EVALUATION OF THE ROLLING THUNDER CAMPAIGN AS PRESENTLY RESTRICTED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070049-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 29, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 April 1968
Evaluation of the Rolling Thunder Campaign
as Presently Restricted
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the effects of the
self-imposed US bombing restriction in North
Vietnam, which began on 31 March 1968, to targets
below the 19th Parallel. It also considers, as a
separate matter, the importance of North Vietnamese
facilities lying between the 19th and 20th Parallels.
In the areas north of the 19th Parallel, which
contain the main industrial and transportation
centers of North Vietnam, we have noted the follow-
ing during April:
1. Port activity at Haiphong
continued at a high level, with
exports up sharply and imports down
only slightly. The turnaround time
for vessels in port decreased signif-
icantly, probably as a direct result
of the bombing halt.
2. The restoration of damaged
key generating plants in the electric
power system and of the Haiphong
cement plant also continued. This
restoration work began earlier, and
no reconstruction of other industries
has been identified as having started
after 31 March.
JCS review completed.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and the Office of Current Intelligence and was
coordinated with the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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3. Key rail/highway bridges in
the Hanoi and Haiphong areas are
being repaired. Aerial photography,
although limited, shows that the
North Vietnamese are taking full
advantage of the bombing restrictions
to restore these key lines of com-
munication.
4. Manpower allocations appear
to be unchanged. We have no firm
evidence that additional workers are
being reassigned from the north to
help make repairs south of the 19th
Parallel. The preparation of air
raid shelters in Hanoi continues, and
the city remains partially evacuated.
South of the 19th Parallel, which is the North
Vietnamese Panhandle, an average of 218 Rolling
Thunder attack sorties were flown daily during
1-23 April against Route Packages I, II, and the
southern one-third of III. This was a substantial
increase over the first quarter attack rate.
During April, the following significant develop-
ments have been identified:
1. A substantially heavier move-
ment of materiel into and through the
Panhandle has taken place, despite the
heavier bombing attacks. This has been
a continuation of a trend in evidence
since early this year.
Pre im.inary
estimates based on one road watch team
place April truck traffic moving into
Laos as much as 40 percent above March.
2. An increase in the number of
antiaircraft guns in the Panhandle
has been reported by a number of
sources. However, there has been no
redeployment south of SAM battalions
or jet aircraft.
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3. The infiltration of personnel
continued an upward trend in evidence
since January. From 31 March through
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26 April an estimated 23,000 men ha
been noted
Political reactions to the US self-imposed
restriction on bombing have varied, with the
following highlights:
1. Hanoi has followed a dual
political strategy. It has attempted
to assure the continuation of the
restrictions while it presses for an
end to all the raids. Its desire to
see the restrictions continued can be
viewed in its cautious handling of
the diplomatic exchanges on selection
of a site for "contacts" with the
United States. In this diplomacy, it
has taken a stance which it apparently
hopes is sufficiently flexible to dis-
suade the United States from renewing
full-country air assaults. Meanwhile,
North Vietnamese propaganda has been
alleging that the United States is
conducting indiscriminate terrorist
raids against the populace south of
the 20th Parallel in an attempt to
build pressure for a complete US bomb-
ing cessation. Domestically, Hanoi
has tried to prevent a general let-
down by urging continued preparedness
and cautioning against the hope of an
early end to the war.
.2. Communist China has publicly
characterized the reduction in bomb-
ing as a "fraud" designed to "get
from the conference table what the
United States cannot get on the
battlefield." However, privately
the Chinese have preserved some
flexibility on the negotiating issue,
and Peking, while advising against
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negotiations, has also stated its
full diplomatic support, if Hanoi
decides to negotiate.
3. The USSR's leaders are cer-
tainly pleased with the bombing
limitation and Hanoi's response,
since they have long been seeking a
de-escalation. There is no indication
of the advice that Moscow has been
giving Hanoi in private in recent
weeks. Publicly, the USSR has been
urging a full halt to the bombing.
4. The general reaction of non-
Communist Asia and of Western European
governments has been favorable. French
reaction, while initially favorable,
was tempered by De Gaulle's reminder
that the pause, while important, was
"neither general nor unconditional."
The official position of France has
been a hope that preliminary talks
would lead to a total and unconditional
cessation of the bombing and then to
negotiations. On the other hand,
Singapore and Malaysia expressed some
apprehension about their future as a
result of the US limitation.
