SUDAN: THE NIMEIRI REGIME UNDER PRESSURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 7, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of ret
('entral
Intelligence
Sudan: The Nimeiri Regime
Under Pressure
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Copy 2 2 8
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SUDAN: THE NIMEIRI REGIME
UNDER PRESSURE
Information available as of 1 March 1980 was
used in the preparation of this memorandum.
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Page
FOREWORD ............................................................................................................ 1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 5
Recent Historv \ ..................................................................................................... 5
The Nimeiri Regime ............................................................................................ 6
The Economic Challenge .................................................................................... 6
The Costs of Austerity .......................................................................................... 8
The Economic Outlook .......................................................................................... 9
Political Challenges .............................................................................................. 10
The Security Forces .............................................................................................. 13
Foreign Connections .............................................................................................. 14
Outlook .................................................................................................................. 15
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FOREWORD
This paper reviews recent developments in Sudan and assesses the
problems and prospects of the Nimeiri government over the next 12 to
18 months. Sudan recently has played an increasingly significant role in
the international relations of the Arab states and the countries in the
Horn of Africa. The country's domestic situation is shaky and any
repetition in 1980 of the serious rioting that occurred last August in
Khartoum will be dangerous for President Nimeiri and for the US
position there.
~.,.1~_~n.?.,
morandum was prepared ~ the National Intelligence
Officer for Af rica_, ith contributions from
N e ureau o ~ ritell`igence anal
Research of the Department of State, t e Def ense Intelligence Agency, c~?.~~C ~/~, ,
with Intelligence Community representatives at the working level..
an er-vlce. It has been coordinated
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political bounder Arab, fa
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The greater US~ role in the northwestern Indian Ocean area has
made it increasingly important from Washington's point of view to have
a friendly and moderate government in Khartoum. Sudanese President
Nimeiri's support for the Middle East peace process, in the face of
pressure from other Arab states, has also given his country a new
significance.
The most serious challenge to Nimeiri's regime is economic.
Despite international financial action, the economic outlook is bleak.
Serious shortages of consumer goods and a declining standard of living
could cause outbreaks of popular unrest and dissatisfaction within the
security forces-Nimeiri's main base of support-that could threaten
his government. The possibility of a commercial-size oil find, his
political skill, and the disunity of the opposition will improve his
prospects somewhat.
If Nimeiri were deposed, the military presumably would remain in
control, although it is possible that a successor regime would be
nominally civilian led. In either case, the successor regime would
probably identify less with US interests in the area and move some
distance toward the Arab consensus, especially with regard to policy
toward Egypt and the peace process. * A less likely alternative would be
a successor regime controlled by military officers who favored a closer
alignment with the hardline Arab states.
US ability to influence Sudanese policy depends primarily on how
the Sudanese perceive US resolve and strength. Sudan wants a strong
friend and military patron to counter threats it sees presented by the
USSR, Ethiopia, and Libya.
As Nimeiri's hope f or political survival over the short term depends
in part on his ability to have bread and flour on store shelves when the
traditional lean summer season arrives, probably the most important
thing that the United States could do to aid him in the near term would
be to increase food aid.
? For the views of the Defense Intelligence Agency on this sentence, see footnote 7 at paragraph 75 of
the Discussion section.
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DISCUSSION
Recent History
1. The significance of Sudan to the United States,
which has not been great in the past, has increased. Its
present importance stems from a combination of
geography, recent history, and the personality of
President Gaafar Nimeiri, its leader for the past 10
years. Since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
late 1979, the Sudanese role as an obstacle to the
expansion of Soviet influence in the region has become
especially important.
2. For most of its modern history, Sudan has been a
backwater-a refuge in times of trouble, or a territory
to be traversed on a Tourney to a farther destination. It
has been important to non-Sudanese mainly for its
relations with other lands-Egypt, at all times because
of the Nile; Zaire, when the "Congo rebels" used
Sudan as an arms pipeline in the 1960s; Chad, when
earlier in the 20th century the French were extending
their control and now when Paris is trying to preserve
some semblance of orderly administration there in the
face of Libyan machinations; Uganda, since the fall of
Idi Amin and the withdrawal of his partisans across
the Sudanese border; Ethiopia, since the Eritrean
rebels began in the 1960s to use Sudanese territory yet
again as a sanctuary to fight the Ethiopian central
government.
3. -Sudan was more or less openly unfriendly toward
the United States from the time of the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war, when it broke diplomatic relations, until
1972. At that time General Nimeiri, having survived a
Communist-led coup against him, began turning away
from the USSR, which had been providing Sudan with
extensive military equipment and some economic
assistance. Because of a coincidental cooling in Egyp-
tian-Soviet relations, Sudan and Egypt began to draw
together. Egyptian President Sadat's subsequent turn
toward the United States then laid the foundation
for aWashington-Cairo-Khartoum relationship, and
Nimeiri endorsed the Camp David accords. Many
Sudanese, however, mindful of past Egyptian at-
tempts to dominate their country, have remained
wary of closer relations with their northern
neighbor.
4. From the US standpoint, this endorsement ap-
peared to confirm Nimeiri in the role of a reasonable,
politically seasoned personality with whom the United
States could deal-a voice of moderation in a region of
chronic intemperance. Moreover, Nimeiri's support
for the Camp David accords assumed greater impor-
tance as it became evident that he was virtually alone
among Arab leaders in his willingness to associate
himself with Sadat publicly.
5. Since mid-1977, Nimeiri has moved to create a
more liberal political climate and provide opportuni-
ties for important tribal, religious, and political groups
to participate in public affairs. The 1978 elections to
the National Assembly and the Southern Regional
Assembly were relatively free of interference by the
regime. Party identification remains prohibited, how-
ever, and the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) is the sole
legal political organization. Press freedom is not com-
plete, but newspapers are permitted to criticize gov-
ernment policies and actions, although they are careful
not to attack Nimeiri directly. Despite these moves
toward greater political tolerance, Nimeiri is prepared
to move firmly against any serious challengers.
