NORTH AND SOUTH YEMEN: COMPARATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000800980002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
''11.4t1, Intelligence
North and South Yemen:
Comparative Militar
Capabilities
A Research Paper
Secrct
Secret
NESA 87-10053
December 1987
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Directorate of Secret
/17E\
Intelligence
North and South Yemen:
Comparative Militar
Capabilities
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions from
NESA, and Office of Imagery Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 87-10053
December 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 20 October 1987
was used in this report.
North and South Yemen:
Comparative Military
Capabilities
Neither the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) nor the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) has sufficient military
strength to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. Their armies
and air forces are comparable in both quantity and quality of equipment.
In a conflict, South Yemen's Army would enjoy an initial advantage
because of better training, but neither side has the ability to make
significant territorial gains.
Ultimately, the army with the superior morale and more effective tribal
support would perform better in battle. Most Yemeni military personnel
have a stronger allegiance to their tribes than to their national govern-
ments, making their willingness to fight highly dependent on tribal ties.
The ability of either country to enlist the services of powerful tribal militias
could decide a Yemeni conflict.
Moscow has trained both militaries, but more intensive Soviet training has
provided South Yemen's armed forces with an operational edge over North
Yemen's. The Soviets have not taught the Yemenis how to maintain their
equipment, however erpetuating their reliance on Soviet maintenance
personnel.
The Soviets are in a position to provide the decisive edge in a war between
North and South Yemen, but they probably would try to maintain
neutrality. Moscow has long-term equities resulting from military supply
relationships with both countries and would not risk antagonizing the
moderate Arab Gulf states by actively supporting either side. Nevertheless,
the Soviets probably would intervene decisively on behalf of South Yemen
in the unlikely event that a North Yemeni military operation threatened to
topple the regime in Aden. Moscow would use its influence to restrain
South Yemen from achieving a decisive victory over Sanaa.
Both Yemens probably will remain dependent on Moscow for most of their
military needs through choice and necessity. Despite anticipated increases
in revenues from oil discoveries on both sides of the frontier, neither Aden
nor Sanaa will have sufficient independent financing for large arms
purchases.
The Saudis probably would provide substantial military aid to North
Yemen if Riyadh believed that Sanaa faced military defeat. The Saudis,
however, are careful to limit such aid to North Yemen in peacetime to pre-
vent a North Yemeni arms buildup that could be used against them.
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NESA 87-10053
December 1987
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The Libyans recently provided North Yemen with sizable military assis-
tance in return for closer North Yemeni ties and support for Libya's war
with Chad. Over the past year the Libyans have been North Yemen's
second-largest source of military aid.
Conflict between North and South Yemen would provide the United States
with opportunities to increase its military relationship with North Yemen,
but Sanaa would try to maintain its Soviet military ties. In the event of
hostilities, North Yemen almost certainly would press the United States
for a direct military supply relationship that bypasses the Saudis. Sanaa
continues to value US military equipment and training, but it probably will
favor Soviet and Libyan interests over US concerns as long as Moscow and
Tripoli continue to meet North Yemen's arms requests.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
Comparative Capabilities
1
The Ground Forces
1
Overall Numbers Suggest Parity
1
Comparable Equipment
1
Unit Deployments Favor South Yemen
2
South Yemen's Training Edge
2
Limitations on Command, Control, and Communications
2
Inadequate Logistics
2
Poor Maintenance
3
Morale and Tribal Loyalties
5
Limited Air Capability
6
Navies Not a Factor
11
Foreign Military Support
11
Soviet Potential To Influence Fighting
11
Uncertain Saudi Support
12
Possible Sources of Future Conflict
12
Sanaa's Efforts To Diversify Arms Suppliers
12
Outlook for Increased US and Soviet Influence
13
Soviets as the Chief Arms Broker
13
Opportunities for the United States
16
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North and South Yemen:
Comparative Military
Capabilities
Since South Yemen's establishment as a Marxist
state in 1967, North and South Yemen have been
involved in two wars with each other and a series of
major border clashes. South Yemeni forces invaded
North Yemen in 1972 and 1979. The second attack
supported a major insurgency in southern North
Yemen that Sanaa finally defeated after three years
of effort and with substantial military aid from Saudi
Arabia and the Soviet Union. Skirmishes continue
between North and South Yemeni border forces and
occasionally erupt into large clashes, most recently in
1985.
