CIA THE BATTLE FOR SECRET POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2014
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 3, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

0
Declassified and Approved For Release_ 50-Yr 2014/01/15 : CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
THE SATURDAY
EVENING
CIA
John McCone is boss of the controversial CIA. Secretary Robert McNamara created rival DIA.
The battle for secret power
By STEWART ALSOP
Since World War II the Central Intelligence Agency has been our
main covert defense?sometimes offense?against Communism.
Now a Defense Department agency is challenging its supremacy.
At about 9:30 on most working mornings
/A. Maj. Gen. Chester Clifton, the Presi-
dent's military aide, comes into the
President's office clutching a handful of
documents. The papers in Clifton's hands
are likely to include a couple of "eyes
only" cables from American ambassa-
dors, the ultrasecret "Black Book" of the
code-breaking National Security Agency
and intelligence summaries from the
State and Defense departments. But the
document which Clifton almost always
shows die President first is a little book
which has been put together in the early
hours of the morning by the Central
Intelligence Agency.
This neatly typed and bound booklet
has on its cover the words: INTELLIGENCE
CHECKL C T. FOR THE PRESIDENT. TOP
SECRET. The,booklet.represents-theEfurn-
tessenial.ndproduotofli major postwar
industry about which even knowledge-
able people know remarkably little. This
is the intelligence industry, which spends
upward of $2.5 billion a year and em-
plEs over 60,000 people.
Intelligence-has-traditionally-been- a
peculiarly. feud-ridden -business; and-for
a .simple, reason, -.Intelligence is, knowl-
edge,,knowledge--is .power, and pow.er-is,
the-most,valuable-commodity in-govern-
mentj The Central Intelligence Agency
has been at the very center of all the
great crises of the last decade?and the
CIA has actually caused several of these
crises. Where the stakes, in terms of
power, are so great, rows and rivalry are
inevitable, which is one of the principal
reasons why it is rather widely believed
within the intelligence industry that "Bob
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15 CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
The CIA has
figured in
every major
postwar
crisis.
McNamara and John McCone are on
a collision course."
? John McCone, director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, is a white-haired,
kindly faced man, who has been de-
scribed by Georgia's Sen. Richard Rus-
sell as the second-most-powerful man in
tie
l'irkt
the Government. r r e G en etlrlriy
d
-zesponsibilities5at , enmogtimportantls-td
xnake.mt.a.M,.,that,the4ecretAntelligenee
Qatlye,ye&tcmthe,..Presidentltitvisigtlittle
ja2aLA.,bcttl,A.,ade.qpate.,and?,,accurate.'
When the President opens his little
r book, he sees on the left-facing page a
series of newspaper-type headlines?
COMMUNISTS PLAN GNATEMALA RIOTS, a
headline might read, ..--tvakitsfolm42i7RI,U.
AkemsgrawohoNDair:"Ifsthelieadlintlifter-
?estslimpthe:PresidentTeadslon the oppo-
site page a brief factual paragraph, ex-
plaining, for example, that .the Commu-
nists plan to try to topple the military
junta jn Guatemala by instigating mass
riots; thataygeny,Ivanovpwhvghaed
the-so rfavomoWhristint'Keelerwith
atitishiWar,Minister-JackPrdfumorwas'a
rgxesentatiVeoPGWI-TrorSovietrmili-
Jyiiiteii.gencil Usually - there are ? a
doz n or so such items.
deas,aboskt,the
spr.businegg9nietrfindftliePfe'gidan's
boQkaprettyitamestuffammostBut
? the book helps to make the President, in
the words of one intelligence expert, "the
best-informed chief of state in the world
today.? It is John McCone's job to keep
him. that way. .
..McCone himself is known hardly at all
to the American public: He grants no
interviews and makes no speeches.207414-
yetralthoughnher,may,not_beatheasecond-
mostvowerfulAnarfifirtheAGovernment,
,heis cad' taiiirrarriblif ffirrairroferPrtiott-
.,ITK5Welftl:3He has three distinct, vital and
overlapping jobs. ?
As a member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the National Security Council,
McCone is one of the handful of men who
advise the Pfesident on the substance of
high national policy.Enohirtvcrothe&jobs.,
-McGorteaalso&suPPiicrsAgtErFkicleRttilh
the--ititelligetce,-anik'lliewoestimateson
?which??poficy,,is7based:IT,his,c,orrihipatipn
of-funetions-AisniquePand,0somemmain-
tain7danger-ottsi
As director of the Central Intelligence
Agency .McCone is boss of a vastly im-
portant empire that employs some 14,000
people and spends several hundred .mil-
lion dollars a year.
Among those 14,000 people there is an
infinite variety?scholarly intelligence
analysts, spies, ? black propagandists,
scientists, U--2 pilots, specialists'in every-
thing from Urdu to assassination:
fftteletAspendreldtritoremonerlham
the..StateDepartmentpandrat,.thries4t,has
bad,?more,..real?epower-,and,influence7ron
hizb.polic,311.,The CIA, for example, was
principally-responsible for thedverthrow
of Iran's Premier Mohammed Mossadegh
in 1953 and Guatemala's pro-Communist
Presirt Jacobo Arbenz ?Guzman in
1954. CJA.,;kopgratjys,?,,dugAc?farnous-
tu?nnpLtd4ap;?Sovi.et*telephogg,lines!,in
Fiag,,BerIirt-itt4.95-4k-44teTreat,U,2,..citisis -
of0M0whiclrbrukeldrthella-firiUm-
mit*conferenterfwasr6P-Murse-mrCIA
opepatiortr-Aud-Iiie.eht-thasNbee. matlthe
centeraefathe.two.,grea&Gubatrerisesr4of
the,KennedyAdministrationthe-nBay
of_Eigs,disastervin,196tand.lastlikrober's
grgatf.sonfrontatiorv4betweerr'Keilriedy
andAKtirusliChbv.
