NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01079R000200250001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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uirecior or / I %PLO 1011C1214C-1,_
-, Central
. #J Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
29 August 1987
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----reirSeeret?
("PAS 147-9112.1X
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Contents
Philippines: Implications of Coup Attempt
South Korea: Prospects for Bipartisan Compromise
Western Europe: Acclaiming Central American Accord 4
Notes
El Salvador: Insurgents Propose Cease-Fire
Haiti: Political Activity of Leftist Priests
Mauritius: Close Election Expected 7
Peru: Terrorism Intensifies 8
Colombia: Increase in Political Killings 8
Mozambique: Refugee Repatriation 9
Sudan: New Group Joins Insurgents 9
In Brief
10
Special Analyses
Israel: Compromise on Lavi Likely 11
Thailand-Burma-India: Limited Antidrug Progress 14
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PHILIPPINES:
Implications of Coup Attempt
The immediate threat to the Philippine Government posed by the
abortive coup appears over, but President Aquino must now find
a way to reunite her military and restore her political prestige;
although she is likely to deal harshly with the rebel soldiers, she
may also make some concessions to their demands, such as the
removal of armed forces Chief of Staff Ramos.
Most rebel troops in Manila have surrendered or escaped, and leader
Col. Gregorio Honasan and several hundred of his supporters may
have slipped out of the city, according to US Embassy and press
reportin . Pockets of resistance remain in the countryside, however.
Comment: This coup attempt demonstrates again that the military's
dissatisfaction with the Aquino government runs deep and is a serious
threat to stability. The attempt will undoubtedly further increase
distrust between civilian and military leaders, complicating Manila's
efforts to defeat the Communist insurgency, revive the economy, and
develop democratic political institutions.
Aquino will have to maneuver carefully to reassert her authority over
the armed forces without antagonizing them. Apparently outraged by
the violent revolt?her only son was wounded in the attack on the
presidential palace?Aquino will probably demand that the coup
plotters be punished severely.
Some of her advisers are likely to recommend that she take steps
to address the rebels' concerns, which include the alleged
mismanagement and weak leadership of Chief of Staff Ramos.
Although Ramos helped quell the revolt, Aquino may decide he is
more of a liability than an asset and offer him some other government
post?a move that could stimulate further rebel demands.
The coup attempt is almost certain to prompt Aquino's political allies
and foes alike to reassess their positions. By damaging her prestige
and possibly weakening her popularity, the attempt is likely to make it
more difficult for her to persuade supporters in the Congress to push
her policy agenda, and it gives her opponents ammunition with which
to attack her leadership
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SOUTH KOREA: Prospects for Bipartisan Compromise
The ruling party and the main opposition party appear ready to
compromise on constitutional revision next week, while the
government is preparing to get tough with "leftists?' 25X1
diate-qu-d.
Both sides are claiming that the few remaining sticking points will be
resolved when ruling-party President Roh Tae Woo and opposition
leader Kim Young Sam meet onNee?10 Party representatives _I
hinting they have struck a backroom deal. - e ? Ihe
ruling party will concede its demand for a five-year residency
------fi or presidential candidates; government critics claimed it
could have blocked a presidential bid by Kim Dae Jung. The
opposition has said it is shelving demands for a vice-presidency and a
four-year, two-term presidency. 25X1
Key issues remaining are lowering the voting age?now 20?and
including an explicit guarantee in the constitution's preamble?that
the military will not intervene in politics?both are opposition
demands.
?Kim Ywirlg Sam and Kim Dae
Jung .h agreed to hurry efforts at compromise. The Kims continue
to battle, however, over the critical issue of who will be the party's
standard bearer. Kim Dae Jung's faction declared for the first time
this week that he must be the candidate.
ep(07.8auj r?I?
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kim Chung Yul announced on
that the government was investigating as many as 1,600 "leftist"
dissidents. Police, resumed tough tactics yesterday, including liberal
use of tear gas, against protesters who ignored a nationwide
government ban against rallies coinciding with the funeral of a striking
worker killed accidentally by police this month.