We believe political and economic constraints will
preclude full-scale conflict between North and South
Yemen in the near future, but the two countries'
traditional distrust, ideological differences, and poten-
tially competing oil interests are likely to lead to
military clashes over time. Neither Aden nor Sanaa is
prepared to initiate a major military confrontation,
since both regimes are trying to breathe life into their
moribund economies and are encountering domestic
political challenges. We believe Aden and Sanaa also
are reluctant to risk jeopardizing crucial Soviet mili-
tary and economic aid by initiating another conflict.
Comparative Capabilities
In prolonged ground fighting, we believe neither side
would achieve a decisive victory. Major fighting
would severely strain the capabilities of both coun-
tries' armies and air forces. North Yemen's regular
Army has more active duty personnel, but South
Yemen would enjoy an initial advantage because it
has better training and larger border units. We
believe that the ability of either side to seize and hold
sizable territory would be severely constrained by
logistic problems. In addition,
the armies and air forces
on both sides depend on their Soviet military advisers
and would have difficulty maintaining their sophisti-
cated military equipment without them.
1
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The Ground Forces
Overall Numbers Suggest Parity. Numerically, the
two countries' around forces are roughly the same.
that North 25X1
Yemen's regular Army numbers 35,000 men, while
South 25X1
Yemen's regular Army numbers 24,000. South
Yemen, in addition, has at least 15,000 active duty
militia that act in close coordination with its Army.
Ground force reserves for both sides are difficult to
calculate but could be sizable.
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North Yemen mustered 10,000 Army re-
servists in the Sanaa area to march in the National
Day parade on 26 September 1987, 25X1
Both sides field the equwa- 25X1
lent of at least 11 2,000-man combat manuever
brigades, and each has several thousand uniformed
personnel serving in special security and paramilitary
units. 25X1
North Yemen may have up to 32 units designated as
brigades, but many of these are no more than battal-
ion-size formations.'
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Comparable Equipment. Both armies have military
equipment of roughly equal quantity and quality.
Each relies primarily on Soviet armor and artillery,
although North Yemen also has three US-equipped
brigades. North Yemen has more armored vehicles
than the South, but
South Yemen has more artillery and operational
'North Yemen has two brigades?a total of 3,000 troops?serving
in Iraq, The contingent is
rotated every six months, and the I I th rotation took place in
October 1987. Upon their return to North Yemen, many of these
brigades retain their honorary designation as Aruba (Arabism)
brigades. These units are deployed throughout North Yemen, but
their strength is unknown.
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tactical missiles, including Scud and FROG surface-
to-surface missiles.2 Neither side has been able to
acquire and operationally deploy significantly more
advanced weapons than the other, and both armies
carry large quantities of World War IT?vintage equip-
ment, including T-34 tanks.
Unit Deployments Favor South Yemen. Barring a
lengthy period of mobilization, Aden's ground forces
would have the initial advantage in a future border
war, partly because of its larger border units. South
Yemen also has assigned more tanks and artillery to
each of its brigades, which provides them with more
concentrated firepower. North Yemen's border units
are well suited for counterinsurgency warfare but
probably would be overrun in a surprise attack by
conventional forces. Sanaa has dissipated its overall
armor advantage by deploying its tanks in smaller
formations.
South Yemen's Training Edge. South Yemen's forces
are better trained in the use of their equipment,
particularly artillery and tanks. The South Yemenis
conduct more exercises?including frequent use of
live ammunition?probably because their Soviet and
Cuban advisers plan and oversee such training.
I conduct only one or two major
exercises annually and that Soviet advisers often are
2 The Soviets delivered at least four SS-21 surface-to-surface
missiles to North Yemen in early September 1987. The missiles are
significantly more accurate than South Yemen's FROGs and Scuds
but are not expected to be operational in the near future. We
believe that the Soviets will deliver the same system to South
Yemen to maintain balanced military relations with the two
countries.
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excluded from planning or participation.
artillerymen do
not understand the concept of indirect fire, preferring
to shoot only when they can see their targets. South
Yemeni forces probably would receive more accurate
fire support from their artillery.
Limitations on Command, Control, and Communica-
tions. There is close coordination between the Army,
Air Force, and Air Defense Force in South Yemen's
daily operations. Soviet and Cuban military advisers
oversee South Yemeni military operations,
and probably are
responsible for the efficient functioning of military
communications.
Command and control for South Yemeni frontline
units probably would not function as efficiently in
war. Soviet advisers probably would not be directly
involved with South Yemeni border units in combat,
reducing the accuracy of their air and artillery strikes.
