CHINESE THORNS ALONG THE VIETNAMESE BORDER: MEANS TO MANY ENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T01298R000200240001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Means to Many Ends
Chinese Thorns Along
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EA 85-10223J 25X1
IA 85-10083J
o December
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Directorate of Top Secret
Chinese Thorns Along
the Vietnamese Border:
Means to Many Ends
This paper was prepared b
Office of East Asian Analysis,
Office of Imagery Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
China Division, OEA,
EA 85-10223J
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top secret
Chinese Thorns Along
the Vietnamese Borde7
Means to Many Ends
Key Judgments In the seven years since the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of
Information available Cambodia, the Chinese have regularly initiated scattered, small-scale
as of 20 December 1985 fighting along the China-Vietnam border. By doing so, the Chinese have
was used in this report.
forced Hanoi to keep its best troops along the Chinese frontier and
unavailable for duty in Cambodia. Over the past 18 months, however, we
have seen a shift in Beijing's military strategy and a greater use of the
clashes to meet other objectives such as influencing its relations with the
United States, the Soviet Union, and members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations. 25X1
The new "strategy of a thousand thorns," adopted in April 1984, involves
the battle for and occupation of small pieces of Vietnamese territory-
action that has provoked the Vietnamese into protracted and bloody
combat to regain lost territory:
? The fighting involves hand-to-hand combat from entrenched and bun-
kered positions as well as heavy shelling of Vietnamese villages and
military positions.
? The human and materiel price has been heavy. Hundreds of battles have
been fought and thousands of lives lost. The burden of supporting from
50,000 to 120,000 men in the field, moreover, has caused substantial
dislocations to the local Chinese economy. 25X1
The Chinese have controlled the fighting carefully, however, limiting it to a
small salient in a remote area. By doing so, Beijing avoids the international
condemnation and steep military costs that would come with a major
attack on Vietnam and, at the same time, plays to the strength of Chinese
forces in that area-nonmechanized infantry operations that do not rely on
long logistic lines or close air support.
Beijing is aware that such limited warfare will not force Hanoi to alter its
Cambodia policy; indeed, the Chinese at times appear as much interested
in the experience gained for their military modernization program as in the
pressure exerted on Vietnam:
? The fighting has provided a training ground for Chinese infantry forces
and the recently rejuvenated officer corps. Units from nearly every
military region have rotated to the border over the past 18 months, and
many graduates from China's military academies spend their first tour
there.
Top Secret
EA 85-10223J
IA 85-10083J 25X1
December 1985
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? The clashes also give the Chinese the opportunity to test new military
equipment-some of it acquired from abroad-~
The conflict over the past 18 months has increasingly become an integral
part of Beijing's foreign policy, influencing its relations with the United
States, the Soviet Union, and members of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations. It gives China a card to play in the strategic triangle-by
manipulating the level of fighting during high-level US or Soviet visits,
Beijing can graphically display a congruence with US policy interests in
Asia or, alternately, a willingness to further the dialogue with Moscow.
The pressure on Vietnam also strengthens China's relations with ASEAN
nations supporting the resistance effort in Cambodia
Because Beijing believes its actions along the Vietnamese frontier meet
important domestic and foreign policy needs, we expect the fighting will
continue indefinitely. But we do not look for China to expand the scope of
the fighting substantially-although it maintains the force strength and
capability to do so-without a significant provocation, such as a major
Vietnamese incursion into Thailand. We also believe that Hanoi will accept
the costs of the conflict rather than escalate the tension; as long as the
fighting remains under control, the Vietnamese will not be forced to alter
their policy in Cambodia..
