CONSULTATION ON THE SDI PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R001701250013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
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unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.
Access List
16 MAR 1987
C STAFFF
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No.NSDD 261
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NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
The attached document contains classified National Security Council
Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by
law.
Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you
will show or discuss information contained in the document only with
persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.
Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and
understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with
any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any
unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.
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? SECRET
SE
ON
y 18, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PR
THE SECRETARY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
AMBASSADOR MAX KAMPELMAN
AMBASSADOR RONA ?
AMBASSADOR MAY MAN
SYSTEM II
SUBJECT: Consultatio
The President has approv
Decision Directive dire
restructuring of the SD
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachment:
NSDD-261
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SDI Program
National Security
s on the possible
Frank C. Carlucci
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SYSTEM II
90126
THE W
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 261
ON
SE
ruary 18, 1987
CONSULTATI ROGRAM (U)
Initiation of Consultation ecently completed a series
of discussions with my princip visors on the future conduct
of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, I would like
both the Congress and key Allies to be consulted on the substance
of the decisions that I face. The material provided at the
attachment to this NSDD shall be used as the basis of this
consultation. The initial report on the results of this
consultation should be provided to me by March 2, 1987. (C)
Public Diplomacy. As we cons
public speculation about the
relationship to the ABM Trea
responses to such speculati
the maximum extent possibl
Related Activity in the
anticipate increased So
to influence my future
to the Nuclear and Spac
continue to protect all
hould anticipate increased
the SDI program and its
essential that all
coordinated in advance to
e Talks. We should also
activity in an attempt
fore, the U.S. delegation
to take special care to
C)
With regard to the sp of activities permitted
and prohibited under the ABM ?, it is essential that we
avoid giving the Soviet Union the mistaken impression that we are
willing to accept additional restrictions on the conduct of the
SDI program either through the process of clarifying the terms of
a 15 year old treaty or by renegotiating what the ABM Treaty
permits or prohibits. However, while maintaining the principal
focus of the negotiations on the U.S. proposals and agenda, the
Defense and Space negotiating group is authorized to respond to
the Soviet pursuit of their p by continuing to criticize,
question, and probe them (in ce with their instructions),
and by pointing out ways in ch S. proposals respond to
Soviet concerns. (S)
Additionally, the De
authorized to attempt to
disagreement. In seeki4
group has been instruct
U.S. interest to accept
terms and definitions as
that which has already be
negotiating group is called
e negotiating group is
f agreement and
tion, the negotiating
d that it is not in the
he understanding of key
e ABM Treaty which alter
and agreed. The
ounter and reject Soviet
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? rAd rc i ?
6ELREI
attempts indirectly to narrow
treaty. In responding to So
proposed definitions, the n
that the U.S. will not acc
development and testing b
Additional Tasking. In
above, I direct that the
2
hich is permitted by the
tempts to promote their
group will make it clear
1 constraints on research,
ablished by the treaty. (S)
a. The Department o
30, 1987, a plan which inc
onsultations on the
ertaken. (C)
. ?
provide to me by April
inimum:
1. the specific programmatic steps that the Secretary
of Defense recommends be taken if I authorize the restructuring
of the SDI program;
2. a description, including dates, of the first
planning activities which would require the use of the broader
interpretation of the ABM Treaty,
3. a description,
which would require the broad
4. an assessment
to take these actions. (S
b. The Department
other agencies as approp
1987, recommendations o
capability. These reco
cost. Additionally, the
assessment of the impact o
with recommended improvement
on other Defense needs. (S)
g dates, of the first tests
rpretation; and
pact of not being permitted
ordination with NASA and
de to me by April 30,
space heavy lift
be include estimates of
efense should provide its
requirements associated
. space heavy lift capability
c. The Legal Advisor of the Department of State, working
with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, will complete
work on the remaining issues associated with the interpretation
of the ABM Treaty as soon as possible, but not later than April
30, 1987. He will provide a plan to accomplish this task for my
approval not later than Februa 987. This plan should
include a recommendation conce in. ow the results of this work
would be appropriately shared ith ongress and Allies. (S)
c. The National Secur working with Departments
and Agencies as appropria'mate the consultations
authorized by this NSDD w ngress and Allies. (S)
Attachment:
Terms of Consultation
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". 6LCRET . p-i-
TERMS OF CONSULTATXN OW THE
Criteria and Technology (11)
When we initiated t
importance of ensur
properly channeled to
stability and securi "
(U)
? SYSTEM II
90126
SDI PROGRAM (U)
e recognized the
in technology were
ram into areas in which
anced, rift diminished.
To accomplish this, we de ed a series of criteria by
which we could judge technological options as they emerged.