Running,,,,theveI-Aandmadvising-,the
Apsideritr4nr:EXeoffitTP-mightr-seem,-job
ettp,rugh,foranyytrian_BBut McCone is also
responsible, in the words of a letter to
him from the President, for the "effective
guidance of the total intelligence effort."
Members of what is known in bureau-
cratese as "the intelligence community"
include the State Department, the Atomic
Energy Commission and the FBI. De-
partments like Commerce and Agricul-
ture, and agencies like AID and. USIA
also have joined the intelligence act. But
in terms of both money and manpower, it
is the Pentagon that owns the lion's share
of the intelligence industry. , ?
The. Pentagon's heavily guarded Na-
tional Security Agency employs- more
people than CIA, and its building at Fort
Meade, Maryland, is even bigger than the
CIA's huge new building in Langley,
Virginia. All three services have big in-
telligence setups of their own. So do the
Joint, Chiefs of Staff. And the Defense
Intelligence Agency, newly created by
Secretary McNamara, will soon spill over
from the dark depths of the Pentagon
into another huge building of its own in
Arlington, Virginia,For"whichathe
budgetwirequestiforroVer1Vsmillion.
1114C494-1245-itis.?Ananges
The intelligence community over which
McCone is supposed to rule is thus a very
big community indeed. It is not a com-
munity noted for brotherly love Caladi
happyafellowshi@CIA has been feuding
intermittently with the State Department
for years. But the real tension nowadays
is betWeen CIA and the Pentagon. Both
McCone and Secretary McNamara deny
that they are "on collision course.'FBut4
is,ce,r-tainly-true-thatpMcGonezs,wram
ivk,Na-rnapa:s.new;?rapidiy.kxpayiaihg
Dm-Aave,aireraoy,no . tistyof,minor
antirsomewmajor?icolysion.s.,,,,,,, .
The place to , tart in try'ng to under-
stand what the telligence industry is all
about is with Jon McCon and his CIA.
There are certln facts a out McCone
which no one d putes. Ed is immensely
rich. His own elf-made 4:Irtune, based
on wartime ship ng?wheii added to the
even bigger shiiping fortune of his tat-
tractive second T e,the f mer Theiline
Pigott?comes what hI. been called
"Kennedy kind tf money.
McCone is also very ?e. He has
enemies in Wshington4 15 senators
voted "nay" on his appo ntment?and
in time he is lik4y to have,o ore" But not
even his enemie doubt hilt ability. Like
most able men, 1tcCone enjoys the exer-
cise of power, Ind he is CA born com-
petitor. He is a Jevout Cat ' olic, a con-,
servative Repub jean?Rich rd Nixon is
a friend?and a ervent anti- ommunist.
In any listing o the hawk and doves
among the Presi pit's advis s, McCone
certainly rates as ta leading h wk.
Beneath his railer placid- eming ex-
terior, in fact, McCone is a passionate
man, with deep a
And, despite th
can be very tou
ran a happy ship
the Bay of Pigs ' sa
61,4,10Johnwne-Convinmsgamtautnhip'."
chief, ha_d-demoted,AmosttofmhisJifeAdiThe
Dur, McCone's predecessor as C
intelligence4radwartthhelovedwit7FSub-
9,Tdinatesdfouri&himatasy,dEace-ess,tand
easyAlo,,workqwith:WeNvereliketat,b.and
pf-conspiratoraat4brothersi.4rsays,.7afeA
marav,e6talthough.:Iberw-7waSvirellerrtly
doubtfahoutzwhowasobirbirPtfiFff
Dulles liked to involve himself directly
in secret operations, and when an agent
or station chief?head CIA man in an
area abroad?returned to Washington,
Dulles would call him into his office,.puff
his pipe and pick the CIA man's brains.
McCone runs CIA like the big industry it
is, on an all-business basis. He rarely sees
a returned station chief, and he holds
himself aloof from operations, although
he insists on being informed. .
Within the CIA McCone deals almost
exclusively with thekey men who
really run the agency. glaiortmmemit5T1
alIt&earemefta.t4heirjebamtTlieoeason
fo,_,A412i4,44r4emteA4.g.444lee.s.t4PMPO:i#1.11.in
tkeewdwmds7mwords!v.vtiafo,GIV7Tften
hate?Bay of Pies. In th wake of the Bay.
of Pigs disaster all CIA's top officers,
from Dulles don, wert replaced.
"We. were a ck dot in those days,"
one CIA veterai recala "Anyone could
kick us and kno4 we c Idn't bite back."
For at least thre weel after the disaster
the President 'hi self anted nothing to
do with the sic dog-te even refused to
read CIA reports. In those days the whole
organization s med ro be teetering on
thetritTk4Lefa,cles ruction.
