SIG MEETING SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R000300380012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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REMNE?FROM-66CUMENTS THANKS...
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Date
3637 (t041)
ExeUtive Secretary
5 June 1986
Date
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STAT
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8617383
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
June 4, 1986
UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRET Attachment)
Senior Interagency Group No. 54
TO OVP
NSC
CIA
Defense
JCS
- Mr. Donald P. Gregg
- Mr. Rodney McDa,1
- COL James Lemon
- CDR Manfred Karlisch
SUBJECT: SIG Meeting Summary of Conclusions
Executive Registry
86- 2008X/1
Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the SIG Meeting
on Humanitarian Assistance for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
held on Thursday, May 15, 1986.
breNicholas P1 t
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Summary of Conclusions
2. List of Participants
UNCLASSIFIED
(With SECRETAttachment)
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SIG MEETING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE FORCES
State
Thursday, May 15, 1986 - 11:00 a.m.
Room 7516
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Under Secretary Armacost (Chairman)
Elliott Abrams, ARA
Robert Duemling, NHAO
William Walker, ARA
Sheila Lopez, S/S-S, Notetaker
Ron Godard, ARA
OVP: Sam Watson
NSC:
Observers:
CIA:
DOD:
JCS:
Oliver North
Ray Burghardt
Nestor Sanchez
Adm Anthony Less
COL Stephen Croker
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TO:
IMMEDIATE
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
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SUSPENSE
(13)
JOCTOTOry
1 4./ May 1986
Date
3637 (10-81)
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S/S 8 6 1 4 8 5 5
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Wasnington, D C 20520
Senior Interagency Group No. 54
May 13, 1986
TO: OVP - Mr. Donald Gregg
Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel
DOD - COL David Brown
JCS - MAJ Michael Emerson
SUBJECT: SIG Meeting, May 15, 1986, 11:00 a.m.
Humanitarian Assistance for Nicaraguan Resistance
Forces
An agenda and a draft of the 90-day report for discussion at
the May 15 SIG meeting are attached.
Attachments:
1. Agenda
2. Draft 90-Day Report
?
irre Nicholas P1 tt
Executive Secretary
SECRET
DECL: OADR
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SECRET
Senior Inter-Agency Group Meeting
May 15, 1986
NICARAGUAN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
AGENDA
I. Review of Developments
A. Discussion of NHAO Activities
B. Congressional Oversight
1. Subpoena of Bank Accounts
2. Improving NHAO Financial Control
C. Developments Within the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance
II. Review of 90-Day Report
III. Future Prospects for NHAO Program
A. Remaining Disbursements
B. New Legislation
SECRET
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REPORT ON NICARAGUA
DRAFT
May 5, 1986
(Note: Annex D classified "confidential". attached)
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EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN NICARAGUA
Summary
Diplomatic efforts centered on Central America increased
significantly during the reporting period. The Caraballeda
Declaration (issued by the Contadora foreign ministers in January)
provided impetus for renewed discussions. A February 10 meeting
between Secretary Shultz and the eight Contadora and Support Group
foreign ministers was followed closely by a meeting of the 13
plenipotentiaries in Panama February 14-15. Ambassador Philip
Habib, appointed by the President March 7 as the new Special Envoy
for Central America, made two trips to the region. The 13
Contadora and Central American foreign ministers met April 5-7 in
Panama. Nicaragua refused at that meeting to resume negotiations,
but subsequently agreed to do so. Negotiations had not, in fact,
resumed as the first week of May although we understand that a
meeting has been proposed for May 16-18. On April 11, Special
Envoy Habib restated the U.S. policy toward Contadora:
"We will, as a matter of policy, support and abide by
a comprehensive, verifiable and simultaneous
implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives
of September 1983, as long as such an agreement is
being fully respected by all the parties. We would
not feel politically bound to respect an agreement
that Nicaragua was violating."
In addition to Contadora's efforts, the Central American
democracies worked together during this period to find solutions
to the regional conflict.