Top Secret iv
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Top Secret
Key Judgments
Beijing's Strategy of a Thousand Thorns
Strategic Concerns
Serving Military Modernization
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Ton Secret
I
Figure 1. It is an important policy of China to remove the threat
posed by Vietnamese authorities against the security of its borders
and safeguard peace and stability in Southeast Asia ... The
Chinese Government has made it clear time and again that the
traditional friendship between China and Vietnam can be rebuilt
provided the Vietnamese authorities withdraw all their invading
troops from Kampuchea and renounce their expansionist policy. "
Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, February
1985, during visit to the Malipo front on the sixth
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'1 Top Secret
Chinese Thorns Along
the Vietnamese Border:
Means to Many Ends F
Beijing's Strategy of a Thousand Thorns
In search of ways to continue to press Hanoi militarily
without engaging in a politically risky and economi-
cally debilitating full-scale war with Vietnam, Beijing
in the spring of 1984 adopted a "strategy of a
the strategy calls for the occupation of small
segments of Vietnamese territory to force the Viet-
namese to try to dislodge the occupying Chinese
forces. By thus engaging Vietnamese forces in limited
but protracted and bloody combat, China rejuvenated
its Vietnam policy in a way that serves a multitude of
functions without the international condemnation or
financial and manpower costs that would result from
a major Chinese attack:
? Border clashes compel Hanoi to keep its best divi-
sions-at a high state of readiness-in northern
Vietnam and unavailable for duty in Cambodia.
? Threats of wider warfare require Vietnam to main-
tain a large standing army in the north, an act that
Beijing believes bleeds the Vietnamese
economically.
? Tensions with Vietnam serve as instruments of
Chinese foreign policy, proving to the world that
China actively opposes Vietnam's occupation of
Cambodia and Hanoi's "collusion" with Moscow.
? Harassment of the Vietnamese allows Beijing to
point to a congruence with US foreign policy in East
Asia and has created new bonds with Thailand and
opened doors to improving relations with other
Southeast Asian nations.
? Finally, limited warfare tests the mettle of Beijing's
rejuvenated armed forces and reminds China's
youth of their military obligation.
The Cambodian Connection
Politically, China's "unheralded war" is motivated by
a variety of factors including rival regional ambitions,
chagrin at Hanoi's turn toward Moscow, anger over
Vietnam's ingratitude for China's assistance during
the Vietnam war, territorial disputes, and ethnic
animosity. But since 1978 the "explicit" reason of-
fered by Beijing for Sino-Vietnamese tensions has 25X1
been the presence of Hanoi's troops in Cambodia.
Beijing implies that Chinese-Vietnamese relations ca125X1
be normalized-diplomatic relations have never been
severed-only if all Vietnamese forces are withdrawn 25X1
from Cambodia. This policy line serves Beijing well as
it casts China's antipathy toward Vietnam in an
international light-as opposed to simply a quarrel
between neighbors-and reassures ASEAN and the
Cambodian resistance of China's continued opposition
to Vietnamese domination of Indochina
Strategic Concerns
Beijing first implemented its strategy on 28 April
1984 at the height of Vietnam's 1983/84 dry season
campaign (November-May) in Cambodia by seizing
at least five hilltops 1 to 2 kilometers inside Vietnam's
Ha Tuyen Province. But, even at that juncture, we
believe Beijing had broader strategic objectives than
Cambodia in mind:
? The assaults-the first division-sized attack against
Vietnam since 1979-were timed to coincide with
President Reagan's visit to Beijing. Reminiscent of
China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 on the heels of
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washing-
ton, the assaults were manipulated by Beijing to
suggest tacit US support.
? Beijing also was responding to an uprecedented joint
Soviet-Vietnamese amphibious exercise in the Gulf
of Tonkin conducted in mid-April.
? Finally, Beijing signaled Moscow that it was not
intimidated by the growing Soviet military presence
at Cam Ranh and in the South China Sea and was
prepared to jeopardize the planned visit of Soviet
First Deputy Premier Arkhipov to Beijing-sched-
uled for early May-to prove this point. Arkhipov
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did abruptly cancel the visit as Moscow apparently
calculated among other things that it could not risk
even larger Chinese attacks on Vietnam during his
Reports of secret talks, in
visit.
These broader strategic calculations have continued
to be major factors in China's calculus of military
action against Vietnam. In fact, the level of fighting
sometimes has little relationship to events in Cambo-
Having improved their security relation-
ship with the United States, we believe the Chinese
thought they were in a better position to make a few
gestures to Moscow. Moreover, analysis of speeches
by Chinese leaders at the time strongly suggests
differences within the Chinese leadership, with some
senior party figures-including Chen Yun and Peng
Zhen-advocating a more accommodating stance to-
ward Moscow in order to improve relations with the
Soviet Union.