NoWadaysAtbeis..backaou.top-of,.
thef,heap,,,,Themen,principtallyzesponsible
tbritsc?resurrzetionereJohnlvIceatt-and
One of these
key men-Epertraps-tim.kermanrthough
therzaistatigarnetttopttidhigrainG-is
Lyman Kirkpatrick Jr., afotlae
white-haired polio Victim, confined to
wheelchair. Kirkpatrick's title is. execu-
tive director?in effect, he acts as a sort
of.chief of staff to McCone.
tLickais.oeptainlyieenwatile.man,
obviously intelligent, with a talent for
climbing the bure ucr tic ladder. He also
a
?
ubborn convictions.
ndly face, McCone
deed. "Allen Dulles
t least he did before
one veteran of the
has a talent for
Dulles ran the ag
was Dulles's sp
enemy-making jo
After McCone h
while Dulles was
rick added copiou
mies when he wro
secret report harsh
other colleagues f
Bay of Pigs opera
Partly because
Kirkpatrick's abili
g enemies. When
Kirkpatrick, who
favorite, had the
inspector general.
been nominated but
tilltdireCtor, Kirkpat-
ly t his roster of ene-
e for McCone a long
acking Dulles and
r tile handling of the
ion.
as impressed by
, a d no doubt partly
beeause he wants abo ? e all no Bay of
Pigs during his teiture, McCOne greatly
"I?OMPJ3.4.9,c,WKIWAtfi.4.3.,szpowerstlErven.s.o_
in terms of money, manpower and real re-
sponsibility Richard Helms, a dark-haired,
good-looking ex-newspaperman of 49,
may be the real No. 2 man after McCone.
Helms has the innocuous-sounding title
of deputy director for plans?D.D.P., as
narInggifiPri 2nd Approved For Release @ 50-Yr 2014/01/15 CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8 ,
?
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he is known in the agency.J Aimorevaettrz
nate-title-might.bechiefrofce pionage,and
4ir.ty-4pHeIrrisas-vdivision-is-nsespon?
siblelormlaatisrknowirin-theintelligenCe.
industty.as.the.usexystuff.:7;,Althe,CIA's
covert-operationsmsivirlterelit'Sreatrithat
haveruernerto4ightandlnanpthatzha
not_ritameebeendithemwork-sofstheTzaildk
These operations fall into several cate-
gories. The first is traditional espionage,
the gathering of secret intelligence by
agents acting under one cover or another.
Then there are "special ops," designed to
overthrow a hostile government;'gsf4tt
covatemalawett4ranto prevent the over-
throw of a friendly government or to
mount such a p. military operation as
the Bay of Pigs: . "b1aele-prop-
aganektao-andr.44nonale-coretatiedrninits,
oangthere is the creation and support of a
vast variety of "front" and "cover" or-
ganizations.c?onie-ef-these-eirgarrizatitias
operatequite.openivrarrertettratIffolitit
su.p.port4rorathetitizentycklutateliff
subsielized-anclontrolledlnAthe7DitaPte
All in all, Helms "owns" about half the
people in the CIA, and at least until re-
cently, . the D.D.P. spent most of the
CIA's funds.
th
Bay of Pigs.
was Richard M
of the Bay of P
the Bay of Pig
Dulles as CIA
Bissell was a
many successfu
operations, incl
the most brilli
ment of the po
U-2, Nikita K
autumn to sprin
States in Cuba m
Helms is acco
dent and a less b
"There will be no
Helms," one C
adding, "but the
U-2 either." Hel
t4WraWelfeC6116r for
kl-cessor as D.D.P.
Jr., chief planner
o . tion and, before
od bet to succeed
Tr
hief architect of
ence and special
e U-2, perhaps
ligence achieve-
war fears. Without the
ushclev's attempt last
a tr p for the United
I have succeeded.
oth a more pru-
an than Bissell.
Pigs under Dick
ve ran comments,
e wold have been no
s is inquestionably a
first-class professional clandestine opera-
tor. "He's a real pro," comments another
CIA veteran. "I laws44whereetalMhe
leti
bechergreibertired."
The chief customer for Helms's secret
intelligence is Ray Cline, deputy director
for intelligence, or D.D.I., a stocky, sandy-
haired man of 45 with a brilliant academic
record.acrecrer,41rattblitTRIVIITOTeru-
,clentwbtit-dess'mffitagittaliVeffigirilitifitlis
preo-Barwofizftigs415relleeatOr4IVOISert
Amirty3Unlike Helms, Cline mounts no
secret operations and "owns" no foreign
agents. But Cline is a powerful man too.
Allen Dulles is the authority for the esti-
mate that less than 20 percent of intelli-
gence derives from espionage. Cline's
corps of analysts, who deal in the other 80
percent, includes experts on everything
from "cratology"Eafdriikentelegy" e
identification of the contents of a crate
from its external appearance?to the
me ical history of Nikita Khrushchev.
Cline's main function is to see that the
intelligence gets to the people who use it.
Cline, for example, made the carefully
worded phone call to McGeorge Bundy
that first alerted the White House to
"hard" evidence of the Soviet missiles in
Cuba. Cline is also responsible for get-
ting that little book to the President?his
subordinates begin arriving at the CIA
building at the horrid hour of three A.M.
to read the late cables and put the book
together. Only McNamara, McCone and.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk get copies
of the Presidentbook. Cline's shop also
puts out a Dail InteilligencegittiletinWith
aonucellowielerceirculat. , - :.:]weekly and
monthly intelligence summaries as well.
