign the
covering memoranda.
? Attachments:
a/s
2
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STAT
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SECRET
CCISCMS/ICS:
Distribution of DCl/ICS-87-0785
Oriainal - Addressee (w/atts)
1 - ADCI (w/atts)
1 - ER (Watts)
1 - D/ICS (Watts)
1 - Mark Sullivan, NFI2 Secretariat (w/atts)
1 - ICS Registry (w/atts)
1 - CCISCMS Subject (Watts)
1 - D/CCISCMS Chrono (wo/atts)
3
SECRET
STAT
STAT
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
27 FEB 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: NFIB Members
DCl/ICS-87-0786
SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination
of Intelligence Information"
1. This memorandum is to:
? Record my approval of the attached revision of DCID 1/7, "Security
Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information."
Acknowledge that paragraph 8c of DCID 1/7, dealing with the rules
embodied in the marking NOCONTRACT, is contentious and is
essentially unchanged from language contained in the 7 January
1984 version of 1/7.
Direct that the SCI Forum report within 90 days on the possibility
of better accommodation of the several views of the NOCONTRACT
rules.
2. I recognize that the NOCONTRACT rules impact widely throughout the
Community, but I charge CIA and DIA to vigorously lead the reexamination of
these rules. (U)
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
2? FEB 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: SCI Forum Members
DCl/ICS-87-O787
SUBJECT: DCID 1/7--Approval of Attached Revision
This memorandum records my approval of the attached revision of DCID 1/7
dated 7 January 1984, and directs that work continue to reach an expeditious
Community agreement on a final revision of paragraph 8c (NOCONTRACT).
jt
aatr6s
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director
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U111.1
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 1/71
SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE DISSEMINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
(Effective
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of
1947, Executive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356, and implementing
directives thereto, policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination
and use of intelligence information and related materials are herewith
established.
PART I
1. Purpose
This directive establishes policies, controls, and procedures for the
dissemination and use of intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating its
interchange for intelligence purposes, it will be adequately protected. This
directive amplifies applicable portions of the 23 June 1982 Information
Security Oversight Office (IS00) Directive No. 1 which implements Executive
Order 12356. Additional controls are established on the dissemination of
intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and immigrant
aliens, including those employed by the US Government. Policy and procedures
1 Footnotes on p. 18
La_auzz-i4L---rttr-trET?
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I., U., .,,
governing the release of intelligence to contractors and consultants are set
1/- forth in Part II of this directive.
2. Definitions
a. Intelligence information and related materials (hereinafter
referred to as intelligence) includes the following classified information:
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as defined in
Executive Order 12333;
information describing US foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, sources, methods, equipment, or
methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or
exploitation of such intelligence; foreign military hardware
obtained for exploitation; and photography or recordings
resulting from US intelligence collection efforts; and
information on Intelligence Community protective security
programs (e.g., personnel, physical, technical', and information
security).
b. "Need-to-know" is the determination by an authorized holder of
classified information that access to specific intelligence in his/her
possession is required by another person to perform a specific and
authorized function to carry out a national security task. Such persons
must possess appropriate security clearances and access approvals.
2
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3. General Applicability
a. The controls and procedures established by this directive shall
be applied uniformly in the dissemination and use of intelligence
originated by all Intelligence Community components.
b. The substance of this directive shall be promulgated by each
Intelligence Community component, and appropriate procedures permitting
prompt interagency consultation will be established and promulgated. To
this end, each Intelligence Community component will designate a primary
referent.
4. Use By and Dissemination Among US Intelligence Community Components
Executive Order 12356 provides that classified information originating in
one US agency shall not be disseminated beyond any recipient agency without
the consent of the originating agency. However, to facilitate use and
dissemination of intelligence within and among Intelligence Community
components and to provide for the provision of intelligence to consumers, the
following controlled relief to the "third agency rule" is hereby established:
Each Intelligence Community component consents to the use of its
intelligence in intelligence products of other components and to
the dissemination of those products within the Intelligence
Community, except as specifically restricted by this directive.
3
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5. Use By and Dissemination to US Components Outside the Intelligence
Community
a. Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive
control markings, will not be released in its original form to US
components outside the Intelligence Community without the consent of the
originator.
b. Any component disseminating intelligence beyond the Intelligence
Community assumes responsibility for ensuring that recipient organizations
agree to observe the restrictions prescribed in this directive and to
maintain adequate safeguards.
