VIOLENCE APPARENTLY AVERTED IN GUYANA-SURINAM BORDER DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000700070008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 29, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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greater. The British and American ambassadors continued to urge moderation
upon Burnham and suggested possibilities for a compromise solution. Great
Britain finally sent a special representative to impress upon Guyana the
dangers and foolishness of an armed conflict.
negotiated settlement now possible. These pressures finally bore
fruit. Burnham softened his position substantially and on March 21 offered
the Dutch a counterproposal. He suggested that Guyana would withdraw its
security forces (but not civilians) in response to the withdrawal of all
Surinamese personnel. Both nations would complete the evacuation by
April 1. If the Dutch accept this suggestion, representatives of both
parties will meet in a neutral location (which the US, taking no
position on the border dispute, has agreed to provide) to prepare for
resumption of the negotiations begun in April 1966, to examine the bases
for removal of all security forces from the border, and to discuss
arrangements whereby civilians of each side can remain in the other's
territory. In effect, Burnham has withdrawn his demand that the Nether-
lands publicly acknowledge the superiority of Guyana's claim and he has
proposed discussions leading to formal negotiations.
The Netherlands has been critical of Burnham's proposal in its present
form, particularly in regard to the timing of the security forces' with-
drawal from the disputed area. Additional difficult discussions will hope-
fully produce a mutually acceptable formula. In the meantime, Burnham is
unlikely to initiate a conflict by ordering the Guyana Defense Force to
move against the Surinamese.
Bilateral negotiations over a final settlement of the boundary
dispute will probably drag on interminably. The issue has become too
entwined with internal politics to permit an easy solution based on bilateral
interpretations of legal agreements. Arbitration by a neutral third party is
likely to be the only means of eventually terminating the dispute, but no
definite steps have been taken in this direction. But while direct and
indirect discussions continue the chance of a deliberate violent outbreak
is slight.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STAT
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
,11(),4ettf`/Teh
/eft) 110/ eti 111
INR-5, March 29. 1969
To
Thru
From
: The Secretary
: S/S
INR - Thomas L. Eughe I
Subject: Violence Apparently Averted in Guyana-Surinam Border Dispute
The festering Guyana-Surinam border dispute recently led the two
countries to the brink of an armed conflict. Difficult diplomatic
maneuvers, encouraged by the UK and, especially in Guyana, with US support,
have apparently reduced the likelihood of violence in the near future.
This paper discusses the origins of the dispute, the recent flare-up, and
prospects for a solution.
ADSTRACT
The dormant Guyana-Surinam border dispute sprang to life in December 1967
when Guyanese police forces ejected a Surinam hydrographic team from the
contested area. Surinam Prime Minister Pengel reacted violently, threatening
drastic reprisals and the use of force in defense of Surinamese interests.
Although his pronouncements exceeded his actions, Pengel did expel a small
number of Guyanese from Surinam and established at least two police posts in
the disputed region. Guyana Prime Minister Burnham, in turn, became
Incensed and ordered his military forces to prepare to expel the Surinamese
police. Burnham seemed prepared to use arms in support of Guyana's
territorial claim.
The Netherlands, which has constitutional responsibility for Surinam's
foreign relations and defense, initially took a surprisingly calm view of the
I !lc .rcipert was produced i,y the Bureau
el Intelligence and I:esearch. Aside
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GROUP 3
Downgrade:1 at 12 year
Intervals; not
automatically declassified
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entire affair. Stimulated by Surinam's aggressive stance, however, it
suggested negotiation of the issue. Prime Minister Burnham received the
Dutch proposal with considerable distaste because it failed to acknowledge
the alleged superiority of Guyana's territorial claim. Urged by Britain and
the US to take a moderate position, Burnham made a counterproposal in
which he eased considerably his pre-conditions for negotiation. Surinam and
the Netherlands probably will not accept Burnham's offer in its present
form, but they are likely to use it as the basis for further pre-negotiation
discussions. N.Jither party is likely to employ armed force as long as
serious attempts to find a peaceful solution continue.
