SYRIA'S STRATEGY AND ASSETS IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000300030007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Sccr ct
A! JMsl s A.1 r
NASA P4-10267
Srp 91-- 1904
C'"' 349
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Syria's Strategy and
Assets in Lebanon
This paper was prepared by I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10267
September 1984
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Syria's Strategy and
Assets in Lebanon) 25X1
Key Judgments Syria, we believe, will remain the dominant foreign power in Lebanon for
information available some time. Its central role will ensure that the Lebanese Government
as of3 September 1984 continues to press for Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon with no
was used in this report.
political gains. Damascus will encourage indirect Lebanese-Israeli with-
drawal negotiations, but it will also sponsor increasing terrorism against
Israeli forces.
Damascus, in our view, possesses the assets and determination to prevent
Israel or the United States from reestablishing preeminent influence over
the Lebanese Government. The Syrians clearly want to limit the role the
United States can play in the region. Nonetheless, Syrian leaders believe
they need US assistance to end the Israeli occupation and want the United
States to take the lead in negotiating new security arrangements for the
south. Any such negotiations probably will fail, however, unless they take
Syrian interests into account.
Syria's basic objectives in Lebanon are to ensure that the Lebanese
Government remains susceptible to Syrian influence and to bring about an
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The Syrians are determined to
prevent Beirut from making a separate peace with Israel and fear that
continued Israeli occupation leaves western Syria open to attack by Israeli
ground forces. In our view, the Syrians believe they have a long-term stake
in Lebanon and are determined to remain intimately involved there
regardless of the costs. Even the death of Syrian President Assad would be
unlikely to alter Damascus's strategy in Lebanon.
We believe President Assad will maintain regular Syrian forces in Lebanon
but will prefer to use Lebanese surrogates to pursue Syrian objectives.
Syria supports and exercises considerable influence over Druze and
Muslim militias as well as Palestinian guerrilla organizations active in
Lebanon. Damascus also maintains contacts within Lebanon's Christian
community, which the Syrians believe will continue to play a key role in
the government and Army.
Syrian leaders believe they won a major victory when the Multinational
Force withdrew from Lebanon last winter, and they now want to stabilize
the status quo in and around Beirut. They will support President Amin
Gemayel, who capitulated to their demands for the abrogation of the
Lebanese-Israeli accord and the appointment of a pro-Syrian Cabinet last
winter, as long as he remains obedient to Damascus.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10267
September 1984
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The Syrians do not expect to impose a comprehensive political settlement
on the warring Lebanese factions in the short run. Syrian efforts to
establish a new political order in Lebanon during the past decade have
failed. Damascus, therefore, is adopting an incremental approach, initially
limiting its efforts to improving the security situation in Beirut and the
surrounding mountains. It will also continue to promote a rough equality of
power among the major factions in the civil war to maintain its pivotal
influence.
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Syria's Strategy and
Assets in Lebanon
ment with Israel.
Syria wants to establish a stable government in
Lebanon that is closely tied to Damascus rather than
Israel. The Syrians consider Lebanon integral to their
national security and intend to maintain their preemi-
nent influence over events there. In our judgment,
Syrian policy toward Lebanon is also shaped by the
Assad regime's determination to be the pivotal power
in the region. The Syrians want to be the decisive
factor in any negotiations aimed at a regional settle-
Israeli attack through Lebanon.
demonstrated to Damascus its vulnerability to an
decimated the Syrian Air Force over Lebanon in 1982
The Syrians argue that the continued Israeli occupa-
tion of southern Lebanon poses a threat to Syrian
territory. Syrian officials are keenly aware that Israeli
troops in Lebanon are deployed less than 30 kilome-
ters from Damascus. The relative ease with which
Israeli forces overran Syrian positions in Lebanon and
cus.
troops in Lebanon on historical grounds. Lebanon wasp
part of Syria until the French Government created it
as a separate entity after World War I. Many Syrians
still consider Lebanon a part of "Greater Syria." The
Syrian Government does not maintain an embassy in
Beirut, and there is no Lebanese embassy in Damas-
Syrian officials also justify the presence of Syrian
sion.