Despite the high level of activity, there has been no
substantive progress toward a comprehensive, verifiable, and
simultaneous agreement. Up to now the Sandinistas have evinced
little interest in an agreement under the present circumstances
of no additional U.S. government aid (and no military aid since
June 1984) to the Nicaraguan resistance, but we do not preclude
the possibility that this position could change as the June 6
deadline draws near. End Summary
In a February 10 meeting with theforeign ministers of the
Contadora and Support Group nations, Secretary of State Shultz
accepted their offer of good offices (conveyed in the January
Caraballeda message). He also made two offers to the
ministers: to reopen bilateral discussions with Nicaragua
simultaneously with the initiation of talks between the
Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan democratic opposition, including
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the armed resistance; and to take positive action in response to
concrete changes in Sandinista behavior in any of our four
traditional areas of concern (support for insurgencies, the
Soviet/Cuban presence, the military buildup, internal
repression). The foreign ministers received letters from
President Reagan outlining the commitments the Secretary made
orally and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to a peaceful
solution.
In their declaration at Caraballeda, the Contadora foreign
ministers implicitly rejected Nicaragua's attempt to suspend the
process for six months and paved the way for the February 14-15
meeting of the 13 Contadora plenipotentiaries. That meeting
focused on implementation of the Caraballeda message, however,
rather than on negotiation of the draft agreement. The Central
Americans urged that negotiations be resumed; Nicaragua's
refusal to negotiate remained unchanged. The meeting made no
progress on substance or procedure. The plenipotentiaries also
received a joint Nicaraguan-Costa Rican letter requesting
establishment of a commission to monitor their border. This
proposal was the result of an ongoing effort to resolve
continuing cross-border intrusions/attacks, one of which in May
1985 resulted in the death of two Costa Rican civil guards at
the hands of the Nicaraguan forces.
Former Special Envoy Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman visited
several of the Contadora participants February 19-26. He
consulted with them on the direction of the process and sought
responses to President Reagan's letter of Feburary 10.
Shlaudeman reiterated the need to work for a comprehensive,
verifiable agreement and urged the Contadora nations to return
to negotiations of the draft treaty. He counselled all
participants to avoid undermining chances for success by
entering into bilateral arrangements which address only portions
of the Contadora agenda.
On February 20, Contadora's vice foreign ministers were
invited to meet in Managua to discuss the request for a border
commission. The vice ministers agreed to form a commission, but
no concrete arrangements were made pending a final agreement
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. To date, no agreement has
been reached.
In a further demonstration of the importance the United
States places on a negotiated solution, the President, on
March 7 appointed Ambassador Philip C. Habib as the Special
Envoy for Central America. Ambassador Habib's appointment was
greeted warmly by the Contadora nations. He met with the
Central American presidents during a brief visit March 12-14.
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On April 5-7, the foreign ministers of the 13 Contadora
Group, Support Group, and Central American nations met in
Panama. The Central American democracies took the lead in
proposing a detailed schedule for resumed negotiations and a
deadline for concluding the process. The eight Contadora
mediators also sought to return the peace process to its
objective of promoting a comprehensive regional agreement. The
Nicaraguan position of refusing negotiations, first announced
in November and upheld in January and February, remained
unchanged at this meeting. The Honduran, Salvadoran and Costa
Rican foreign ministers released a statement outlining their
proposal for negotiations. The eight Contadora and Support
Group ministers subsequently issued a statement inviting the
Central Americans to resume negotiations and to commit
themselves to sign and agreement on June 6. (Texts of both
communiques are attached as annexes to this document.)
Throughout the Panama meetings, as in previous Contadora
sessions, the Nicaraguan delegation was advised by Cuban
officials who reportedly counseled the Sandinistas to maintain
their hardline posture. One Cuban concern is presumably that
the verification measures required by an agreement would reveal
the extensive Cuban presence in Nicaragua and would jeopardize
the continued Cuban role there.
As requested by the Contadora mediators, all five Central
American states have formally notified the Contadora nations
that they are willing to continue the negotiations. In
conveying the Nicaraguan response, however, President Ortega
noted that "The modified Contadora document, which appeared as
a result of the difficulties created by the United States,
contains points which are unacceptable as they seriously harm
the country's sovereignty and security." He also reiterated
that "Nicaragua agrees to sign this document on June 6, as long
as the U.S. aggression against Nicaragua has completely ended
by that date . . . . " As of the first week of May,
negotiations had not resumed although we understand that a
meeting has been proposed for May 16-18.
