PROSPECTS FOR NICARAGUAN COMPLIANCE WITH PEACE PLAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000100430001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 August 1987
Prospects for Nicaraguan Compliance with Peace Plan
Summary
The Sandinistas, in our opinion, will be able to
meet or finesse the demands of the Central American
peace plan signed on 7 August without endangering their
political control. They probably believe the plan
accomplishes Managua's main goal of complicating, if
not dooming, prospects for US funding of the rebels and
see such a cutoff of US support, coupled with the
guerrillas' exclusion from any peace talks, as a fatal
blow to the insurgency. As part of their early
strategy, the Sandinistas claim their constitution and
amnesty law already guarantee most of the political
rights called for in the peace plan, and they have
begun forming the prescribed National Reconciliation
Commission to oversee implementation of the plan. We
believe, however, the Sandinistas will try to avoid
granting the internal opposition full political rights
--especially freedom to reopen the independent daily
La Prensa and hold public demonstrations--and are
maneuvering to stack the Commission with sympathizers
willing to accept cosmetic reforms or regime excuses
for noncompliance. If confronted with strong internal
and foreign pressure, the Sandinistas may make some
tactical concessions to the opposition, but they would
do so confident that their grip on society ensures
their ultimate control.
This typescript was prepared byl I Middle America-
Caribbean Division, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed
to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA
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The Sandinistas apear pleased with the results of the
Guatemala peace talks.. They probably believe the peace plan is
a serious, if not fatal, setback to the prospects for continued
US funding of the insurgents--a central goal of Sandinista
foreign policy during the past five years. The regime has fully
endorsed the plan and given prominent media attention to steps
taken toward implementation, such as issuance of formal
invitations to the Catholic Church and political opposition to
prepare their slates of nominees for the National Reconciliation
Commission. Managua probably believes that such actions
strengthen its international image, while its propaganda
continues to portray the United States as advocating only a
military solution to Central America's problems.
Comfortable with Most Provisions
Sandinista statements thus far have cast the regime as
willing to comply with the Guatemala accord. Regime leaders
claim that Nicaragua's democratization process began with the
Sandinista revolution eight years ago and that political rights
are guaranteed by the constitution promulgated last January.
They say the state of emergency suspending those guarantees will
be lifted once US support for the insurgents ends. They add that
the presidential and National Assembly elections in 1984 were
certified by international observers to be free and open, and
point out that the only parties not in the contest withdrew
unilaterally. The Sandinistas cite an amnesty program begun in
January 1985, which they claim thousands of former rebels and
collaborators have already embraced, as proof of their
willingness to allow the insurgents back into civilian life.
Managua probably is willing to acdept a cease-fire with a
simultaneous cutoff of all external aid to the insurgents and an
end to rebel use of foreign territory. The regime has long
believed that the rebels will be unable to sustain significant
military operations without US military assistance and Honduran
cooperation in providing logistics and safehaven.
the government has been
unable to make significant progress against the insurgents on the
battlefield during the past seven months, finding its military
capabilities increasingly strained as the rebels have expanded
their areas of operation while adopting small-unit guerrilla
tactics. The war is also seriously taxing the economy by
consuming about 60 percent of the government budget and more than
half of Nicaragua's oil. As a result, government strategists
probably welcome a cease-fire to end the conflict.
For more information on the peace plan signed at the
summit, see Annex 1, Major Provisions of Central American Peace
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Compliance with the peace plan's demand for an end to
Sandinista material support to the Salvadoran guerrillas, in the
short term at least, probably will be relatively easy for
Managua.
Finessing Tougher Measures
Sandinista claims of democratization notwithstanding, the
regime is likely to seek ways of avoiding implementation of the
sweeping political freedoms stipulated in the peace plan.
the Sandinistas--increasingly
concerned about their eroding popular base in recent years--are
loath to allow the reopening of the main opposition newspaper,
La Prensa, especially without prior censorship. The regime's
long record of harassing opposition parties strongly suggests it
is equally reluctant to allow them full freedom of organization
and assembly.
The Sandinistas probably are confident they will be able to
manipulate the National Reconciliation Commission. According to
the peace plan, the regime forms the commission by choosing one
government representative, one "notable citizen" outside the
ruling party, one pIrson from a list of three nominated by
opposition parties, and one of three nominated by the Catholic
Church. The US Embassy in Managua reports that antiregime
politicians and Church leaders fear that Sandinista penetrations
and pressure against their organizations could render the
Commission useless. Five of the opposition parties have approved
three strongly antiregime candidates, but five other
"independent" parties actually favor the Sandinistas and have
boycotted the selection process, according to the US Embassy.