Highly centralized command and control procedures
practiced by the South Yemenis in Soviet-directed
training exercises would break down in actual combat,
in our view, with forces on both sides relying on an
informal, highly localized command structure.
North Yemen has serious problems coordinating its
forces, partly because the Soviets are not permitted to
play as large a role in military operations as they do in
South Yemen, and partly because of North Yemen's
diverse weapons inventory and communications proce-
dures.
use Russian, English, and Arabic
in military communications and that they have not
integrated their Soviet and West European communi-
cations equipment.
Inadequate Logistics. Logistic problems handicap
both sides and almost certainly would limit the ability
of either army to move deeply into the other's territo-
ry. Mountainous terrain and desert along most of the
border would preclude rapid movement or resupply of
advancing forces. Vehicular traffic is further restrict-
ed by poor national road systems that are subject to
interdiction at several key junctions. Resupply already
is an acute problem for border units on both sides.
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North and South Yemen: Regime Protection Forces
Both Aden and Sanaa maintain sizable countercoup
forces near their capital cities, including their best
Army units and special paramilitary forces.
North Yemen
Central Security Forces. This elite paramilitary force
was created specifically as a countercoup and riot
control force and is commanded by one of President
Salih's brothers. The unit is equipped with crew-
served weapons, BTR-60 armored personnel carriers,
and AML-2451H90 armored vehicles. The Central
Security Forces have a strength of 18,000 men,
, with
10,000 personnel serving in the Central Security
Forces in the Sanaa area.
Special Guards Unit. This 500-man unit is reponsible
for presidential security and is stationed around
Salih's residence,
The guard is equipped with M-113 armored
personnel carriers.
Regular Army Units. An estimated 10,000 North
Yemeni troops are garrisoned in the Sanaa area,
including fully equipped armor, airborne, artillery,
and commando brigades, and could be called on to
counter threats from rebellious Army units or tribal
forces marching against Sanaa. Most of the brigades'
personnel are drawn from Salih's Sanhan tribe, and
each unit is commanded by one of Salih's close
relatives.
South Yemen
Fully equipped armor, artillery, and tactical missile
brigades apparently act as the Aden regime's praeto-
rian guard.
These units were instru-
mental in routing overthrown President Ali Nasir's
forces from Aden during the 1986 coup.
South Yemeni units have gone without ammunition
and spare parts resupply for several weeks even when
there has been no fighting.
Sanaa and Aden lack sufficient air and ground trans-
port to move large quantities of equipment rapidly
over long distances. South Yemen's air cargo fleet of
10 Soviet transport aircraft and North Yemen's eight
transport planes are used primarily to carry small
units and light supplies,
sufficient trucks for troop transport and probably
would have to requisition civilian vehicles in the event
of major fighting.
Poor Maintenance. The maintenance capabilities of
the two countries are rudimentary. Both sides are
handicapped by a serious long-term shortage of
trained maintenance personnel, complicating even
routine maintenance.
We believe they lack the
capability to airlift enough troops, heavy equipment,
and supplies to sustain major military operations.
Both sides suffer from a shortage of tank transporters.
Neither army could move more than 30 tanks over a
long distance at one time. The countries also lack
3
have no concept of
preventive maintenance, a problem that is compound-
ed by the harsh Yemeni environment.' North Yemen
'The heat, humidity, and salt air of the coastal Yemens, particular-
ly the Aden area, rapidly rust and corrode armored vehicles unless
they are properly maintained.
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Tribes in North and South Yemen
'ABIDAH Major tribe of Bakil Confederacy
SANI1AN Major tribe of Hashid Confederacy
RADFAN Tribe of unknown confederacy
People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen
(South Yemen)
AR _e
'AWALIQ
*
BAN!-RUA
ZABYANAIndebra? DATHNAH
BANI AL 'AWADHIL
YAFP
RADFAN
IYAWSHAEI7
.AI "Anad
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Road to Sanaa
has only limited maintenance facilities outside Sanaa,
and some North Yemeni brigades have up to 40
percent of their equipment idled by maintenance
problems, South
Yemeni border units also have severe equipment
maintenance problems, although they have tried hard-
er than North Yemen to provide field units with
equipment for routine maintenance,
We do not believe that either North or South Yemen
could maintain the bulk of its military equipment
during combat without foreign military personnel.
South Yemen depends on Soviet and Cuban techni-
cians to keep its sophisticated equipment running.