Once Arkhipov departed China, however, Chinese
forces initiated some of the heaviest battles of the
18-month campaign in retaliation for Vietnamese
assaults on Communist and non-Communist resis-
tance bases along the Thailand-Cambodia border.
A recent Chinese use of border clashes in support of
foreign policy was triggered by Beijing's anger over
alleged Vietnamese rumors of a secret dialogue.
place along the border-with weapons.
fact, prompted Deputy Chief of General Staff Xu Xin
in early November to quip to US officials that the
only contact between China and Vietnam was taking
Serving Military Modernization
In addition to foreign policy goals, Beijing has found
the Malipo battlefield an excellent place to advance a
national modernization objective-the rebuilding of
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a modern
fighting force. Concerned by the deficiencies apparent
in PLA commanders, weapons, tactics, command and
control, and logistics during the 1979 border war,
Deng Xiaoping is using today's battles on the Viet-
namese border as proving grounds for the rejuvenated
officer corps, China's better educated soldiers, and
improved weapons.
Careers, in fact, have already been made and lost on
the Malipo front. Fu Quanyou, commander of Nan-
jing's 1st Army, apparently drew Beijing's approval
for his forces' performance in fierce battles with the
Vietnamese in the first three months of this year. A
Sichuan provincial newspaper reported that Fu re-
placed Chengdu military commander Wang
Chenghan in June. Subsequent to military region
realignment in September, Fu was given larger re-
sponsibility for all of southwestern China, including
the Yunnan front on the Vietnamese border. Chinese
press reports highlight two more junior officers who
have received national acclaim and risen quickly
through the ranks because of exemplary combat
records on the Vietnamese front:
? Liao Xilong, 43, reportedly handpicked by Deng
Xiaoping to be the youngest army-level commander
in China. Liao, who probably commands the 14th
Army in Yunnan, was commander of the division
that first seized the Vietnamese hills in early 1984.
? Zhang Youxia, 34, son of a PLA general and a
deputy division commander, probably in the 14th
Army. He is currently studying at the prestigious
PLA Military Academy near Beijing, the finishing
school for China's general officers.
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Instilling Revolutionary Fervor in China's Youth
The (Jinan) cadets displayed their fearless revolution-
ary heroic spirit during combat. "The Chinese race
cannot be humiliated. Our sacred territory cannot be
abandoned." "Willingly we shed our youth blood to
build a new great wall for defending our country". . . .
The merits achieved by these cadets are the pride of
the motherland .... This makes us feel that the
youths of the 1980s are not the so-called `fallen
generation"nor the "generation having lost faith"but
instead are the warm-blooded sons and daughters of
ideals and are ardently in love with the motherland.
Jinan's Dazhong Ribao
16 April 1985
Dearest father and mother, I am now the only person
left at the post and may have to sacrifice myself for
the nation at any time .... I am not the slightest bit
timid or afraid, because after my death there will
still be the great motherland. . . . After my "glory"
do not be sad for me, but be proud that I died a
glorious martyr's death.
Zhou Shenhui, 18-year-old awarded
first-class honors for bravery during
August fighting
Hongqi, No. 21
1 November 1985
Early on the morning of 11 September, he and his
comrades-in-arms were intercepted by fierce enemy
artillery fire while moving toward position 211. Al-
though his left arm was injured, he led the fighters to
continue the advance .... When the enemy launched
a further artillery bombardment, he ordered the
fighters of the whole squad to retreat into a tunnel so
as to reduce casualties, while he stood at the tunnel
entrance observing enemy movements. Enemy fire
wounded his limbs, but he went on directing the
combat until he had shed his last drop of blood.
Nie Jianqing, 25 years old at the time
of his death, awarded first-class honors
for heroism during an 11 September
battle
Xian Radio
14 October 1985
In addition to testing officers, the border fighting is a
useful propaganda tool to remind Chinese youths that
they have an obligation to serve in the military. Senior
PLA officers worry that the new opportunities avail-
able in China's expanding economy and the lower
prestige accorded military service recently will lead
China's best and brightest youths away from military
careers. Thus, a national campaign has been under
way for the past six months-probably orchestrated to
offset the negative publicity of the current million-
man reduction in force-highlighting the contribution
and sacrifices of young Chinese soldiers.