The regime probably will instruct its allies to demand
representation on the existing slate or threaten to submit their
own three candidates directly to the government by the deadline
on Thursday, 27 August. The Church has nominated Cardinal Obando
y Bravo and his top aide--both sure to follow a hardline tack--
and a US-born bishop who, in our view, may be more sympathetic to
the regime. Combined with the two Commission seats directly
chosen by the regime, indirect Sandinista influence over one or
both of the other two seats would significantly decrease pressure
for authentic political reforms.
The Sandinistas are probably heartened also by the generally
weak international verification provisions of the peace plan.
Most members of the International Verification Commission--which
For an overview of the opposition parties, see Annex 2,
Opposition Political Parties.
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includes the UN and OAS Secretaries General and the Foreign
Ministers of the Contadora and Support Group countries--have put
only modest pressure on the regime for reform in the past,
Moreover, the Commission is
unlikely to have either the staff and funding to carry out its
investigations thoroughly, or the authority to sanction violators
of the peace plan. US diplomatic reporting indicates that even
most Central American democratic leaders, particularly Costa
Rican President Arias, may be flagging in their resolve to keep
The peace plan's mandate for full respect of each country's
constitution and political system, the bar on all outside
interference, and the regionwide application also could diminish
pressure for reforms. A demand by the Nicaraguan opposition for
earlier national elections, for example, could be rejected on
grounds that the schedule is already set by the Nicaraguan
constitution. If confronted with growing pressure to grant the
opposition more access to the political process, the Sandinistas
may counterattack by charging that La Prensa, the opposition
parties, and the Church hierarchy are receiving US covert funding
and are therefore in violation of the treaty prohibitions on
outside intervention. As a means of justifying its own
noncompliance, the regime also could allege that other
signatories to the pact, such as Honduras, are not complying with
their obligation to deny armed rebels safehaven. If scattered
bands of insurgents continued operating in the mountains after a
cutoff of US aid, the government probably would argue it also
Maintaining Firm Hold
The Sandinistas probably will make some goodwill gestures--
albeit hollow ones--toward the opposition, mostly to build a
favorable international image.
They may also offer,
for example, to permit reopening of the Church radio station,
Radio Catolica, but they probably will make the issue part of a
long, contentious negotiating process intended to wear down
Church leaders and will in all likelihood reject a Church request
that the radio's exiled director, Monsignor Bismarck Carballo, be
allowed to return. In the political realm, the Sandinistas may
offer opposition leaders limited access to government-controlled
media or even allow them to open their own, confident that the
costs and licensing procedures would severely tax the already
Even if international pressure forced the regime to make
significant concessions to the opposition, we-believe the
Sandinistas' grip on power would remain firm. Although US
Embassy reporting indicates that regime opponents in Managua will
try to take full advantage of any freedoms resulting from the
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peace plan, personal and ideological disputes among opposition
leaders probably preclude a sustained, effective political action
program in the near future. Over the past eight years, moreover,
the Sandinistas have built a formidable propaganda and security
apparatus to harass opponents and discourage potential dissenters
from joining the struggle. A Sandinista official told the US
Embassy that the regime will launch an intense smear campaign
against domestic opponents and use "dirty tricks and set-ups" to
intimidate them. If the state of emergency is lifted, for
example, the Interior Ministry could use Sandinista-controlled
mobs under the guise of spontaneous counterdemonstrations to
break up opposition rallies. Detention on trumped-up charges and
other subtle ways of harassing political organizers would almost
surely have an additional dampening effect.
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MAJOR PROVISIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN
Must be consistent with each country's "constitutional
framework." No provision for direct talks with rebels. Takes
place within 90 days (7 November).
External Aid to Insurgents
Governments request cutoff of aid to rebel forces and pledge
to prevent rebel use of their-territory. Only aid for
repatriation or-relocation permitted. Within 90 days.
Amnesty
Governments implement amnesty programs. Rebels must release
prisoners. Within 90 days.
Governments end states of siege or emergency, implement
"broad, democratic, and pluralist" reforms, while choosing own
economic and political system without foreign interference.
Opposition permitted unrestricted access to mass media without
prior censorship, right to organize and hold public
demonstrations. Within 90 days.