North Yemen has technicians from at least eight
countries, including the Soviet Union, the United
States, Taiwan, and Jordan, according to the
and Embassy reporting
the Soviets do
not provide maintenance training to either side, per-
petuating the reliance of both countries on Soviet
maintenance personnel.
5
Morale and Tribal Loyalties. Morale would be a
critical factor determining the effectiveness of North
or South Yemeni forces and probably would favor the
defender. Military units on both sides are recruited
from and generally assigned to their tribal areas,
and traditionally fight best when defending their
tribal homeland. morale is
poor in North and South Yemeni units located far
from their homes and that these units have high
desertion rates.'
We believe that tribal loyalties would be the most
decisive factor in determining the outcome of major
fighting between North and South Yemen. Both
Aden has resorted to
forcible conscription in outlying areas because the desertion rate is
so high North Yemeni military
conscription outside Sanaa is largely in the hands of tribal shaykhs
who send a certain quota of men into the Army in return for
subsidies from the central government.
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The Yemeni Terrain: Hard on Conventional Forces
Mountainous terrain and few roads along most of the
North Yemen?South Yemen border limit the move-
ment of conventional forces and offer the defender
significant advantages. There are three likely cross-
ing points for invading forces where major roads
could handle armored vehicles. The best route is the
two-lane Aden-Ta`izz road. Mountainous terrain on
both sides of the border would confine movement to
the roads, however, and both sides have deployed
sizable blocking forces along these routes. Most of
North Yemen's key population centers are located in
the mountains. Sanaa, for example, is 2,400 meters
above sea level.
The mountainous terrain is ideally suited for insur-
gency warfare and was effectively exploited by South
Yemeni?backed National Democratic Front forces in
the early 1980s. Several thousand fighters, operating
in small groups and enjoying the support of the local
population in southwestern North Yemen, thwarted
conventional government forces by using the hills to
stage hit-and-run attacks and evade conventional
North Yemeni forces. North Yemeni forces could not
defeat the insurgents until they also developed small-
unit tactics.
armies are factionalized along tribal lines, and alle-
giances based on tribal affiliation usually override
central government authority. Leaders in both Aden
and Sanaa acknowledge these loyalties by recruiting
personnel from their own tribes to fill the most
important military units. Army and militia units
stationed in the outlying provinces, however, are
recruited from local tribes, who often are indifferent
or even hostile to the central government.
Both Aden and Sanaa have tried to develop and
maintain the loyalty of their militaries. The current
leaders in both regimes have filled key military
positions with members of their own tribes.
the most powerful faction in
South Yemen's ruling coalition, which includes senior
military officers, represents tribes drawn primarily
Secret
from the Lahij Governorate?with Dhalai and Rad-
fan tribesmen manning the key armor and artillery
units protecting Aden. These same units were instru-
mental in routing the forces of ousted South Yemeni
leader Ali Nasir during the 1986 coup. Ali Nasir's
military supporters?fellow Dathinah tribesmen?
either fled to North Yemen or have been purged from
military service since the coup. South Yemeni Army
and militia units in the Hadhramaut and Shabwah
Governorates probably would become involved in
border fighting with North Yemeni forces but do not
strongly identify with the current Aden leadership.
During the 1986 coup, these units remained
uncommitted.
Most of the key North Yemeni military units protect-
ing Sanaa?Army, paramilitary, and Air Force
units?are members of President Salih's tri
Sai as
deployed units commanded by fellow tribesmen to
protect the oilfields at Ma'rib. Salih's uncle, who
commands North Yemen's airborne brigade, also acts
as military governor for Ma'rib.
We believe the powerful North Yemeni tribal confed-
erations outside Sanaa pose a strong challenge to the
central government's authority in remote areas, but
they are too disunited to march against Sanaa. Gov-
ernment forces firmly control Sanaa, but shaykhs
from the Bakil and Hashid tribal confederations
control the countryside. The government has recruited
tribesmen from the outlying areas for military service,
but only after paying subsidies to the local shaykh.
Powerful tribal militias in both countries could tip the
balance in future outbreaks of major fighting. During
previous border fighting the North Yemenis mustered
almost 100,000 fighters from various tribes,
Limited Air Capability
Air power is unlikely to decide future ground battles
because of the limited ground attack capabilities of
both air forces. Soviet training for South Yemeni
pilots probably is more intensive, according to sources
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711924 (A05684) 12-87 25)(1
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South Yemeni armor in action
during January 1986 civil war
fighting in Aden.
of the and they conduct
more :requent training in airstrike missions. Despite
this,
South Yemen's Air Force has only limited capabili-
ties, and most of its
better trained fighter-bomber pilots may have defect-
ed to North Yemen after the 1986 coup.