6. Dissemination to Foreign Nationals or Contractors
a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control
markings, will not be released to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens
(including those employed by, used by, or integrated into the US
Government) without the permission of the originator.
b. Release of intelligence to a foreign contractor or company under
contract to the US Government will be made according to the provisions of
paragraph 7 below through the government under which the foreign
contractor or company operates. Direct release from the US Government to
a foreign company or contractor is prohibited.
4
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7. Dissemination to Foreign Governments
a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control
markings, will not be released in its original form to foreign governments
without the permission of the originator.
b. Information contained in intelligence of another Intelligence
Community component, which bears no restrictive control markings, may he
used by recipient Intelligence Community components in reports provided to
foreign governments provided that:
no reference is made to the source document on which the
released product is based;
- the information is extracted or paraphrased to ensure that the
source or manner of acquisition of the intelligence is not
revealed and cannot be deduced in any manner;
- foreign release is made,through established foreign disclosure
channels and procedures as set forth in the DCI Directive on
Intelligence Disclosure Policy.
c. RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA are prohibited from
foreign dissemination under the provisions of Sections 123 and 144 of
Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
5
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8. Authorized Control Markings and Their Use
a. "WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED"
(WNINTEL)
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence whose
sensitivity requires constraints on its further dissemination
and use. This marking may be used only on intelligence which
identifies or would reasonably permit identification of an
intelligence source or method which is susceptible to
countermeasures that could nullify or reduce its effectiveness.
Classified intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated in
any manner outside authorized channels without the permission of
the originating agency and an assessment by the Senior Official
of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) in the disseminating agency
as to the potential risks to the national security and to the
intelligence sources or methods involved. In making such
assessment, consideration should be given to reducing the risk
to the intelligence sources or methods which provided the
intelligence by sanitizing or paraphrasing the information so as
to permit its wider dissemination. To avoid confusion as to the
extent of dissemination and use restrictions governing the
information involved, this marking may not be used in
conjunction with special access or Sensitive Compartmented
6
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Information (SCI) controls. This marking may be abbreviated as
"WNINTEL" or as "WN."
b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)
This marking is used to enable continuing knowledge and
supervision by the originator of the use made of intelligence.
This marking may be used only on classified intelligence which
clearly identifies or would reasonably permit ready
identification of an intelligence source or method which is
particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify
or measurably reduce its effectiveness. This marking may not be
used when an item of information will reasonably be protected by
use of any other markings specified herein, or by the
application of the "need-to-know" principle and the safeguarding
procedures of the security classification system.
Information bearing this marking may not he disseminated beyond
the headquarters elements3 of the recipient organizations and
may not be incorporated in whole or in part into other
briefings, or used in taking investigative action, without the
advance permission of, and under conditions specified by, the
originator. As this is the most restrictive marking herein,
agencies will establish procedures to ensure that it is only
applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and that timely
7
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3,
procedures are established to review requests for further
dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This
marking may be abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."
c. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NOCONTRACT)
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that
shall not be released to contractors or consultants (hereinafter
"contractors") without the permission of the originating ,
agency. This marking may be used only on intelligence which was
provided by a source on the express or implied condition that it
would not be made available to contractors; or which, if
disclosed to a contractor, would actually or potentially give
him/her a competitive advantage which could reasonably be
expected to cause a conflict of interest with his/her obligation
to protect the information. These restrictions do not apply to
consultants hired under Office of Personnel Management
procedures, or comparable procedures derived from statutory
authorities of departments or agency heads, and who are
considered to serve as extensions of their employing offices.
This marking may be abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."
d. "CAUTION--PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN).
This marking is used, with or without a security classification,
to identify information provided by a commercial firm or private
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source under an express or implied understanding that the
information will be protected as a trade secret or proprietary
data believed to have actual or potential value. Information
bearing this marking shall not be disseminated in any form to an
individual, organization, or foreign government which has any
interests, actual or potential, in competition with the source
of the information without the permission of the originator.