The fourth key man among McCone's
subordinates is Sherman Kent, a brilliant
man with a bulldog face, who chews to-
bacco and talks more like a. stevedore
than the ex-professor he is. Eenaeugyitthe
top.menfeKentois5thevinipsUrni,brathe
Bay.efoR-igsranoowatiehwastfimno.-i:Away
itIvolvedv.41thelintreadefatinifehrehy
hemtisNfaidltTWAm-alidtifWt1ie'tfaeriflkiTe'm1ie
rawks.laeJ0w4,4441.1gh.Y.An..q11.0Butthis
jobAnayiWirtiVitigliffiroirt-rnfaalE
His job is to interpret the intelligence,
to say what it means,clfsayitiggehatriff
delligerideani-eaTiViEat east as important
as getting it in the first place. Kent is
chairman of the 12-man !BoardEfiroEstig
uaatesir-zPheoigBoarcVariEttiffiMertrns
out national intelligence estimaVs,
iu..time,auasis4tJerasMgestimatesf,t4e1tuwn
asz.p.e,.cial4tationallintelligencewstinaate0
Making the national estimates is a
risky business.0,Aimaties-itroyingatoreput
y,-ourselfainWeritheigfell:6WNWOWnitl
as Allen Dulles as pointed out, Nikita
able of taking off
ing. ?
uggest how risky
ent's board pro-
e of Soviet capa-
ion of strategic
st from the 'Air
r parochial rea-
estimate was too
ocrats, who had
eit own, the myth
as born. "Hard"
that the Soviets
ar fewer missiles
udged capable of
e missile gap was
this hard intelli-
official Oleg Pen-
n in Moscow in
solutely invalu-
Khrushchev is-q
his shoes for des
Three exampl
Kent's job is. In
duced a nationa
bilities in the
missiles. With
Force, which i
sOns that the n
low, and from
parochial intere
of the "missile
intelligence later
had in fact pro
than they had b
producing?and
thus a myth. So
gence came from
kovsky, shot for
May, who suppli
Yle .
te c
-ba
will
958
stim
rodu
n as
isted
able" information on Sbviet missile pro-
duction to CIA and British intelligence.
SomeTals-eWearnafftirtrinenta
teehriLVIvespOTIMPIM
gitiatIgiaex4821112r404402
Last September 19 the estimator
guessed wrong. A national estimate of
that date, while recommending an intelli-
gence alert, concluded that the Soviets
were unlikely to adopt the "high-risk pol-
icy" of placing missiles in Cuba. The first
Soviet ships carrying missiles had actually
arrived in Cuba on September 8. A CI
sub-agent,geughwhisopstitreft
on theopAil_i_tjnight of September 12,
spotted a missile-carrying convoy. His re-
port was detailed and convincing enough
to be rated "hard" intelligence. But, un-
derstandably, in view of Fidel Castro's
elaborate police apparatus, several days
elapsed before the sub-agent could get the
report to the chief agent in his area and
thence to the CIA. Thus the report did
not reach CIA hands until September 21,
or two days after the national estimate.
Ettotificlusingrth'eheightsqnfatheAGuban
crisisozawgashiestimateVanubmitted-:to
EtxeminniotitsRpurpoiCWis.rffiiekSh-
they,,,,rMghtmow,te5willitigitoTiskm1Clear
warF0T4-nwately.ICIPtiVilliMibrOhls' es-
ticnateelsolturnechoutto,beAvrongThese
thzee.oxoacuplesritashoulchbe,noted;fdoqitit After th
aueurately.orefl Khe4acumen3ofeKentand,
..!hisomestimatori. The Board of Estimates B
has done a creditable job over the years,
!
gin the inherent imponderables.
AVtlitrirwritten7thelobvf,'Mcetitie's
YfflmaislaisolVtlyX.,1101.0k1.7.4kleojt.
i
wasogemjechlw,Hetibent,i.(Pete))Scoville; .
atlAleopienti_st4ngh1r fegardegbingtW!
VglaitewtlouservSccyvil1enwas,mD:DR:?
dcputy,dir.ectorfor-researcWal:PT6?tffiewly
ureatecliby.orMeekotig A more accurate.
title might be deputy director for techni-
cal espionage. Mata Bari, in fact, is rap-.
idly giving ground to such scientific intel-
ligence devices as the U-2, ieconnaissance
satellites, side-viewing radar, long-range ?
communications intercepts and other un-
mentionable technical means of finding
o,U.yvhat the other side is up to. .
Aotootheoliteigivtiog4theo@nbaPetisisfithei
fyoverflyiligirg.512V-Wafitakett
out of Scoville's ants. and assigned to
the Pentagon. T e deed?a fell deed in
the CIA's eyes done with Mc...!
Cone's approval fte a bloody jurisdic-
tional hassle at S ovi es level, although
the hassle did no cotrary to published
report, lead to a urveillance gap.''
Scoville is not tal but it is a good
guess that the P n's tendency tc.
move in on him, a cCone's tendenc3
to remain above t ulting battle, hae.
a lot to do with s reignation in June
The search for a or is under way
. So much for te cipire over whicl
McCone rules as ireor of CIA. It i
interesting to co IA and its mail
rivals in the worl of cret intelligence
the Soviet K.G.B.e British M.I. 6,
CIA is a direct de t of the wartim
Office of Strateg,c Se ices, built fron
scratch by Gen. ill Donovan. A,
Donovan once a dged, OSS was!
carbon copy of he itish intelligenc,
system. Now, in orn.ways, the Amei
ican system has ommon with th
Soviet system thin witi the British. ,
The K.G.B., like Cr, is headed by
public figure, VI emichastny, foi
mer leader of he omsomol and .;
Khrushchev m des the K.G.B,
there is a second. .secret service, th
G.R.U., which irun jy the military. !