These criteria include military effectiveness, survivability
and cost effectiveness at the margin. (U)
And, we set for the SDI program the goal of not merely
providing technologically feasible options for advanced
defenses, but of finding options that meet our criteria, and
doing so as expeditiously ible while conducting our
program under the terms o M Treaty. (U)
In the almost four yea
work, technology has
and is still acceler
for a review of bot
guidance to ensure
ahead of the techno
The results of our
from the point of vi
the validity of our
the SDI program began its
t an unexpectedly fast pace,
ore, the President asked
d its associated policy
uidance was able to stay
are encouraging both
s of the technology and
olicy. (U)
Based upon the progress made to date, we remain convinced
that the basic goal of the SDI program is achievable. In
fact, if the rate of technological progress continues as now
anticipated, that goal may be reached,much sooner than we
had expected. (U)
This progress has enabled
concrete, working hypothe
options that may be avail,
has given us new insigh
would face were we to
research. (U)
Early Deployment Decisio
However, the SDI pr
that it has generat .
which meet our critet,ia.
the contrary, discussion about
deployment" decision is not
us to begin now to examine
t the types of defensive
the early-to-mid 1990s, and
the contingencies that we
implement the fruits of our
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SECRE
progressed to the point
ing advanced defensives
, despite speculation to
Imminent "early
priate at this time. (U)
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Concept of Incremental Capah it., (U)
Further, it is very
defenses capable of
that the President s
step. (U)
?
we could ever deploy
the overall objective
rogram in one single
It is much more like-
decisions on a series
provide increments of
have to ?make future
options, each of which
ity. (U)
A fundamental issue, then, is whether we can build the
overall defensive capability we seek in "increments" while
remaining true to our overall objective, while constantly
maintaining the quality of stability and security we seek,
and while guarding against inefficient use of limited
resources. (U)
Incremental Capability and Cri U)
One of the first questio
previously identified c
concept. (U)
Since our overall o
to believe that the
increments must be
The criterion of mi
the research efforts
goal, rendering balli
e considered is whether our
remain valid under such a
unchanged, we continue
g from the various
our basic criteria. (U)
ess aids us by focusing
at support our desired
obsolete. (U)
We don't simply seek to complement our offensive retaliatory
forces by defending them against a disarming 1st strike. (U)
On the contrary, we seek a transition to a more stable basis
for deterrence which makes use of the increased contribution
of defensives which threaten no one, and an improved basis
for deterrence which allows us simultaneously to move to
lower overall levels of s offensive forces while
always maintaining our s and that of our allies. (U)
The criterion of surviv
of defenses does not
vulnerable, it could
an aggressor to atta
Defenses need not b
maintain a sufficie
their mission, even
against them. (U)
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ensures that the deployment
isis instability. If
ncentive in a crisis for
(U)
ut must be able to
ctiveness to fulfill
determined attacks
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?
By the criterion of co
mean that any defensi
to provide incentive
acquire or to retai
effort to defeat or
defense. (U)
?
ctiveness at the margin, we
hould be designed so as not
al adversary either to
ensive forces in an
ffectiveness of our
syst
o a poten
dd 1
Cost effectiveness a
economic criterion,
terms. If met, this
pursue both stabilizing
reductions as mutually reinforcing goals. (U)
much mo?e than an
couched in economic
fers us the opportunity to
es and offensive force
The criteria of survivability and cost effectiveness provide
needed protection against increasing instability.
Therefore, it is our view that these two criteria must be
appropriately applied to all options considered. (U)
On the other hand, while
effectiveness should als
require that an option
capability be expected
the program. (U)
At the same time, w
real limitations th
for the deployment
continued research
accomplish our over
eria of military
lied, it certainly cannot
to provide incremental
eve the full objective set for
at we consider the very
resources available both
pability and for the
g increments needed to
Therefore, in applyin
to options designed to
are inclined to require
that
t of military effectiveness
incremental capability, we
any such option:
a. clearly add an element upon which the larger,
integrated system can continue to be built; and, in the
process,
b. perform a militarily
contributes an increase
the commitment of resour
Promising Technologies (U)
We believe that new
that will be able t
additional criteria
designed to provide in
useful function which
curity commensurate with
lved. (U)
options will be available
general criteria and the
use in evaluating options
ability. (U)
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pr R c-7
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?