China's choice of battlefields reflects the carefully
calibrated pressure Beijing wishes to bring to bear on
Vietnam. A remote and mountainous area opposite
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Three Unspoken Rules of Engagement at Malipo
1. Chinese and Vietnamese airpower is used only for
defensive patrols and reconnaissance, not ground
attack or offensive strikes.
2. Chinese artillery fire is directed against civilian
and military targets north of Ha Giang but never
against the city itself.
3. Vietnamese units counterattack against Chinese
units and military lines of communication inside
Vietnam, but refrain from any major incursions into,
or long-range shelling of, Malipo County.
Malipo County, the Malipo front has hilltops that are
of no strategic value and are not on a major invasion
route into Vietnam. The Chinese claim, according to
the US defense attache in Beijing, that they took the
hills because the Vietnamese were using them to shell
Chinese hamlets and farms. In fact, their only tactical
significance is to provide Chinese gunners excellent
positions from which to rain fire down on Vietnamese
villages and troop positions.
The 10-kilometer-wide and 5-kilometer-deep Malipo
front does provide a veiled threat of a small "second
lesson," for it is only 17 kilometers from Ha Giang-
one of the provincial capitals occupied during the
1979 invasion. But Beijing ensures that until that
decision is made Chinese actions do not disturb the
town of Ha Giang.
Beijing
appears to be concerned that artillery fire directed at
Ha Giang might prompt the Vietnamese to mount
major counterattacks or large artillery bombardments
into Malipo County
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11 Top Secret
Beijing was probably also motivated to choose the
Malipo front to compensate for China's serious mili-
This has tary shortcomings:
forced the Vietnamese to redeploy their guns closer to
Ha Giang, giving them only limited ability to shell
Chinese outposts on Vietnamese territory and no
opportunities to hit Chinese civilian targets.
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Too Secret
Trench Warfare
Since April 1984, in hand-to-hand combat from en-
trenched and bunkered positions, Chinese and Viet-
namese infantry forces have attacked and counterat-
tacked for control of three or four of the more
vulnerable hilltops. A senior Vietnamese general, in
an interview with a Western journalist, last spring
estimated that China had fired half a million rounds
of artillery and mortar shells into Vietnam's Ha
Tuyen Province over the past year. Today, Chinese
forces retain control of most higher peaks in this area
of the border. Many of the smaller hills have traded
hands several times
Considerable Costs ...
The human and materiel price of the Malipo cam-
paign has been considerable. By their own accounts,
Chinese forces have fought hundreds of battles for the
Although the Chinese are using 122-mm, 130-mm,
and 152-mm artillery pieces to shell the Vietnamese,
the vast majority of rounds are fired from shorter
range weapons such as 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm
mortars and recoilless rifles used by Chinese infantry
regiments. The mortars have a maximum range of 6
kilometers and are ideal for the close-infighting
typical along the Malipo front.
hilltops, and casualties have been substantial
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Military Commission Chairman Deng iaopmg
has
tacitly admitted to the high costs on several occasions
recently by conferring posthumous decorations on
martyrs who have "expended lives and blood to
preserve the dignity of the motherland."
given that the battles are fought by infantry units
attacking entrenched hilltop positions, Vietnamese
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and Chinese casualties must run into the thousands.
Anecdotal reports tend to
confirm significant Chinese losses:
A Chinese provincial radiobroadcast in June 1984
reported on a newly designed military ambulance
that had evacuated 500 wounded from the Malipo
front in the first two months of fighting alone.
Disruptions to the local Chinese economy-support-
ing from 50,000 to 120,000 men in the field over the
past 18 months-also appear to be substantial.
The bloodiest fighting appears to have taken place in
February, when the Chinese threw two divisions-or
24,000 men-into the fray.
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If Malipo has been costly for the Chinese, Vietnam
also has paid a high price for its stalwart defense of
Ha Tuyen Province. Vietnamese forces-which we
estimate to number 30,000 in the area-have not
retreated in the face of overwhelming Chinese tactical
superiority.
