SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1961
• Content Type: SNIE

Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
AUG 1961
SNIE 11-10-61
24 August 1961
4109
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-10-61
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 24 August 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) , Department of
the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Di-
rector of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstainield.ut,..:,uh&sNurbi,10.
CCHANGEIN CLASS. II
ject being outside of their jurisdictio _
nNu.,
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
iN,t JETC7H.:REFIVI_E, A DATE:
o'
DATE;
REVIEWEFG
N? 372
cepc-i Eji
-- Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on
a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the
following officials within their respective departments.
a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
c. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) , for the Department of
the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
h. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for the Department
of Defense
i. Director of NSA for the National Security Agency
j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or
Agency
2. This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement
with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it
for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested
of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
DISTRIBUTION:
White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
4100
SOVIET TACTICS IN THE BERLIN CRISIS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet tactics in the Berlin crisis over the next few months, with
particular reference to the effect on these tactics of possible developments within
East Germany.
THE ESTIMATE
1. With the action of 13 August, the Com-
munists have taken a long step toward their
objectives in Berlin and have created a new
political situation there. The border controls
instituted on that date have met East Ger-
many's most pressing need by reducing the
refugee flow to tolerable proportions. At the
same time, the division of Berlin into two
separate cities has been made virtually com-
plete, with the eastern portion all but in-
corporated into the GDR. Thus the Soviets,
induced by the rising tide of refugees, have
taken unilateral action to achieve results
which they had intended to accomplish at a
later date, and by different means.
2. The refugee question, however, was only
one aspect of the larger problem of stabilizing
the GDR, and the closing of the Berlin escape
route may worsen other aspects if it leads to
a further buildup of tensions within East Ger-
many. Even apart from this, the stemming
of the refugee flow will not change the USSR's
view of the necessity to bolster the GDR's
claims to sovereignty with a peace treaty and
eventually to eject Western influence from
Berlin altogether. We do not believe that the
USSR has given up its intention to press for
a peace treaty and a "free city." The question
is whether the Soviet leaders will accelerate
their movement towards these objectives, or
will moderate their pace after their consider-
able achievements of 13 August.
3. The action in Berlin has initiated a mo-
mentum which the Soviets may wish to sus-
tain. A wide variety of further unilateral
measures is available to them. The termina-
tion of military liaison missions would be a
relatively low-keyed act which might appear
to the Soviets as a means of keeping events
moving in their favor.' Another option
would be to deny Allied rights to enter East
Berlin, thereby carrying to its conclusion the
destruction of the four-power status of that
part of the city. More drastically, the East
Germans might disrupt or harass civil traffic
between West Berlin and the Federal Re-
public; most dangerous of all, interference
with Allied access might begin. Politically,
the USSR might choose to accelerate the
timing of a peace conference and a separate
treaty with the GDR.
4. Another factor which could importantly
affect the USSR's timing and tactics is the
increasing involvement of Soviet prestige.
Khrushchev in recent weeks has reacted to
the stiffening US attitude by increasing his
commitment to early action. He now asserts
that the issue transcends the problems of
Germany and Berlin, important as these re-
Under the occupation, the US, French, and
British forces in West Germany presently have
military missions accredited to the Soviet Com-
mander in East Germany, who in turn has missions
to the three Allied Commanders.
gik:AN*
1
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
4.
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
main, and that the West's refusal to conclude a
peace treaty represents an attempt to achieve
a "strategic breakthrough" against the Bloc.
In claiming a challenge to Soviet power and
prestige, he wishes to convey to his opponents
that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to
draw back from crisis situations in which rea-
son and prudence would appear to dictate re-
straint. He might decide to take new steps
on Berlin which would strengthen the image
of inflexible resolve.
5. In our recent estimates of the USSR's policy
toward Germany and Berlin, we have regularly
attributed to the Soviet leaders a confidence
that they can move gradually toward their
eventual objectives without incurring unac-
ceptable risks. We have pointed to their be-
lief that the West could probably be induced
to make negotiated concessions. And we
have further estimated that, if these Soviet
expectations are not borne out, the USSR will
move unilaterally, but still intending to pro-
ceed in such a way as to avoid at any stage
unduly high risks of war.2
6. We believe that Soviet actions in the re-
cent phase of the Berlin crisis do not indi-
cate that the USSR has departed from this
general approach and method. Thus we con-
clude that the Soviets' present intention
probably is not to take further drastic ac-
tion immediately, though they may undertake
measures of limited scope. For example, they
will probably further restrict German civil and
Allied access to East Berlin, and they may
embark upon a program of gradual harass-
ments of German civil traffic to West Berlin.