Soviet-equipped air squadrons
conduct infrequent air-to-ground training. North Ye-
men has lost 25 of its Soviet aircraft to flight acci-
dents since 1985,
F-5 fighter-bomber squadron, which
and -equipped
failure to
coordinate air traffic control operations that are conducted in
Russian, English, and Arabic has contributed to the high military
aircraft accident rate.
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claim is the best ground attack and intercep-
tor aircraft on either side. During a conflict, North
Yemen's qualitative advantage with the F-5 aircraft,
however, probably would be dissipated by competing
demands for air defense and ground attack missions.
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As with ground equipment, operational readiness
rates for North and South Yemeni combat aircraft
have been seriously affected by limited local mainte-
nance capabilities and reliance on foreign military
technicians and logistics. South Yemen's Soviet air-
craft are better maintained by their Soviet advisers
than North Yemen's,
, but both countries?
as with other Soviet Third World clients?must ship
aircraft and helicopters to the Soviet Union for major
maintenance work, with overhauls averaging seven to
18 months.I
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North Yemen's Military Mishaps
North Yemen's misfortunes with Soviet military
equipment since late 1984 reflect poorly on Soviet
equipment and have been a major source of tension in
the Soviet?North Yemeni military relationship. The
North Yemeni Air Force's losses since 1984 have left
it with 44 operational combat aircraft, as of spring
1987.a The accidents have ranged from at least two
midair collisions between MIG-21s on training mis-
sions to the destruction of an SU-22 fighter-bomber
by its own bombs during an exercise in 1985.
Soviet-equipped air squadrons have been forced to
cut back training flights because of maintenance
problems and plummeting pilot morale. Tensions
between North Yemeni pilots and Soviet advisers
occasionally have resulted in physical violence, and
in one case a North Yemeni pilot pistol-whipped a
Soviet adviser. The North Yemeni Air Force com-
mander refused Soviet requests to punish the man.
The accidents have cast US training and equipment in
a favorable light, based on the performance of
Sanaa 's one US-equipped air squadron. The squad-
ron has had only one accident since 1983, and that
was caused by a Saudi pilot flying an aircraft to
Saudi Arabia for overhaul. North Yemeni pilots in
the F-5 squadron believe that US equipment and
flight training are better,
citing the greater maneuverability of the
F-5 and the US stress on pilot intitiative.b
This figure does not include 14 SU-22 fighter-bombers delivered
in summer 1987 by the Soviets to offset Sanaa 's aircraft losses.
The new SU-22s were operational as of fall 1987.
b Western fighter-pilot training places a greater emphasis on
individual initiative in air-to-air missions. Soviet fighter pilots are
taught to rely heavily on direction from ground control sites.
Sanaa's logistic
problems are compounded because the Saudis control
maintenance and logistic support for the North
Yemeni F-5 squadron.
F-5s were idled for six
weeks this year when the Saudis delivered contami-
nated aviation fuel.
We believe that both Yemens are capable of launch-
ing a strategic airstrike that would provide either side
a military advantage during a conflict. By attacking
first, either Sanaa or Aden could achieve air superior-
ity by destroying the other's combat aircraft and
damaging its airfields. North Yemen's ability to
detect hostile aircraft is poor,
but most of its aircraft are de-
ployed away from the border, increasing their surviv-
ability. South Yemen's ability to detect an airstrike
probably is better, but its Air Force is particularly
vulnerable to a quick strike because most of its
combat aircraft are deployed close to the border.
Air defense forces on both sides are handicapped by
training shortcomings and their reliance on Soviet
military advisers. North Yemen's SA-2 and SA-3
surface-to-air missiles are well placed to protect key
cities and the Ma'rib oilfields, but poor Soviet train-
ing makes their effective operation and maintenance
questionable without Soviet advisory assistance,
' South Yemeni personnel
probably are better trained to use their air defense
weapons, including SA-6 and SA-9 surface-to-air
missiles?accurate, highly mobile short-range systems
that the North Yemenis do not possess.
[air defense personnel engaged in a training exercise at
Ma'rib in December 1986 misfired an SA-2 missile that nearly
struck a Hunt Oil Company drilling rig. Several air defense
personnel were killed by the missile backblast. The North Yemenis
were trying to conduct the exercise without Soviet supervision. An 25X1
enraged and embarrassed President Salih promptly court-martialed
the battery commander and requested refresher training for his air
defense officers.