In accordance with each country's constitution, governments
hold free elections "once the conditions that characterize a
democracy have been established." Hold Central American
Parliament elections by July 1988, with municipal, legislative,
and presidential elections later. Oversight by International
Verification Commission.
Security and verification agreements to be negotiated with
Contadora mediation. To include measures on disarming rebels.
No deadline stipulated.
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National Reconciliation Commission
Governments facing insurgencies form four-member commissions
to verify compliance with accord. Government chooses one
representative from government, one "notable citizen," one of
three persons nominated by Catholic Church, and one of three
persons nominated by legal opposition parties. Within 20 days
(27 August).
Commission consisting of OAS and UN Secretaries General and
Foreign Ministers of Central American, Contadora, and Support
Group countries. To report on progress toward implementation
within 120 days to Central American presidents, who will meet
within additional 30 days. No sanctions stipulated for
violations of agreement.
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Democratic Coordinating Board. Also called the Coordinadora.
Main opposition coalition. Also includes business and labor
groups. Plagued by internal disputes, lack of charismatic
leadership, and hemmed in by the expanded state of emergency
decreed in October 1985. Parties in Coordinadora have no seats
in National Assembly because they boycotted 1984 elections.
Social Christian Party (PSC)
Led by Erick Ramirez. Most active opposition party during
past two years. Slowly recovering from infighting over
strategy and power. Ties with Christian Democratic parties
in Europe. At times has bucked Coordinadora leadership on
tactics. Legal status suspended because of 1984 election
boycott, restored by Sandinistas in apparent effort to curry
party favor.
Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCN)
Main faction led by Mario Rappaccioli. Relatively inactive.
Splinter faction led by outspoken Myriam Arguello, which
broke away in 1985, also member of Coordinadora. Each
faction preoccupied with attacking other. Was largest
opposition party under Somoza.
Social Democratic Party (PSD
Led by Guillermo Potoy. Organized in 1979 and has
unsuccessfully sought membership in Socialist International.
Has active youth group. Self-exile of former party
President Luis Rivas in 1986 was major blow. Activity
decreasing.
Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC)
Led by Jose Ernesto Somarriba. Smallest and least
influential of Coordinadora parties. Little popular
following.
Parties Cooperating with Coordinadora. Although not allied with
Coordinadora, several parties have participated in antiregime
activities it has planned. Most leaders cooperated with the
Sandinistas in early years of regime but have since become vocal
critics. These parties control 14 of the 96 seats in the
National Assembly.
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Independent Liberal Party (PLI)
Led by Virgilio Godoy, former Sandinista Minister of Labor.
Left-of-center democratic party allied with regime from 1980
until early 1984. Sometimes plans antigovernment activities
with Coordinadora. Holds nine seats in National Assembly.
Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC)
Led by Mauricio Diaz. Relatively minor party. Left-of-
center democratic orientation, founded in 1976. Previously
supported regime. Disagreements with Sandinista agenda have
intensified in recent years, but leadership hesitates to
take confrontational action. Holds six seats in National
Assembly.
Conservative Democratic Party (PCD)/"Unofficial Faction"
Democratic faction of PCD. Former members of PCN. Ignored
Coordinadora boycott of 1984 elections. Led by Enrique
Sotelo, a National Assembly member and human rights
advocate. (Another PCD faction led by Rafael Cordova-Rivas,
a Sandinista collaborator. Third group directed by Clemente
Guido, who cooperated with regime until dispute over
constitution last January.)
Liberal Party (PALI)
New party founded by Andres Zuniga, ousted head of private-
sector professional association. Outside Coordinadora, but
probably tends to support its activities. Little apparent
success in forming alliances to build political base.
Central American Unionist Party (PUCA)
Self-proclaimed centrist party. Virtually inactive.
Attended Coordinadora-led meeting to choose nominees for
National Reconciliation Commission.
Parties Generally Sympathetic to Sandinistas. Although critical
of some Sandinista actions, four political parties generally
support the regime and oppose Coordinadora efforts to challenge
the Sandinistas. These parties hold 20 of the 96 seats in the
National Assembly.
Democratic Conservative Party(PCD)/Cordova-Rivas Faction
Led by former Sandinista junta member Rafael Cordova-Rivas.
Apparently under direct regime influence, which guarantees
faction's "official" recognition despite diminutive size.
Has small antiregime faction. Holds 14 seats in National
Assembly.
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Popular Action Movement--Marxist-Leninist (MAP-ML)
Led by Isidro Tellez. Small, ultraleftist party. Critical
of regime for moving too slowly toward Communism. Two seats
in National Assembly.