Guyana bases its claim to the 6,000 square mile contested area on
historical precedents. Great Britain exercised a tenuous sovereignty over
the region since the mid-nineteenth century. The Netherlands (Surinam)
claim is based on geographic considerations--the question of what river
forms the major affluent of the Courantyne River, and therefore the border.
In 1939, Great Britain and the Netherlands negotiated a treaty which
would have given the disputed area to what was then British Guyana. The
treaty was never signed because of the interruption of World War II.
Following the war, the Netherlands refused to accept the treaty because of
Surinamese pressures. The border question has thus remained to poison
Guyana-Surinam relations.
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Bilateral negotiations are unlikely to produce a final solution to thu
dispute, but they would help in defusing the current crisis. Although the
remote and uninhabited jungle area has no known value, national pride has
become deeply enmeshed in the issue. The US takes no position on the issUe
other than that it should be settled by peaceful means. The use of a neutral
arbiter would probably be the only way of eventually reaching an acceptable
settlement, but no definite steps have been taken in this direction.
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A festering border dispute between Guyana and Surinam that took a sudden
turn toward violence last December now seems to be moving toward a peaceful,
though perhaps temporary, settlement. The dispute, involving sovereignty
over almost 6,000 square miles of uninhabited jungle, stems from the absence
of a definite delineation of the interior boundary between the two countries.
Both nations agree that their border is formed by the left bank of the
Courantyne River. The question is whether the Kutari River or the more
western New River constitutes the headwaters of the Courantyne. The
disputed area has no particular value, but national pride has become deeply
involved in the issue.
The claims. Guyana, basing its claim on historical precedents,
insists that the Kutari forms the Courantyne's source. Great Britain
exercised sovereignty over the area between the Kutari and New. River since
the mid-nineteenth century as the result of a tacit agreement with the
Netherlands. In return, Great Britain recognized the left bank of the
Courantyne, rather than the customary middle of the river, as the Guyana-
Surinam boundary. The Netherlands claim to the area is based on the late
discovery of the New River, which geographical evidence indicates is the
principal affluent of the Courantyne. In 1939, the Netherlands and Great
Britain negotiated a treaty which would have delimited the boundary along
the Courantyne and Kutari rivers. World War II, however, prevented the two
nations from formally approving the treaty.
After World War II the Kingdom of the Netherlands was radically
reorganized. The colonies became "associated" entities within the Kingdom.
The Hague retained constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs and
defense but, at the same time, committed itself to consider local opinions
in actions affecting the overseas areas. Under this new organization,
Surinam refused to surrender its claim and pressed the Netherlands into
supporting its demand for the New River as the boundary.
Several attempts were made to resolve the issue before Guyana gained its
independence, at a time when both parties to the dispute still displayed con-
siderable flexibility. Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham visited Paramaribo
in January 1966 for discussions with his Surinamese counterpart, Prime
Minister Pengel, but they agreed merely to continue their discussions at a
later date. Dutch and British representatives discussed the issue again in
April 1966, but without achieving an agreement. Thus Guyana gained its
independence the following month without any real progress having been made
on the boundary dispute. Another attempt in June 1966 to resolve the
dispute was as futile as all the earlier efforts.
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Crisis breaks out. The issue remained dormant until December 1967,
when Guyana ejected a Surinamese hydrographic team that had been conducting
gauging operations in the contested area. No clear explanation has been
provided as to why Guyana chose that particular time to expel the Surinamese.
Burnham possibly wished to demonstrate his displeasure over Prime Minister
Pengel's visit to Venezuela, which claims more than half of Guyana's present
territory. One can also speculate that Burnham, expecting a mild Surinamese
response acted to strengthen his internal position by adopting a
nationalistic pose. It is even conceivable, though improbable, that the
Guyanese had just come to appreciate the importance of the gauging opera-
tions and decided to act immediately.
Surinam reacted violently to the ejection of its hydrographic team.