On April 11, Ambassador Habib wrote to Congressmen Barnes,
Slattery, and Richardson affirming that
"we will as a matter of policy support and abide by a
comprehensive, verifiable and simultaneous
implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives
of September 1983, as long as such an agreement is
being fully respected by all the parties. We would
not feel politically bound to respect an agreement
that Nicaragua was violating."
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The letter was made public and shared with the Contadora
governments. (The text of the letter is attached as an annex to
this document.)
Ambassador Habib returned to the region April 18-28 for an
extensive round of consultations with the presidents and foreign
ministers of the Contadora Group, the Support Group and the
Central American democracies. During this trip he reiterated
the U.S. pledge to abide by a comprehensive, verifiable
Contadora agreement which is implemented simultaneously. He
also explored the future plans of the mediators and the
participants. He found the Central American democracies intent
on concluding an agreement.
This reporting period also witnessed increased and
effective cooperation among the Central American democracies.
Guatemalan President Cerezo foreshadowed the trend at his
January inauguration by calling for a Central American summit in
May. Ministerial and vice presidential meetings have resulted
in agreement that the presidents will discuss the creation of a
Central American parliament and efforts to achieve peace. On
March 4, Salvadoran President Duarte offered to conduct a
dialogue with the Salvadoran guerrillas simultaneously with
talks between the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan democratic
opposition. At the April 5-7 meetings of the 13 foreign
ministers, the Central American democracies took the lead in
proposing a detailed timetable for resumed negotiation of the
draft acta and a deadline for conclusion of the process. We
have every expectation that this cooperation will continue and
increase.
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CONTADORA GROUP AND SUPPORT GROUP
FOREIGN MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE
APRIL 7, 1986
The Ministers of Foreign Relations of the five Central
American countries, of the Contadora Group and of the Support
Group met in the City of Panama from April 5 to 7, 1986, in
order to assess the development of the peace process in Central
America and to determine the process of political negotiation
for a solution to the crisis in that region. The Chancellors
of the Contadora Group and the Support Group warned that during
the past weeks the military escalation, the policy of force and
the increase in border incidents have sharpened the Central
American conflict, thereby intensifying the threats which hover
over the already precarious stability of the region. Peace, an
irreplaceable condition for the development of these peoples,
confronts new and growing dangers, despite the conciliation
efforts promoted by the Contadora Group to arrive at solutions
which respect the legitimate rights and interests of all the
Central American states.
Following extensive deliberations, the Chancellors of the
Contadora Group and the Support Group resolved:
1) To reaffirm that the process of diplomatic negotiation
forstered by the Contadora Group is the only viable means to
obtain a political understanding which permits, with the subs-
cription and entry into force of the Act of Contadora for Peace
and Cooperation in Central America, the fulfillment of the
commitments therein specified, which constitute the essential
bases for peace in the area.
2) To invite the five Central American governments to
a meeting on June 6, 1986, in the City of Panama, to conclude
officially the negotiation of the text of the Act of Contadora
and to proceed with its ratification.
3) To invite the five Central American governments
to recommence immediately negotiations on the remaining two
unresolved aspects of the Act of Contadora, that is, control
and verification of arms and international military maneuvers,
based on the proposals presented by the Contadora Group.
4) (The Chancellors) extend these invitafions in the hope
of receiving the respective responses within eight days.
5) (The Chancellors) reiterate that, for the achievement
of peace in the region, it is essential that all parties and
countries with ties and interests in the region abstain from
lending support to irregular forces or insurrectionist move-
ments which operate in any of the countries of the region or
which attempt to subvert or destabilize the constitutional
order of the Latin American states by means of force or acts
of terrorism of whatever type.
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6) (The Chancellors) reaffirm that any interference by
one state in the internal affairs of another is incompatible
with the principles and norms of the Charter of the United
Nations and of the Organization of American States and consti-
tutes a flagrant violation of the international juridical order.