The K.G.B. ad thG.R.U. run ant
pletely separate.bitterly competin
intelligence nets 41n Cl files a number i
episodes are reco ded.A which the K.G.I.
and G.R.U. clo -an., -dagger men hal
tripped on each o er; cloaks and stabbc
each other with aggers. In our sy;
tern the equivahit othe G.R.U. is tf?
Defense Intelligce Agency, headed by
former FBI ma Gen. Joseph Ca
roll.
roll. The devclopng rationship betwei
CIA andDIA is like that betwi
K.G.B. and G.
All importantnt4igence servic07 ,
ploy "diplomati co r" for their tizn. 1
it
ay of Pigs
fiasco,
heads rolled
in CIA.
19
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McNamara
revealed ,CIA
secrets in
a television,
speech
20
operatives ab oad. l this respect there is
a certain honr a4ng thieves. The So-
c,iets, for exanp1e, le certainly aware of
the identity o IVA station chief in.
Moscow, and erican government,
knows'who 4 K..B.'station'chief. in ,
...Washington i nselor of Embassy
.Aleksandr Fo ? ?? ? -, ? _
GeorgiBolsiako, alio a member of
?the Soviet Emassytaff until recently, is
? believed in the2lAto have been 'a major '
G.R.U:.'Oper is assignment was
similar to thatbf hiIG.R.U. colleague in
LOndon; Chritine rKeele?'s , friend, Ev-
geny Ivanov itivate the acquaint-I
ance of. poweh,ful arsons. Through' his ,
connections, B lsharov coriveyed Kh rush-
chev's false asfiranes to President Ken?
-
nedy that Sovkt wpons in Cuba were.
,,,
wholly defensive.-hen, an article in The
Post reported s role in the Cuban crisis,
Bolshakov wa hastily withdrawn. Bol-
nit ,
shakov is a witt anlpersonally agreeable
man;`and befoie?heketurped to Moscow'
certain'Americin Inds gave him a fare-'
well dinner. Hgpariing toast deserves to
bereeordetl:"Sbviettl nion hasmadegreat
concessions fo'f 'p t ce. Has withdrawn...
missiles: Has wi dr wn 1 L-28's. Has with,
--,
drawn ,Bolsha v.' o more concessions P! i
In the Britis4 syrtem, there is no real.
eqUivalent of BilA ''13 r G.R.U! But the:
most obviou ntrst between the Brit-,
ish and 'Amerian -ittelligence systems is.%
suggested b'Y thl difference between Mc--!
'Cone ancf."C" lchitt of Ml. 6. Unlike.
/McCone?or S ic aitny?"C" is not a
public figure. I4is $ ame is never men-
tioned in the Bkishtress, and, out of re-
gard for Britisiens bilities, it will not be,
Mentioned her , Thg, Soviets,, of course?
know who "C's. lin' t keeping his name.
out of the publd priks' does have certain
,undeniable adttates. -
McConehim,self luld prefer theano-
nymity of a ,77q. 7 Bufthe Cannot possibly?;
achieve it; The direiOor. of CIA is ines-
capably a pikh ; fig e, and there is mo ?
American equili
, lenkof the Official Se-.
AA Y
$9,440:et_pti,ttzle..itivlealing
crets Thi crates l'problems. Ad-'
vancepublicitY'n'th4Press, which would,
certainly have use4he Official Secrets
Act to be invokedin Britain, contributed.
to the disaster i Ithe a .of Pigs: : ? .
MtGine7,has ,,en fliticerrUgrens,t
erbti"e"ainFnernAg : e-,can-..hire.and,fire at t
ft.ny will, and and he can spend Mis,?"unvouchered'
-
funds" as he sees!fit. These,powers give
to the ? CIA%a flexibility 'Unique in the,
Federal buFeaucracyTo cite one exam-,
ple, just eight -months ;passed between
December, ;1 954, ''hen lien ,Dulles gave
Richard Bissell die green- light on the U-2,.
and August, 1955;7 when :'the .U-2 first
flew. By Pentagon?standards, this was ? a k
totally incredible.perfOrmance?it would,
have taken the Pentagon bureaucracy ? at
least two years; and more probably.three,-,
to get the ,U-2'into the air. ? ,?
? ThiS;capacity,tp-actlquickly is one of
Meathe's major assets when he is wear-
ing his hat as t"direetol Of ,central
lence," with .responsibuitSr.fOr;"effective
of the total intelligence effort."
?'? en he wears this hal, iMcCone needs,
the assets he can find:, For, although,
i'tMcCone says goes in the CIA, what
McCone says does not necessarily go in
the rest of the nation's intelligence com-
munity-and above all in the Pentagon.