A change in the bombing program to move the
cut-off up to the 20th Parallel from the 19th
would not add major target opportunities at this
time. There are 80 miles of rail lines and more
than 150 miles of primary roads which contain
about a dozen bridges of target significance.
Thanh Hoa is the most important transshipment
point and staging base in the area, and more
active use of its facilities may now be under
way, although we have no hard evidence of this.
If evidence does show Hanoi to be making use of
the Thanh Hoa and other facilities just over the
19th Parallel as a major bomb-free staging area,
this region would then present lucrative targets.
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North Vietnam: Logistical Systems in Route Packages l,2 g 3
O Area of POL storage
? Other storage area
A Transshipment point
Road added or improved
since March, 1965
Route package boundary
Major inland waterway
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I. Activities North of the 19th Parallel
A. Haiphong Shipping
Preliminary data for April do not show any
significant change in the level of seaborne trade
to North Vietnam. A decline of 8 percent in ship
arrivals and a decline of 4 percent in imports,
below the monthly averages for the first quarter
of 1968, took place. A drop of 76 percent in
imports of fertilizer and an increase of 36 percent
in petroleum represented changes of ship loadings
that were decided upon well before 31 March.
Seaborne Imports to North Vietnam
Thousand Metric Tons
Commodity
Monthly Average
First Quarter
1968
Preliminary
April 1968
Foodstuffs
46.7
39.8
Fertilizer
18.3
4.3
POL
33.7
45.7
Timber
2.7
Miscellaneous
and general
51.3
56.7
Exports in April increased substantially over
the level of the first quarter of 1968. Coal ex-
ports were up 51 percent, probably as a result of
reduced congestion at the coal ports of Cam Pha
and Hon Gai.
Average layover times of ships departing
Haiphong improved considerably in April, dropping
to 23 days from 28 days in March. This improvement
probably is due to a decrease in unloading inter-
ruptions as a result of the virtual cessation of
air raid alerts in Haiphong. The volume of cargo
in open storage in Haiphong decreased sharply prior
to the bombing halt, and photography since that
time has not been sufficiently clear to permit a
reassessment of the volume of cargoes in open
storage.
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Since the bombing halt, there has been bolder
daylight activity by the North Vietnamese in
Haiphong. On two different occasions in April,
tracked prime movers were observed during daylight
hours moving antiaircraft guns near gun emplace-
ments in Haiphong. The moving of antiaircraft guns
into and out of emplacements has not previously been
observed in Haiphong, and in the past presumably
occurred at night.
The reappearance of the large Soviet-made suction
dredge ZemZesos No. 8, which has not been seen since
June 1966, was also observed. This vessel presuma-
bly has begun dredging the ship channel to remove
accumulated silt, which has limited the draft of
incoming ships since early 1967. The lack of dredg-
ing of the ship channel since mid-1966 probably re-
flected North Vietnam's unwillingness to risk US
air attacks on the dredge. Its reappearance
suggests Hanoi's confidence that the dredge can
operate without risk of attack.
B. Reconstruction
1. Industry
Reconstruction of industries now under
way in North Vietnam is a continuation of activity
begun late in 1967 and includes work on at least
six electric powerplants and on the important
Haiphong Cement Plant. No reconstruction of in-
dustries can be identified as having started after
31 March. General reconstruction of bomb damaged
industry is not likely to be undertaken until the
bombing halt gains some degree of permanence and
other priority repairs to major facilities on lines
of communication (LOC's) have been completed.
Repairs are currently being made to at
least six electric powerplants -- the Hanoi Thermal
Powerplant, Haiphong West, Viet Tri, Thai Nguyen,
Hon Gai, and Ben Thuy. Restoration of the heavily
damaged Haiphong West Powerplant was first noted
during March. About 40 percent of national installed
generating capacity is in operation, but, repairs
now under way could increase serviceable capacity
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to 60 percent within six months. Full restora-
tion of North Vietnam's electric generating
capacity will require up to two years.
The only major manufacturing plant known
to be undergoing repair is the Haiphong Cement Plant.
Repair work was first noted in March, and one kiln
was observed in operation on 23 April. The plant
could be operating at about 20 percent of capacity
within six months, although complete restoration
would take one to two years. Plants moderately dam-
aged -- the Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant and
the Viet Tri Paper Plant -- could be restored to full
operations within six months. The Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Complex and the Nam Dinh Textile Plant
probably would take one to two years to complete
restoration.
