SIE-1: TERMS OF REFERENCE: CURRENT ACTIVITIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A000100010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 23, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 March 1951
SUBJECT: SIE-1: TERMS OF REFERENCE: CURRENT ACTIVITIES VITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST
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THE PROBLEM
To examine the scope and nature of Soviet and Satellite activities
during the past three months and to estimate the probable purposes of
such activities with particular reference to the Far East.
QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
I. What Soviet activities have taken place in the Far East during the
past three months, and where have these been most pronounced?
A. MILITARY (GROUND)
1. U.S.S.R.
a. Changes in Strength
No change has been noted in the over-all strength of the
Soviet Army in the Far East. This strength since 1947 is estimated to
be 381,000 man.
Personnel strength of units has remained at normal
peace-time levels, which are estimated to be 701% of war-time strength.
However, the assumption that all units are at 70% of the war-time
strength can neither be substantiated nor denied.
There is no evidence of change in the organization of
Soviet Army units in the bar East since June 1948. At that time, the
126th Mountain Corps was raised to army status (army as yet unidentified),
At the sane time, several brigades are believed to have been expanded
into divisions.
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Since the Korean war, the numbers of Soviet military
and civilian advisers to both the Chinese Communist and the North Korean
forces have increased. The present minimum estimate of these Soviet
Army advisers is 10,000 with the Chinese Communist forces and 2,000 with
the Korean. Some civilians are included therein.
b. Dia.....,:ge.ELL_JCrrainim:
No significant changes in training of Soviet Ground
Forces have been noted during the past three months.
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There
have been no indications of special training since then.
c. Changes in Equipment:
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the evidence does not suggest that this is a new development.
d. E1229.02.1n Morale:
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None noted.
e. Changes in Leadership:
No significant changes noted.
f. Changes in Logistical Support:
Soviet ground transportation in the Far Bast is being
improved. In January 1951, it was learned that three new rail lines
were under construction: one probably from Sovetskaya Gavan through
DeKastri and Cape Lazareva to Nikolaevsk, a second on Sakhalin from
Pogibi through Alexandrovsk to Pobedino, and a third from Vladivostok
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to Kraskino providing a direct route to North Korea. A preliminary
survey from a railroad on Kamchatka connecting bet Bolsheretsk with
Petropavlovsk was in progress in August 1950. Foreign sources report
a railroad improvement program in North China, with Soviet advisers:
has been in progress since 1949; it called for accomplishment within
five years of the following: completion of Tatung-Tangku line; con-
struction of double-track raflroad Mukden-Tientsin; completion of the
Paotow-Lanchow line, via Ningsia, and of the Tientsin-Lanchow line.
It is not known whether this plan for improvement of railroads in
North China is still being carried out.
A Sakhalin-Kamsomolsk oil pipeline is reported under
construction and may be completed by late 1951. Completion of this
pipeline will enable the refneries at Komsomolsk and Khabarovsk to
operate throughout the year and provide in part the Forces of the Far
East with FOL; normally, the refineries operate only from the middle
of May to the end of October.. This year, exceptionally, the Khabarovsk
refinery has continued operations at least through January, using crude
oil shipped from the vest.
In February :_951? the refinery at Mewl. (Komsomolsk)
was expanding production famaities to include jet fuel, which was not
previously known to be manufactured in the Par East.
There are indications that the strategic stockpiling
program under the Ministry of State Food and Material Reserves and
Ministry of Mar has increased significantly in the Far East during
recent months. This program is both an economic necessity and a means
to increase Russia's ability to conduct a war in this area. Evidence
during the last three months has shown a build-up in the Irkutsk area,
and raw materials there are being removed for processing; the storage
space made available is being used for finished products. This appears
to be a natural step in the State Reserve program.
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There are indications of a steady increase in heavy
industry- in Irkutsk and the area immediately west thereof; a synthetic
rubber plant at Tulun is now under construction. Industrial develop?
ment in this area seems aimed at decreasing )astern Siberia's logistic
dependence on the west.
g-
Chanues_inatploymen:
None noted.
h. Changes in Soviet Facilities:
None noted.
2. NORM KOREA
a. Chanaes in Strew,th Organization or Composition:
-
Following the apparent disintegration of the North Korean
People' s Arli7 in October 1950, rapid reconstruction and reorganization
of salvaged elements were instituted and, by early December, six North
Korean corps had been identified in addition to the original two, making
a total of eight. Also since November 1950, the number of identified
North Korean divisions inceased from 14 to 29. There is evidence that
the authorized strength of the reorganized divisions is slightly less
than the earlier divisions, the strength having been reduced from an
estimated 10,970 to 9,500. There are also indications that the T/OE of
several of the reo.%.ganized dil,isions provided for organic antiaircraft
battalions. This is a development in line with the Soviet practice of
having an antiaircraft battalion organic to each division.