In our judgment, however, Damascus has failed to
establish a stable, pro-Syrian political order in Leba-
non despite the considerable attention and resources it
has devoted there during the past decade. The Syrian
Army's intervention in the Lebanese civil war in
1976-belatedly sanctioned by the Arab League-
ended large-scale hostilities for several years but did
not address the underlying political grievances and
hatred among Lebanon's Christians, Druze, Muslims,
and Palestinians. The Syrian occupation has failed to
stop the sporadic violence and festering internal ten-
The Syrians no longer believe they can impose a
settlement on the warring factions in the short run, in
our judgment. Syrian officials dismiss the notion that
a "magical" solution to the civil war is possible,
according to the US Embassy. Damascus, therefore,
has adopted a pragmatic, incremental approach in
Lebanon and is focusing its immediate efforts on
stabilizing the security situation in and around Beirut.
Syrian efforts to bring about a comprehensive politi-
cal settlement during the past year failed.
Damascus put pressure
on Lebanese factional leaders to reach an agreement
during national reconciliation talks at Lausanne last
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Damascus, unable to establish a new political order in
Lebanon, has settled for a policy of preventing any
one sectarian group from gaining dominance over the
others. The Syrians almost certainly believe that the
ascendancy of one faction would sharply reduce their
influence. A complete Christian victory might result 25X1
in an alliance between the Lebanese Government and
Israel. A victory of Muslim forces, on the other hand,
might eventually produce a radical or fundamentalist
Islamic government in Beirut that would cause trou-
ble for the secular Syrian regime.
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Areas of Control and Syrian Military Deployment
Armored division
Armored brigade
Mechanized infantry
division
Commando/Special
Forces regiment
Mediterranean
Sea Lebanese
Army controlled
BEIRUT
Druze and
Shia controlled`
Christian
controlled)
Israeli .
withdrawal line
.BiMfalryi
UNOOF
Zone
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Syria's Latest Security Plan
for Lebanon
Syrian Vice President Khaddam traveled to the
Christian town of Bikfayya on 19 June to launch
Syria's current initiative in Lebanon. Khaddam, im-
patient with the lack of progress in stabilizing the
security situation in and around Beirut, persuaded
Lebanese factional leaders to agree on a new compre-
hensive plan, dubbed the Bikfayya accord. The ac-
cord provides for.
? Some redistribution of Lebanese Army posts among
the confessional groups.
? The establishment of a military committee to study
ways to restructure the Army.
? A security plan that envisions Lebanese Army units
deploying throughout greater Beirut and eventually
the surrounding mountains as well.
Damascus attached a high priority to the security-
related parts of the accord,
the Syrian Army would not tolerate
resistance to the accord by any group. The Lebanese
Army did deploy throughout West Beirut in July, but
the plan has since bogged down over Druze and
Christian opposition to Army deployment in their
areas of control. The Syrians, however, remain com-
mitted to the accord and continue to put pressure on
factional leaders to cooperate.
We believe the Syrians favor an eventual redistribu-
tion of power in Lebanon to satisfy Druze and Muslim
demands, but they do not want to provoke a violent
Maronite Christian reaction. Syrian Vice President
Khaddam has met with Lebanese factional and gov-
ernment leaders frequently in recent months to try to
work out agreements on a redistribution of Lebanese
Army and intelligence posts.
Syrian officials believe that Lebanon's
Shia Muslims in particular will not tolerate indefinite
Christian domination of the political system. None-
theless, the Syrians want to stabilize the security
situation and therefore are not advocating immediate,
far-reaching political reforms
Support for the Gemayel Government
The Syrians accept the principle of a Maronite Chris-
tian remaining president and are willing to work with
President Amin Gemayel despite his Phalange back-
ground.
Gemayel's negotiations
with Israel and his eagerness to increase US involve-
ment in Lebanon, however, prompted the Syrians to
put political and military pressure on him throughout
last fall and winter to force him to deal with Damas-
cus.