Comment: Pressure from hardliners in both camps could complicate
the talks onjMotteley. With Kim Dae Jung's supporters pressing his
3/014"?' candidacy, Kim Young Sam may be reluctant to compromise, fearing
it would open him to criticism. Roh is already under attack from
government hardliners who blame labor unrest on his reform
proposals and may find his maneuvering room limited if Kim hangs
tough
Roh and Kim Young Sam nonetheless share an interest in
compromising on the constitution. Roh needs progress to justify his
initiative to reopen dialogue with the opposition. Kim surely
recognizes that a failure to compromise will frustrate the public, bring
more protests, and perhaps even prompt a crackdown that could
extend to the opposition party itself. In any case, an agreement is not
likely to keep hardline radicals off the streets this fall.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Acclaiming Central American Accord
Most West European governments, as well as the EC, have
applauded the Central American peace accord as the best hope
for securing a regional peace, but they remain skeptical about
Nicaragua's commitment to democratization and Washington's
readiness to pursue a diplomatic solution.
Managua's acceptance of the plan has not diminished growing
West European disenchantment with the Sandinistas, and several
governments and parties are moving to test Managua's commitment
to reform. Bonn, for example, has protested the recent arrest of
human rights activists to spotlight the issue of civil liberties. The
Brussels-based Christian Democratic International, meanwhile, is
holding a meeting in Managua next month and plans to give new
financial aid to its Nicaraguan affiliate, the Social Christian Party.
The West European press has portrayed recent US initiatives as a
tactical move designed to secure greater funding for the Nicaraguan
insurgents. Some British officials are concerned that Ambassador
Habib's resignation signals a lack of US commitment to a diplomatic
solution, according to US Embassy reporting
Comment: Despite their skepticism, the West Europeans see the
peace agreement as a useful test of Managua's intentions. Most are
likely to urge Washington to cut off aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents
to avoid giving Managua a pretext for noncompliance and to undercut
Sandinista efforts to solicit international sympathy and assistance.
Still, most West European governments are unlikely to press the US
too hard on the insurgent issue, particularly when they are focused on
an imminent INF accord and events in the Persian Gulf?issues of
much greater importance to them.
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EL SALVADOR: Insurgents Propose Cease-Fire
A communique from the Salvadoran insurgents proposing a one-
week cease-fire to begin on 12 September is an attempt to regain the
political initiative lost after the signing of the Central American peace
accord. The insurgents also reiterated their willingness to engage in
peace negotiations on 15 September, the date proposed by President
Duarte.
Comment: There is no indication that Duarte intends to back away
from his demand that, as a precondition to negotiations, the guerrillas
meet a 30 August deadline to accept the accord. Duarte is likely to
counter the proposal by making public plans to implement a cease-
fire of indefinite duration, hoping the guerrillas will reject his offer and
be seen as obstructing the peace effort.
HAITI: Political Activity of Leftist Priests
Radical Catholic priests in Haiti are increasingly involved in
antigovernment activities and are undermining Church authority.
the most prominent radical cleric,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, has called for the violent overthrow of the
ruling council and denounced elections scheduled for November
'call-fatten
laishop-reeen -a-Haitiart-Gernmuniet-leader-in-lebbying-the
ifideperident-eleGtevel-comntssion-net-te-hold-alections-thtsrssIts
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to-FeveneitsedMiSIMinMitlerhiffiTatmf-Per4--att-Prineer
9ther leftists priests have publicly criticized their
moderate superiors. -6ast-Sundayr-the-Embassy-eagAristide and
several other priests were attacked and in'ured by peasants in a town
north of the capital.
/bat
Comment: By successfully cha lenging more moderate Church
leaders, leftists are making it increasingly unlikely that the Church will
be able to facilitate a democratic transition. Although it is unclear why
the radical priests were attacked last weekend, leftists are blaming
the incident on the discredited council and the Army?a charge many
Haitians will readily accept.