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b. Chan-es jol Training:
Three of the new North Korean People's Army corps, the
VI, VII and VIII, are known to have been organized and trained in
Manchuria. There are no indications that their trainio4; was along any
special lines. It is also knoiat that a large number of overage (35-37
year old' s) individuals were removed from the corps during their
training period.
c. Chams in Equipment:
Wgimia
No informo.tion is available to confirm any significant
changes in North Korean equipment. In fact, there are indications of
a shortage of heavy equipnent.
d. Changes in Morale:'
ea*
During the last three months, several reports indicate
Door morale in the combat units as a result of food shortages.
poor morale
Chaim in Leadershlp
In addition to Korean leaders., there is evidence that
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There is no evidence, however, that any advisers
have a direct command function.
f. Changes in Logistical Support:
kemcgarriamsr, ???? adru
There are indications that supplies in quantity are being
received by the North Korean People's Army through Manchouli, Manchuria.
In early February, over 538 Soviet-type vehicles had been
distributed to Korean corps in Manchuria. There are indications that the
three corps which were trained in Manchuria received supplies, especially
artillery and ammunition, :h1. such amounts that a surplus would be avail-
able for shipment to units in Torea. The North Korean People's Army
maintains a special committee in Manchuria known as the Committee for
Receiving Military Goods from tie Northeast. There is evidence that most
Korean logistical support comes from the Soviets and/or Chinese.
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g. Changes Al,pep_lmanIl
In early December, two North Korean corps, the I and
IV, and possibly one other -- the II -- were actually committed against
UN forces. Three corps -- the VI, VII aid VIII -- were training in
Manchuria. Locations and activities of the others the III and V
Corps -- were unknown.
All iden'Ufied major units are presently deployed in
Korea. Since January, the I, II, III and V Corps have been in contact
with UN forces. During rebruery and early March, the VI, VII and VIII
Corps, well equipped, well trained and at full T/O strength, moved from
Manchuria to positions in Korea, although the VIII Corps has possibly
undergone some decimation as result of UN interdiction. Elements of
these corps are currently being committed to combat.
3. CHINA
a. EhEasj.m. Streng1,21/...2Eganization or Compition:
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b. Changes in TratrAng:
There is no information to confirm any significant
changes in the training of Chiaese Communist forces; however, uncon-
firmed reports indicate that some elements of the Chinese Communist
field forces are undergo:eng training in Manchuria in anticipation of
receiving heavy equipment from the Soviets.
c. Changes in Egliaeat:
There is no firm evidence of significant changes in
Chinese Communist equipment to date.
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d. Changes in Morale:-
?EM.1.???? tp alWayou. ? ??? amoa?
PW intereogations during the past three months indicate
a perceptible lowering morale among Chinese Communist combat units
as a result of food shoreages? high casualty rate and severe weather
conditions in Korea. The general state of discipline, however, remains
effective.
e. Chaaa...in LeademIllEs
No signiacant changes noted.
C, Changes Logistical Supports
stm u.00mewom*m
No changer: noted.
g. Chases in_22212aellt:
On 18 Mar 511 it was noted that units of the CCF 4th
Field Army were all withdrawing north. 'Whether they are leaving Korea,
or whether they are retiring to more northerly defensive positions remains
to be seen. Units of the 1st Field Army were moved into Korea ae replace-
ments or reinforcements. Indications that 1st Field Army elements were
moving from northwest Chd.ra into the North China area were noted in
January 1951. Good eviderce indicates that elements of two armies of the
2d Field Army have moved or are presently being moved from southwest
China to North China,
4. CHINA-TIBET
Evidence in late December and early January disclosed that
Chungking had ordered 20, COO fur hats for Chinese Communist forces going
into Tibet. Peking promieed delivery by the end of May 195..
These item
would provide protection against snow glare and colds (Notes Gauze masks
covering the mouth and nose are widely used in the Orient to prevent cold
infection).
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illoo-curati
a. Changes in Strength Organization or Composition:
Since mid-1950, the Viet Minh forces have been going
through what appears to be a continuous build-up into higher echelon
combat units. This reorganization has taken effect primarily in Tonkin,
where five divisional-type units have been identified.
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Elsewhere, the Viet Minh
Army is still organized into independent regiments and battalions, and
it is believed that the Viat Minh will attempt to combine these units
Into divisions as personnel and equipment become available.
Informatioa suggests additionally that two corps are in
process of formation in Tonkin,.
b. CI-Aga...LI Trag:
This infornation confirms estimates that Chinese Comm-
nist military and political training and advisory pers,:nnel are with the 50X1
Viet Minh.
c. Changes in E'suipment:
d.
Changes in Morale:
None noted,
e. Changes in Leadershipl
Avu+1441voineva:tie...es..,..