Syrian tactics included threatening to use Syrian
artillery against the Lebanese Army, mobilizing oppo-
sition militias, and stirring up resistance to the gov- 25X1
ernment in the Lebanese parliament, according to US
Embassy reporting 9 F X I
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Gemayel capitulated to the Syrians following the 25X1
defeat of the Lebanese Army at the hands of Syrian-
backed militias and the withdrawal of the US Multi-
national Force contingent in late February. He met
with Assad in Damascus in March and agreed to
abrogate the accord with Israel and to appoint opposi-
tion leaders, most of whom are susceptible to Syrian
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influence, to a new Cabinet. The Syrians then
dropped their opposition to the Lebanese Government. 25X1
Syrian leaders decided to support Gemayel's presiden-
cy because they believed he would be more responsive
to Syrian demands in the future,
Damascus concu tat Druze
and Muslim control of West Beirut had weakened
to take Syrian concerns into account
Gemayel's position and would henceforth compel him
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Syrian Assets and Shifting Alliances
Syrian regular forces control most of eastern and
northern Lebanon, but the Syrian Government prefers
to work through Lebanese surrogates to achieve its
objectives in Lebanon. Damascus keeps two rein-
forced divisions and several Special Forces regi-
ments-totaling about 45,000 men-in Lebanon in
addition to numerous Syrian advisers and supervisors
who work directly with Lebanese factional militias.
According to ]defense
attache reports, Syrian intelligence officers operate
throughout Lebanon, providing support to various
factional elements.
Syrian occupation forces deny the Lebanese Govern-
ment control of Tripoli, the northern mountains, and
the Bekaa Valley and add weight to Syria's political
leverage. Two Lebanese Army brigades stationed in
Syrian-controlled areas, for example, are virtually
held hostage. Syrian artillery east of Bikfayya can
strike the Beirut area and the Christian heartland
north of Beirut. Nonetheless, the Syrians prefer indi-
rect involvement in the civil war, as demonstrated by
the fact that Syrian units did not participate in the
fighting last fall and winter.
The Syrians' most effective method of influencing
events in Lebanon is manipulating a wide range of
Lebanese political and military organizations. Damas-
cus supplies and directs the activities of a number of
Druze and Muslim militias and political parties. The
Syrians also cultivate relationships with the Christian
community, including the Lebanese Forces militia
and the Phalange Party.
Syrian involvement across the Lebanese political spec-
trum enables them to maintain a rough balance of
power among the Lebanese factions and government.
When the Syrians want to challenge the Christian-
dominated government, they can mobilize their Druze
and Muslim allies. When the Syrians want to support
the government, they can strengthen their Christian
contacts and put pressure on the Druze and Muslims
to cooperate with the government.
Syrian relations with the Lebanese factions have
fluctuated during the past decade. Syria intervened in
the Lebanese civil war in 1976 on the side of the
Christian Phalange against the Druze and Muslims.
During the late 1970s, however, Damascus switched
sides as the Christian militia developed close ties with
Israel. The Syrians again attempted to improve their
relations with the Christians after the election of
Amin Gemayel in 1982, according to the US Embas-
sy, but Christian support for the Lebanese-Israeli
accord in 1983 prompted renewed Syrian support for
the Druze and Muslims.
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year has been the predominantly Druze Progressive
Syria's most effective Lebanese asset during the past
The Druze spearheaded the
forces last February.
assault on the Lebanese Army during the fighting in
the Shuf Region in September 1983 and were instru-
mental in the seizure of West Beirut by opposition
The Druze militia has been dependent on Syrian-
supplied weapons and ammunition since 1975. The
Druze probably obtain large quantities of small arms
on the open market or from abandoned Palestinian
caches in Beirut and the mountains, but they depend
on Syria for heavy artillery, ammunition, and ar-
mored personnel carriers, which they need to resist
the Christian Lebanese Forces militia and the Leba-
nese Army. The Druze, moreover, are attempting to
convert their militia into a regular army that requires
tanks, which they can obtain only from Syria.
Despite their military dependence on Syria, the Druze
are tough mountain fighters not always willing to
follow orders. The Druze have proved themselves
capable of defying the Syrians when Syrian objectives
differed from their own.
tives to Junblatt.