2. Transportation
Aerial photography, although limited,
shows that the North Vietnamese are taking full
advantage of the restricted bombing program to re-
pair their LOC's north of the 19th Parallel, prim-
arily in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.
Recent visitors to Hanoi report that
repair efforts are continuing on the Doumer Rail/
Highway Bridge. In addition, the completion of a
rail bypass bridge south of the Doumer Bridge pro-
vides a second bypass for rail traffic into and
south of the North Vietnamese capital. Aerial
photography showed that the 2,800-foot
bypass bridge was useable, but possibly only for
shuttling cars without locomotives. The rail ferry
bypass to the Doumer Bridge continues to be used.
Photography revealed about 200 pieces
of rolling stock and six locomotives near the ferry.
Photography) (showed that the
Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge was operational
for rail traffic. Photography
showed this structure to be severely damaged, with
some 200 feet of the 295-foot bridge in the water.
The repair of this key bridge will greatly ease the
problem of clearing seaborne imports from Haiphong.
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C. Manpower
There have been no discernible changes
since 31 March in the tasks assigned to the
civilian and war-related labor force. A partial
cessation of the bombing would not be expected
to bring an immediate release of the estimated
200,000 full-time workers diverted to repair work
and to moving supplies. Months of repair work re-
main as well as the threat of a resumption of the
bombing.
A large number of the part-time workers on
civil and air defense and on LOC's probably have
had a welcomed respite from their extra labors.
However, even earlier there had been a considerable
respite because of the lessening of US air attacks
against the northern areas. There is no firm evi-
dence that additional laborers have been sent south
to work on the LOC's in the southern route packages.
An observer wrote in early April that the
people of Hanoi were relieved by the recent peace
overtures but that life continued much unchanged.
Air raid shelters were still being dug and workers
still journeyed to the country on Sunday to visit
their children.
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II. South of the 19th Parallel
A. Scale of Attack Since 31 March
During the period 1 through 23 April 1968,
an average of 218 Rolling Thunder attack sorties per
day were flown against targets below the 19th Parallel
in Route Packages I, II, and the southern one-third
of III. This rate of attack is the same as the
number of attack sorties per day flown over all of
Route Packages I, II, and III during April 1967,
but is only about three-fourths the rate throughout
North Vietnam during this month of 1967. Attacks
in April represent a substantial increase over the
average of 162 attack sorties per day flown through-
out North Vietnam during the first quarter of 1968.
Attack sorties flown over the Panhandle and through-
out North Vietnam during the first quarter and April
of 1967 and 1968 are given in the following tabulation:
Route Packages
Route Packages
I Through VI and
I, II,
and III
the Buffer Zone
1967
1968
1967
1968
January-March
Attack Sorties per Day
170
123
226
162
Total Attack Sorties
15, 430
11, 160
20.9550
14,730
April
Attack Sorties per Day
221
218 a/
299
220 a/
Total Attack Sorties
6,620
5,0290 a/
8, 960
5, 050 a/
a. Number flown during 1-23 April 1968.
B. Air Defenses
Since 1 April, there have been indications
of an augmentation of antiaircraft artillery in the
Panhandle south of Thanh Hoa. There is no evidence
of an increase in the number of SAM battalions in
the southern area or of a return of significant
numbers of jet aircraft to indigenous airfields.
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A number of sources indicate an increase of
antiaircraft artillery guns in the area currently
subject to bombing. Pilots flying armed reconnaissance
missions south of the 19th Parallel have reported
experiencing increasingly heavy around fire since
1 Apri 1.
photography have shown an
increase in the number of trucks traveling south
towing antiaircraft artillery.
There is no firm evidence of a shift in the
deployment of SAM battalions. Two active units con-
tinue to operate near Thanh Hoa, two or possibly
three in the Vinh area, and two or possibly three
in the area immediately north of the DMZ. Construction
and activation of new sites continues in the northern
portion of the country as well as in the south, with
no discernible increase in the south.
No significant redeployment of jet aircraft
to North Vietnamese airfields from Chinese fields has
been noted. Four MIG-21's have been redeployed to
North Vietnam from China since 1 April, increasing
the number of MIG-21's in North Vietnam to 12. The
North Vietnamese have increased the number of IL-28's
based in North Vietnam to four, an increase of two.
These movements are not believed to be a direct
response to the partial bombing halt. A deployment
of MIG-17's to China began prior to the announced
bombing halt.