None noted,
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f. Changes in Lofistical_!Support:
There was a temporary lull in the rearmament program
during December 1950, but supply of materiel to the Viet Minh has been
resumed. In addition, movement of supplies from Hainan to the Viet
Minh areas of the Annam coast is believed to be of some significance,
particularly in terms of eupplementing land supply of equipment to
units in Annam.
g. Chan es in Deployments
There is evidence that virtually all major Viet Minh
units in Tonkin have recently been in movement, deploying close to the
French perimeter in preparation for another major attack.
h. Dev2a2pment of Facilities:
alse.041, Ara,
None note6,
6. BURMA
Recent information strongly suggests that the Burma Commu-
nist Party is not only attempting to unite the several dissident grouns
under a "united front" dorinated by them, but also that active Chinese
Communist military support may have started, or at least is imminent.
The program of Chinese Conmunist aid is certain to be extremely modest
at the outset, and no spectacular successes against Burmese Government
troops are expected in the near future.
II. To what extent have these changes affected Soviet and Chinese
Capabilities?
A. OFFENSIVELY AGAINST:
1. UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA
a.
These chances have not affected Soviet capabilities
-against United Nations forces in Korea significantly.
b. Communiet China:
The increase in Soviet stockpiling noted in recent
months has increased the potential Soviet logistical support which may
be made available to the Chinese Communists,
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2, UNITED STATES FORCES IN JAPAN, RYUKYU ISLANDS, ALASKA
AND THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES
a, U.S.S.R.;
There has been no significant chance in Soviet capa-
bilities against these areas.
b. Communist China:
To date, this threat has been limited in part by the
apparent scale of the Soviet logistical and technical support provided
to the Chinese Communists Such support can however, be increased and
may perhaps be increasing.
3. TAIWAN AND SOUTH EAST ASIA
a. U.S.S.R.:
These chances have not affected Soviet capabilities
against Southeast Asia and Taiwan.
b. Communist. China:
MOINI*`.1. VOM01.1?IIMIS .101.001.00
As a result of Soviet stipport made available by the
Soviets, the Chinese Communist Ariv may be developing an *proved
capability for an attack acainst Taiwan and perhaps Southeast Asia.
B. DEFENSIVELY
Defensively, Soviet military and economic activities throughout
the Soviet Far East have, ever since World War II, been directed at
securing the independence of that area from the western U.S.S.R. in
terms of both offensive and defensive capabilities. Recent changes in
this area reflect only a continuing build-up of these capabilities.
?
The increased rate of the activity indicates a growing Soviet concern
for the vulnerability of the area, and probably indicates that the
priority requirements of the western U.S.S.R. have been substantially
attained. From the receat changes, it may be concluded that the Soviets
have made considerable progress at reducing the strategic vulnerability
of the Far Eastern U.S.S.R. through stockpiling and reduced dependence
upon the line of communication into the area.
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III. Have there been any comparableSoviet and/or Satellite military,
political or economic developments elsewhere which might indicate
Soviet intentions, particularly in the Far East?
During the past year, and particularly since mid-1950, there has
been a sharp increase in the extent and nature of Soviet support pro-
vided to the Eastern European Satellites. The previous Soviet poillicy
of providing largely war-worn, obsolete or obsolescent equipment to
their Satellites has shifted markedly to a program of providing new and
modern equipment in increasing quantities. During the past year,
intensive training programs have been accomplished. Satellite armies
have been expanded and reorganized in conformance to the pattern of
Soviet units. As a result of these developments, these Satellite armies
as a group have become capable of offensive combat operations. This, ir
itself, may be an indication of Soviet intentions to use these Satellite
armies for offensive purposes. The provision of Soviet logistical
support and technical advisers to the Chinese Communist Army may have
the same objective in the Far East.
If a comparison may be made between the developments within the
Eastern European Satellite armies, and the development to be expected
in the Chinese Communist Army, it is that the added logistical and
technical support now being provided- to the Chinese Communists is
intended to convert them into a large land force with, modern technical
equipment capable of sustained offensive warfare in the Far East without
overt Soviet combat support.
IV. What is the probable purpose of all of these developments?
A. GROUND FORCE POINT OF VIEW:
1, U.S.S.R.
The developments noted in the Far East probably have the
purpose of making the Soviet Far East logistically and militarily self-
sustaining.
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2. CHINA
The extent and nature of Soviet support that has been
provided to the Chinese Communists may, if it is continued on the
same or an increasing scale, have one or both of the following
objectives
a. The development of a Chinese Amy capable of sup-
porting the Communist drive toward world domination by independent
acts of aggression in the Far East.
b. The development of Chinese Communist armies capable
of augmenting the Soviet Army in a global war.
3. INDO-CHINA
Probably the most significant purpose of these develop-
ments is to improve the over-all combat effectiveness of the Viet
Minh forces and to hasten their efforts to overrun and control all
of Indo-China, with particular and immediate reference to ehrinking
the French defense zone in Tonkin. The establishment of divisional-
tyoe units will facilitate better co-ordination between adjacent units
and between subordinate elements. It will enable them to concentrate
their forces at points of greater vantage with minimum delay and
confusion.
The improvement of radio equipment will pave the way for
greater co-ordination of Viet ifinh effort throughout Indo-China and
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will facilitate the dissemination of adverse propaganda. It will
likewise enhance Viet Minh relations with Communist factions in other
countries.
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