!Secretary of Defense Robert McNa-
mara spends far more money and "owns" '
far more people in the intelligence indus-
try than McCone does as CIA chief. And
McCone and McNamara are very much'
)alike in one way?they are both competi-
tors in: their every instinct. "Both Bob
and . John," says one who knows both
well, "like fo get thar fustest with the
mOstest." "Thar" is the center of power?
the White House. ' ? *
The competition between McCone and
'McNamara to .get thar fustest .with the
mostest has Sometimes provided a rather
entertainidespectacle. During the Cuba
crisis each new crop of U-2 pictures was
daily processed in the early hours of the?
morning at the photo-interpretation lab-
oratory in downtown Washington. While
the' pictures were being developed and
analyzed, McCone's CIA man and Mc-
Namara's Pentagonrman?usually a ma-
jor general?would breathe anxiously
down the necks of the photo'interpreters.
?As soon'-as an interesting picture ap-
peared, McNamara's general would grab
it and 'drive like the wind to the Pentagon,
where- McNamara, ,a compulsive early
'riser, would beawaiting him.
L.The CIA man would ?grab his copy,
race even 'faster for McCone's house in
northwest Washington, righ to McCone's
bedside, and shove.? the, picture in 'Mc- .
Cone's sleepy face. At this instant the tel-
. ephone would ring, and McCone .would
be able?by a split second?to say,-"Yes,
Bob, I.have the picture right in front of
me. Interesting, isn't it?"' ? ? ,
l,'All I had to do was trip on McCone's
back stoop," one of the CIA's couriers,
has been quoted is saying, "and McNa-,
mara would have won the ball game." '
Fn4,-443-isnarriew-offmnemprnarrshirmtbe
C eitibilitriVaVimportant
asset., More tihan once, doubtless _to
- McNamara's ';cha , n, ,McCone
beat him to th Whi '` House with oper-
ational inteligenc garnered by Air
-Force or ?Nav s. But- McNamara
has assets, toc abo e all in the Penta-
gon's commanof m ney and manpower.,
?
. ?CIA- s iwn .troubles' .
-`:(;??.'t.. , A.4L ?
People thiilk the has more spend-,
ing money than it des," .saY's.one CIA(
i
than. "Hell, these day it's really tough to
get a measly 4iarter 4 f a million for an
operation?an in t Pentagon that's
not even carfare. If -the Army hadn't
taken over. a I,5t Of our responsibilities in
Vietnam, the tgericy i,4,ould have had to
declare in ba ruptcyiN - ' ...
It ,is .no. se et thd :, McNamara and ?
McCone have Tiot always seen eye to eye,
' particularly legard to the exceedingly,
sensitive subj ' of C ba. McNamara re- -
cently told a c&gressbnal committee, "I,
d9 not feel [Cu.f.a] is 'ging used as a base
for,the export o Corp unism to any sub-
stantial degreeletoda This was flatly
contradictory .ttii Mc 4-ones publicly ex-
pressed views 4, thei, me subject?and
in this case Mcone Aquestionably has
the best of the tigumeNit.-
,
r
McNamara's two-hOr national tele-
cast on the ?Cubila ?miSsile situation' last
February r did' ,nt .iirpiove McCone-
McNamara'relatio s. qn February 6 the
President sudden1P decided that the ru-
mors that the?Soviitsad not really:with-
, .. - , ? ?
drawn .their missigS'ft 'Cuba Must ? be .
publicly scotched: he b ,,,...*ed McNamara ?
to conduct that sa 3. e daY?la :`special.Cuba
briefing" on .natio v'videinetworks.,
.4 ?
-McCone ' Was n&:coniitsulted about the
telecast.- He was 't, estitling in executive
session on Capitol ?illi ,at morning, and,
when' asked "by such .4natorial ?grand ,
dukes as Senators usSg and Saltonstall
about ,details .. of ie Cuban intelligence
?-,,pi
operation, , he wa ,caget.in his, replies.,
When,,a, few ,hou later4'Ehe.heard those
.4; ? .
same detail's 'bein roade-aSt to the world
fo,. -
by MeNamaia;'..- s hairts said to have_
turned a shade w iter:.'? .? , - :
Off Meanie's ders, IT analysis'of the,.
McNamard-telecast Was . made, in 1 CIA. -
'
The report'. conl hat '. ',..at the telecast
had-seriously Co . proin'Sed'certain intel-
ligence , teehniq .1.4 , the, next go-
round," . says r o e expVt? "you can be
damned sure. the/ will 'Change the shape ?
k
.c,4.. .. . .
of the crates they4snipNtpeir missiles and
1L-28's -in." As We McNamara telecast,
made obvidus; t is .,`cratologistS7
had confirmed b6th iticoming and:out- ?
going shipments cmisiles and bombers.'
McCorie ; had i a ' ightt to ...be unhappy ?
about , the . telecast-he ...1k, charged by :law
with `.`the.protecti4Of iiltelligence sources
agdwinethodWorati&te7sh-Ouldocertainly .
haweehectricopstilted?itOadvancez,..For-his
Lag.tg>cNamara has made it abundantly
clear that McCone's.7piesideritial author-
ity to "guide" the total intelligence effort'
has certain Well-defined limits where the
Defense Department is concerned. Dur-,1
ing a House hearing- McNamara' :was
asked if he was ."operating On the intelli-
gence you:get from the .ClAr -,
."No, ? sir,;' McNamara . replied, firmly..
"I-receive 'information - directly from the -
Defense Intelligence Agency, and that in= --
formation is screened by ,no One outside
the Pentagon. , i ,...; ?:1' ,r 4 N .
'
The Defense 'Intelligence Agent), was r
created by -McNamara on August 1, 1961....
