USSR: FAILING RELIABILITY OF PIPELINE GAS TURBINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01451R000100120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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JJII UI LVtIVI.
Intelligence 25X1
I
USSR: Failing Reliabilit of
Pipeline Gas Turbines
'1)
An Intelligence Assessment
9
pRainor NUMBER 3att-g- 0 2-5-3 SPC
49w. M J K.
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PAGE NUMBERS ,7 ?
TOTAL NUMBER OF COP=
DISSEM DATE gO
F:XTRA COPIES74&7_r_s___73.
RECORD C:ENTER
JOB NUMBER
PROJECT NUMBER
SOV 88-10013
88-10013
March 1988
Copy
346
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USSR: Failing Reliability of
Pipeline Gas Turbines
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis, with a
contribution from Office of Global
Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Economic Performance
Division, SOVA,
Secret
SOV 88-10013
March 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 10 February 1988
was used in this report.
USSR: Failing Reliability
Pipeline Gas Turbines
Growing problems with the reliability of domestically produced 16- and
25-megawatt (MW) turbines threaten to undermine the capability of the
Soviet gas pipeline system to deliver adequate volumes of gas to the
industrialized western regions of the USSR during the winter months.
Following the 1981 US embargo on pipeline equipment, Moscow launched
a crash program to develop indigenous production capacity for these large
turbines. While the program was successful in terms of quantities pro-
duced, the emphasis on getting production under way quickly led to
shortcomings in design and manufacture. As a result, according to Soviet
press reports, numerous turbine failures have already occurred and more
are expected to cause disruptions in gas deliveries to some areas.
So far the Soviets have been able to deal with the potentially debilitating
effects of turbine failures because of excess capacity along many lines and
the redundancies and flexibility of its hiahlv intewsated pipeline network.
the pipeline network?
despite its flexibility?will not be able to meet peak winter demand in some
regions by 1990:
? The pipeline network transporting gas to the Baltic, Belorussian, and
Leningrad regions (the Northern Lights system) apparently has been
nearly fully utilized since 1985; turbine failures would result in reduc-
tions in as deliveries
? the key pipeline system transporting gas from
West Siberia to the central and western regions of the USSR show that
by 1990 excess transport capacity could fall to as little as 10 percent dur-
ing peak winter periods.
? The Siberia?to?Western Europe pipeline is unlikely to be affected
because it is largely powered by more reliable imported turbines.
Because natural gas will be the major source of growth in the USSR's en-
ergy supply in the 1990s, Moscow can ill afford disruptions in gas
deliveries. The expected shortfalls in many areas of Moscow's Long-Term
Energy Program will put pressure on planners to boost dependency on
natural gas. This, together with turbine failures, would reduce peak-use
excess pipeline capacity even further. Regional disruptions in gas deliver-
ies, if prolonged or exacerbated by increasingly frequent turbine break-
downs, could develop into a problem of national proportions.
111
Secret
SOV 88-10013
March 1988
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Cutbacks in gas deliveries would result in some combination of increased
use of fuel oil, reduced oil exports, lower electricity production, and
reduction in industrial output. Each of these consequences carries a heavy
cost, particularly considering the importance of expanding industrial
output to Gorbachev's modernization program.
If disruptions in gasdeliveries threaten to reduce oil exports or electricity
production, we believe Moscow most likely would resume imports of
Western turbines to improve the reliability of the natural gas network. The
economic costs of prolonged natural gas disruptions are far greater than
the hard currency expenditures required to obtain needed equipment.
While the Soviets could conceiveably opt for a domestic solution to the
problem by developing new, more reliable turbines, increasing redundancy
along each line, or building more reliable electric-drive compressor sta-
tions, each option carries a higher economic cost than an "import option."
In fact, the Soviets reportedly have already made inquiries to some
Western firms about the availability of 10-, 16-, and 25-MW gas turbines.
Western companies would welcome any opportunity to increase sales and
could be expected to vie strongly for Soviet business. The US-USSR Joint
Commercial Commission meeting scheduled next month could provide a
forum for Moscow to pursue this issue with US businessmen.