6. The deterioration in US relations with Ethiopia
has made Sudan more important to the United States
than previously. With the Ethiopian revolution of
1974 and the strengthening since 1976 of ties between
Ethiopia and the USSR (and of course Cuba), Sudan
has become geopolitically more important for the
West in the Horn of Africa. The complication here is
that Sudan has had a longstanding and in some
respects debilitating involvement in Ethiopian affairs.
For most of the past decade, the Nimeiri regime's
security organs have played host to various Ethiopian
insurgent groups and have supported their struggle
against the government in Addis Ababa. Sudan has
acted both on its own account to keep a large and
normally unfriendly neighbor weak, and as a conduit
for aid to the Eritreans from Arab states of both
moderate and radical stripes.
7. As long as Ethiopia could be counted in the
Western camp, Sudan's support for the Eritreans was a
point of disagreement with Washington, although the
United States acknowledged that the Eritreans had
legitimate complaints against Addis Ababa's adminis-
tration. Since 1977, when massive Soviet/Cuban mili-
tary aid began to arrive in Ethiopia, the Eritrean
guerrillas-and Sudan's support for them-have tend-
ed to become aspects of the larger problem of the
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threat to the Arabian Peninsula and the rest of Africa
posed by the Soviet presence in the northwestern
Indian Ocean region.
The Nimeiri Regime ,,
8. Nimeiri ~ today-nearly 11 years after the mili-
tary coup of 'May 1969-can claim a~ number of
successes in domestic and foreign policy. His political
longevity alone is ar- achievement: more than a decade
of one-man rule, in contrast to the revolving-door
leadership during the .previous 13 years of .Sudan's
independence. His effort to reconcile the many com-
peting groups within Sudanese society-Ansar vs.
Khatmiyyah ' sectarians, "Sudan firsters" vs. pro-
Egyptians, northerners vs. southerners, urban dwellers
vs. peasants, ideologues vs. pragmatists, military vs.
civilians-have inevitably fallen short of. full success.
But he has blunted these divisions by bringing all overt
political activity under a single party (the SSU), by
imposing his personal predominance on the discussion
of political issues, and by drawing on the Army to
provide relatively nonpartisan leadership.
9. Nimeiri has evolved into a shrewd political ma-
nipulator. H`e has developed techniques of alternating
repression with cooperation, and has kept his oppo-
nents off balance by frequent shakeups of his cabinet
,and senior military commanders. But his one-man rule
still has its foundations in the military, and he has paid
close attention to military pay and allowances, equip-
ment modernization, and personnel shifts. He also
instituted a concerted counterintelligence effort within
the officer corps, following 'the defection of some
officers to a Libyan- and Ethiopian-backed coup
attempt in 1976.
10. Nimeiri's tactics have served him and his coun-
try better in politics,. however, than in economics. In
this latter arena; one-man ~ rule and conciliation have
had the effect of focusing all. initiatives in the presi-
dency, and there has not been a realistic program:to
build on the foundations inherited from the colonial
period. "Socialist" experiments have burdened Sudan
with inefficient government factories, now viewed as
the preserve .of their directors and employees. At the
same time, Sudan has tended to become a country' of
' Sudan has two major religious sects: the: Mahdiyyah (followers of
the house of Mahdi, who are also known as Ansar), which claims the
loyalty of approximately one-fifth of all Sudanese; and the rival
Khatmiyyah (followers of the house of Mirgharii):~The Ansars have
traditionally resisted the spread of Egyptian influence in Sudan,
while the leaders of the Khatmiyyah have historically allied them-
selves with Egyptian goveinments.?
second- or third-rate business and professional talent
because of the superior rewards available to competent
Sudanese working in the wealthy states of the nearby
Arabian Peninsula. Sudan is now a country with
promising long-range prospects for agriculture and
possibly some kinds of industry. To realize this poten-
tial, however, Sudan needs massive investment for
basic infrastructure, especially transportation and
communications development. Aggravating the gen-
eral economic problems are the debt burden and
increasing current expenses, notably the rise in the
'price of imported oil.
11. Nimeiri must act to halt the steady decline in
the living standard of the average Sudanese. It will be
several years, however, before economic development
can start to pay significant political dividends. To
produce the kinds of economic benefits that would
have a timely political payoff; Nimeiri needs rich and
openhanded friends. Neither Egypt nor the United
States can meet all, or even most, of Sudan's financial
needs. Despite the moderate success of his foreign
policy during the 1970s, Nimeiri's bets on Cairo and
Washir-gton now look less attractive than they did
then. Sudan is almost completely dependent on an
Arab "dole," while the relationship with Egypt's Sadat
has been gradually isolating him within the Arab
world. Moreover, Sudan's search for Western arms has
been largely unproductive, while the Soviet arms
inventories of Libya and Ethiopia are burgeoning.
12. What Nimeiri is conducting today is a holding
operation, which may turn into a retreat if his internal
economic situation worsens further and if the interna-
tional environment in which he operates continues to
deteriorate.
The Economic Challenge
13. There have been periods during the past year
when the ability of the Nimeiri government to main-
tain aflow of basic supplies-food, petroleum prod-
ucts-was doubtful. While rail maintenance between
Port Sudan, the country's sole working port, and the
rest of the country has been neglected, the completion
this year of `a hard-surface road between the port and
the capital could significantly improve the Supply
situation.
14. Since at least 1975, Sudan has become gradually
less able to find the foreign exchange, either from
export sales or from borrowing, to pay for the goods
and services the country needs to sustain an acceptable
quality of life in the present, much less build for the
future. No reversal of this trend is likely soon, and
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Sudan probably will be facing a serious balance-of-
payments constraint on economic growth for the next
few years. Efforts by the Arab states to help out with
additional loans and rescheduling of existing debts
have been rather hesitant and sporadic; aid from the
International Monetary Fund, while it has required
politically painful but necessary adjustments, has been
more certain.
15. The impact of such adjustments on political
leaders probably produced deeper dismay than it
otherwise might have done because of high hopes that
had sprung out of contemporary political develop=
ments. In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
Western threats to withhold food supplies in retali-
ation for the Arab oil embargo sparked an Arab
"decision" to turn Sudan into the breadbasket of the
Arab world. Sudan indeed farms only 6.5 million of its
80 million arable hectares, and is virtually the only
Arab country where unused cultivable land is avail-
able in combination with favorable water resources
and climate.