9
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Both sides have a limited capability to launch an
airstrike or tactical missile strike against key econom-
ic or civilian targets. South Yemen possesses FROG
and Scud surface-to-surface missiles with high-
explosive warheads that, if launched from South
Yemeni territory, could strike Ta`izz or Sanaa, North
Yemen's largest cities.' North Yemen is concerned
that Aden could target its oilfields in the Ma'rib
region. Despite this capability, we believe that Aden
would consider using its missiles only if military
defeat appeared imminent.
North Yemen probably would consider using its F-5
fighter-bombers against the South Yemeni oil refin-
ery in Aden or possibly against South Yemen's new
oilfields in Shabwah during an all-out conflict.
Although North Yemen has recently acquired the
highly accurate SS-21 tactical missile, it lacks the
trained personnel to maintain and operate the system
without Soviet advisers.
Navies Not a Factor
The small Yemeni navies probably would play a
negligible role in any fighting. Neither country has a
significant amphibious capability for its troops nor the
capability to disrupt the other's Red Sea military
supply lines. North Yemen has eight seaworthy patrol
boats, and South Yemen has six OSA II missile boats
that sustained some damage during the 1986 coup.
Most of South Yemen's naval personnel defected after
the coup,
Foreign Military Support
Soviet Potential To Influence Fighting. We believe
that the Soviets are in a position to provide the
decisive edge in a war between North and South
Yemen, but they probably would remain neutral and
try to end the conflict through diplomatic means. We
g According to CIA estimates, the FROG-7 has a range of 70 km,
while the Scud-B has a range of 300 km. The SS-21 has an
estimated range of 80 to 100 km.
11
SS-21 tactical missile
believe Moscow prefers to preserve long-term equities
resulting from its military supply relationship with
both Yemens and wants to avoid antagonizing moder-
ate Arab states. Moscow already has demonstrated its
reluctance to become involved directly in fighting
between the two countries. During the 1979 war,
Soviet advisers were withdrawn from South Yemeni
units that invaded the North,
The Soviets probably would intervene on behalf of
South Yemen if diplomatic efforts failed to halt
North Yemeni military operations that threatened the
Aden regime. We believe that Moscow would step up
arms shipments to Aden while cutting off military aid
to Sanaa. If the Soviet Union chose to become directly
involved, Soviet and Cuban military advisers could
play a crucial role on the battlefield by providing
South Yemeni forces with better command and con-
trol, directing artillery and airstrikes, and flying
combat missions in support of South Yemeni ground
forces.
We judge that the Soviets would not commit combat
units to South Yemen unless North Yemeni troops
threatened to overrun Soviet military facilities. The
Soviets could airlift a 1,500- to 2,000-man Cuban
combat brigade from Ethiopia to
airfields at Aden and Al `Anad.9
If Soviet lives in South Yemen were threatened, the Soviets could
call on the naval infantry company stationed on an amphibious
assault ship normally deployed with the Soviet Indian Ocean
squadron.
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Uncertain Saudi Support. The Saudis probably would
provide significant military aid to North Yemen if
they believed that Sanaa faced military defeat.
Riyadh considers North Yemen as a buffer against
Marxist South Yemen, and it could tip the military
balance in North Yemen's favor by subsidizing addi-
tional arms purchases and by delivering large quanti-
ties of Western military equipment from its stocks. In
1979, the Saudis agreed to finance a US arms
package to North Yemen valued at over $300 million.
Saudi money could buy the temporary allegiance of
the powerful North Yemeni tribal confederations,
whose military forces collectively would triple the size
of North Yemen's Army
The Saudis also have influence over South
Yemeni tribes along the Saudi border, and Saudi-
subsidized tribal disturbances could cause consider-
able security problems for Aden's forces in the
Hadhramaut.
The Saudis, however, have been careful to limit
military aid to North Yemen to prevent an arms
buildup that could be used against them. Riyadh
regards control over North Yemen's military and
economic aid as a vital check on the territorial
ambitions of its more populous and fractious southern
neighbor.
Possible Sources of Future Conflict
Unruly tribes along the border area shared by North
Yemen, South Yemen, and Saudi Arabia occasionally
have provoked inadvertent clashes between North and
South Yemeni forces, but they are not a likely source
of future conflict between Aden and Sanaa. Tribes in
the triborder area have resented central government
efforts to impose tighter control over their local
affairs, particularly efforts to curtail their lucrative
smuggling trade.
these tribesmen occasionally have attacked
central government officials and military personnel.