Damascus uses both the carrot and the stick to try to
control Walid Junblatt. The Syrians augment their
military aid with both economic and political incen-
inflicting total defeat on government forces
Damascus was
having difficulty restraining Junblatt's forces from
Damascus has grown disenchanted with Junblatt in
recent months as its strategy has shifted from opposi-
tion to support of the Gemayel government. Junblatt
continued to call for Amin Gemayel's resignation long
after Assad decided last February that he wanted to
keep Gemayel in office.
Syrian influence with Lebanon's populous Shia Mus-
lim community is more tenuous, but we believe
Damascus attaches a high priority to gaining leverage
over the Shia Amal movement and its leader, Nabih
Barri. Syrian leaders almost certainly believe that
their ability to manipulate events in Lebanon in the
future will depend on their relations with the Shias-
who are the largest and least satisfied confessional
group in the country. Syrian officials believe they can
work with Barri, whom they consider a force for
moderation among the Shias
The Syrians realize, however, that
they cannot control him.
The Syrian strategy for bringing Barri into their
sphere of influence has been to threaten to undercut
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his position by strengthening his rivals within the Shia 25X1
community. Assad, for example, has met publicly on
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Syrian Vice President Khaddam escorts Druze leader Junblatt and
Shia leader Barri from the Foreign Ministry in Damascus
several occasions with Muhammad Shams al-Din,
Barri's principal competitor for the leadership of the
Beirut Shias. The Syrians have also co-opted several
top Amal leaders, including Agil Hamiyah, the Amal
chief for an important section of Beirut, and Zakar-
iyah Hamzah, the Amal military commander for
eastern Lebanon
The Syrians also use their loose control over radical
Shia groups based in the Bekaa Valley-such as
Islamic Amal-to try to force Barri to come to terms
with Damascus. According to
Embassy reporting, the activism
and increasing popularity of radical Shia leaders such
as Husayn Musawi and Subhi Tufayli have been
eroding Barri's position in Amal during the past year.
The US Embassy reports that Damascus allows radi-
cal Shia groups in the Bekaa greater freedom of
action than Amal.
Damascus, nonetheless, remains wary of the radical
Shias and has begun to curtail their freedom to
operate in the Bekaa. Syrian troops have clashed with
Shia extremists in the Bekaa several times since early
1984. Most of the Shia extremists advocate an Islamic
revolution in Lebanon to establish an Iranian-style
fundamentalist state there. The secular Syrian regime
strongly opposes this goal and therefore tolerates
radical Shia activities only to keep pressure on Barri
Despite the Syrian campaign to control Amal by co-
opting its leaders and tolerating the activities of
radical Shia groups, Barri has remained relatively
independent of Damascus. He refused to join the
National Salvation Front last fall and winter and has
strongly resisted Syrian attempts to manipulate Amal.
Barri has
moved to limit Syrian influence in ma and the
activities of pro-Syrian Amal officials
Barri can ignore Syrian pressure to a greater extent
than can the Druze and Palestinians because Amal
depends far less on Syria for its military supplies.
Amal is primarily a street militia that operates in the
crowded slums of southern Beirut using small arms,
mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades, which the
militiamen can easily obtain on the open market or
from abandoned Palestinian arms caches in Beirut.
Amal, moreover, has been able to capture what little
heavy equipment it needs from the Lebanese Army.
The Syrians exercise substantial influence in Leba-
non's Sunni Muslim community, and wealthy Sunni
politicians have traditionally maintained close politi-
cal and family ties to Damascus. Although the Sunnis
lack a powerful militia, Syrian leaders almost certain-
ly continue to view their Sunni connection as valuable
because the Lebanese political system reserves impor-
tant government posts for Sunnis.
Damascus cultivates relationships with key Sunni
politicians to guarantee that it will have friends in the
Lebanese Government. Sunni Prime Minister Kar-
ami, for example, has always been inclined to follow
the Syrian line on most issues. Syrian officials have
also worked closely with former Sunni Prime Minis-
ters Saib Salam, Rashid al-Sulh, Salim al-Huss, and
Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, all of whom periodically travel to
Damascus to confer with the Syrian Government.
When Amin Gemayel agreed to appoint a new Sunni
prime minister last March, virtually every candidate
was to some extent sympathetic to Syria.
and the Lebanese Government.