This marking may be used in conjunction with the "NOCONTRACT"
marking to preclude dissemination to any contractor. This
marking may be abbreviated as "PROPIN" or as "PR."
e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that
may not be released in any form to foreign governments-, foreign
nationals, or non-US citizens without permission of the
originator. This marking may be used on intelligence which, if
released to a foreign government or national(s), could'
jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or when it would not
be in the best interests of the United States to release the
information from a policy standpoint upon specific determination
by a SOIC. SOICs are responsible for developing, publishing,
and maintaining guidelines consistent with the policy guidance
herein for use in determining the foreign 'releasability of
intelligence they collect or produce. These guidelines shall he
used in assigning NOFORN control markings, and by primary
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I VI\ VI I Jt-
referents (paragraph 3.b. above applies) in responding to
inquiries from other organizations on application of this
control. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or as "NF."
f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO name of country(ies)/international
organizations)" (REL)
This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an
originator has predetermined to be releasable or has released,
through established foreign disclosure procedures and channels,
to the foreign country(ies)/international organizations
indicated. No other foreign dissemination of the material is
authorized (in any form) without the permission of the
originator. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated
name of country(ies)/international organizations)." In the case
of intelligence controlled under DCID 6/2, authorized
distribution indicators, published separately, may be used
instead of the "REL" control marking.
9. Procedures Governing Use of Control Markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary
to the restrictions established by this directive shallobtain the advance
permission of the originating agency. Such permission applies only to the
specific purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically
apply to all recipients.- Originators will ensure that prompt
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consideration is given to recipients' requests with particular attention
to reviewing and editing, if necessary, sanitized or paraphrased versions
to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no control
markings.
. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title
page, front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated
in the text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and
associated (in full or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in
automated data processing systems. The control markings also shall be
indicated by parenthetical use of the marking abbreviations at the
beginning or end of the appropriate portions. If the control markings
apply-to several or all portions, the document may be marked with a
statement to this effect rather than marking each portion individually.
c. The control markings in paragraph 8 shall be individually
assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in
conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by
Executive Order 12356 and its implementing 'SOO Directive. The marking
shall be carried forward to any new format in which the same information
is incorporated, including texts for oral and visual presentations.
10. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings
The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the
date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
11
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I J.
INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING
NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED
DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED,
CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NO FOREIGN DISSEM,
USIB ONLY, and NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current application
of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination and
control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this
directive should be referred to the originating agency or document.
11. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result
in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall
be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the Unauthorized
Disclosure Analysis Center.
PART II
12. Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to
Contractors and Consultants
a. Intelligence Community components may release4 selected
intelligence5 to contractors and consultants (hereinafter
"contractors"6) without referral to the originating components provided
that:
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(1) Release is made only to private individuals or
organizations certified by the SOIC (or his/her designee) of the
sponsoring organization as being under contract to the United States
Government for the purpose of performing classified services in
support of a national security mission; and as having demonstrated
"need-to-know" and an appropriate security clearance or access
approval. If retention of intelligence by the contractor is
required, the contractor must have an approved storage facility.
(2) The SOIC of the sponsoring agency, or his/her designee, is
responsible for ensuring that releases to contractors are made
pursuant to this policy statement and through established channels.
(3) The sponsoring,agency maintains a record of material
released.
(4) Contractors maintain such records as will permit them to
account for all intelligence received, disposed of or destroyed,
produced and held by them for the duration of the contract, and to
permit identification of all persons who have had access to
intelligence in their custody.
(5) Contractors do not reproduce any intelligence without the
permission of the sponsoring agency, and classify, control, and,
account for reproduced copies in the same manner as for originals.
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FUR UJL UPILI
(6) Contractors destroy intelligence only according to
guidelines and by standards set by the sponsoring agency.
(7) Contractors make provisions to ensure that intelligence in
their custody is not released to foreign nationals, whether or not
they are employees or contractors themselves, except with the
permission of the originating agency through the sponsoring agency,
and then released through established channels.
(8) Contractors receiving intelligence do not release it: to
any of their components or employees not directly engaged in
providing services under the contract; or to any other contract
(including subcontractors), without the consent of the sponsoring
agency (which shall verify that any second contractors satisfy all
security requirements herein).