C. Movement of Supplies
South of the 19th Parallel, the average
daily sightings of motor vehicles for the period
since 31 March has been 60 percent greater than the
average daily figure recorded during the first quarter
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of 1968. Weather has also improved, however, and
there has been a substantial increase in the number
of attack sorties flown in Route Packages I, II, and
III since 31 March.
The increased motor vehicle activity
observed has been concentrated along coastal Route
1A and Routes 82, 15, 151, and 101, with the heaviest
traffic noted on 15, 151, and 101 near Bai Duc Thon
and the Mu Gia Pass. During the night of 18 April,
pilots reported seeing more than 200 trucks on Route
15 near Bai Duc Thon moving south toward the Laotian
border. Even while under attack, these vehicles
kept moving with their headlights on. Large numbers
of trucks are continuing to flow through this area
toward Laos.
Aerial attacks over the Panhandle of North
Vietnam have increased the number of trucks destroyed
and damaged. During the first three weeks of April,
effective vehicle losses have averaged 63 per week,
compared with only 37 per week during the first
quarter of 1968.
Significant increases in water craft
activity south of the 19th Parallel have been observed
in April by pilots and by photography. The number
of water craft counted by pilots during 1-21 April
was more than double the number counted in March.
Even more significant is evidence that large barges
and coastal craft are again being used in the
southern part of North Vietnam. A field readout of
a daylight photographic mission of 22 April revealed
not only an unusually large number of small craft
on the Song Ca River near Vinh but eight coastal
vessels of 100-ton capacity each, three barges of
300-ton capacity, and two LCM's of 40-ton capacity.
In total, the craft observed from the mouth of the
river to a point 15 nautical miles upstream had an
estimated carrying capacity of more than 4,300 tons.
Such numbers and sizes of craft have not been
observed in this area previously except during the
Tet standdown of over a year ago. The smaller craft
were being used to transship further south on the
coastal route leading towards Mu Gia Pass.
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E. Truck Traffic into Laos
Truck traffic moving from North Vietnam into
Laos has increased further in April over the high
level of earlier months. Although the data are
preliminary and the basis of comparison has shifted
from one road watch team to another, it appears that
the increase in traffic in April could be as much
as 40 percent above the March level. If each south-
bound truck carried 3 tons of supplies, this traffic
could have delivered about 260 tons a day into Laos
during March, compared with 230 tons a day in January
and February and 95 tons a day during the last quarter
of 1967. A 40-percent-increase in April would raise
the deliveries to more than 350 tons a day.* There
are indications, however, that some of the trucks
moving south in recent months have carried troops
instead of cargo.
* Reporting during about 22 days of ApriZ from a
team Located on Route 912 for the first time in over
a year indicates that [footnote continued on p./4].
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F. Infiltration of Personnel
Since 31 March, infiltration of personnel
has continued at the accelerated pace that has pre-
vailed since January.
Limited collateral evidence suggests
increased infiltration/logistic movements, but this
is from the period before the bombing halt in the
north. A prisoner of war claimed that his unit was
trucked from an area just south of Hanoi to Kontum
Province in about 11 days during February.
mobilization of
civilians into labor units for porter duties was
under way in at least Lai Chau and Son La Provinces
in northwest North Vietnam. Finally, an editorial
of 24 March in the official North Vietnamese press
called for increased mobilization of the army and
people.
traffic on this second major access route may not
have been as high since the beginning of 1968 as
has been estimated. Even though the tonnage
delivered into Laos may not have increased to 350
tons a day in April, there is ample evidence that
the total traffic into-Laos has been increasing
throughout this dry season.
Furthermore, traffic during April is normally
the highest of any month of the year, as preparations
are being made for the rainy season that usually
begins in May.
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Hanoi has followed a dual political strategy
since the bombing was restricted. It has attempted
to assure the continuation of the limitation now
in force while pressing for a total end to the
air attacks. It has thus maneuvered very care-
fully in its diplomacy concerning the opening of
"contacts" on the war with the United States.
Hanoi has taken a stance which it apparently hopes
is sufficiently forthcoming to prevent the United
States from renewing full country air assaults,
but which will eventually enable North Vietnam to
gain the psychological advantage of naming the
site for the talks.
Meanwhile Hanoi has been keeping up the
pressure for a full halt in bombing. Regime
propaganda has been steadily alleging that the
United States is conducting an intense campaign
of terror attacks against the populace south of
the 20th Parallel. At the same time, in political
contacts with the Free World states, the North
Vietnamese are requesting diplomatic pressure on
Washington to end the bombing. On occasion, Hanoi
has claimed that the United States has bombed
locations north of the 20th Parallel -- apparently
to lay a basis for claims of US "treachery" and
"deception." Hanoi has not, however, attempted
to make a major issue of these latter claims.