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MAURITIUS: Close Election Expected
(PC.36
The Mauritian parliamentary election' will be close, with the
incumbent Alliance likely to emerge with a slim majority.
A recent independent public opinion poll shows
the Alliance?led by Prime Minister Jugnauth?slightly ahead
because it has presided over a four-year economic boom,51ceeird+rig-
to-t4e-US-Errtbasa The opposition Mauritian Militant Movement has
tried to parlay corruption charges against former overnment officials
into support for its candidate, Prem Nababsing.
kadiGates414 the Movement also hopes, by running Nababsing?a
member of the Hindu majority community?to offset Jugnauth's
Hindu advantage.
Comment: An Alliance victory would bring little change to Mauritian
policy. Jugnauth would continue to soft-pedal Mauritian claims to
Diego Garcia to maintain good relations with the US'. The opposition's
effort to win Hindu votes is unlikely to reverse the perception that the
Movement's General Secretary Paul Berenger, of European descent,
would dominate a Nababsing-led government. If the opposition
nonetheless won, it would favor closer diplomatic ties to the USSR
and increased pressure for Mauritian control of Diego Garcia.
7
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PERU: Terrorism Intensifies
Peru's second-largest terrorist group, the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement, has increased attacks against high-profile
targets in Lima, suggesting a change to more violent tactics.
Antiterrorist police have arrested an important commander and a
large number of the Movement's members, including a squad
responsible for the renade attack on 5 Au ust a ainst the
presidential palace
Police
also attribute car bombs over the last few days?targeted at an Army
garrison, the Sheraton Hotel, and the offices of Citibank?to the
group.
Comment: In the past, the Movement has worked at night and tried to
avoid killing anyone, but recent attacks have occurred during daylight
hours and have produced a large number of casualties. Because the
group frequently targets US installations, a change in tactics could
mean greater danger for US personnel. Although government forces
have scored some intelligence successes against the group, the
steady level of its activity indicates that the personnel and weapons
lost have not set the terrorists back operationally.
COLOMBIA: Increase in Political Killings
(Mt-09,56turt
The murders'T-ttestley o three prominent Colombian leftists?two
educators and a labor leader?have provoked widespread student-
teacher demonstrations and led to renewed charges that rightwing
death squads are operating in Colombia. All three victims were shot in
Medellin, a city known for narcotics trafficking and violent crime,
where 11 university students and faculty members have been killed
during the past two months. Some 40 to 50 other
been murdered throughout the country over the past year.
leftist activists have
Comment: Colombia has grappled with the issue of paramilitary
violence since the early 1980s, when the emergence of a death squad
funded by drug traffickers prompted an investigation and a
condemnation by Bogota. The Defense Ministry's recent authorization
of civilian self-defense groups is adding to concerns about increasing
political violence throughout the country. Some political killings have
been attributed to guerrillas, but continued attacks on leftist leaders
will fuel charges that President Barco is losing control over
Colombia's deteriorating internal security situation.
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MOZAMBIQUE: Refugee Repatriation48.414'r. 1-44?114"425X1
Mozambique is cooperating in the repatriation ofIE-weefof its
refugees whose presence in several neighboring countries has fueled
growing security concerns in the region. Police and Army units have
expelled more than 7,000 of the 70,000 Mozambican refugees in
Zimbabwe, some of whom may be sympathizers of the RENAMO
insurgents,,
jytqttiyj,is concerned about the 262140trefugees inside its borders, 44.?
most of whom need emergency food aid,Reeer44ng4e4he-Embasey-in 0-K
Likuagwe. Mozambique is negotiating repatriation pacts with
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi, despite opposition among UN and
Western officials, who claim the country's civil war and lack of
resources will disrupt resettlement efforts
Comment: Mozambique's neighbors are concerned that the refugees
are straining limited food and budgetary resources and aggravating
border security problems. Mozambique almost certainly could not
meet the needs of returning refugees and will probably need
increased emergency food aid this year. Nevertheless, Maputo
depends on some 7,000 Zimbabwean, 500 Malawian, and 3,000
Tanzanian troops to help contain the RENAMO insurgency and is
probably cooperating on the refugee issue to avoid bilateral tensions
that could undermine this assistance.