(9) Any SCI released to contractors is controlled pursuant to
the provisions of DCI Directive 1/19, Security. Policy for Sensitive
Compartmented Information, effective
(10) Contractors agree that all intelligence released to them,
all reproductions thereof, and all other material they may generate
based on or incorporating data therefrom (including authorized
reproductions), remain the property of the US Government and will be
returned upon request of the sponsoring agency or expiration of the
contract, whichever occurs first.
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' (11) Sponsoring agencies arrange for and contractors agree
that, upon expiration of contracts, all released intelligence, all
reproductions thereof, and all other materials based on or
incorporating data therefrom, are returned to the sponsoring agency;
or all or a specified part of such items are retained by the
contractor under all applicable security and accountability controls
when the contractor has a specific need for such retention that is
validated by the sponsoring agency.
(12) Sponsoring agencies delete: the CIA seal, the phrase
"Directorate of Operations," the place acquired, the field number,
the source description, and field dissemination from all CIA
Directorate of Operations reports passed to contractors, unless prior
approval to do otherwise is obtained from CIA.
b. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National
Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs), and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda
will not be released to contractors. Such materials shall be marked NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS. However, information in them may
be made available to contractors, without identification as national
intelligence, by the SOIC of the agency authorizing its release.
c. Intelligence which, by reason of sensitivity of content, bears
control markings "CAUTION?PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED," "NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS," or "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION
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OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR," as specified in Part I of this
directive, will not be released to contractors unless special permission
has been obtained from the originator.
d. Intelligence Community security policy requires that the
government maintain control over sensitive intelligence and release to
contractors only that information required to perform tasks beyond the
capability of the government. The DCI has determined that there are
significant risks to national security in contracting out support services
or functions such as operation of telecommunications centers; automated
data systems; or other facilities when this permits broad contractor
access to all-source or other sensitive intelligence information.
Accordingly, Intelligence Community departments and agencies are cautioned
to fully consider the consequences of contracting out these services
pursuant to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, or similar
guidance, in cases where the government's control of sensitive
intelligence would be substantively diminished or where contractor access
to such data would be unnecessarily expanded.
13. Interpretation
Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these
procedures shall be referred to the Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Staff/Intelligence Community Staff.
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FOOTNOTES
1 This directive supersedes DCID 1/7, effective 4 May 1981.
2 Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in
consultation with the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) or as agreed
to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized channels are the
Intelligence Community, as defined in Executive Order 12333, Intelligence
Community contractors and consultants, and officials of agencies represented
on the NFIB as determined on a "need-to-know" basis by recipient SOICs.
3 At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may
include specified subordinate intelligence-producing components.
4 Release is the authorized visual, and, or physical disclosure of
intelligence.
5 The term "selected intelligence" excludes Foreign Service reports, SCI,
and material bearing ORCON, NOCONTRACT, or PROPIN control markings. Foreign
Service reports may be released only with the permission of the Department of
State. Release of intelligence material bearing ORCON, NOCONTRACT, or PROPIN
markings is governed by paragraph 8 or this directive.
6 Non-Intelligence Community components of the executive branch of
government under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be
treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will
be made only with the consent of the originator, will be solely for the
specific service required by the contract, and will not include authority to
disseminate intelligence further. Government-owned, contractor-operated
(GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the
intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community component, and which are
designated as authorized channels by a SOIC or his/her designee, are not
considered as contractors subject to the provisions of this directive.
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Attachment 2
DCID 1/7 REVISIONS
Revision 1 (p.1): This directive is reissued as unclassified (FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY). Earlier versions were unclassified until 1984. In June 1985, the
Director, Information Security Oversight Office requested that the DCI review
the need for classified status. Review and analysis by SECOM resulted in the
conclusion that under current classification policy (E012356), there was no
justification for classifying the directive. In connection with the
declassification action, the last two sentences have been deleted.
Revision 2 (p.4): This language change restructures the sentence to more
concisely state the intended control on ORCON material. This change was
approved in 1984, six months after issuance of the existing DCID.
Revision 3 (p.4): The most significant and most common reason for NOCONTRACT
control is stated first.
Revision 4 (p.6): The footnote is corrected by addition of other categories
of controlled intelligence which may not be released without originator
consent.
Revision 5 (p.6): The language change is made to ensure originator cognizance
of treatment to be accorded intelligence releases to assisting components of
the executive branch and to limit such releases to the executive branch.
Revision 6 (p.8): Community and Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Staff is substituted for SECOM which has been disestablished.
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