The Chancellors of the countries belonging to the
Contadora and Support Groups reiterate their approval of the
initiative of the Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica in
establishing a civilian mission of investigation and inspec-
tion of border incidents between the two countries. With the
participation of representatives of each of those groups, a
general reconnaisance of the common frontier between said
states will be made during th current month of April 1986
with the aim of specifying the needs of the civilian mission in
order to effect its establishment in the briefest time possible.
Likewise, acknowledging the need which the Governments
of .Costa Rica and Nicaragua have outlined on that matter, the
Contadora and Support Groups will immediately initiate, before
the international community, the respective steps to secure the
indispensable human, material and financial support for the
functioning of the civilian mission.
The Chancellors express their appreciation for the attend-
ance of the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Netherlands,
Mr. Hans van der Broek, President of the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities. This attendance reaffirms the
support of the twelve (12) for the Contadora peace process.
Finally, (The Chancellors) likewise wish to thank the
Government of Panama for its hospitality and the President
of the Republic for his inspirational words.
Concluded in Panama, on the seventh day of the month of
April of nineteen hundred eighty six.
Contadora Coup
Augusto Ramirez Ocampo
Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia
Bernardo Sepulveda Amor
Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico
Jorge Abadia Arias
Minister of Foreign Relations of Panama
Simon Alberto Consalvi
Minister of Foreign Relations of Venezuela
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Support Group
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Dante Caputo
Minister of Foreign Relations of Argentina
Roberto Abreu Sodre
Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil
Allan Wagner Tizon
Minister of Foreign Relations of Peru
Enrique Iglesiaas
Minister of Foreign Relations of Uruguay
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CONTADORA CORE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS COMMUNIQUE
APRIL 7, 1986
Joint proposal of the Governments of Costa Rica, El
Salvador and Honduras to immediately conclude the negotiation
of the pending matters (issues) of the Contadora Acta for Peace
and Cooperation in Central America.
The Governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras,
convinced of the urgent and indispensable need to achieve
peace, democracy, security, and economic and social cooperation
among the peoples of central America decided, in the face of
the impasse created by the expiration of the 45-day period for
the conclusion of the negotiation of the text of the the Acta,
to continue with the efforts designed to achieve compliance
with the mandate of September 13, 1986, issued at the eighth
joint meeting of the members of the Group of Contadora and
Central America.
Upon termination of this period of time, there remained
pending for negotiation the matters related to 'commitments as
regards military maneuvers" (Section 1, Chapter III of Part I)
and 'commitments as regards armaments and military manpower'
(Section 2, Chapter III, Part I).
Also identified was the necessity of elaborating the
statute for the functioning of the mechanisms of execution and
followup, as well as the tasks and actions necessary to bring
them (the mechanisms) to realization.
Realizing the aforementioned, the plenipotentiaries of our
countries held several working meetings and achieved results
which allow us to publicly state our readiness to sign the
Contadora Acta.
Accordingly, it was deemed best to present the progress
achieved to date as well as a joint proposal to end the
negotiations of the Acta and to proceed with its signing.
1) In regard to armaments and military manpower, the
framework was devised for a mechanism that will permit the
creation of conditions that (in turn) will lead to the
establishment of maximum levels of military development
of the parties, with independence and flexibility.
2) In regard to military maneuvers, our countries accept
both the regulation of these as well as efforts to determine
mechanisms leading to their limitation.
3) We have developed a proposed statute on mechansims
concerning the execution and followup of the Acta of Contadora
for Peace and Cooperation in Central America, in accordance
with the tenor of the Acta.
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4) In like manner, we identified the foregoing tasks and
actons which are indispensable in order to bring into effect
the mechanisms of execution and followup.
All the aforementioned constitute contributions that
are to be discussed and that are contained in the documents
and issues raised in the Acta, and are not different matters
or new issues that were not previously contained in the Acta.
In this respect, we propose the following timetable:
The plenipotentiaries of the Central American countries,
of the Group of Contadora, and of the Support Group, would meet:
A) From April 16-16, to complete (finalize) the negotia-
tions on Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III of Part I of the Acta.