Secret iv
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
The Importance of Keeping the Gas Moving
Reliance on Domestic Producers 2
A Success of Sorts. . . 2
. . . But Short on Quality 2
Outlook 5
Implications 6
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Figure 1
Key West Siberian Gasfields and Pipelines, 1981-95
U.K
The United Stated Government has not recognized
the incorporation et Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
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Barents
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Peninsula
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Uzhgorod
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*MOSCOW n.Kiev
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Neutral Zone
Iran
Saudi
Arabia
Persian
Gulf '
Secret
Afghanistan
vi
Soviet Union
Completed
Under
construction
Planned
0
Urengoy
(1981-85)
Pal?r-?)
Yamburg
(1986-90)
600 Kilometers
600 Miles
amburg
Urengoy
Yama?I4(
Peninsula
(1991-95)
712461 (544860) 3-88
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USSR: Failing Reliabilit
Pipeline Gas Turbines
The Importance of Keeping the Gas Moving
Natural gas?which is displacing oil as the largest
single component of Soviet primary energy produc-
tion?will be the major source of growth in the
USSR's energy supply for the remainder of this
century. The country is endowed with enormous gas
reserves in West Siberia, but Moscow must continue
to expand the gas pipeline network to move this gas to
both domestic and foreign consumers. To transport
West Siberian gas 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers to the
European regions of the USSR (roughly the distance
from New York City to Phoenix, Arizona), the Soviets
use large-diameter, 1,420-millimeter gas pipelines op-
erating at pressures up to 75 atmospheres (see figure
1). Gas turbines fueled from the pipelines?with
power ratings of 10 megawatts (MW) and greater?
are the preferred source of power for compressors that
move the gas through the pipelines (see inset).
Before 1981 the USSR had long used indigenously
produced 6- and 10-MW turbines to power compres-
sors on its large-diameter pipelines dedicated to do-
mestic consumers. Using a portion of its anticipated
hard currency earnings, Moscow installed more pow-
erful and higher quality imported equipment on lines
that serve customers in Western and Eastern Europe.
Soviet ability to continue this strategy was con-
strained by the quantum leap in pipeline construction
anticipated for the 1981-85 period?from 9,000 km
during 1976-80 to 20,000 km during 1981-85. Mos-
cow's program to manufacture the more powerful
pipeline turbines languished until US sanctions on oil
and gas equipment were imposed in 1981 as a re-
sponse to the Soviet-inspired imposition of martial law
in Poland.'
' These sanctions followed the US embargo on grain and high-
technology products im osed in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan
1
Development of Soviet Gas Turbines:
Taking Its Time
The USSR has long had difficulty in developing and
producing gas turbines for pipeline service. During the
1960s the Soviet demand for lightweight, efficient,
and more powerful gas turbines was not great, and
the USSR's large and bulky 4- and 6-MW gas
turbines were adequate for Moscow's needs. Subse-
quently, however, Soviet gas output soared?from 45
billion cubic meters (m3) in 1960 to nearly 200 billion
m3 in 1970?as new and productive gasfields were
developed in the remote areas of Central Asia and
West Siberia. The Soviets began to lay large-diame-
ter (1,020 mm and greater) gas pipelines at an ever-
increasing pace.
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Despite growing demand, Soviet industry during the 25X1
1970s continued to make halting and mostly unsuc-
cessful attempts to develop and manufacture the
larger 16- and 25-MW gas turbines necessary for
large-diameter gas pipeline service. Although some
prototypes were assembled, no unit entered serial
production during the 1970s. Typically, following the
assembly of prototypes, testing was delayed, took a
long time to complete, and led to a decision to
postpone serial production. Moreover, the urgency of
the program to manufacture more and better turbines
was lessened by the Soviets' reliance on the West for
a large number of high-quality 10-, 13-, and 25-MW
turbines for use on 1,420-mm gas pipelines. During
1971-80 Moscow imported nearly 300 gas turbines
that provided more than one-third of the aggregate
power installed on 1,420-mm gas pipelines. Imported
turbines provided a "safety valve" that tended to
minimize the need for the Soviets to manufacture
larger and better turbines.