Domestically, some propaganda in North
Vietnam has urged continued preparedness despite
the bombing restrictions and has cautioned against
hoping for an early end to the war. The Communists
doubtless believe they will face some letdown
in effort by their armed forces and populace if
the lull continues and are apparently trying to
head it off with an exhortatory campaign. Western
observers who have been in Hanoi since the limited
bombing halt went into effect have reported that
the mood of the city has changed and become much
lighter. Children have been noted in greater
numbers. Night activity, including repair work,
is carried on at a greater pace. Some facilities
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which have been damaged for several months are now
being repaired.
There has been little in the regime's
propaganda stressing the necessity of greater
efforts at transportation in the areas covered
by the restrictions. Such a campaign could be
carried out at the local level, however, and would
not necessarily be reflected in overt regime
propaganda obtained by the United States.
B. Communist China
The Chinese Communists have avoided
comment on Hanoi's 3 April offer to hold "contacts"
with US representatives to establish a date for
a complete cessation of bombing. They have con-
centrated instead on trying to discredit the
President's speech as a "big fraud" aimed at
masking an expansion of the war. In the most
recent statement on the subject, Foreign Minister
Chen Yi on 26 April characterized the reduction
in bombing as a "fraud" designed to "get from
the conference table what the US cannot get on
the battlefield." He professed confidence that
the Vietnamese people understand that without
military victory "it is impossible to solve any
question."
Despite this adamant line, the Chinese
have been careful to preserve some flexibility
on the negotiations issue. They have privately
stated in recent months that although Peking has
advised the Vietnamese Communists to avoid negotia-
tions, China would give Hanoi its full diplomatic
support if it elects to proceed with talks.
Soviet reaction to the President's 31 March
speech was skeptical and deprecatory until Hanoi's
3 April reaction, after which Soviet propaganda
quickly got into line with Hanoi's own.
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Soviet leaders are certainly pleased with the
bombing limitation and Hanoi's response, since
they have long been seeking a de-escalation. There
is no indication at this time what, if any, advice
they have been giving Hanoi in private. Soviet
media, however, have been pressing for the exten-
sion of the bombing halt to the whole of North
Vietnam and stressing that the onus for further
de-escalation rests on the United States. Speaking
in Rawalpindi on 17 April, Kosygin reiterated that
the complete cessation of bombing and all acts of
war against North Vietnam was "the first necessary
step" toward a political settlement and the "mini-
mum demand" to be met. This position has also
been expressed by Soviet officials in private
conversations and is a line echoed by East European
countries as well.
D. Western Europe
In general, all of Western Europe welcomed
the curtailment of the bombing as a long overdue
move.
1. United Kingdom
Recent British reaction to Vietnam
developments has focused on the dispute over a
site for peace talks. Little has been said lately
about the bombing pause.
2. Canada
Since their initial favorable reactions
to the President's curtailment of the bombing,
Canadian officials have made few public comments.
3. West Germany
German opinion continues strongly to
approve the bombing restrictions instituted by
the United States and the bid for talks, but these
developments have in recent weeks been overshadowed
by Germany's own domestic problems, such as the
student-led disorders and East German harassment
of access routes to West Berlin.
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4. Scandinavia
The bombing restrictions and the
possibility of talks have kept some of the
opposition pressure off of the governments, but,
on the other end of the spectrum, it has not
prevented pro-North Vietnam elements from con-
ducting their public protest activities.
5. Italy
The Italian reaction to the President's
decision to reduce bombing was overwhelmingly
favorable.
Prime Minister Moro on 1 April spoke
of the 31 March speech as directed toward the
conditions for beginning negotiations on Vietnam,
"as was so desired by public opinion. It shows
the good will of the American people and government."
Initially, the French public, press,
and unofficial government reaction to President
Johnson's announcement of a bombing halt and call
for negotiations was favorable.
Some dissatisfaction with the limita-
tions the United States imposed on the bombing
pause was reflected in De Gaulle's reminder that
the pause, while important, was "neither general
nor unconditional" -- conditions which Hanoi had
strongly emphasized. A later public statement
reflecting the official position of the French
government made explicit the hope that any pre-
liminary talks would lead to a total and uncon-
ditional cessation of the bombing and then to
negotiations.