B) From April 26-30, to reach an agreement on the statute
on the mechanisms for execution and followup and on the previous
tasks and actions in order to bring them into realization.
C) From 15-17 (sic), to design the material and human
structure, budget, quota system, constitution of a fund for
Central American peace, headquarters, and sub-headquarters for
the mechanisms for execution and followup.
D) From 23-25 (sic), reconsideration of pending matters,
overall appraisal of achievements and elaboration of the final
report for the Ministers of Foreign Relations.
E) From May 29-31, meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Relations to receive and evaluate the report and sign the Acta.
F) Beginning May 1, the Foreign Ministers of Contadora,
the Suppeqt Group and Central America, who wish to and can
collaborate, should make the necessary consultations with
previously suggested countries and individuals, for the
integration of the mechanisms of execution and followup of
the Acta, as well as to complete the commitments required
for the financing of the Acta.
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ANNEX C
Text of April 11, 1986 Letter from
Ambassador Habib to Representatives
Barnes, Richardson and Slattery
Dear Mr. Barnes/Richardson/Slattery:
I am prompted by our conversation of April 10 to restate
for the record the Administration's position with respect to a
Contadora agreement and U.S. support for the Nicaraguan
resistance.
Part I, Chapter III, Section 6, Paragraph 32 of the
Contadora draft agreement of September, 1985 prohibits any
"political, military, financial or other support to
individuals, groups, irregular forces or armed bands advocating
the overthrow or destabilization of other Governments..."
Paragraph 34 of Section 6 requires signatories to "deny the use
of and dismantle installations, equipment and facilities
providing logistical support or serving operational functions
in their territory, if the latter is used for acts against
neighboring Governments." Paragraph 35 of this Section would
permit governments interested in bringing peace to Central
America to provide financial and logistical support for the
purpose of relocating disarmed irregular forces or returning
them to their respective countries, in accordance with the
conditions laid down by the Governments concerned.
Part III, Paragraph 4 of the draft treaty states that "The
parties, as from the date of signature, shall refrain from any
acts which would serve to frustrate the object and purpose of
the Act..."
We interpret these provisions as requiring a cessation of
support to irregular forces and/or insurrectional movements
from the date of signature. We do not believe these provisions
would prohibit financial or other humanitarian aid for the
purpose of relocating or repatriating such forces.
Although the United States is not a party to the Contadora
negotiations and would not be legally bound by signature of a
Contadora treaty, we will as a matter of policy support and
abide by a comprehensive, verifiable and simultaneous
implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives of
September 1983, as long as such an agreement is being fully
respected by all the parties. We would not feel politically
bound to respect an agreement that Nicaragua was violating.
This has been U.S. policy from the outset of the Contadora
process. On 'April 27, 1983 President Reagan stated to a joint
session of Congress that "We will support any verifiable,
reciprocal agreement among Central American countries on the
renunciation of support for insurgencies on neighbors'
territory."
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HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ARMED RESISTANCE
The United Nicaraguan Opposition Human Rights Commission
(UNO/CDH) is currently investigating charges against twenty-one
members of the resistance for various violations of the UNO
Code of Conduct. These cases are distinct from the thirty-two
cases referred to in previous reports to Congress.
Most of the cases previously cited involved abuses against
fellow resistance combatants. Of those relating to violations
of the rights of Nicaragua's civilian population, two were
robbery (punished by one and two years incarceration
respectively); one was assault and robbery '(four years
incarceration and expulsion from the Nicaraguan Democratic
Forces (FDN)); and one was multiple rape (four years
incarceration and expulsion from the FDN).
The Sandinista press reported during this period that the
resistance had kidnapped sixty-nine civilians, killed twelve,
and wounded twenty-six. The most widely publicized case
concerned the alleged mining by resistance forces of a civilian
vehicle and the consequent deaths of five persons and wounding
of twelve. Among those killed was a Swiss agronomist. The
initial government reports of the incident claimed that the
cause of the deaths was the explosion of a claymore mine,
stated to have been detonated by remote control. This version
was later changed, charging that the mine only caused the
vehicle to stop, after which the passengers were fired on by
"contras.'