For example, if progre
anticipated, we may h
future to consider a
which could destroy
force to introduce
materially our abil
increase overall St
?
nues to be made as
ion in the relatively near
eploy a two-layered system
tacking ballistic missile
ainty to enhance
a attack and, thus,
Some of the Presiden timate that were we to
use space-based kineti 11 v cles (SBKKVs) as a
boost-phase layer in co n with some ground-based
late-mid-course kill mechanisms, such a system could begin
deployment by the 1993/4 time frame at reasonable cost. (S)
Such a system would not be able to engage all attacking
ballistic missiles. Rather, it would be designed to destroy
a significant portion any ballistic missile attack, and to
so in a manner that would make it impossible for the
aggressor to know which b missile warheads would get
through our defenses to t rgets. (U)
Deterrence would be en
uncertainty would mak
sure he could execut
successful 1st stri
Also, since the att
missiles would be d
overcome by simply
attacking force to m
can expect to be dest
ecause this major element of
sible for the aggressor to be
ttack and, thus, conduct a
redict which of his
ertainty could not be
missile warheads to the
portion of his force he
This is just one example of what may be possible. It is an
idea still in conceptual development. It is not yet an
option which is sufficiently formulated and refined to be
appropriately measured by the criteria we have cited. (U)
However, the idea behind the example
used to provide additional focus for
our research. (U)
Heavy Lift Capability (U)
Our programmatic revie
to conclude that the
developing addition
space. (U)
This basic capabili
ability to implemen
described above in t
cost. (U)
is mature enough to be
our thinking and for
has also led the President
should give priority to
lift heavy payloads into
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s in protecting our
e option like the one
-to-mtd 1990s at reasonable
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?
It would also provide
both military and civ
prudent and needed co
that the Soviet Uni
Therefore, the Pres
necessary to place
U.S. space heavy-lif
?
access to space for a range of
es, and it would provide a
to the significant effort
acing in this area. (U)
The ABM Treaty (U)
ing additional steps
y on the development of
(U)
When we embarked on our SDI research, President Reagan made
the commitment that this program would be conducted in full
compliance with all our legal treaty obligations. He
directed, from its inception, that this program be planned
to meet that commitment, and we have done so. (U)
In October, 1985, the United States completed an extensive
review of the ABM Treaty
record which led Preside
interpretation of our a
justified. (U)
However, at that sam
evaluated the price
to keep our SDI pro
bounds of the more
weighed these costs
requirements and th
commitments to our A
that, as long as the
implement the plan, it
restructuring of the U.S. SDI
of the broader interpretation
U.S. could justifiably observe
associated negotiating
n to conclude that a broader
under that treaty was fully
esident carefully
ould be required to pay
s it was then within the
of the ABM Treaty. He
all national security
enerated by our
upon this he decided
ived the support needed to
necessary to authorize the
program so as to make full use
of the ABM Treaty which the
(U)
In taking this action, he noted that, there could be
absolutely no doubt of our intentions to fully meet our
treaty commitments. In sharp contrast to Soviet behavior,
especially in such cases
Krasnoyarsk radar in cle
President noted that ou
respect to our own SDI
to date in exercising
deeds, our sincerity
Since October, 1985#we
other records and ? a
work remains to be ,
that this be accompl
respond appropriately to
the U.S. position my,
onstruction of the
tion of the ABM Treaty, the
and principled restraint with
and the price we have paid
aint, demonstrates by our
iated commitments. (U)
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r411..c.? reki
"
ued to review various
ct. Some additional
nd e President has asked
priir1ty basis so that we can
and all questions concerning
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?
Based on the worked com?4 we remain convinced of the
correctness of the con4usion'Apipt the President reached in
October, 1985, that a broader interpretation of the ABM
Treaty is fully justyiedstiv )
At the same time, considering t e current status of the SDI
program, it is cleaetthatthe conditions which the President
found in 1985 have changed significantly.
Our technical understaMing o feasibility of providing
advanced defensive optioftg, ions which could meet our
criteria, is growing rapidly. (U)
The costs of continuing our more restrictive policy with
respect to the conduct of
expenditure of additional
of increased, unnecessary
correspondingly. (U)
As a result, the balance
the U.S. and its allies
program structured with'
view of the ABM Treaty
requirements. (U)
Therefore, the Presl
the SDI program to
ABM Treaty. (S)
the SDI program, in terms of the
resources and time, and in terms
technical uncertainty, are growing
ing between the price that
e to pay for keeping our SDI
ounds of the more restrictive
overall security
However, before he m
the full benefit of t
our Allies. (U)
ing the restructuring of
our rights under the
decision, he would like
oth the U.S. Congress and
The President has asked the Secretary of Defense to provide
additional specific programmatic information and
recommendations which will take several weeks for the
Department to generate and for him to consider. (C)
Therefore, the President would like to use this time to
complete a full and frank, ential exchange of views on
the issue of restructurin I program. (C)
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