There were good reasbds. for establishing
the DIA. The intelligence.eStimates Of the
individual services h?raditionally been
intensely." parochial-an- example being,.
the wildly inflated Airforce estimates of
Soviet: missile , and ,bomber production: -
'Moreover, there.are ; some ? things in the
intelligence industry,which the Pentagon
can do'better than the CIA,': 1. ..
. For example, .J.ohn,MCCone ,wai.prob-
ably right on balance ,When- he agreed at ?
the height Of the Cuban criSis to turn the ?
CIA's :U-2 sUrveillance operation over to -
the Air 'Force. The U-2 operation was-
then no longer covert; and in the Circum-
stances, .the .sensible .thing , to do was to
make, the surveillance., effort a straight
military operation, as 'it remains today..
L.' ..opgairdfh"dgexarp_pleriitsthen4hemPresi ,
dentAeafiledof.theyGotturtunistylan to
instigate,riotstiniGuatemalaffilietaskedAns -
'thilita-rfaide.,arip,kyjous?qu,,estionvtl#,N.,nt
thosegaiotsp!-WeigefeNfajOTGefieial
?elttr61'-r'E-Sh'rtretgiTe'TnTii''eYffnikgWdTe'
theingt,findf.un'Maboutv-thati0mThe!OrA -
did,,,nottfhavestheTaitSwevtoVte-PresiderirS
. ,. (1.., #; - ? '1 :,?':(7.,-. . , .,*.
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8
,
questioth.Through.itmlase-rcorrnections
waitr-thennilitarylmenvinAhe:Guatemalan-
j witarthe,A3Ii6v.,did.baltietlit'abs-wer a
firm -1,-`,yes,11,..an dwitv, del ivereduttrewaffSWet-
Aohe MhitetHouseqbeqsaitle- day.
And" yet there is one reason why the
Defense Intelligence Agency should not
have been created. There is really nothing
very much that the DIA can do that the
CIA is not doing already. The Army,
Navy and Air Force must have their own
order-of-battle intelligence, so the three
service intelligence units will continue to
exist. That being so, the DIA has no
choice but to concentrate on the political-
strategic intelligence which is .the CIA's
chief function. Some military men have
sensitive political antennae. A great many,
u rtunately, do not.
,NItriviymptzli'ark-irtS011Z-SwIlaws}roperates
wifIrgb-eeialmvirulencesincthemPentegon
OneAreasonikistkhat4 IhremervicesLUre
top-heayy with fligh-r nking officers. This
:creates an intens t hu er for staff "slots,"
and 'intelligence ias ways been a happy
hunting ground r ic slot-hungry. This
Scrambling in tiir leads to empire
building, and as t udget request for a
huge new buildin fo DIA suggests, the
DIA's empire is rpi ly expanding.
DIA spokesme ot CIA?insist that
all is sweetness an li. t between the two
agencies. In fact, i sues had arisen at
last report bete IA and CIA, on
which McCone an puty Secretary of
Defense Roswell dilp tric have been qui-
etly negotiating.
For example: Will the DIA's intelli-
gence bulletins ci4iIa outside the Pen-
tagon in competit *th CIA's? Who
maintains liaison i friendly foreign
intelligence, like Who "owns" the
CIA-created nati al photo interpreta-
tion center? Who nssLich technical de-
vices as the 1i-2? he does the CIA's
responsibility fo gurriIla and anti-
guerrilla operation end and the Penta-
gon's begin?
Above all, who rinsTeovert operations
and where? This is the most sensitive
issue of all. It is in Ittis rea that CIA and
DIA, like K.G.B. .R.U., are likely
to begin tripping o ch other's cloaks
and stabbing eacli%othcrwith their dag-
gers. Recently reIorts4reached CIA that
DIA was pIannin a 1iaior clandestine
operation in an aia tI at was previously
an exclusive CIA Jilt ck. "If they move
in on us there," ss oi CIA man, "we'll
really have to pick uphe gauntlet."
Meanwhile, mdch dpends on the an-
swer to the ques Ion: How good is the
CIA? For DIA. 'and the military can
make a case formoing in on the CIA
only if they can pr klhetter intelligence
more quickly tc4the president and the
other major inteIligenc consumers.
"Intelligence. ohn McCone, is
not a measurable Crdity. You can't
put a price tag of." T at is true enough.
But there are ceain nasures which can
be used all the same. ?ne is the opinion
of old hands inhe in lligence industry.
This reporter hs asketl many old hands
for their opinio s of iA. Their answers
in most cases rare remarkably similar.
They boil dossi3tbouttas follows:
Dick Helms Dc4rtment of Espio-
nage and Dirty ric s?a solid C-plus.
This moderate
light of the fac
course in all th
Ray Cline's
Sherman Ken
given the tricki
tional estimates,
The newly vac
nical espionage?
There are oth
effectiveness of a
tion. The grand
"penetration of th
insert an agent o
side's intelligence
the happy positi
blindfold in a ga
M.I. 6 has bee
thee-well, as was
case of George Bl
endless successio
have penetrated t
"The British suff
tie complex," say
"You know?'W
coat? Why, 1 wen
They regarded the
manly and our s
b9orish. But they'
ting ri ust be. read in the
that is is the toughest
intel Igence curriculum.
alysk section?B-plus.
's estimators?a B or,
making the na-
ps even a B-plus.
partment of tech-
plus.
ys to assess the
tgence organiza-
the game is the
ition." If you can
s into the other
ation, you are in
layer without a
lindman's buff.