16. But the program to expand agricultural produc-
tion has sputtered. The reasons have been various:
- Emphasis on investment in new projects meant
that money was not available for existing projects
and also that there was inadequate maintenance
and investment in the infrastructure.
- Emphasis on bringing into production irrigated
cereal crops, such as wheat, meant a loss of
export earnings from more immediately profit-
able crops such as cotton and peanuts.
-The bureaucracy pushed investment in public
corporations, with lots of new desk jobs, at the
expense of the private sector.
- Development was concentrated in the center of
the country, leaving high-potential areas in the
far west and south without the advantages.of
modernization.
- Livestock development, with its potential for
export earnings from meat and meat products,
was given a low priority in favor of crop
production.
17. Had import costs remained stable, the program
nevertheless might have had a chance. Receipts from
exports did rise briskly for about three years, though
more because of favorable prices than larger volumes;
and increasing current account transfers-owing in
large part to .remittances from Sudanese working
abroad-helped offset trade deficits. At the same time,
however, the cost of petroleum soared (as did the costs
of servicing the government's foreign debt), import
requirements for the development program increased,
and prices of manufactured imports went up.
18. FY 1979 (Sudanese fiscal years run from 1 July
to 30 June) was a disaster. The current account deficit
was a record $590 million. (See table 1.) A reduced
volume of exports of cotton and oilseeds-down about
20 percent because of fertilizer shortages and late
planting due to flooding-combined with soft world
prices for cotton to cut export earnings by 6 percent.
At the same time, the rising prices of imports resulted
in a trade deficit of $800 million for 1979.
19. On the domestic side of the economy, financing
the cost of development produced its own complica-
tions. Growing budget deficits-from $83 million in
1973 to $572 million in 1977-were increasingly
financed through local bank borrowing. Whereas the
Sudan: Balance of Payments, FY 1975-79
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domestic banks financed only 12 percent of the deficit
of FY 1975, they underwrote 83 percent in 1977.
Although efforts were subsequently made to reverse
these trends, they had already made their contribution
to inflation.
20. It has now been about 18 months since Sudan
accepted the first of the programs negotiated with the
International Monetary Fund to try to redress the
country's severe economic problem. At the same time,
the six-year development plan (1977-83) was scrapped
in favor of a more conservative three- year plan (1978-
81). The IMF's initial one-year "stabilization" pro-
gram called fora 20-percent devaluation of the Suda-
nese pound, a reduced rate of increase in government
current expenditures, and a reversal of agricultural
policy to favor export crops, particularly cotton,
chiefly at the expense of wheat.
21. In May 1979 a US-supported three-year IMF
program was adopted, consolidating some of these
reforms. The new Sudanese development plan re-
sponds to these requirements by cutting overall pro-
posed development expenditures by 16 percent in real
terms-to $1.76 billion-from the corresponding
years of the scrapped six-year plan. The new plan
emphasizes completing projects under way and im-
proving existing facilities instead of undertaking fresh
starts. It also focuses on eliminating road and rail
bottlenecks. The FY 1980 operating budget tried to
keep within IMF limits, but its initial projection of a
$230 million surplus should be viewed with skepti-
cism. (See table 2.)
22. Finally, a basic policy shift in favor of the
private sector was announced _last September. Many
foreign exchange controls have been lifted, various
taxes and surcharges reduced, and exchange rate
adjustments have been made to stimulate some spe-
cific kinds of trade. These measures, which are gener-
ally popular with the local trading community, also
offset to some degree the unpopularity of austerity
policies that result from the IMF program.
The Costs of Austerity
23. Because the Nimeiri government began with a
military coup and is dependent on the will of the
military for protection against fresh coup attempts (as
most recently in 1976), one of the first areas of
concern is the impact of austerity on the military
budget. In absolute terms, measured in current US
dollars, the defense budget has more than doubled
since 1975, but the bulk of that increase came between
1975 and 1977. As a percentage of the government's
Sudan: Central Government Current Budget
for 197980, as Proposed in June 1979
' Includes only current expenditures. Capital expenditures are
not yet available and probably exceed the $230 million surplus in
current budget account.
overall budget and of gross national product, the
military's share of the budget in 1979 was virtually the
same as in 1975.
24. While the allocation of funds to separate serv-
ices and functions is not known precisely, the budget
appears to be barely adequate to cover the pay and
allowances of a 71,100-man force, plus some limited
operational costs, but no new equipment. Procurement
of major items of equipment will depend on foreign
aid. The loyalty and responsiveness of the security
forces remain critically important to the regime. Al-
though Nimeiri has paid special attention to the needs
of military personnel, most Sudanese officers and men
are part of an extended family and they are keenly
aware of the social costs of austerity.
25. In the summer of 1979, the government at-
tempted to meet IMF demands for reduction of
current outlay by reducing subsidies on such key
consumer items as bread, sugar, liquor, cigarettes, and
petroleum. Steep price rises followed immediately,
and there has been a general cost-of-living increase,
now estimated at a minimum of 40 percent. (See table
3.) The prices of other imported goods were boosted
by the currency devaluation.
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Sudan: Price Changes During 1979 for
Commodities and Utilities
Commodity
Price Changes
Date Implemented
Bread
40-percent increase
11 June
Flour
127-percent increase
11 June
Sugar
33-percent increase
26 June
Liquor
56-percent increase
26 June
Cigarettes
21-percent increase
26 June
Electricity
60-percent increase for residential users, with
1 July
increase of 150 percent in minimum charge.
For heavy industries, 65 percent higher in non-
ceak ceriods and up to 300 percent higher in peak
ceriods.
Water
Petroleum
Increase of 75-300 percent
Kerosene, 75-percent increase; gasoline, 70-cer-
1 July
4 August
cent increase; and diesel fuel, more than 70-
percent increase.
Gasoline prices decrease in regular by 37 percent
13 August
and super by 25 percent.