UNO/FDN officials publicly denied that their forces
possessed any such mines, and further stated that FDN elements
had not operated in the area of Somotillo, where the attack
occurred, either on the day of the incident or for months prior
to that date. Although it is not possible to prove the
identity of those responsible for the attack, the Sandinista
military itself has engaged in extensive mining of both the
Costa Rican and Honduran borders, including the area of
Somotillo. The placement of these mines, intended presumably
to affect operations by the resistance, has resulted in the
deaths of a number of civilians attempting to flee Nicaragua
for refuge in Honduras. The Sandinistas have also placed mines
in both Honduran and Costa Rican territory. In January, 1986,
mines placed on the Honduran side of the border killed three
Honduran soldiers and wounded two others.
At a press conference on February 12, Mario Fernandez
Perez provided ostensibly first-hand information on members of
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the Sandinista 50th Anniversary Brigade reportedly taken
prisoner by elements of the armed resistance on five different
occasions at five different sites during 1984. Fernandez
Perez, a self-described deserter from the FDN, claimed the
prisoners had been "tortured and abused and then hanged," and
their bodies buried in the FDN Las Vegas base camp. This claim
is in conflict with reported statements by Maria Obregon Rivas,
who was one of the volunteer teachers taken prisoner by FDN
forces. According to FSLN daily Barricada, Obregon Rivas
stated at her own press conference in November 1985 that four
other prisoners "were assassinated several hours after having
been kidnapped by mercenaries in Guale, Pantasura." According
to a report on her press conference by a Reuter correspondent,
however, Obregon Rivas claimed to have no idea what had
happened to her fellow prisoners. The Sandinista press has
thus offered two conflicting versions, while a foreign
correspondent has offered a third.
UNO/FDN has informed the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) that it has no record of six of the nine
brigadistas reported to have been taken prisoner, two of whom
were allegedly seized in southern Nicaraguan, outside of the
area of operation of either the FDN or KISAN. Information was
provided about three others reported captured, including Marcia
Chamorro, a combatant with the FDN Segovia Regional Command;
Maria Obregon Rivas, who lived with an FDN combatant in Danli,
Honduras, where she worked in a restaurant before leaving
Honduras legally; and Maritza del Carmen Cubillo, who was cited
in the February 1986 report to Congress as awaiting release.
Del Carmen Cubillo, whose release was complicated by the
Sandinistas' refusal to receive her on Nicaraguan territory,
has in the interim married an FDN combatant and has chosen to
remain with him. She is in correspondence with her family in
Nicaragua.
On March 18, resistance forces attacked a power station
located on the outskirts of the town of Yalaguina. According
to government accounts, the force of about 150 men wounded a
soldier defending the plant and killed two civilians during
their retreat. The militia killed the "contra" chief,
identified as "Aquila V." Embassy officers visited the site of
the attack to interview local residents about the press
reports. They were told that the technician defending the
plant had been killed, along with one member of the militia,
and other members of the militia were wounded. Two of the
resistance fighters were wounded and taken prisoner, one of
whom later died from unknown causes. None of those
interviewed, including a participant in the fighting and a
local official, mentioned the deaths of civilians.
For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is
increased awareness of the obligation to treat prisoners
humanely, the FDN has moved increasingly toward offering those
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captured the options of returning to their military units,
returning to their homes, or integrating with the resistance.
The commander of one of the FDN's largest forces, Jorge Salazar
I, explained that this approach has been adopted by his command
because of the impracticality of marching prisoners for an
average of forty-five days to reach incarceration facilities.
According to the commander, most prisoners have chosen to
return to their homes. Those choosing to do so are turned over
to civilians capable of facilitating onward transportation. On
the other hand, UNO/CDH reports that twenty of twenty-nine
prisoners offered this choice in September 1985 elected to
remain with the FDN, while another twelve were released at El
Caco in Central Zelaya in August 1985. The names of former
prisoners who have integrated with the resistance are routinely
provided to the ICRC, as are the names of those who return to
their homes or military units. Correspondence to families from
both categories of persons is made possible with the assistance
of the ICRC.