Shootouts between South Yemeni Government forces
and tribesmen involved in cross-border smuggling
periodically have drawn in North Yemeni border
forces caught in the crossfire. These incidents have
not been a major irritant in relations between the
Secret
Yemens, however, and Aden and Sanaa have success-
fully used negotiations to contain tensions resulting
from tribal unrest.
South Yemen's recent discovery of oil close to North
Yemen's oil concession raises the possibility of a
future Yemeni clash resulting from conflicting re-
source claims. Although we do not know the size of
South Yemen's oil find in Shabwah, it may overlap
North Yemen's oil concession in the undemarcated
border area. Both regimes probably regard oil as
crucial to their economic rejuvenation and political
survival and would not hesitate to defend the oilfields
against attack by the other. North Yemen already has
shown its willingness to defend forcefully its oil-rich
Ma'rib area, where the last major Yemeni border
clash occurred in 1985.
Militant South Yemeni exiles protected by North
Yemen have caused the most recent tension between
Aden and Sanaa, but Sanaa has reduced its support
for the exiles, and their future role in South Yemen is
in serious doubt. Sanaa initially exaggerated the
exiles' military potential to obtain US and Saudi
military support and deter the Aden regime from
subversive efforts against North Yemen. The exiles
have been unable and unwilling to mount credible
military operations on their own, however, and would
require substantial North Yemeni military support to
do so. In our view, North Yemen will not provide such
support to avoid provoking a confrontation with Aden.
Salih also is aware of South Yemen's demonstrated
capability to sponsor subversive military operations in
North Yemen.
Sanaa's Efforts To Diversify Arms Suppliers
Serious financial constraints have frustrated North
Yemen's efforts to diversify its sources of military aid.
It has been dissatisfied with the poor quality of its
Soviet military equipment and the level of training,
maintenance, and logistic support provided by Mos-
cow, according to US defense attache reporting.
has solicited help from moderate Arab states
that have Soviet equipment, including Jordan and
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Military Exiles in the Yemens:
Numbers and Missions
Many South Yemeni exiles aligned with ousted
South Yemeni leader All Nasir remain in North
Yemen, but they pose little military threat to Aden.
All Nasir's forces consist of 13,000 South Yemeni
military defectors and fellow tribesmen from Abyan
Governorate.a The exiles have failed to mount signifi-
cant military operations because of indecisive leader-
ship, poor training, and North Yemen's apparent
unwillingness to sanction their military operations.
Sanaa retains control of Libyan arms delivered to
North Yemen for Ali Nasir's forces and has confined
most of the exiles to three military camps along the
South Yemeni border. Most of the disaffected exiles
are likely to return peacefully to South Yemen.
A minority of irreconcilable South Yemeni militants
probably will remain in North Yemen, joining a host
of militarily dormant South Yemeni exile groups.
Most of these groups?notably the South Arabian
a Between 35,000 and 50,000 South Yemenis fled to North Yemen
after the 1986 coup in Aden, according to US Embassy reporting.
League?espouse militant anti?South Yemeni rheto-
ric but generally appear content to receive annual
stipends from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis also have
provided quarters for a South Yemeni exile brigade
in northwestern Saudi Arabia for over a decade,
but most of
the personnel are long past military retirement age
and probably train infrequently, if at all.
North Yemeni exiles of the South Yemeni?sponsored
National Democratic Front remain a potent political
force in South Yemen, but their military activity
probably is overstated by concerned North Yemeni
officials. The National Democratic Front proved
capable of mounting an effective insurgency during
the early 1980s, and at the height of its activity it
fielded an estimated 12,000 men.
the front's political leadership
probably commands the loyalty of several thousand
supporters who could quickly be rearmed by Aden.
$4 billion of military equipment delivered on a grant
or credit basis. Military manpower losses during the
1986 coup in Aden probably increased South Yemeni
dependence on Soviet military advisers. Heightened
tension with North Yemen would almost certainly
prompt Aden to seek more Soviet weapons, providing
Moscow with new opportunities to expand the size of
its military advisory group and increase its access to
South Yemeni port and air facilities. The instability
that characterizes Aden's politics is not likely to affect
the strong Soviet military relationship with South
Yemen.
