THE CHANGJIN-GANG HYDROELECTRIC POWER PLANT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A070200200001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 8, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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INFORMATION ?INiEriDIRT INFORMATI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the m
18. U.S.C. Secs, 793 and 794. the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited 1?? 1^-
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COUNTRY North Korea
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
The Changj in-gang Hydroelectric
Power Plant
REPOR-
DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES
REFERENCES
gNoirember 1963
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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
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Summary. The/Changjin-gang Hydroelectric Power Plant in Hamgyftg-namdo,
originally conisting of four power plants, was severely damaged during
the Korean War.
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with Czechoslovakian assistance,
the entire plant reconstructed. Average capacity of the plant rose 50X1-HUM
from 8o200o kva to 330,000-350,000 kva However
was
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most of the plant's equipment was old, operated- inefficiently, and caused ,
frequent trouble and accidents. Security of the plant,included,armed
guards, barbed wire fences', charged wiring, and flood lightS-..-VPlant
inspections were conducted by the Korean Labor Party's Centtd Committee,
other power plants, along with those of the plant's own
and officials of
management.
Background
1. The Changjin-gang Hydroelectric Power Plant in Hamgy5ng-namdo, roughly 40
miles northwest of Hangnam, originally consisted of two reservoirs, one
pumping station, and four power stations which were located along the eastern
slopes of the mountains.1 Water was conducted through pressure tunnels to
the forebay of Power Station No. 1 which, in turn, supplied exhaust water
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downivading and
declassification
STATE
# I DIA
ARMY
NAVY
I AIR
NSA
IAID
OCR
ORR Ev'
(Note: Field distribution indicated by "
NFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT
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to the other station and then to the next. When it was fully operative,
the total capacity of. the plant was as follows:,
Power Stations
Generators No. 1, 2, & 3
Generator No.. 4
Total
Station No. 1
40,000 kva each
40,000 kva
160,000 kva
Station No. 2
31,111 kva each
31,111 kva
124,444 kva
Station No. 3
Station No. 4
Total .
-15,500 kva each
13,500 kva
46,500 kva
40,500 kva
371,444 kva
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2. After the liberation, facilities of the Changjin-gang Power Plant were kept
intact, but operation was limited because the demand for power in North
Korea was low. However out ut gradually rose as the demand for power
increased, and, reached about 8o percent of its capacity. 50X1-HUM
Most of the plant s instal ations were totally damaged during the Korean
War, although some valuable machines such as generators, transformers, and
turbines had been dismantled and moved to safety in nearby mountain valleys.
Reconstruction of Power Station No. I was started even before 50X1-HUM
the end of the war, with arched ceilings of ferro-concrete about three
meters thick being constructed above generators No a '
protective measure. The generators were operative In 50X1-HUM
order to facilitate further reconstruction, the Fou ons ruc on Trust
was organized under the then Ministry of Electricity and was made responsible
for the reconstruction of the plant, generator 50X1-HUM
No. 4 of Power Station No. 2 had been put into operation.
Plant Reconstruction
3. Reconstruction of the plant was facilitated by Czechoslovakian material
and technical aid
approximately 50 Czechoslovakian technicians and skilled workers helped
reconstruct the plant. The following machines and materials came from
Czechoslovakia: coils for six generators, two exciters, seven 21,000-kva
transformers, three 320000-kva transformers, one .60,000-kva transformer;..
two 630-kva transformers, two 530-kva transformers, control board equipment
for three power stations (Power Stations Nos. 1, 2, and 4), 11 automatic
voltage regulators, eight turbine governors, expansion circuit breakers
for a total of 48 phases, about 130 disconnecting switches, approximately
80 percent of the secondary-circuit lead-covered .cables required for . 50X1-HUM
the reconstruction, and 120 meters of penstock pipes for Power Station No. ?
1. ? While the North Korean government had originally expected Czechoslovakian
aid to be gratis, as in the4.case of aid from the USSR and Communist China,
it was later learned that all. Czechoslovakian aid had to be paid for and
that the price of the machines,
was approximately 30 percent higher than on the international
market. In addition, the North Korean government had to pay monthly
salaries and daily food allowances to the Czechoslovakian workers. As a
result of Czechoslovakian aid, a total of 11 generators were reconstructed
when reconstruction of
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the entire plant was completed.
4. Reconstruction was initially expected to restore the plant to its original
state, but because of the use of Czechoslovakian machines and parts, some
of the structures were altered. In particular, the transformer and
transmission facilities of Power Station No. 2 were remodelled to form the
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center of the power distribution system in North Korea, i.e., Power Station
No. 2 became a connecting point of all transmission lines in the country.