SUDAN: New Group Joins Insurgents
Leaders of Anyanya II, a southern Sudanese militia allied with
government forces for the past two years, have agreed in principle to
unite with the southern insurgent Sudanese People's Liberation Army,
according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. Ethiopian-backed
attempts to reconcile the groups began in FebruaryH
the two reached a de facto cease-fire this summer, and
some Anyanya ll troops have begun moving freely through rebel-held
territory. Public acknowledgment of at least a limited rapprochement
occurred this week when Anyanya ll and insurgent leaders met at a
conference in Addis Ababa.
Comment: The reconciliation deals a blow to Prime Minister Sadiq's
efforts to augment government forces by arming local militias to fight
the insurgents. Growing dissatisfaction with government support and
a longstanding hatred of Arab domination probably have spurred
Anyanya II to accept Ethiopian offers of military supplies in return for
suspending hostilities with the Liberation Army. The two groups are
unlikely to join their military forces, but even sporadic coordinated
attacks would further weaken the government's units, already hard
pressed in the south
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East Asia
Americas
China, France signing first agreement to exchange military
delegations, cooperate in arms development, according to press
... Beijing has similar arrangement with Italy... hel s deflect
Third World criticism of Sino-US military exchanges.
Oul
Surinamelhas received one-Swise trainer aircraft, second
expected Tuesday Ea-Miamir
probably for eventual use against insurgents ... deal initially to
include instructor-pilot, mechanic, spare parts.
Brazilian Finance Minister Bresser announced measures to cut
public-sector deficit ... will impose ceiling on government salaries,
ban new fiscal transfers to state governments.., political
pressures likely to undermine efforts, push inflation up.
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Europe
EC-Hungary formal trade negotiations to resume in October,
. some senior EC officials favor accord, but
some member states reluctant to grant concessions sought by
Budapest ... agreement unlikely this year.
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
ISRAEL: Compromise on Levi Likely
Israeli Foreign Minister Peres?previously a strong supporter of
the Levi fighter aircraft?apparently now advocates scrapping
the program. He proposes to divert $100 million per year in US
military assistance to the primary contractor for Levi, Israel
Aircraft Industries, to preclude large-scale layoffs and to provide
sufficient research work to keep several thousand engineers and
technicians employed once the Levi project is canceled,
according to the Israeli press and the US Embassy. Pending US
approval, the compromise also includes F-16 coproduction in
Israel and Israeli contributions to developing the advanced F-16.
Peres's proposals apparently are supported by Defense Minister
Rabin and Finance Minister Nissim.
Peres's sudden shift means that proponents of scrapping the Lavi
program now have a slight majority in Israel's 24-member Cabinet.
Under pressure from Peres, Rabin, and Nissim, even Prime Minister
Shamir is pulling away from his unequivocal backing for the Lavi.
During a meeting with visiting US Senators this week, Shamir said the
Lavi project was financially too much for Israel to handle. According
to the Embassy, Shamir's top political adviser claims that a
compromise solution to terminate the Lavi is close.