In a series of radio broadcasts and communiques, Prime Minister Pengel
threatened to take strong reprisals and to use armed force to protect
Surinamese interests in the disputed area. Despite these threats, Surinam
did little more than expel a small number of Guyanese workers who, it
alleged,were in the country illegally. Pengel did, however, organize a
paramilitary force of civilian "volunteers" and established .4t least two
police posts within the contested territory.
Surinamese leader's internalgtoblems. Pengel's actions during the
current crisis have been designed to satisfy his internal political needs
as well as to assert Surinam's boundary claim. His coalition government
won a relatively easy victory in the 1967 parliamentary elections and
apparently is internally stable, but the border dispute poses a serious
potential problem. In all his actions, Pengel must take into account the
racial divisions which dominate Surinamese politics, the presence of a
small but vociferous group that favors full independence, and the large
"Hindustani" opposition party. The Prime Minister no doubt felt it
necessary to maintain a strong nationalist, patriotic stance on the border
issue to prevent a possible erosion of his domestic political position
and possibly to increase his ability to gain greater independence of action
from the Dutch. Although Surinamese public opinion has generally favored
negotiation rather than force to settle the border dispute, it has held
Guyana responsible for precipitating the crisis. Pengel, who is first
and foremost a politician, probably felt it necessary to carry out his
interpretation of the demands of public sentiment in order to insure his
political position.
Guyanese leader faces election. Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana,
meanwhile, has been under greater internal pressure than his Surinamese
counterpart. Sometime during the next twelve months Burnham must hold
national elections in which opposition leader Cheddi Jagan will pose a
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very strong challenge. Burnham fears that indecisive action on the border
question, particularly if the presence of Surinamese security forces in
the disputed area becomes public knowledge, would expose him to damaging
criticism by Jagan. Guyana's boundary dispute with Venezuela is another
important reason for Burnham to take a firm position. The Guyanese feel
hemmed in by the boundary dispute with their two neighbors. Pengel's
visit to Venezuela late last year and Venezuelan Foreign Minister
Iribarren's recent visit to Surinam aroused Burnham's suspicion that the
two countries were collaborating against Guyana, thereby heightening the
latter's defensive attitude. In Burnham's view, failure to counteract
Surinam moves with sufficient determination would encourage Venezuela to
press its territorial claims more aggressively.
Stage set for armed conflict. Burnham, therefore, initially adopted
a hard line. He was willing to discuss the border issue, but only if the
Netherlands requested negotiations. As a pre-condition for discussions,
moreover, he insisted that the Surinamese security forces be withdrawn from
the disputed area and that the superiority of Gayana's claim to the area
?be acknowledged. As it became evident that the Dutch would not accept
those terms, Burnham ordered the Guyana Defense Force to prepare to expel
the Surinamese forces from the disputed area, by force if necessary. The
stage was set for an armed conflict.
The Dutch, meanwhile, took a surprisingly calm attitude toward the
entire affair, partially because they believed Burnham was bluffing and
partially because of Pengel's position. Upon learning of Guyana's December
action to expel the Surinamese hydrographic team, the Dutch merely asked for
an explanation. Surinam's more aggressive stance, however, prompted the
Dutch to propose a return to the statue 4442 ante followed by negotiations
on the substance of the dispute. Under the terms of the Dutch proposal
Guyanese and Surinamese security forces would withdraw from the disputed
area, civilians from the two countries would be permitted to resume their
work in the area, and no more Guyanese workers would be deported from
Surinam. Great Britain, strongly encouraged by the US, pressed the
Netherlands to adopt a more conciliatory and active policy in order to avert
violence. The Dutch, nevertheless, remained firm and waited for Guyana's
formal reply to their proposal.
Burnham's initial private reaction, which he did not communicate
directly to the Dutch, was highly negative. He was willing to withdraw
Guyana's forces from the disputed area, but only after the Surinamese had
departed. Should the Surinamese hydrographic team return, moreover, Burnham
insisted that it be accompanied by Guyanese observers. Such a solution was
unacceptable to the Dutch and the possibility of an armed conflict grew
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