Communist-Party of Nicaragua (PCdeN)
Led by Eli Altamirano. Hardline Communist party
ideologically similar to MAP-ML. Two seats in National
Assembly.
Nicaraguan. Socialist Party (PSN)
Led by Gustavo Tablada. Traditional Moscow-line Communist
party. Allied with regime from 1980 to 1984. Occasionally
critical of Sandinista repression. Two seats in National
Assembly.
-Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT)
Minor party. Opposes peace plan because it forbids
Sandinista export of revolution.
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Schedule for the Central American Peace Agreement *
Signature (7 August 1987)
- Governments appeal to regional states with Insurgencies to reach agreement ending
hostilities.
15 Days (22 August 1987)
- Central American Foreign Ministers met In San Salvador as Executive Committee to
regulate compliance and organize working committees.
20 Days (27 August 1987)
- National Reconciliation Committees to be formed.
90 Days (7 November 1987)
- Cease-fires take place.
Governments prevent use of their territories by insurgents and request cutoff of
external aid to rebels.
- Governments grant amnesty; rebels release prisoners.
Democratization provisions take effect, including political freedoms, press freedom,
and ending of state-of-siege restrictions.
120 Days (7 December 1987)
- International Verification and Follow-up Commission analyzes progress made in
fulfillment of agreement.
150 Days (7 January 1988)
- Central American Presidents meet to discuss the report of the Verification
Commission.
By First Semester 1988 (30 June 1988)
- Simultaneous elections for the Central American parliament, with International
observation.
No Time Periods Given
- Arms control talks begin with Contadora mediation.
- Time frame for duration of the agreement.
? Approximate dates.
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SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR NICARAGUAN COMPLIANCE WITH PEACE PLAN
25 August 1987
Distribution:
Ms. Jackie Tillman, NSC, Old EOB, Room 391
Mr. Ronald Godard, Deputy Director, Office of Central American
Affairs, Room 4915, State
Mr. Richard Wyrough, Deputy Director/Coordinator, Office of
Central American and Panamanian Affairs, Room 4915, State
Mr. Luigi Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning
Coordination/ARA, Room 6913A, State
Mr. Robert Fouche, Director, Office of Analysis for Inter-
American Republics/INR, Room 7358, State
Mr. David Smith, Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division/INR,
Room 7637, State
Mr. Robert Witajewski, ARA/CEN, Room 4915, State
Dr. Tony Gray, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, DOD, Room 4C800, Pentagon
Col. John Cash, DIO/DIA, Room 2A520, Pentagon
DIA/DE3, DIAC, Bolling Air Force Base
DIA/DB3, DIAC, Bolling Air Force Base
CAJIT (Ken Rosen) Room 1D917, Pentagon
SOUTHCOM
DDI Rep CINCLANT Room 168, Bldg. NH95, Norfolk, VA
NSA, Room 3A156, Fort Meade, MD
SINIO, NSA, Room 3A109, Fort Mead, MD
SSCI iRoom 7B02, HQs
HPSCI Room 7B02. HOs
DCI/DDCI, Executive Staff
Executive Registry - 7E12
Mr. Daniel Childs, Comptroller - 7C21
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs - 7D43
Office of Congressional Affairs - 7B02
NIO/LA - 7E62
NIO/Economics (Mr. Dean Hoffman) - 7E62
NIC/AG - 7E47
C/LA/DDO - 3C3203
DDI - 7E44
C/PES/DDI 7F24
D/CPAS - 7F16
PDB Staff - 7F30
SCIO/CPAS/DDI
CPAS/IMC/CB/DD -
CPAS/ISS/DDI -7G50
CPAS/CDPB/CC/DDI -GH25
C/OGI/FSIC/SA/DDI - 3G13
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C/OGI/FSIC/PIB/DDI - 2G09
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Production Staff/ALA/DDI - 4F21 (2)
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DC/ALA/MCD/DDI - 4F29 (2)
C/ALA/MCD/Nicaragua/DDI - 4F29 (10)
C/ALA/MCD/Central America/DDI - 4F39 (10)
C/ALA/MCD/Mexico/DDI - 4F39
C/ALA/MCD/Cuba/DDI - 4F39
C/ALA/MCD/Caribbean/DDI - 4F21
ALA/MCD/Files - 4F29 (5)
ALA/MCD/Nicaragua Branch Files - 4F29
ALA/MCD/Central America Branch Files - 4F39
DDI/ALA/MCD/NIC (25Aug87)
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