26. Also in keeping with IMF requirements, the
costs to consumers of such services as electricity,
water, and transportation were raised substantially
during the summer months, when demand was espe-
cially strong.2 At the same time, the government felt
compelled to renege on wage boosts promised public
sector employees for mid-1979 under a scheme adopt-
ed ayear earlier. Although some wage increases have
subsequently been granted to certain workers, the
standard of living of the middle class, which includes
military officers and bureaucrats, has steadily declined
as wage increases have fallen behind inflation.
27. Adding to Sudan's burdens is an influx, coming
in spurts over recent_ years, of refugees-a third of
whom are estimated to have located in urban areas.
Most of the official refugees are Eritreans from Ethio-
pia or Ugandans who were associated in some way
with the former Amin regime. Taken together, these
are variously estimated to number between 340,000
and 442,000.3 (See table 4. )
Q From the standpoint of daily life, one of the most serious
aggravations besides costs is the frequent shortage of water and
power in Khartoum and other maior cities. In an effort to alleviate
the shortage of electric power in residential areas of the capital, the
government has begun rationing industrial users, but the effect of
this action so far has been to cripple the local industrial sector with
lost production and spoilage-not to mention workers idled-
without improving the situation in the homes.
' The UN High Commission for Refugees uses the lower figure;
the Sudanese Government the higher.
28. Camps overcrowded with people underem-
ployed and inadequately fed are more than an eco-
nomic burden. The refugees are a drain on military
personnel required to monitor their activities, because
they are often active dissidents against their home
governments and potential sources of weapons for
Sudanese dissidents. Efforts to relocate the refugees-
especially those in the Khartoum area, where their
activities are especially sensitive politically-are also
costly and occasionally even result in military
casualties.
The Economic Outlook
29. As a result of actions by the international
financial community-public and private institu-
tions-Sudan has been given atwo-year breathing
Refugees in Sudan, by Nationality'
Nationality Number
Chadian ................................................................ 1,000
Eritrean ................................................................ 280,000
Other Ethiopian .................................................. 23,000
Ugandan ? ............................................................ 35,000
Zairian .................................................................. 5,000
' Estimates of UN High Commission on Refugees.
= Sudanese Government estimates 133,000.
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spell, but little more.* It remains questionable whether
the benefits of the breathing spell will be sufficiently
visible and timely to be of much use politically. '
30. Serious shortages will remain for the short term
and may become more acute unless Saudi and other
foreign aid is increased to cover increasing imports.
Foreign exchange reserves are now equivalent to less
than one week's imports of fuel, foodstuffs, and other
consumer goods. The inadequate transportation net-
work continues to hinder distribution, especially dur-
ing the rainy season when rail traffic, which crawls at
50-percent capacity under the best conditions, is dis-
rupted and road transport becomes impossible. These
problems may well be compounded by bureaucracy,
because the government has taken complete control of
the composition of all imports in an effort to assure
that only essentials come in, and import permits are
now difficult (and probably expensive in bribes) to
obtain.
31. New programs are under way to improve agri-
cultural production, to alleviate the problems of out-
moded and inadequate infrastructure, and to provide
better basic support for the growth of industries. There
is a possibility of a commercial-size oil find, although
it would take some years for actual production to
begin. With the exception of the road link between
Khartoum and Port Sudan, none of these efforts is
likely to produce actual returns within the next two
years, although the oil prospects would increase Su-
dan's creditworthiness.
32. Agricultural exports are not expected: to recover
to previous levels for several years, and this year's late
rainy season delayed planting of next year's cotton
crop, the main export earner. (See the accompanying
figure.) The outlook for the industrial sector is bleaker
than that for agriculture. Productivity levels dropped
further with last summer's power outages, and two to
three years will be needed before additional thermal
power plants can begin to come on stream, while
planned hydroelectric projects are still 10 years away.
' The meeting of the "Paris Club" in November 1979 formulated
a plan for rescheduling Sudan's government-backed external debt
and payments of arrears. Sudan will be given a moratorium of three
years on 85 percent of the debts falling due between October 1979
and mid-1981. Approximately $190 million of debt obligations to
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have already been rescheduled (in mid-
1978). Commercial banks are also expected to make rescheduling
arrangements, although negotiations could be protracted. Payments
of official debt arrears-estimated by the IMF at $1.3 billion-will
be staggered over a period of seven years beginning as of October
197x.
33. Substantial inflows of fresh funds (as distinct
from arrangements for postponing repayment of exist-
ing debt, helpful though this is) will be required to
give the Sudanese a renewed sense that their economy
is moving favorably and confidence that the Nimeiri
regime knows where it is going for a longer haul. At
present, the only visible sources of such funds in the
quantities required are other Arab governments, even
if Sudan's own oil potential should suddenly prove out
in a large way. As no Arab leader could argue
convincingly that Sudan is a good short-term invest-
ment from a purely economic point of view, Arab aid
for the next two to three years will be a highly political
question, almost certainly tied in with Arab attitudes
toward Egypt, the USSR, and the United States.
Political Challenges
34. Although the steady economic decline could
bottom out in 1980 or 1981, Nimeiri almost certainly
faces the prospect of antigovernment strikes and other
forms of protest'in the coming months. Some of these
manifestations may well follow the pattern of the
demonstrations of August 1979, which, while small by
grander revolutionary standards, appear to have been
a close call in terms of the willingness of the second
echelon of leadership in the civil service, .the .police,
and the military to come forward and actively defend
the regime.
35. The 1979 challenge to the regime culminating
in the August disorders was orchestrated and manipu-
lated by the Sudan Communist Party, long known as
the best organized and largest.such group in either the
Arab states or Africa. The party had been severely
damaged by the arrest of many of its members and the
execution of its top officials following the abortive
coup of 1971, but it has substantially regained its
strength since Nimeiri "liberalized" the political sys-
tem in mid-1977. As of mid-1979, its membership was
estimated at about .15,000; its strategic significance,
however, is greater because of its historical core base
in the Sudan Railway Workers Union, which has the
capability of seriously disrupting the economy.