_________approximately 100,000 kilowatt hours generated. in the eastern 50X1-HUM
orth Korea were transmitted to the western part by the trans-
former and transmission facilities of this power station. In addition, four
dams were newly constructed : (a) at Kotio-ril Changjin-gun, HamgyOng-
namdo, 00 at approximately 500 meters northwest of Power Station No. 1,"
(c) at approximately 400 meters northwest of Power Station No. 2, and (d) 50X1 -HUM
at approximately 300 meters east of Power Station No. 3. These dams were
constructed in order to harness the Kotiosu and the'Hungnim-chs6n rivers for
additional water for the Changy -aana Power Plant. The midway water ? .
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intake facilities were constructed
Power Station No. 5, with a generating capacity of- 50X1-HUM
8,000 kva and designed to--
11AP elchaust water from Power Station No. 4, 50X1-HUM
The construction work was done by the Fourth Construction
Trust of the Power _ndustry Management Bureau (PIMB), Heavy Industry'Commission;
the assembling of equipment was done by the Eighth Construction Trust of the
PIMB. All of the machines and equipment installed at Power Station No.
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were produced by North Korean factories: transformers and generators,
including two 4,000-kva generators, by the Taean Electric Appliances
Factory in Yonggang-gun, PlyOngan-namdo; turbines by the Yongs6ng Machine
Factory in Hamhang-si, Hamgyong-namdo; control boards by the Plyongyang
Electric Factory in P'yongyang; and switches by ChuD1 Electric Factory in ?
KyOngsong-gun, Hamgyang-pukto.
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Output
ut of the Changjin-gang Power Plant, which steadily increased
showed a sharp drop because of a severe drought, so
of the four power station op rated only two generators. One of
the two generators operated merely as a synchronous condenser. The total
capacity of the sower slant dropped to 120,000 kva
80,000 kva However, with the rainfall it the summer
power.pro uc on rose again. The following are average capacity
figures:
80,000 kva
100,000 kva
.150,000 kva
220,000 kva
120,000 kva
3.300000 - 350,000 kva
330,000 - 350,000 kva
330,000 - 350,000 kva
6. While the generator buildings of the Changj in-gang Power Plant were
originally designed to accommadatfive generators each at Power Stations
No. 1 and No. 2, and four each at Power Stations No. 3 and No. 4, the
capacity of the waterway was inadequate for this number of generators.
Since it was not feasible to develop additional sources of water after the
construction of Power Station No. 5, further expansion of generating capacity
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Condition of Equipment
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Except for new equipment replaced during the period of Post-war
reconstruction, most of the plantls equipment had been in use
Coils of generator No. 1 of Power Station ,,No. 1 and of the 50X1-HUM
our generators of Power Station No. 2 had been replaced .with new ones,
and Power Station No. 1 was equipped with spare coils for one generator.
Coils of the other generators were all old and had been in use
As a result, the pressure test of those coils were.conducted for a minute
at 1.2 times that of the rated voltage. .The.overvltage relays were set at .-- /
120 percent and 0.3 seconds, in order to prevent overvoltage accidents of 50X1-HUM
the generators. The unguarded section was reduced to 10 percent by making
use of ferrous hydrogen lamps and the rated phase voltage was lowered as 50X1-HUM
low as one-eleventh, in order to prevent grounding accidents within the
generator.- Turbines were repaired withspare parts stocked
and their efficiency ranged from 81 to 85 percent. However, as a 50X1 -HUM
result of the sand influx, caused by damage of . water intake towers anu,
the mid-way intake facilities, the efficiency of the turbines began to
deteriorate rapidly Because of the increasing demand for Power, 50X1-HUM
the generators were orten overloaded as much as 10 percent, with coil
temperatures rising to 90 degrees centigrade, so that generator coils wore
out within 10 years. the 3.3 kva power distribution 50X1-HUM
equipment of Power Station No. 1 and three 500-kva transformers for the
Chang:piling transmission line of Power Station No. 4 were extremely worn
and caused frequent trouble, but they could not be replaced because the, equipment
was' in short supply. In an effort to maintain the generating equipment,
minor repairs were carried out once a month and major repairs, such as atisrhaul
of generators and turbines, once every two years. About 10 accidents occur-
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a result of mismanagement of machines 50X1-HUM
In addition, four accidents occurred as a result
of flashover of Czechoslovakian insulators, one resu_ted from poor
insulation of a Czechoslovakian transformer, five
resulted from poor insulation of old transformer coils.
Security, 50X1-HUM --
8. The security department of the power,plant,which was probably an element
of the Hamgyong-namdo Internal Affairs Department, consisted of approximately
80 internal affairs personnel, but their names as well as the organizational
structure of the department were unknown to most employees of the power
plant. The main office of the security department was located in a separate
building of the plant's headquarters and was manned by approximately 10
officers and two master sergeants. The department chief was a lieutenant
colonel. There were 15 guards assigned to Power Station No. 1 and 11
each in Power Stations Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Seven guards. also were assigned to the.