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The USSR originally contracted with Western firms
to buy 120 US-designed 25-MW turbines for installa-
tion on the Siberia?to?Western Europe gas export
pipeline.
Moscow probably was also count-
ing on additional Western imports to satisfy a signifi-
cant portion of the demand for pipeline turbines
during 1981-85. The US embargo imposed in 1981,
however, foreclosed this option at least temporarily
and highlighted Soviet technological inferiorities to
domestic and foreign leaders alike
Reliance on Domestic Producers
Faced with the prospect that the US embargo might
delay delivery of the 120 Western turbines needed for
the gas export pipeline and preclude additional pur-
chases for its five domestic gas pipelines planned
during 1981-85, Moscow initiated a crash program to
produce 16- and 25-MW turbines.' Not surprisingly,
this concerted effort yielded results. During 1982-83,
the Soviets began serial production of three models of
gas turbines suitable for large-diameter pipelines:
? GTN-I6, an industrial 16-MW gas turbine designed
and manufactured at the Sverdlovsk Turbomotor
Plant.
? GPA-Ts-16, a 16-MW aeroderivative turbine devel-
oped by the Ministry of the Aviation Industry from
NK-8 aircraft engines; the current workhorse of the
gas pipeline network, this model satisfies about one-
third of Moscow's current demand for large-diame-
ter pipeline turbines.
? GTN-25, a 25-MW industrial turbine assembled in
Leningrad and frequently hailed by Moscow as a
more than worthy substitute for the US Frame-5
turbine.
' Because of far higher costs, substantial inefficiencies, and much
longer installation periods, expanded production and use of smaller
domestic turbines was not a viable option. Moreover, because
Moscow also planned to accelerate construction of smaller, regional
distribution pipelines, many of the USSR's less powerful turbines
were probably earmarked for installation on these pipelines
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A Success of Sorts . . .
In terms of quantity, the crash program has been a
success. We estimate that aggregate power provided
by Soviet production of 10-, 16-, and 25-MW turbines
increased from about 1,000 MW in 1980 to 2,000
MW in 1983. The newly developed gas turbines
accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total power
installed on two domestic gas pipelines laid during
1984-85 (see table). In a recent interview with the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress, one of Gor-
bachev's key economic advisers, Abel Aganbegyan,
characterized increased production of the turbines as
a major advance for Soviet technology.
Moreover, development and serial production of 16-
and 25-MW gas pipeline turbines substantially re-
duced?if not eliminated?the Soviet Union's need to
import Western gas turbines (see figure 2). Since the
delivery during 1983-85 of the 120 US-designed
Frame-5 gas turbines originally purchased before the
embargo, we know of no Soviet imports of Western
turbines for pipeline use, although the Soviets contin-
ue to import spare parts to service and maintain
turbines imported before 1985.
. . . But Short on Quality
In terms of quality, however, the Soviet program has
fallen far short of expectations. Recent articles in the
Soviet gas industry journal?including two by direc-
tors of gas transport associations?have been sharply
critical of the poor reliability and inadequate perfor-
mance of the 16- and 25-MW turbines developed
after the US embargo:
? In 1986 GTN-16 turbines on average operated only
620 hours before an unscheduled shutdown. (Com-
parable statistics for Western turbines run into the
thousands of hours.) These turbines were reportedly
out of service on average 45 percent of the time.
Numerous design flaws were cited as key causes of
the turbine's "very low reliability."
? GTN-25 turbines reportedly ran on average 526
hours before a failure occurred that required an
unscheduled shutdown. Soviet design engineers
originally presumed that these turbines would oper-
ate roughly 3,000 hours before an unscheduled
2
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Sources of Compressor Power
on the Urengoy?Center I
and Urengoy?Center II
Gas Pipelines, as of Yearend 1986
Turbine Type
Number of
Units
Installed
Aggregate Power
Provided (MW)
Share of
Pipelines'
Total Power
Supply
(percent)
Total
370
5,063.5
100.0
Imported 25 MW
12
300
5.9
Soviet 10 MW
128
1,280
25.3
Soviet 16 MW a
(industrial)
20
320
6.3
Soviet 16 MW a
(aeroderivative)
111
1,776
35.1
Soviet 25 MW a
12
300
5.9
Soviet 12.5 MW
(electric)
87
1,087.5
21.5
a Production of these turbines began in 1982-83.
shutdown, but a large number of design and manu-
facturing defects have reportedly been discovered.