36. The SCP is kept under heavy surveillance by
the government's security organs .and is periodically
harassed by police action. Party.leaders appear to have
accepted, therefore, that the party is too weak to'try to
seize power by itself, and have sotight in recent years
to loin with other elements in an anti-Nimeiri front. If
the Communists succeeded in this, the government
would indeed face a dangerous situation, but such a
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Major Crop Yields in Sudan, 1974-79
I ~ ~ ~ ~
1974/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79
50
78/79 1974/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79
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success, under Communist inspiration, seems unlikely
during the next year or so. Because of its strategic
placement in the economic apparatus, however, the
party's long-range goal of promoting such disruption
that Nimeiri would be forced by others to step down
should be taken more seriously.
37. From the standpoint of numbers, the conserva-
tive Muslim Ansar sect, which claims the allegiance of
about a fifth of Sudan's 17 million people, probably
constitutes the most formidable body of disaffection
from the present government. For the members of this
sect, Nimeiri's military regime represents a deviation
from legitimacy, and is blamed for the death of their
leader Imam al-Nadi al-Mahdi, who was killed in a
clash with the Army in 1970. Nevertheless the Ansar
sect has lost some of its appeal to the educated youth.
38. The present Ansar leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, plays
vis-a-vis the government a role that he defines as that
of "a reconciled nonparticipant." During the disorders
last August, he told his followers to stay aloof. Sadiq's
program is traditionalist and anything but dramatic-
he calls for a regime of reconciliation on a more
specifically Islamic basis than Nimeiri has adopted; for
increased attention to social justice in economic policy
and practice; and for a foreign policy that would put
Sudan into the Arab mainstream. Sadiq has taken
money from Libya and from the Saudis, but he
himself has recently spoken against outside interfer-
ence in Sudan's affairs. The Ansar stance is not hostile,
but it does not provide positive support to the govern-
ment as long as Sadiq refuses to participate. At the
same time, moreover, Nimeiri must tread carefully
lest he move the sect into active opposition.
39. The Muslim Brotherhood, which is more mili-
tantly Islamic, is significant despite its apparently
small membership because of its mass appeal and its
willingness to use intimidation against its enemies and
rivals. It is the most conservative of all of the orga-
nized Islamic groups in Sudan. It is independent of the
Brotherhood in Egypt, although it was influenced by
the Egyptian organization early in its history. It has
appealed for a revival of Islamic awareness in Sudan
and probably hopes to profit from the upsurge in
Islamic fundamentalism that has accompanied the
revolution in Iran.
40. Nimeiri has been able to co-opt the head of the
Brotherhood, Hasan al-Turabi, who became an Assist-
ant Secretary General in Nimeiri's umbrella Sudan
Socialist Union in July 1978 and was appointed Attor-
ney General last August. Cooperating with the govern-
ment, however, is an anomalous position for the
Brotherhood; its members have been predominantly
students and faculty at Khartoum University who find
permanent opposition more congenial. Despite the
presence of Turabi in the government, the regime
regards the Brotherhood as a clandestine organization
and maintains a close watch on its activities.
41. Turabi is reported under a cloud for his collabo-
ration with the government. The Brotherhood was
defeated in elections held during the fall of 1979 for
control of the Khartoum University student union, and
the loss has not helped Turabi's image. During the
coming year, the Brotherhood could desert its compro-
mising leaders or force them into active opposition.
Not surprisingly, a particular point of difference with
Nimeiri has been his support for Sadat and Camp
David.
42. Nimeiri's major failure in conciliation has been
the stubborn refusal of Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, the
head of the National Unionist Party, to enter the
government's tent. The NUP, which is illegal as are all
other parties in Sudan, reflects the outlook of the
better educated-and more secular-merchants, civil
servants, and professionals who, on the one hand,
oppose the traditional conservative forces in the coun-
try and, on the other, feel deprived by the military
regime of their rightful places of leadership and
influence.
43. The NUP thus contains a broad accumulation of
anti-Nimeiri sentiment, and on occasions in the past it
has supplemented its own numbers by alliance with
the Khatmiyyah religious fraternity-a sectarian rival
of both the Ansar and the Muslim Brotherhood. Some
80 of the 304 members of the last National Assembly
are believed to be members of the party and thus
subscribers, in some degree, to al-Hindi's current
melange of radical Arab nationalism, "confrontation,"
"intellectual awakening," and undefined measures of
"scientific socialism." The NUP's organization is poor,
however, and al-Hindi remains in exile.
44. Al-Hindi at one time depended on Libyan
money, which dried up in early 1979 when Libyan
leader Qadhafi mended fences with Nimeiri as part of
continuing efforts to isolate Egypt. Now the NUP's
foreign financial support comes from Iraq. This, along
with obvious ideological affinity, has led al-Hindi into
a paper alliance with the Sudanese branch of the
Bath.
45. The Bath-the Arab Socialist Resurrection
Party, a Pan-Arab revolutionary movement-has
probably fewer than a thousand actual members,
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compartmented into cells. As of late 1979, Sudanese
security officials regarded the NUP-Ba'th alliance as
their most serious problem. They were especially
concerned over a reported effort, backed by the Iraqis,
to build a paramilitary terrorist capability, which is
already said to involve 100 to 200 individuals. Like the
Muslim Brotherhood, the Sudanese Ba'thists tend to
see violent action against individuals as clearing the
way for a righteous society; unlike the Brotherhood,
their vision is secular Arab nationalist, not Islamic.
46. All of these groups have attacked Nimeiri for
his inability to manage the economy successfully and
for his decision to associate Sudan, not merely with
Egypt, but with a "corrupt Egyptian regime which has
itself sold out to the Zionists." This is the opposition's
common theme and the basis of its present appeal.
Nimeiri's critics also contend that the nation's eco-
nomic difficulties stem less from Sudan's historic
poverty or a short-term limitation on resources than
from the rejection of Nimeiri by the wealthy Arab
governments. The idea is gaining currency that Sudan
could be saved by the rich Arabs, but that they will not
come to Nimeiri's aid while he is aligned with Sadat.
47. On Nimeiri's side, his effort to moderate the
regime's authoritarian image and provide some vehi-
cle for political groups to participate in public affairs
has had only limited success. While his creation, the
Sudan Socialist Union, has worked in some measure as
a device for conciliation and the SSU leadership is in
theory chosen by elections through several levels, most
Sudanese look on it as being manipulated from above
because it is the country's sole legal political organiza-
tion and Nimeiri's more obvious opponents are
screened out of the process The SSU acts to some
extent as a safety valve, and this is useful to Nimeiri,
but it provides no marching formations with which .