?rated to a fare-
the celebrated
of a seemingly
let agents who
h government.
the old-school;
ecurity expert.
Guy a turn-
ool with him.'
ph as ungentle-
techniques as
ning to learn."
Penetrat
K.G.B., it can
ity, has been penet
the hows and N;vh
toppest of top s
penetrated by K.
There is no wa
not. As Bedell
predecessor, once
a furor in the Mc
gence chief must
tion that the opp
his organization.
might have been S
fired from the CI
position to judge b
r w
int
ize
opp
age
rgant
of a
e of
pen
oved
ke, o
of S
e Bri
fro
one
t, o
to sc
olyg
curit
beg
state
ted b
es ar
rets.
B.?
to
ith,
stifle
arthy
erate
sition
t leas
viet a
Butt
ieve t
spies
n high author-
CIA, although
of course, the
as CIA been
ye that it has
llen Dulles's
thus creating
%ra?an intelli-
n the assum0-
as penetrated
wo men who
nts have been
se in the best
t the odds are
highwthatmic4-44a
sop,C1AzniustvbergivertmathIMPStmetrib
this*italtaremtharritsitiVals.
@tlittftcomparison,Ei _nsfal suggests
that the CIA has done reasonably well in
total effort over the years. The Soviets
have overflown American territory more
frequently than is generally known, but
they have had nothing to match the U-2
operation. And although we have had our
Bay of Pigs, they have had theirs?
Khrushchev's missile adventure in Cuba.
The outcome of that adventure proved a
total Soviet intelligence failure, in regard
to both American intelligence capabili-
ties and the probable American reaction
to Khrushchev's challenge.
The K.G.B. has had plenty of other
failures. A recent, less obvious example,
was the flop in Iraq. According to CIA
estimates, the Soviets invested the equiv-
alent of half a billion dollars in General
Kassim's Communist-infested dictator-
ship, hoping to turn Iraq into a Middle
Eastern Cuba. Yet K.G.B. had no ad-
vance warning of the coup that led to
Kassim's assassination in February, and
the destruction of the Communist appa-
ratus in Iraq. Neither did the British,
Israeli or Egyptian intelligence services.
The CIA was "thoroughly clued in."
There is no doubt, furthermore, th
CIA has succeeded in attracting and hol
ing many remarkably able analysts ar
operatives. EJkiKrtliaMeGorieolhiniselfoh
clearly?bienmpressedandx,:perhup,
surofisekl?.by.theuquality..lo&the.peop;
.4araLtatua?1.41;641; is the mO,
competent and effec we organization
have had anything to do with in priyal
or ublic life," he says.
T Ate.,fiaar4,444;4*.pgi,
9,sofTei;ing.fr-o, us, tostalgia;who3sen
stedgitaess.oftepiitrvIlYbwregretstitti
days when such brit ant if sometim
overdaring men s Jilles, Bissell an!
Amory ran the s
"The real trou e wi this new build,
ing," says one C "is that it tend
to make an honst wman of the
madam?you kr' w, n spittoons, keel
the antimacassar cle and no chani
pagne in the mom ingjWe ought to 8
lurking in scrabb deouts, with th
plaster peeling pped-up toilets
There's somethin abol7t the atmospher
of this building at 4ds to too man;
memos, too ma y 4etings and no
enough dirty wo
There are tho
Cone's tendency
like a big corpora
of conspiratorial b
was a bit of a ro
working for him. am
been abroad for a coup
esent John MC
he organizatiot
her than a bark
"Maybe Alle
But it was fti,
t, a man who'
of years on e
toughsassigarrient4kweintsototsee4thevbussi
if,eudy-feir+alfaoanahour."
those in a good position to judge
give oth the CIA and McCone himself
high marks. One thing is certain. Our in-
telligence industry is here to stay. There
are a lot of things wrong with it: it costs
too much, employs too many people and
involves too -much rivalry and duplica-
tion. But we can never go back to the
dear old days before World War Ii, when
American intelligence was largely in thel
hands of a few elderly female civil ser-
vants with pince-nez glasses, who tended
the attach?iles in the War Department. 1
John McCone himself has summed up the 1
best reason why we can't go back:
"Every war of this century, including
World War I, has started because of in-
adequate intelligence and incorrecttel-
ligence estimates and evaluations.).;
vv,as4r,ae.of.PearilipPliartropKethvexemple,
4.111147...WauemiultKoreavulaTzlic.(itthan
crisis in October
war, some think
over Cuba was a
gence success.
curity, every we
rectly identified i
dent and his poli
to make a ration
tion,_ and to dev
with it with a max
and a minimum ri
sider this an in
though intelligenc
commodity, that is
ure of its value."
If good intelligen can elp us to avoid
a war which might dest y us all, the
enormous ,Ameriemainvestrrientioiri4wthe
iRtelligenceirnduSttrWillTrgfrMM
offrather handsomely. THE END
ould
nucl
ided'
ery t
ave generated a
r war. But war
ecause of intelli-
reat to our se-
stem, was cor-
give the Presi-
rs time to think,
te of the situa-
eans of dealing
ance of success
obal war. I con-
success. Al-
t a measurable
a partial meas-
e have
'agents inside
Russia's
intelligence
? pystem.
, Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/01/15: CIA-RDP74-00115R000300020003-8