The border also is providing an excellent proving
ground for new equipment, some of it acquired from
abroad. Chinese television broadcasts over the past
summer have shown Chinese soldiers near Malipo
using hand-held laser rangefinders and short-range
radios produced by the Israeli defense manufacturer,
And Military Benefits
The Chinese military press increasingly is highlight-
ing the Vietnamese border fighting both for its value
as a training ground for Chinese infantry forces and
as an international political statement. A 7 April
article in the Liberation Army Daily boasted that the
border fighting. has "trained a new generation of
reliable soldiers."
Using the Vietnam conflict as a training ground is, in
fact, Chinese military policy. China's aging high
command is well aware of the lack of combat experi-
ence in the ground forces and appears to relish the
chance to test the mettle of its recently rejuvenated
officer corps.
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Figure 10. A Chinese soldier at Malipo Liberation Army Pictorial
uses an Israeli-designed laser rangefinder
Beijing shows no signs of changing its strategy.
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The Chinese have improved medical evacuation pro-
cedures-severely criticized after the 1979 conflict-
by using more helicopters to move difficult cases to
larger cities for treatment
time they have always been replaced by other forces.
Beijing is also reassuring Bangkok that China is
prepared to respond to Vietnamese actions along the
Thailand-Cambodia border. China's Deputy Chief of
Mission to Thailand told his US counterpart in early
November that China had "taken steps" to remind
Vietnam it does not have a "free hand" against
Although we believe the fighting at Malipo will
continue-intensifying when Beijing seeks to score
political points-we doubt the Chinese are prepared
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to open up any new salients.2 There would be little
additional political mileage to be gained because
Beijing seeks to avoid criticism that it is the aggressor;
also, a new front would create an additional drain on
Chinese economic resources. A new front in Guangxi
Province would also be closer to traditional invasion
routes, and, given Vietnamese sensitivity, China can-
not be sure that it could control a conflict in that area.
The Chinese military, moreover, needs no new south-
ern training ground because it has been able to rotate
sufficient units and officers through Malipo. Finally,
the tenacity with which the Vietnamese have fought
against numerically superior forces for the hilltops of
Ha Tuyen Province will give the Chinese leadership
pause before contemplating the opening of any new
"running sores" along the Sino-Vietnamese frontier.
The Chinese will, however, periodically conduct
saber-rattling operations along the length of the bor-
der to remind Hanoi that China has other options and
perha s to test Vietnamese defenses.
Short of a major Vietnamese incursion into Thailand,
however, China is unlikely to expand the scope of the
real fighting beyond Malipo. Beijing cannot afford to
sidetrack its economic modernization program with
an expensive "second lesson" against Vietnam. More-
over, with the major increase in Vietnamese troop'
strength since 1979 along the China-Vietnam bor-
der-and the marked improvement in equipment and
training supplied by the Soviet Union-Beijing would
2 In the event that Beijing does seek new pressure points, it may
choose an area on the Guangxi border, which the Chinese refer to
as Fakashan (designated by the Vietnamese as Hill 400). This
mountainous area northeast of Lang Son also has contested hilltops,
and Chinese leaders often refer to the area in the same breath as
Malipo
probably have to mass a force of over 2 million men-
half its standing army-to inflict the same level of
damage to Vietnam as it did in 1979. Such a major
military incursion-especially if unprovoked-also
would run counter to Beijing's efforts to reduce
tenisons with Moscow.
The View From Hanoi
0
We believe that Vietnamese forces will continue to
react strongly to Chinese forays on the tactical level.
The "thousand thorns," however, are likely to have
little effect on Vietnamese policy. Beijing's actions did
not deter Hanoi's largest dry-season offensive in six
years, and we detect no effort now to move additional
Hanoi's leaders appear to be gauging correctly the
limits of the Chinese strategy and display confidence
that local commanders can successfully manage the
pressure. We foresee no Vietnamese effort to match
the Chinese buildup opposite Ha Tuyen Province, an
area of limited strategic significance. China's policy
of keeping border tensions within carefully controlled
bounds-not building up, for example, along tradi-
tional invasion corridors-has not been lost on Hanoi
who has no compelling reason to respond in kind to
Chinese provocations.
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25X1,
Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90TO1298R000200240001-6