Nimeiri's opponents could be confronted in the street.
For that, he relies on the Army.
48. In addition to Nimeiri's problem with Sudan's
opposition groups, the "southern problem" remains a
potential cause of domestic turmoil. The politics of the
south would have little to do with Khartoum were it
not for the fact that the ineffectiveness of the southern
autonomous administration-strapped for funds even
more severely than the central government-and the
corruption allegations bandied about in the southern
legislative assembly in effect tarnish one of Nimeiri's
great achievements, the ending of the long civil war
between the central government and southern guerril-
las in 1972.
49. Given the intractable nature of the south's
problems, Nimeiri will continue to face the dilemma
that central government action there will be seen as
subverting autonomy, while leaving the solution to the
southerners will both perpetuate the impression that
Nimeiri's regime is neglecting the region and in all
likelihood further divide the southerners themselves.
50. An associated potential problem is a revival of
the Anya-Nya insurgency in the south, although there
is nothing that could be called an active insurgency in
Sudan at the present time. The Anya-Nya bands that
refused to accept the agreement ending the civil war
remain based in Ethiopia, which uses them somewhat
haphazardly as a counter to Sudan's harboring of
Eritrean guerrillas, and there is some evidence that the
Anya-Nya have again been infiltrating into Sudan in
search of food and fresh recruits. The threat from
these groups is likely to remain low, unless the central
government badly mishandles its relations with the
south, or the Ethiopians become much more active in
their support.
51. Despite these problems, most southerners trust
Nimeiri and regard him as the guarantor of the 1972
settlement that ended the civil war. We doubt that the
settlement will break down as long as he is in power.
But a successor government of almost any stripe would
alarm the south.
The Security Forces
52. Since he took power in the 1969 coup, the
security forces have been Nimeiri's essential pillar of
support. Consequently, Nimeiri will attend to his
principal power base by making major efforts to
minimize dissatisfaction in the security forces. Despite
the continuing professions of loyalty, we are beginning
to see signs of an erosion of support for Nimeiri among
police and military officers.
53. The Sudanese police have been poor cousins to
their military counterparts. This derives from the
lower esteem in which they are held by the public and
their lower scale of salaries and benefits. The arbitrary
dismissal of senior police officers in the fall of 1979,
together with Nimeiri's procrastination over approval
of recommendations for improving police benefits, has
generated increasing dissatisfaction in the force.
54. In the Army there is little evidence of discon-
tent among senior and middle-grade officers; however,
there are signs that morale among junior officers has
fallen significantly. Although professional concern for
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equipment modernization is important to the Suda-
nese officer corps, increased pay to compensate for
rising inflation generally is the overriding issue. More=
over, junior officers' morale has been particularly
affected by new regulations that significantly extend
the time they must remain in grade before they are
eligible for promotion. Their frustrations are increased
by their perceptions of declining social status vis-a-vis
other members of the middle class. There has recently
been more open complaining, which appears to a
significant extent to be focused personally on the
President. We have no evidence of active opposition,
however.
55. Nimeiri knows of the discontent and is aware of
the danger it represents. Unless the issue of compensa-
tion is settled, we believe that active opposition to
Nimeiri in the armed forces and police will surface
during the coming year. Political opposition to Nimeiri
would probably attempt to exploit the President's
weakness if it became apparent that loyalty of the
security services had declined.
Foreign Connections
56. One of Nimeiri's strengths in the past has been
his recognition that Sudan's situation calls for balance
in its foreign relationships. He has sought to stand
between the Arab world and black Africa, between
factions within the Arab world, and between East and
West. He has repeatedly accepted the role of mediator
in the hope that this would help neutralize outside
attempts to exploit one or another of Sudan's chronic
divisions (particularly the southern problem). Geogra-
phy and history have tied Sudan closely to Egypt, yet
Nimeiri tries to retain flexibility in his relations with
anti-Egyptian Arab states.
57. In the East-West context, Nimeiri seeks to stay
on good terms with as many countries as possible in
order to get aid. There has been. a recent increase, in
fact, in trade and aid from Eastern Europe, but,
among Communist countries, China remains the major
economic and military aid donor.
58. Only in the Soviet-US context has Nimeiri made
a clear, sharp choice-trying to align Sudan with the
United States and to develop relations as close as
Washington will permit. He has attempted to reduce
the Soviet presence in Sudan to a minimum, although
there is a potential for renewed Soviet influence in the
large amount of Soviet weaponry in Sudanese arsenals.
59. Sudan's relationship to Egypt almost certainly
will be the central, probably the determining, factor in
its ties to other foreign governments during the next
year to 18 months. Unless there is significant move-
ment in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process that could
serve to reduce other Arab pressure on Nimeiri, or
alternatively to -make him ,less vulnerable to such
pressure, relations between Khartoum and Cairo are
likely to become progressively more strained during
this period.
60. Sadat and Nimeiri share many ideas, particular-
ly concerning the Middle East and the Horn of Africa,
and this commonality of outlook is not likely to
change. In addition, Nimeiri is indebted to S'adat for
Egyptian assistance; following the Libyan- and Ethio-
pian-backed coup of July 1976, the two leaders signed
a mutual defense agreement. Nimeiri thus has a lively
sense of his need for Egyptian support in a crisis, and
he will seek to avoid taking steps that would seriously
jeopardize the Egyptian security commitment or,
worse, turn Sadat against him.
61. Nevertheless, in the closing weeks of 1979
Nimeiri felt obliged to begin to distance himself from
Sadat on the peace process issue. He attended the Arab
summit in Tunis, and evidently made some at least
temporizing promises to the Arab confrontationists
there. He has permitted Sudanese officials and jour-
nalists publicly to criticize .Egyptian policy in the
Middle East, and in December reduced Sudanese
representation in Cairo to the charge d'affaires level.
62. Nimeiri's current position appears to be that he
supports a peace process that is moving toward satisfy-
ing Palestinian aspirations in some form; he does not
support a process that merely takes Egypt out of the
Arab front against Israel. While Nimeiri would con-
tend that this posture is consistent with the support he
previously gave Sadat, it clearly marks a shift toward
appeasement of his foreign as well as domestic critics.