Despite more than 200 technical modifications, the
Soviet press indicates that there has been no "sub-
stantial improvement" in the performance of the
GTN-25.
? The 16-MW aeroderivative turbines reportedly have
an operating life of only five years before the units
have to be discarded. Moreover, the press indicates
the gas turbines need to be removed and overhauled
at the factory after 10,000 to 11,000 hours of
operation. (In contrast, models of a US aeroderiva-
tive turbine during the 1970s ran on average 41,000
hours before the turbines were removed and over-
hauled.) According to the Soviet press, more than
130 6- and 16-MW aeroderivative turbines were
idled in September 1987 awaiting spare parts (see
figure 3).
The Soviet gas turbine program historicallyhas expe-
rienced problems because of low-quality steels and
obsolete technology for fabricating turbine blades and
rotors. But the recent problems with the GTN-25
3
Figure 2
Power Provided by Imported and Domestic
Gas Turbines Installed on Soviet
1,420-mm Gas Pipelines a
in Imported
0 Domestic (new) b
Domestic (old)
Ii I
Megawatts
14,000
a Estimated.
b Production of these turbines began in 1982-83.
Planned.
316514 186
reported in the Soviet press are not limited to a single
section of the turbine. The system monitoring and
controlling ignition works poorly, frequently causing
the protective linings of the combustion chamber to
burn up. Control instrumentation for countering the
effects of vibration is ineffective, and some shaft
bearings are prone to collapse under loading.' ,
'Development of pipeline turbines has been hampered partly
because the civilian program historically has been accorded a low
priority relative to the development of turbines for military aircraft.
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Figure 3. Compressor station equipped with
Soviet aeroderivative gas turbines.
We believe that many of the problems associated with
the USSR's current line of 16- and 25-MW gas
pipeline turbines are the direct result of the crash
effort to rapidly develop and serially produce these
turbines. At the time of the US embargo, Moscow
was motivated both by the practical need to increase
the supply of domestically produced gas turbines and
by an obsession with closing an exposed gap in Soviet
technological prowess. To meet the ambitious produc-
tion deadlines, Soviet designers and machine builders
apparently cut corners. Designs were not adequately
reviewed, and serial production was initiated before
prototype testing was completed.
working the bugs out of a
prototype turbine is as much a trial-and-error proce-
dure (requiring time and observation) as an engineer-
ing problem.
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In addition to design flaws, some Soviet articles have
highlighted poor production and assembly practices.
One author noted that the low quality of some
components was at times so obvious that the ministry
simply appeared not to care about making improve-
ments. The low quality of the turbines and the high
incidence of failure is causing Moscow to spend large
sums on repairs.'
The reliability and performance of the GTN-16 and
GTN-25 may now be so low that the Soviets may
have to scrap their designs and develop a completely
new turbine. An editor of the Soviet gas industry
journal indicated that it would be "inexpedient" to
attempt to improve the GTN-16 and GTN-25 tur-
bines and that "decisive measures are needed to
immediately begin development of a new generation
of more reliable gas turbines for use in the 13th Five-
Year Plan (1991-95)." This bleak assessment is in
marked contrast to the glowing Soviet reviews shortly
after the US embargo was imposed. For example, the
GTN-25 was frequently compared to the best West-
ern models and eventually received the "state seal of
quality."
The low reliability of Soviet 16- and 25-MW gas
turbines may soon threaten the gas pipeline network's
capacity to deliver adequate volumes of gas to con-
sumers in the western regions of the USSR. One
Soviet author noted that "a very tense situation is
developing that could lead to difficulties in providing
energy to the country." Although redundant capacity
is available at each compressor station, the number
of turbine failures is apparently so frequent that some
stations cannot always keep the minimum number of
units operational. Moreover, Soviet gas transport
Each repair on the GTN-25 reportedly costs about 350,000 rubles,
and labor expenses for repairs are eight times greater than the norm
established for repair and maintenance. Moreover, the transport
associations are concerned that in the new system of self-financing
they will not be able to write off expenses incurred in eliminating
factory defects.