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Moderate Sunni leaders often welcome Syrian sup-
port because they view Syria as the only force capable
of preventing complete Christian and Israeli domina-
tion of Lebanon. Many Sunni politicians have told the
US Embassy that the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon remains their most pressing concern and that
they do not view the Syrian forces in Lebanon in the
same light. Saib Salam has told US officials that most
Sunnis realize there can be no peace in Lebanon
without a government on good terms with Syria.
Damascus also supports the activities of several small,
militant Sunni organizations in Beirut.
the Syrians are trying to gain
complete control over the leftist Murabitun militia.
the Syrians
nave enaorsect e o s y ay al- afiz Qasim,
a fundamentalist Sunni cleric, to establish another
primarily Sunni militia that will serve Syrian policy
aims.
A number of leftist Lebanese militias and Palestinian
groups active in Lebanon are Syria's most obedient
proxies there. Several thousand Palestinian fighters-
Fatah dissidents and members of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command,
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
and Saiqa-remain in the country to protect the
Palestinian civilian population there and to harass
Israeli forces. Their presence, freedom of movement,
and arms supply, however, are dependent on Damas-
cus, and they have little choice but to serve Syrian
policy aims.
Damascus uses the Palestinians for military opera-
tions that the Syrians would prefer not to undertake
themselves and to monitor activities within the Leba-
nese Druze, Shia, and Sunni communities.
Damascus sent as many
as 1,500 a estinian guerrillas to help the Druze fight
the Lebanese Army and the Christian militia in
September 1983. Damascus has left some of the
Palestinians in positions on the Druze-held Alayh
ridge in the Shuf Region since then, primarily to keep
Druze leader Junblatt's forces under surveillance,
have infiltrated hundreds of Palestinians into southern
and West Beirut to work with the Shia Amal militia
and to ensure that Amal adheres to Syrian policy
objectives. Damascus almost certainly sees advan-
tages in maintaining some Palestinian assets in Bei-
rut, but we doubt that they want to re-create the de
facto Palestinian rule over much of West Beirut that
existed before the Israeli invasion. The Syrians fear
that a massive Palestinian return to Beirut would
provoke angry reactions from both Israel and the
Lebanese militias. In our judgment, Damascus will
restrict the number of Palestinians who return to the
city in the future.
We believe Damascus uses Palestinian and radical
Shia proxies to keep pressure on Israeli forces in
southern Lebanon. The Syrian Government almost
certainly encourages and facilitates terrorist opera-
tions in the south. The Syrians want to avoid direct
military confrontation with Israel and probably hope
that the use of surrogates will deflect Israeli retalia-
tion from Syrian regular troops or Syrian territory.
The Syrians also control a number of small, ideologi-
cally oriented groups in Lebanon that usually function
as proxy political organizations and militias, including
the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Lebanese
Arab Army, the Lebanese Bath Party, and the Arab
Democratic Party. Damascus also supplies and ma-
nipulates Lebanon's two Communist groups, the Leb-
anese Communist Party and the Communist Action
Organization.
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Damascus occasionally uses these leftist groups to
carry out military operations, but their primary pur-
pose is to serve as political front organizations for 25X1
Syria. Most, for example, have joined the various
Syrian-sponsored opposition coalitions during the past
decade, including the National Salvation Front. Left-
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of Lebanon by defending it publicly. Nonetheless, the 25X1
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A Rapprochement With the Christians?
An evolving dialogue between Damascus and the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia during the past
year clearly illustrates the Syrian policy of keeping a
finger in every pie. Despite their support for the
Druze and Muslims against the Lebanese Forces,
Syrian leaders have opened channels of com-
Most Christian leaders remain publicly hostile toward
Syria and are unlikely to trust offers of support from
Damascus, but Syrian officials clearly attach some
importance to preserving ties with the Maronites. C
the Syrians hope
to wean the Christians away from their dependence
on Israel. In our view, the Syrians believe that
Maronite Christians will continue to play a key role in
the Lebanese Government and Army for many years
to come and therefore have concluded that a Syrian-
Christian entente will be essential if Damascus is to
exert maximum influence over events in Lebanon.