63. To date, Sadat's overt reaction to Nimeiri's
moves has been restrained. Sudan's alignment with
Egypt at this time is of great importance to the
Egyptians, and Sadat would not wish to push Nimeiri
out of the tent. At the same time, Sadat is not above
trying to exert counterpressures through Egypt's com-
mercial and political contacts in Sudan. If it should
appear to Sadat that Nimeiri was in fact defecting
from a pro-Egyptian position, Sadat could, among
other things, try to revive old relations with the
Khatmiyyah. It is doubtful that Sadat would actually
try to overthrow Nimeiri.
64. Since about 1974, the wealthy Arab moder-
ates-particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
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Emirates, and Kuwait-have provided critical finan-
cial assistance for Nimeiri's economic and military
programs and more recently have sent oil. Nimeiri's
domestic programs of reconciliation with his conserva-
tive Muslim opponents have been undertaken in part
to please these foreign moderates. Moreover, moderate
Arab pressure has been an important factor in
Nimeiri's recent moves to distance Sudan from Egyp-
tian policy.
65. The Saudis and their associates, however, are
limited in how far they can move Nimeiri. While in
theory they might look with favor on the idea of a
more forthrightly Islamic government in Khartoum,
they are acutely aware of the danger that a new
Sudanese government might look more toward Iraq,
whose prestige is growing, or even toward Libya.
During the next year or so, the Saudis are likely to
continue the hide-and-seek game they have been
playing with Nimeiri and the United States over
financing new military equipment-reminding
Nimeiri of his dependence and of his need to maintain
Arab credentials, but not trying to oust Nimeiri or
force him into a complete break with Sadat against his
own sense of Sudan's interest.
66. One or more of the Arab radicals, particularly
Libya's mercurial Qadhafi, could well seek to subvert
Nimeiri. But if Nimeiri can sustain the program of
reconciliation with the Islamic conservatives, Libya's
ability to set them against Nimeiri will remain more
limited than it was in 1976. The Iraqis' objective
would appear to be less to oust Nimeiri than to push
him substantially further along the course he is already
taking vis-a-vis Sadat.
67. There is little prospect for a fundamental
change in relations between Sudan and Ethiopia as
long as the Eritrean insurgency remains active. Sudan
cannot abandon the Eritreans without offending their
Arab supporters, who in this case include the Iraqis as
well as moderate Arabs. As long as Nimeiri perceives a
danger that the Eritrean conflict will spill across
Sudan's borders, we believe he will continue to seek a
negotiated settlement. If by chance a settlement in
Eritrea were achieved during the next 18 months,
Nimeiri would still perceive a threat from Soviet-
backed Ethiopia.
68. Relations between the USSR and Sudan are
strained. The Soviets would, of course, welcome a
change of regime in Sudan. It seems unlikely, howev-
er, that they would work directly to overthrow
Nimeiri during the next year or so, although their
willingness to intervene subtly, if they are able, should
not be discounted. Moscow has no particular reason to
get out front when economic and political pressures on
Nimeiri appear to be working for it in any event.
69. US actions may have some significant effect on
Nimeiri's survivability, although a good deal depends
on the general perception in Africa and the Middle
East of US power and Washington's willingness to
project it. Even though US aid-both economic and
military-is unlikely by itself to solve Nimeiri's most
pressing problems, its symbolic value is probably
substantial.s (See tables 5 and 6.) So long as the United
States remains identified with an Egyptian-Israeli
entente that is perceived as damaging to Sudan, and
US aid does not compensate for the assistance being
withheld by the Saudis and others, identification with
the United States becomes a liability. A more active
US policy in the Horn and adjacent Indian Ocean
areas would, on balance, work to Nimeiri's benefit, but
if it were perceived as anti-Muslim or anti-Arab it
would carry costs for him.
Outlook
70. The next 12 to 18 months will be a period of
sometimes acute danger for Nimeiri. Given foreign
support, he will probably make it through the period,
but it will be close. The absence of easy answers to the
economic challenges is central, because of the impact
on Nimeiri's support in the military and police.
71. Active opposition to Nimeiri in the armed
forces and police will probably surface in the next year
unless some means is devised to insulate these elements
from the effects of inflation and the shortages of
consumer goods. Nimeiri knows what the problem is,
and he is aware of the discontent, focused in large part
on him personally, that it has created. We expect that
he will take measures to diffuse the discontent by
attempting to increase military compensation and by
making personal gestures to promote the identification
of the troops with their President.
' From 1972 until 1978, disbursement of US official development
aid to Sudan averaged more than $4 million per year, with thc~
highest being $10 million in 1978. Although disbursement data for
1979 are unavailable, total US aid commitments were estimated at
$29.65 million-$24.2 million in economic aid, $5 million in foreign
military sales (FMS) credits, and $450,000 in international military
education and training (IMET). US aid proposed for 1980 totals
$120.5 million. This would include $25 million in FMS, $1.7 million
in the Military Assistance Program (MAP), and $500,000 in IMET.
In addition, $93.3 million in economic aid-$40.0 million from the
Economic Support Fund (ESF), $23.1 million under PL480, and
$30.2 million in development assistance-is proposed.
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Net Disbursements of Economic Aid to Sudan From Major Donors, 1972-79'
Arab states
Bilateral
Of which:
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Multilateral'
?
-
-
-
-
a
-
-
-
-
86
49
9
-
37
50
36
25
7
14
263
231
165
22
32
118
102
67
13
16
244 -
228 367
125 298
38 63
16 + ?
Western states?
37
43
54
110
114
109
172 ?
Bilateral
10
17
33
60
54
56
112 ?
Of which:
West Germany
9
9
21
34
23
15
38 ?
Netherlands
-
1
4
4
9
20
16 ?
United Kingdom
United States
Multilateral ?
2
1
27
2
3
26
3
4
21
6
8
50
13
-1 '
60
9
4
53
? ?
10 ?
60 + '
'Bilateral and multilateral aid that includes a grant element in excess of 25 percent. Communist countries (mainly China) are minor donors,
having disbursed only $126 million in economic aid during 1954-78.