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officials are expecting more turbine failures, the
complete shutdown of some stations, and a reduction
in gas deliveries to the European region of the USSR.'
Outlook
Problems caused by the low reliability of the large
numbers of 16- and 25-MW units currently in service,
as well as those that will be installed by 1990, will
continue to mount. As the share of these turbines
increases, the overall reliability of the gas transport
system will inevitably lessen. Moreover, the Soviet
press has indicated that about 20 percent of the
turbine capacity installed on the entire gas pipeline
network will have outlived its service life by 1990 and
will need to be replaced. Thus, gas transport system
operators will be caught in a dilemma: new units off
the assembly line will continue to be unreliable while
the need to replace older capacity will be increasing.
Despite Gorbachev's much trumpeted campaign to
improve the quality of industrial production, the fruits
of this effort have had little impact to date on the
power machine building ministry's procedures for
manufacturing gas pipeline turbines.
planned additions to the
Soviet gas network indicate that by 1990 overall
transport capacity will exceed projected average con-
sumption and export levels by about 25 percent.'
However, this excess capacity is not sufficient to meet
peak winter demand in some regions because of
inadequate gas storage capacity and a seasonal surge
in demand that rises as much as 50 percent. The
pipeline network transporting gas to the Baltic, Belo-
russian, and Leningrad regions (the Northern Lights
system) apparently has been nearly fully utilized since
1985, limiting the system's flexibility to meet demand
during peak periods. Thus, additional demands made
by consumers in these regions during peak winter
'The operation of the West Siberia?Western Europe gas export
pipeline is unlikely to be threatened by the low reliability of Soviet
turbines. Despite publicized claims that a large number of domestic
turbines would be used on the gas export pipeline, Moscow
essentially followed its original plans after delivery of the US
Frame-5s was resumed. Imported gas turbines account for more
than 80 ?ercent of the power installed on the gas export pipeline.
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periods must be met by rerouting some domestic gas
deliveries, rerouting export deliveries, and also by
periodically curtailing flow to some areas. Because of
the limited flexibility during peak periods, turbine 25X1
failures forcing shutdowns of compressor stations on
pipelines serving the Baltic, Belorussian, and Lenin-
grad regions would result in additional curtailments in
gas deliveries 25X1
the pipeline system trans-
porting gas from West Siberia to the central and
western regions of the USSR show that excess trans-
port capacity?which is about 35 percent during
periods of average demand?is cut in half during peak
winter periods. During some winter months, excess
capacity could fall to as little as 10 percent. Turbine
failures would result in additional capacity erosion.'
The margin between transport capacity and demand
would become uncomfortably taut, and could lead to
periodic reductions in gas deliveries to some areas in
the central and western regions of the USSR.
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If gas turbine failures threaten to curtail gas deliver-
ies to the central and western regions, Moscow would
almost certainly take immediate action to minimize
any reduction in gas deliveries. Turbine repairs would 25X1
be given priority treatment, and Moscow would use
the pipeline system's flexibility to reroute gas to areas
experiencing shortfalls. Nonetheless, because some of
the system's flexibility already is used every winter to
provide additional gas for the northern regions, there
is less room to maneuver should problems occur on the
main West Siberian pipeline corridor. In addition,
large gas systems react very slowly, to this type of 25X1
rerouting operation, and two weeks may elapse before
diverted gas reaches the intended area.
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'Engineering calculations show that the loss of just one station on a
large-diameter pipeline operating at maximum throughput and
pressure could result in a 15-percent drop in gas flow.
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Because natural gas will be the major source of
growth in the USSR's energy supply in the next
decade, Moscow can ill afford to have an unreliable
gas pipeline network threaten to disrupt gas deliveries
in the 1990s.9 Many aspects of Moscow's Long-Term
Energy Program are likely to fall short of expecta-
tions, increasing the pressure for expanded use of
natural gas: progress in energy conservation is likely
to be modest; prospects for stabilizing oil production
are not good; coal production, instead of showing
robust growth, is likely to limp forward; and growth of
electricity production from nuclear power is likely to
be slower than anticipated.