Although Sanaa probably believes that it could re-
duce Soviet leverage over its policies if it could
balance its military supply relationships with Wash-
ington and Moscow, we believe that North Yemen has
little prospect of reducing its reliance on Soviet
15
military aid in the near future. The Soviets supply
two-thirds of North Yemen's military equipment,
delivering over $1 billion of military equipment to
North Yemen since 1979. Sanaa owes the Soviets over
$700 million, according to US Embassy reporting.
Despite its preference for Western military arms and
advisers, Sanaa lacks the financial resources to buy
large amounts of Western military equipment and
cannot hire sufficient Egyptian or Jordanian military
personnel to maintain its large inventory of Soviet
equipment.
Future Soviet arms deliveries probably will depend
more on Soviet policy objectives than on the countries'
oil revenues. Neither North nor South Yemen has a
specific military modernization plan, although both
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Military Advisers in the Yemens?A Strong Soviet
Flavor
Soviet and Cuban military advisers play a more
active role in military affairs in South Yemen than in
North Yemen. There are about 500 Cubans and up to
1,000 Soviet military personnel in South Yemen,
possibly including Soviet personnel stationed at Aden
and Al Anad to support Soviet naval operations in
the Indian Ocean. Soviet and Cuban technicians do
most of the maintenance and may help to operate
more sophisticated equipment such as air defense
radars. Soviet and Cuban pilots act as flight instruc-
tors and may fly routine missions inside South
Yemen,
Soviet advisers are assigned to oversee training
for each South Yemeni Army bri ade,
North Yemen is host to a sizable Soviet militar
advisory group and a smaller Saudi mission.
that there are at
least 355 Soviet military advisers and technicians in
Sanaa and that an additional 150 may have arrived
since September to support the SS-21s and new
. SU-22 fighter-bombers. Most Soviet military advis-
ers support the Army and Air Defense Force. The
Saudis have 120 military personnel to oversee main-
tenance and support of North Yemen's Western
equipment. A Taiwanese team maintains the F-5s. A
Jordanian team maintains North Yemen's Vulcan air
defense guns, and a small Egyptian team teaches at
North Yemen's officers college in Sanaa.
have tried to obtain more advanced Soviet weapons
from Moscow. The Soviets probably are manipulating
their military supply relationships with both Yemens
to discourage hostilities, while Moscow tries to woo
the moderate Gulf states. The US Embassy in Sanaa
reports that North Yemen agreed to expel leading
Secret
South Yemeni militants in September, shortly after
the Soviets delivered a new weapons package that
included SS-21 missiles. The Soviets also significantly
delayed the supply of new arms to South Yemen to
replace equipment lost in the 1986 coup to rein in
radicals in the new government.
Opportunities for the United States. A renewed
Yemeni conflict would provide the United States with
opportunities to increase its military relationship with
North Yemen. Sanaa almost certainly would ask
Washington to supply additional military aid, particu-
larly if the North Yemenis anticipated a suspension of
Soviet military aid during hostilities with South
Yemen. North Yemen probably would seek US mili-
tary aid to augment, rather than permanently replace,
Soviet military aid.
North Yemen almost certainly would use renewed
hostilities to press the United States for a direct
military relationship independent of the Saudis.
Sanaa would ask the Saudis to finance the purchase of
large amounts of US military equipment, but it would
also appeal to the United States for direct grants to
reduce Saudi oversight of North Yemeni military
assistance. We believe Riyadh would carefully scruti-
nize large-scale North Yemeni aid requests to the
United States and urge Washington to funnel such
assistance through Saudi channels.
Unless the United States increases its military aid to
Sanaa, US influence in North Yemen during peace-
time is likely to decline. Oil development assistance
helps to maintain limited US leverage in North
Yemen, but President Salih places a higher priority
on bolstering his country's defenses. Although Salih
will try to maintain a nonaligned posture, he will
probably feel increasingly obligated to accommodate
the Soviets' and Libya's interests at the expense of US
relations so long as they are his primary military
benefactors.
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Foreign Military Personnel in the Yemens
As of September 1987
North Yemen
Saudi
226b
Soviet/East bloc
355a
Jordanian
28
US
24
a Does not include 150
Soviet advisers who arrived
in late September to
support the operation of
new equipment.
b Includes approximately 40
Pakistanis and 80 Taiwanese.
South Yemen
17
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North and South Yemen: Arms Deliveries
North Yemen
South Yemen
1.
Soviet
Free
world
Total Million US$
Eastern
Europe
Saudi
US
123
1960-69
754
1970-79
3,793
1980-87'
1960-69
18
1970-79
1,542
1980-87'
4,219
Total Million US$
a Estimated.
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