? Aid negligible prior to October 1973 oil price hike.
' Agencies financed by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries.
' Estimated.
? Data not available.
? Includes Japan and the leading Western aid donors: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
' Servicing of aid debt surpassed new aid inflows.
? Aid disbursement data are not available on a calendar year basis; aid commitments will increase in FY 1980 by 150 percent (to $90
million) over the previous year.
? Mainly aid disbursed from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United Nations.
Military Deliveries to Sudan, 1972-79
10.0
8.8 '
' Financed by Saudi Arabia or Kuwait and/or donated to Sudan through grant assistance.
Includes $86 million delivery of six US C-130 transport aircraft, financed by Saudi Arabia.
72. Nimeiri's tightrope act in foreign policy will
become even trickier (again barring a breakthrough in
the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations). He may find it
necessary to move cautiously toward the Arab consen-
sus, although this trend could be delayed by pressure
from Cairo and/or a more muscular US regional
policy.
Million US $
- 4.0 -
3.5' 1.0' 23.5'
116.0'?P 57.0' 1.8
73. Nimeiri is not likely during this period to be
ousted by indigenous nonmilitary political elements
working alone. A serious civilian conspiracy against
him would have to have significant foreign support-
from Libya or Egypt most probably-to overcome
Nimeiri's remaining hold on the Sudanese military.
This judgment assumes that Nimeiri takes the steps
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and positions outlined in the preceding paragraphs. If
he does not, or if the winds blow even harder on him
than we now forecast, the United States should be
prepared to see the emergence of an alternative
regime.
74. The most likely possibility is another military
coup. If the Sudanese should take to the streets, either
spontaneously or at the instigation of one or more
opposition groups, the security forces might be faced
with the prospect of large-scale civilian casualties to
maintain order. In such a situation, military leaders,
possibly including First Vice President Khalil,e would
likely step in to depose Nimeiri. Should a coup result
in the installation of a nominal civilian regime under
military control, the odds probably favor Ansar leader
Sadiq al-Mahdi as titular head of government.
76. A less likely alternative is a successor regime
controlled by military officers who favor a closer
alignment with the radical Arab states. If this hap-
pened, at least for a period the situation would be even
more confused, and the decline of US influence would
be more abrupt. There would very likely be efforts
from Cairo to reverse the situation by threats, money,
and subversion-possibly intervention under cover of
the mutual defense agreement. If these efforts failed,
there would be major shifts in Sudan's domestic and
foreign policies-an identification with the Arab hard-
liners and a revival of "Arab socialism." The Commu-
nists would be unlikely to gain much directly beyond
an opportunity for more open propaganda and agita-
tion, although Sudan's relations with the USSR would
probably improve as the regime sought to offset any
lingering US influence.
75. Under either type of regime there might be
some shift toward greater Islamization in domestic
policy, but not so much as to disturb the delicate
north-south balance. In foreign policy, a successor
government would probably identify less closely with
US interests in the area and move some distance
toward the Arab consensus, especially with regard to
the policies toward Egypt and the peace process.'
Sudan's probable continuing lack of trust of the USSR
and desire for US aid would make it wary of taking
stands widely at variance with US regional interests,
however, unless it believed that the United States had
opted out of serious involvement in the region.
6 Lt. Gen. Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil was named First Vice
President by Nimeiri in August 1979 in an effort to appease Army
critics of the regime. Khalil is a highly competent career military
officer who previously served as Chief of Staff and Minister of
Defense. His efforts to improve the efficiency of the armed forces
have made him popular with junior officers, but have offended
senior commanders who regard him as arrogant and overly demand-
ing. He is strongly pro-US and approves of Nimeiri's support of
President Sadat and the Middle East peace negotiations and, even if
he came to power via a coup, probably would continue Nimeiri's
policies in these areas.
' The Defense Intelligence Agency considers it less likely than
this sentence would suggest that a successor military regime would
move away from US interests and toward an "Arab consensus." DIA
agrees that economic factors are likely to be a major motivation in a
possible overthrow of Nimeiri. DIA believes it probable that a new
military regime would be disposed to follow Nimeiri's foreign
policy, that it would not jeopardize Sudan's security relationship
with Egypt or its economic relationship with Saudi Arabia. Should a
new regime come to Sudan because of social upheaval, DIA believes
the Saudis would be so concerned about Sudanese stability that they
would not press Sudan for foreign policy advantages.
77. In the event that Nimeiri left the presidency
because of retirement or accidental death, the succes-
sion would likely follow the constitutional prescrip-
tion: Khalil would assume the presidency pending new
elections within 60 days. He also would be in the best
position to influence the outcome of the election and
to receive the electoral mandate. To broaden his base
of support in Nimeiri's tradition of reconciliation, it i.s
possible that Khalil would call on Sadiq al-Mahdi to
lead the cabinet as prime minister; however, Khalil
would be unlikely to grant Sadiq, or any other politi-
cian, real independence.
78. In the event of a constitutional succession,
Khalil would not differ significantly with Nimeiri on
policy toward Egypt and close ties would remain. As
with Nimeiri, Khalil would rely heavily on the securj-
ty services for support, particularly the Army. The
degree with which they are considered and cared for
would be most important for the survival of any
successor regime.
79. US ability to influence Sudanese policy protr
ably depends primarily on how the Sudanese perceive
US resolve and strength. The Sudanese want a strong
friend and military patron to counter the threat that
they see presented by the Soviets, Ethiopians, and
Libyans; all segments of Sudanese society, however, at
present are doubtful of US will and reliability. To a
somewhat lesser extent, US influence in Sudan is
dependent on the achievement of a breakthrough on
Palestinian autonomy in the Middle East peace negoti-
ations and on US ability to persuade the Arab moder-
ates to reduce the pressure on Sudan.
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80. US aid to Sudan is also a significant factor in when the traditional lean summer season arrives,
shaping Sudanese views. Since Nimeiri's hope for probably the most important thing that the United
political survival over the short term depends in part States could do to aid Nimeiri in the:near term would
on his ability to have bread and flour on store shelves be to increase food aid.
18
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/20 :CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190008-1