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IV. Targets Between the 19th and 20th Parallels
The North Vietnamese Panhandle between the 19th
and 20th Parallels serves primarily as the wide end
of a funnel through which men and supplies move to
the southern part of North Vietnam, the Laotian Pan-
handle, and northern South Vietnam. Main supply
lines through the area include the Hanoi-Vinh rail-
road, highway Routes lA and 15, the inland waterway
between Thanh Hoa and Vinh, and the coastal waterway
to the area of Vinh. Lifting bombing restrictions
from the 19th Parallel to the 20th Parallel would
permit attacks against about 80 miles of rail line
and more than 150 miles of primary road. In addition,
inland and coastal watercraft in the area could be
struck. The more important LOC's and other targets
are listed in the tabulation below. There are also
numerous other rail and highway bridges, fords and
ferries, transshipment points, truck parks, and
dispersed supply and storage areas.
Most fixed military targets in the area such as
barracks and ammunition depots are inactive, the men
and supplies having been dispersed. The unfinished
Bai Thuong Airfield probably can be made serviceable
for limited jet operations in about two months, with
uninterrupted construction.
Attacking the targets between the 19th and 20th
Parallels would hinder but not seriously impede the
movement of supplies to the south. The North Viet-
namese constructed several bypass facilities for al-
most all of the important rail and highway bridges
throughout the area before bombing restrictions were
imposed. Even when the rail line was under heavy
attack, the North Vietnamese tried to keep the line
repaired for through rail service at least as far
south as Thanh Hoa and used rail shuttle service
on major segments on the rest of the line.
Other than the major LOC's, Thanh Hoa is the
most important target area between the 19th and 20th
Parallels and has been used as a major staging and
transshipping area in the past. The Ham Rong Trans-
shipment Points East and West, in the vicinity of
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JCS
Number
Dong Phong Thuong RR/Hwy Bridge
Dong Phong Thuong Hwy Bridge on Route 1A
Trinh Ha Hwy Bridge on Route 1A
Thanh Hoa RR/Hwy Bridge
Phuong Dinh Hwy Bridge on Route 1A
Thanh Hoa Hwy Bridge on Route 1A
Qui My Hwy Bridge and Qui My Hwy Bridge South
Dai Thuy RR Bridges Nos. 1, 2, and 3
Qui Vinh RR Bridge No. 1
Dong Khe RR/Hwy Bridge
Dong Khe RR Bridge
Ly Nhan Hwy Bridge on Route 1A
Ham Rong Transshipment Points East and West
Tu My Transshipment Point
Thanh Hoa Rail Facilities
Bai Thuong Airfield
Thanh Hoa/My Duc Radar Site
Ban Thach Hydro Powerplant
Thanh Hoa Thermal Powerplant
25X5
Location
19 59N/105 51E
19 58N/105 50E
19 54N/105 49E
19 50N/105 48E
19 50N/105 48E
19 45N/105 46E
19 24N/105 45E
19 22N/105 43E
19 16N/105 41E
19 04N/105 35E
19 04N/105 35E
19 OON/105 36E
19 50N/105 48E
19 01N/105 35E
19 48N/105 46E
19 49N/105 23E
19 53N/105 57E
19 54N/105 32E
19 50N/105 47E
Thanh Hoa, have at least 80 percent of their capaci-
ty remaining active. The area is served by the Thanh
Hoa Thermal Powerplant (with five megawatts capacity)
and the Ban Thach Hydro Powerplant (with one mega-
watt capacity). The Thanh Hoa plant is now operating
at about one-half capacity and the Ban Thach plant at
full capacity. One of the more important radar sites in
the area is at Thanh Hoa/My Duc, which has at least
one-third of its capacity remaining. Heavy attacks
have been made against these targets in the Thanh Hoa
area in the past without extracting a prohibitive
price from the North Vietnamese.
Although a complete assessment is not possible
because of the limited information, the value of the
area between the 19th and 20th Parallels as a staging
area probably has increased since the restrictions on
the bombing. Increased use is probably being made
of facilities at Thanh Hoa. In addition the expansion
and greater use of truck parks and dispersed storage
and supply areas just north of the 19th Parallel may
be in process. The distance is so short from the
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19th Parallel to Vinh that high speed coastal
craft can now make the run to Vinh and return under
cover of darkness.
If the North Vietnamese exploit the area between
the 19th and 20th Parallels as a major staging area
for a continued upsurge of materials to the south,
the area could present lucrative targets.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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