Peres's plan nevertheless faces stiff opposition from pro-Lavi
stalwarts. Likud Ministers Sharon and Arens have already denounced
the move to scrap Lavi development, and Israel Aircraft Industries has
called Peres's proposal unacceptable
Future Israeli Aircraft Research
Unresolved design problems and unproven avionics mean that
already spiraling development cost overruns will worsen considerably
if the Lavi is not canceled. Cost estimates earlier this year, based on
the Israeli air force's requirement for only 100 aircraft instead of the
300 originally planned, suggest that the 100 Lavis would cost up to
$5 billion more than 100 F-16s. Research and development costs
alone for the Lavi would amount to more than $20 million per
aircraft?about the same as the total cost of an off-the-shelf F-16.
continued
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ToDSecret
Peres wants to guarantee the future of Israel Aircraft, however, which
will lose its primary source of funding if the Lavi is canceled. Nearly
$1.5 billion in US grant aid has already been spent developing the
plane, including more than $200 million per year on contracts with
Israel Aircraft?the largest defense firm in Israel, with more than
20,000 workers. Defense Minister Rabin recently claimed that at least
another $5 billion is needed to complete the Lavi program. The Israeli
air force has proposed a variety of projects to keep the firm active,
including remotely piloted vehicles, advanced avionics, precision-
guided munitions, and ex anded slans to modernize aging Kfir and
Phantom fighter aircraft.
Outlook
Barring a reversal in his new stance, Peres's opposition ultimately will
spell the death of Lavi, although the Cabinet is in no hurry to vote on
the issue. Even if Peres formally presents his compromise proposal to
the Cabinet on Sunday, the Ministers must work out the details, and
further delays on the final decision are likely. The pro-Lavi camp
undoubtedly will extract the maximum concessions?such as
guaranteed employment and funding for the aircraft company?in
return for killing the program
12
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O 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
709166 (803941) 7-87
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29 August 1987
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To ? Secret
?
Special Analysis
THAILAND-BURMA- Limited Antidrug Progress
INDIA:
Thai and Burmese antinarcotics efforts along the two countries'
common border have earned a stalemate against the region's
drug powers, but traffickers are changing tactics and
government gains are threatened. The net result may be a larae
increase in exports of Golden Triangle heroin.
Military and eradication operations have made narcotics smuggling
more expensive and have at least slowed the growth of heroin
exports.
leading drug groups remain intact and continue to supply
about 20 percent of the US and West European heroin markets,
!
according to reporting from US embassies and the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
The trafficking organizations, one of which has about 12,000 men
under arms, are becoming more defensive?sacrificing material in
order to preserve manpower and increasing the use of mobile
refineries and smaller drug caravans to cut losses.
they also continue evading military pressure on '
one side of the border by crossing to the other.
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There are also new smuggling routes away from the border area.
_increasing amounts 25X1
of heroin are going through northern Burma to India, which may
become Asia's primary narcotics distribution center. More is also
being exported through Laos into northeastern Thailand, where
government forces are spread thin. The traditional routes through
northern Thailand are likely to remain the largest conduit to the
international market, but the new networks may already account for
30 to 35 percent of regional heroin exports and will probably become
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even more important in the future
continued
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14 29 August 1987
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Ton Secret
Problems and Opportunities
Bangkok and Rangoon, individually, are not capable of containing
expansion along the new routes, but years of distrust and animosity
preclude formal bilateral cooperation. Similarly, relations between
Burma and India are cool, and Laos?which does not acknowledge a
narcotics problem?has been an ered b Thai allegations of official
Lao complicity in smuggling.
Nevertheless, Burma, Thailand, and India apparently see the
trafficking network as vulnerable and have begun limited informal
cooperation.
Burma produces more than 70 percent of the Golden Triangle's
opium but currently sprays only areas secured by government troops,
which excludes the major growing area. If it expanded its aerial
eradication program into unsecured areas, trafficking costs would
rise significantly. In addition, the redeployment of Burmese Army
units to central Shan State would slow the expansion of networks
westward and disrupt supply lines. And, in Thailand, increasing
enforcement efforts in the eastern part of the country and greater use
of airpower against refineries and storage facilities along the Burmese
border would also pay dividends.
These measures may be enough to continue the stalemate, in itself a
victory in view of the drug potential of the Golden Triangle. Over the
longer term, however, bilateral and multilateral approaches and
programs need to be developed even though the political realities
suggest this will continue to prove elusive
15
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29 August 1987
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I up ,ocul
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