Implications
Regional disruptions in gas deliveries, if prolonged or
exacerbated by increasingly frequent turbine break-
downs, could develop into a problem of national
proportions. Disruptions in gas deliveries would at a
minimum cause some consumers to switch to backup
fuel oil supplies?if they were available. This would
contribute to keeping oil consumption high and
threaten to reduce the availability of oil for export.
Because backup fuel oil supplies are also spread thin
during peak-demand periods, gas disruptions could
also lead to some regional reductions in electricity
production and disruptions in industrial output. The
USSR's electricity supply is already taut, and some
key industries?such as steel and cement?are be-
coming increasingly dependent on natural gas. More-
over, Gorbachev's economic modernization program,
which calls for both ambitious growth rates and a
substantial replacement of capital stock, would be
adversely affected by disruptions?even if tempo-
rary?in gas deliveries.
'Natural gas production is scheduled to grow from 727 billion m3 in
1987 to roughly 1,100 billion m3 in 1995.
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Moscow has options available that would mitigate
shortcomings in domestic 16- and 25-MW gas turbine
performance and production. None, however, are
likely to be palatable to the Soviets:
? The USSR could resume equipping compressor
stations with a larger complement of smaller gas
turbines, but this alternative would incur much
higher capital and labor costs. Moreover, a large
volume of construction material would have to be
brought on site, and the time required for compres-
sor station construction would be extended.
? By installing more turbines at each compressor
station, the USSR could increase the amount of
redundant capacity. This would probably increase
the overall reliability of the station, but it would also
involve increased costs and probably constrain the
production of turbines for other industries.
? The USSR could build more electric-drive compres-
sor stations. The amount of electricity consumed by
these units, however, is large. For example, 2,000
MW would be required to service a 4,000-km
pipeline?an amount equal to the entire output of a
large electric power plant?and would further strain
already taut Soviet electricity supplies. Moreover,
this option is not feasible in some areas?particular-
ly east of the Urals?because pipeline corridors are
not near power plants, line losses resulting from
long-distance electricity transmission are substan-
tial, and constructing transmission-line towers in
permafrost regions is difficult.
? Moscow could launch a major domestic effort to
design, develop, test, and install new, more reliable
turbines. Given the current state of Soviet manufac-
turing technology, however, such an effort would
probably require several years to bear fruit. During
this period, the gas transport system would remain
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vulnerable to breakdowns and consequent interrup-
tions in gas deliveries. Moreover, despite requests
from gas transport officials for a new generation of
domestic turbines, we have seen no evidence that
Moscow intends to launch a major new program for
16- and 25-MW turbines.
? The USSR could resume imports of Western gas
turbines. Because of the hard times that have fallen
on the world petroleum equipment industry, West-
ern companies would welcome any opportunity to
increase sales. Purchasing gas turbines from the
West would require substantial outlays of hard
currency or a runup in Soviet debt. About $1 billion
would be required to equip just one of the six gas
pipelines planned for construction during 1991-95
with Western turbines. Moreover, in light of their
much publicized response to the 1981 embargo, this
would be embarrassing to the Soviet leadership.
If gas turbine failures threaten to reduce oil available
for export or to disrupt electricity generation and
industrial production, we believe Moscow most likely
would seek Western assistance. Given the current
7
constraints on domestic investment and the relatively
good credit position Moscow enjoys with Western
bankers, importing turbines would be the least painful
option, despite the embarrassment to the leadership."
It is also the quickest and most effective option for
improving the reliability of the Soviet gas pipeline
network. Such purchases would come mostly from
Western Europe but some could come from the
United States, especially if US turbine manufacturers
pursued joint ventures with Moscow. The Soviets
reportedly already have made inquiries to some West-
ern firms about the availability of 10-, 16-, and 25-
MW turbines. The US-USSR Joint Commercial
Commission meeting scheduled next month could
provide a forum for Moscow to pursue this issue with
US businessmen
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a
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/26: CIA-RDP89T01451R000100120001-1