But rather than pose a major challenge to
West Berlin itself and the Allied position
there, we believe that their present preference
is to let the effects of the border closure sink
in and see whether the Western Powers have
2Our principal estimates on Soviet policy with
respect to Berlin and Germany are NIE 11-4-60,
"Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies,
1960-1965," dated 1 December 1960, paragraphs 161-
164, TOP SECRET; NIE 11-7-61, "Soviet Short-Term
Intentions Regarding Berlin and Germany," dated
25 April 1961, SECRET; and SNIE 2-2-61, "Soviet
and Other Reactions to Possible US Courses of Ac-
tion with Respect to Berlin," dated 11 July 1961,
TOP SECRET, Limited Distribution.
2
become more inclined to accept Soviet terms
of negotiations.
7. In the absence of fairly definite proposals
by the West, we think it unlikely that Khru-
shchev will take the initiative in formally
proposing a date and other specifics for East-
West negotiations. He clearly wishes to ap-
pear as the champion of negotiations, and he
may throw out hints, in an effort to encour-
age a Western proposal, that the USSR could
be persuaded to reduce its demands if a con-
ference were arranged. If presented with
a Western invitation, he would respond favor-
ably but would undoubtedly attempt to define
the task of the conference in a fashion which
served Soviet interests. If the negotiations
were in train toward the end of the year, he
would probably postpone his deadline for a
treaty. If negotiations do not materialize, we
believe that the next Soviet step will be to
issue invitations to their own peace confer-
ence, probably accompanied by a revised draft
of a treaty applicable to both German states
and providing for the declaration of a "free
city" status for West Berlin. We think under
these circumstances that the chances are still
considerably better than even that the treaty
would not be signed before the Party Congress
which convenes on 17 October.
Effect of Developments in East Germany
8. Soviet tactics will be affected by a large
number of factors, including the posture
adopted by the West, the movement of opin-
ion in the important uncommitted countries,
and domestic developments in East Germany.
We have recently examined the possibility that
serious unrest might arise in East Germany
and have concluded that, under most circum-
stances, a major eruption is unlikely;3 here
we consider how popular disturbances or an
uprising might affect Soviet tactics.
9. The Soviet leaders evidently are confident
of their capability for keeping discontent in
check and repressing any outbreaks which
might occur. If they came to feel that the
chances of a general rising were becoming
SNIE 12.4-61, "Stability of East Germany in a
Berlin Crisis," dated 15 August 1961, SECRET.
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
substantial, their main domestic efforts would
probably be in the direction of menace and
intimidation. They would alert and deploy
their own forces in East Germany, as well as
those of the GDR, and the public would be
warned of the regime's determination to re-
act with speed and vigor to hostile manifesta-
tions. Additionally, they would probably
make available additional supplies of con-
sumer goods in order to relieve economic
shortages.
10. Popular dissatisfaction with internal po-
litical and economic conditions would be the
basic cause of mass unrest. However, the
Communist efforts to consolidate the GDR
as a separate German state by isolating it
from further contact with the West, combined
with the international tension generated by
Communist pressures against West Berlin,
are adding to popular unrest. Thus, there is
a relationship between the degree of unrest
in East Germany and Moscow's pursuit of its
policies aimed at neutralizing West Berlin and
fixing the division of Germany, particularly
since the 13 August action has deprived the
East German regime of a safety valve.
11. Even so, we see little chance that the
USSR, if it believed that an East German ris-
ing was likely, would respond by altering its
3
principal aims or policies with respect to Ber-
lin. While it is possible that the Soviets
might temporarily modify their tactics or ex-
tend their timing to reduce the likelihood of
a serious German uprising, we think it un-
likely that such a Soviet response would be
either very significant or lasting. Moreover,
we believe that it would be next to impossible
to convince the USSR, the GDR, or the East
German people that the West intended or had
the capability to support widespread anti-
regime activities.
12. We believe that the Communists will act
speedily and firmly in meeting evidences of
public disorder, if these actually develop, in
East Germany in the months ahead. If an
uprising should occur, they would regard
themselves as having no other choice than to
put it down, despite the cost to their position
and the danger of Western involvement. In
the wake of such a repression, the Soviets
might accelerate their moves toward a sepa-
rate peace treaty, believing that it was un-
profitable to spend further time in cultivating
world opinion or waiting for East-West talks,
and that an early treaty would start the proc-
ess of rebuilding East German sovereignty
and authority.
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8
- Declassified and Approved For Release @50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP79R01012A017900070001-8