Bumping Station and four each to Dams No. 1 and No. 2 and "the water intake
points. Equipped with pistols, sUbmachineztgunglor rifles,,the guards
were responsible for the physical security of the power plant, surveillance
of employees, and control of visitors. New assignments or transfer of
employees had to be cleared in advance with the security department. To
facilitate security, both ends of the dams were fenced with barbed wire,
with a small gate. The top of each dam was equipped with booby traps
of thin wire stretched seven centimeters high from the dam surface at intervals
of about 15 meters. If anyone stepped on the stretched wire, a bell at
the guard post by the dam rang immediately, indicating where the wire had
been touched. At nigh,all interior lights were kept on at Power Stations .
No. 1 and No. 2 and half were kept on at Power Stations-EP. 3 and No. 4.
Each of the penstocks for Power Stations No. 1 and No. 2 was illuminated
by. approximately 20 blinking floodlights of 500 watts each, and each of the
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penstocks for Power Stations No. 3 and No. 4 with five floodlights of
500 watts each. Each power station was enclosed with a concrete or
barbed wire fence; the more accessible points were equipped with four
lines of uninaulated copper wire charged with 220-volt current. Contact
would ring an emergency bell at the guard office of the power station.
Because the power-charged wire was so dangerous) it was charged only
during special holiday periods. While guards checked all visitors at
the main gate of each power station, the employees of the power station
did not have to show their passes. One or two guards patrolled the environs
of the power stations once every two hours, day and night. At night, three
guards were assigned to watch each surge tank. During holidays, surge tanks
were guarded day and night, and many of the off-duty employees of the
power plant were also put on guard duty inside the power station buildings.
Passes, obtainable from the staff personnel department, with approval of
the manager or the plant engineer, were required of all visitors. However)
neighbors or family members of employees visiting the power station on
private business were sometimes given access without a pass) although entry
was subject to approval in advance. Many of the employees of the power
plant were secretly working as informers for the security department) towhich
they submitted written oaths of secrecy. Their mission was to check on the
idealogical tendencies of their fellow employees. They reported to a member
of the guard office but seldom visited the security department headquarters.
Among 31 employees of Power Station No. 4, at least five were known to have
worked as informers of the security department.
Inspection Activities
9. The Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party (KLP) made inspections
The first inspection took about a month, the second about three
months, and the third about nine months. The KLP Central Committee.inspections
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ideological attitudes. A mutual inspection system among enterprises
subjected the Changjin-gang Power Plant to a quarterly inspection by five
or six workers of the planningz accounting and technical sections, and by
the Party committee of the Pujong-gang Hydroelectric Power Plant, who, for
15 to 20 days, examined planning, finance, material management, production
accomplishment, technical standards, maintenance of equipment, working
attitudes and discipline of employees, as well as trade union activities.
The results of such an inspection were submitted in writing to the PIMB,
which determined on this basis the winners of special prizes. There also
were inspections by the Material Management Bureau of the PIMB and over-all
inspections by the power plant management, in' addition to production increase:,
contest inspections, and techniques and skills inspections. The results
were used for evaluating the performance and competence of each power.
station and workshop and their chiefsland often caused...a reevaluation
of the grades of workers; sometimes the highest mark earners were giveno
grade promotions,
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Functions
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the Changjin-gang Hydroelectric Power Plant wee
a state-operated enterprise, Grade I, under the jurisdiction of the PIMB
of the Heavy Industry Commission. The functions of selected personnel and
departments of the power plant were as follows:
Manager: The manager was responsible to theLPIMB for all administrative and
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production activities of the power plant and was assisted by the chief
engineer and the deputy manager in technical and :administrative matters,
spectively.
Chief Engineer: The chief engineer was responsible for all technical matters
of the power plant4 Assisted by a responsible engineer, he supervised and
controlled the technical, power supply, construction, hydraulic facilities,
testing, and signal departments, the pumping and power stations, and the.
electric and machine workshop. The chief engineer acted in the absence
of the manager.
Responsible Engineer: The responsible engineer guided technical aspects at the
power plant in accordance with the instructions of the chief engineer and
advised the chief engineer on technical problems. He could not act for the
chief engineer during the latter's absence.
Power Station Chiefs: Each power station chief supervised the operation of his
power station, with technical advice from the senior duty engineer, and handled
the distribution of labor, supply of materials, and welfare of employees. He
was consulted by the senior duty engineer on technical problems concerning
the operation of the power station, but could not interfere with the decisions
of the engineer on technical matters.