The Syrians also want to prevent Christian hardliners
from growing so alienated that they attempt to divide
Lebanon into cantons controlled by different confes-
sional groups.
We believe Syria will be the dominant foreign power
in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. The Israeli
presence in southern Lebanon dominates the attention
of the Syrian Government and reinforces Damascus's
determination to manipulate the Lebanese Govern-
ment and the private militias.
will grudgingly accept Syrian influence as a fact of
life, although most of them dislike the Syrians. They
see the events of the past year as evidence that
Damascus will have its way in Lebanon. Christian
hardliners will continue to oppose Syrian domination,
but Lebanese Forces' military reversals during the
past year have narrowed their power base and dimin-
ished their ability to do more than defend the Chris-
tian heartland.
Temporary setbacks in Syria's attempts to stabilize
the status quo in Beirut will not deter Damascus. We
believe the Syrians feel they have a long-term stake in
the situation in Lebanon and are determined to
remain intimately involved there regardless of the
costs. Even the death of Syrian President Assad
probably would not alter Damascus's strategy in
Lebanon. Soviet attitudes do not influence Syrian
policy in Lebanon
Syrian leaders, in our view, do not expect an immedi-
ate solution to the Lebanese civil war and are willing
to tolerate continued fighting on a limited scale. We
do not believe Syria will be able to impose a compre-
hensive settlement on the Lebanese in the foreseeable
future. Damascus, therefore, will remain satisfied
with maintaining a rough balance of forces in Leba-
non. In our view, this short-term policy of keeping a
lid on the civil war without undertaking fundamental
reforms will become increasingly difficult if confes-
sional divisions within Lebanese society sharpen.
In our judgment, however, the Assad regime almost
certainly will not send Syrian troops back to Beirut in
the foreseeable future. The Syrians want to avoid war
with Israel, and any Syrian move toward reoccupying
Beirut might prompt an Israeli reaction. When the
Syrians occupied the city in 1976, the Israeli Army
was not in Lebanon, and there was little danger of an
Israeli military response. Damascus, moreover, has
developed its Lebanese and Palestinian assets to the
point where it has numerous policy options short of
direct Syrian intervention
Damascus will continue to deploy regular Syrian
forces in Lebanon but will prefer to use Palestinian
and Lebanese surrogates to achieve its objectives
there. In our view, most Lebanese Druze and Muslims
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We believe the Syrian Government will employ two
different strategies to deal with the Israeli occupation.
They will encourage and facilitate increasing Pales-
tinian and radical Shia terrorism against Israeli forces
in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Syrian
officials have said they would agree to indirect negoti-
ations between the Lebanese and Israeli Govern-
ments-through a third party-aimed at establishing
security arrangements for southern Lebanon,
Damascus, however,
will insist a the Lebanese refuse certain Israeli
demands, such as normalization of relations, perma-
nent Israeli observer posts, and the right to hot pursuit
in Lebanese territory.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, the Syrians possess the assets and
determination to prevent Israel and the United States
from reestablishing preeminent influence over the
Lebanese Government. Syria's Lebanese allies domi-
nate the Karami Cabinet, and President Gemayel is
unlikely to count on support from the United States
following the Marine withdrawal. Damascus, more-
over, could mobilize its assets in Lebanon to put
pressure on any Lebanese government that again
attempted to play an Israeli or American "card."
Nonetheless, the Syrians favor a US role in Lebanon
because they believe they will need US assistance to
end the Israeli occupation of the south. Syrian offi-
cials claim, both publicly and privately, that the
United States can still play a positive role in that area,
according to the US Embassy in Damascus. The
Syrian Foreign Minister told US officials in July that
Syria would like the United States to act as interme-
diary for indirect Lebanese-Israeli limited security
negotiations.
Syria's capability and determination to be the domi-
nant foreign power in Lebanon, however, imply that
future negotiations concerning Lebanon will fail un-
less they take Syrian interests into account. Security
concerns will compel Damascus to try to dictate both
Lebanese domestic and foreign policy, and the Syri-
ans are convinced that their demands will triumph
over those of any other foreign power.
9 Secret
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP85T00314R000300030007-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP85T00314R000300030007-0
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/27: CIA-RDP85T00314R000300030007-0