Senior Duty Engineers: The senior duty engineers, the technical supervisors
of the power stations, controlled the operation of generators and control
boards through duty engineers and directed the minor repair of cables and
machines at the power stations through the repair workers' chiefs., The
testing technicians, who were under the direct control of the senior duty
engineers, performed various tests of machines and kept technical records.
The senior duty engineers acted for the power station chiefs in the latter's
absence.
Duty Engineers: The duty engineers operated the generators and control boards
and maintained the surge tanks. Working in three eight-hour shifts, they
controlled and supervised the operation of machines on instructions from the
power supply commander. Their control over the operation of machines was never
questioned by anyone except the senior duty engineer, who personally replaced
any duty engineers Vliom he considered to be incompetent.
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Planning Department: The planning department was charged with drawing up
various plans for production) labor distribution) fund appropriation, supply
of materials, and training of technicians. It was also.chargedCyith keeping
statistics on the accomplishment of thbse plans. In addition, it analyzed
the reasons for underfulfillment and practicability of plans, and in case
it found the plans inpractical it negotiated with the PIMB for readjustment:
Plans for power generation, consumption of power at the power plant, repair'
of equipment, production of machine parts, construction of various facilities,
labor wages, procurement of materials, payment of travel expenses, prize .-1
(or bonuses), repair expenses, increase or reduction of labor, and training of
skilled workers and technicians were included.
Materials Department: The materials department received the allotment of
materials from the Materials Management Bureau of the PIMB and transported
the materials from the Central Materials Management Station or Various
production factories to the power plant, and thence to individual power
stations. The department was also charged with transportation of all
materials and equipment within the power plant area.
Testing Department: The testing department made technical tests, repairs,
and adjustment of various gauges, relays, and Such high voltage equipment
as generators, transformers, disconnecting switches, oil circuit breakers1.--
expansion circuit breakers, potential transformers, current transformers
and others.
Signal Department: The signal department managed and repaired telephone
equipment and was charged with the operation and management of a switchboard,
equipped with approximately 20 Soviet carrier telephone sets,
which served as a central control point of the communication system for
power distribution in North Korea. The switchboard was equipped with three
or four circuits of local telephone lines connected to the Oro-up telephone
switchboard, a number of security telephone lines connected to the Oro-gun
Internal Affair Station and the Hamgyong-namdo Internal Affairs Department,
and a number of power supply telephone lines connected to the Central Power
Supply Division of the PIMB and to various power plants and power transmission
stations. This system enabled the Central Power Supply Division of the PIMB,
by means of carrier telephones, to contact all power plants in eastern North"
Korea through the power plant switchboatd. No restrictions were imposed on the
use of telephones within the plant but outgoing telephone calls were subject to
approval by the chief engineer.
Hydraulic Facilities Department: The hydraulic facilities department was
responsible for crutching work on such concrete structures as dam facilities,
water intake structures, surge tanks, and power station buildings by
periodically inspecting sinking and leaning rates as well as local ,damage
to concrete structures. In addition, the department was responsible for
new construction and major repairs on official. ..residences of the power plant.
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Technical Department: The technical department was responsible for the
technical affairs of the power plant) including the operation of Power'
Stations No. 1 through No. 5, the Pumping Station) Dams No. 1 and No. 2,
as well as the water intake equipment. The electric instructors provided
technical guidance on the handling of electric equipment and the machine
instructors provided technical guidance on the operation of various
machines. The hydraulic facility instructor inspected water conservation
measures and the condition of hydraulic facilities.
Power Supply Department: The power supply department controlled generation, . --
voltage, and transmission of power. It received instructions from the
Central Power Supply Division of the PIMB,for transmission of power generated
at the power plant, and relayed the instructions to various power plants on
the North Korea eastern coast. The members of the department were divided
into four teams, each consisting 'of a deputy commander and a worker who worked
in three eight-hour shifts. A team was always reserved for holidays and to
replace those on leave.
Electric and Machine Workshop: The electric and machine workshop repaired the
electric and machine equipment and produced simple machine parts. Under the
repair workers' chief were an electric repair team which repaired generators, '
transformers, potential transformers, current transformers, Oil circuit breakers)
and expansion circuit breakers, and a cable or wiring team which repaired
power transmission cables, 'steel towers, and power distribution cables. The
workshop, which also produced iron pipes, was equipped with about eight lathes,
one shaper, one hobbing machine, one planer, two drilling machines, one
bending rollerland forging equipment. The machine repair workers' chief; with
two work teams, three crane operators, and three welders under his control,
took care of major repairs of turbines, penstocks, and flood gate 'equipment.
The operational workers' chief, with one clerk and five designers under his
control, was responsible for the planning and guidance of work, supply of
materials, distribution of labor, designing of machines, and accounting for
costs of products turned out at the workshop.
Pumping Station: Dams No. 1 and No. 2 and the water intake points were
controlled by the chief of the Pumping Station.
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