In another case that has received considerable attention
in the United States, UNO/CDH reports that KISAN released two
technicians, Jorge Canales and Fausto Cristy Moody, in
Honduras, where they took temporary refuge in a UNHCR camp
prior to returning to Nicaragua. The two Nicaraguans were
taken prisoner along with a West German last spring. The date
of their release has not been provided.
UNO/CDH continues to seek the cooperation of international
human rights organizations in improving its operations. A
major difficulty thus far in documenting charges of violent
abuses by resistance forces is the Commission's lack of access
to areas of alleged violations for on-site investigations and
interviews of local residents and witnesses. UNO/CDH is
attempting to overcome this obstacle through its training
program for unit level human rights officers, who will be
tasked with accompanying troops into combat and monitoring
observance of the Code of Conduct. There obviously remain
problems that must be resolved, in particular the authority
such officers will have to intervene in cases of abuse and to
report independently of the unit on such abuses.
The Commission has stated that it is prepared to
investigate, to the best of its ability, all charges presented
against resistance elements subject to its jurisdiction. In
this connection, recent reports by Americas Watch and the
Washington Office on Latin America have been provided by
UNO/CDH to the FDN Military Command for its review and
investigation. UNO/CDH will provide the results of this
investigation when it is available.
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HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SANDINISTA REGIME
The civil opposition remained under heavy pressure from
authorities during this reporting period, with the brunt of the
harassment directed against lower and mid-level activists. The
regime moved to provide long-term legal justification for
repression by issuing a number of new laws and regulations that
significantly expand its economic and political control of the
country. The chief instrument of control will be the new
constitution, an FSLN-drafted document that has elicited the
condemnation of the political opposition and provoked the
withdrawal of the Liberal Independent and one Conservative
faction from the constitutional drafting process.
Religious Oppression
Relations between the regime and the Catholic Church have
settled into a pattern of open hostility over the past three
months. The lead in the attack on the traditional Church was
taken by Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, whose
politically-inspired "way of the cross" march provided a
convenient vehicle for carrying denunciations of the Cardinal
into Nicaragua's rural areas. While the march through the
countryside aroused little public enthusiasm, it was given
intense media coverage. D'Escoto's personal attacks, including
charges of high treason and a warning that "drastic measures"
were needed to disavow the Cardinal, were condemned by the
official Vatican daily L'Osservatore Romano. While lambasting
D'Escoto's personal role in persecution of the Church, however,
L'Osservatore Romano pointed to the totalitarian nature of the
regime, rather than personal animosities, as the chief cause
for concern over the future of the Church in Nicaragua. The
worsening situation of Nicaragua's Catholic Church elicited
strong statements of support from the Archdiocese of San
Salvador and the Colombian Bishops, both condemning repression
by the Sandinista regime and the "popular church."
Cardinal Obando was not the only Church authority
subjected to official wrath. Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega --
earlier extolled as a man with whom the Sandinistas could do
business -- was castigated in the press for a speech he gave in
Washington on repression of the Church. The government station
Radio Sandino carried a statement by an attorney calling for
Vega's trial on charges of "slander and libel and threatening
state security." Vega was also labeled an agent of the C.I.A.
and the "contras." Bishop Julian Barni of Leon was likewise
denounced for his "immoral" reaction to a peace plan presented
to him by Rafael Cordova Rivas, leader of the collaborationist
faction of the Conservative Party. Commenting on the demand
that the United States withdraw its request for $100 million
for the armed resistance, Barni offended official sensitivity
by noting that he would "like Russia also to suspend its $100
million in arms and everything."
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The litany of denunciations aired daily by the government
media provided accompaniment for the more serious actions
against the Church. On April 10, the Ministry of Justice
handed down its ruling on the Church social service agency,
offices of which were occupied by force on October 15, 1985.
The decree officially declared the Archdiocesan Commission for
Social Promotion (COPROSA) illegal and all its activities
illicit and passed to the state all property belonging to the
organization. According to a Church spokesman, the property
referred to included baptismal records, files, and the
Cardinal's official seal. Also confiscated were the Church's
printing press and other reproduction equipment.
The action against COPROSA, which provided essential
health, education, and housing services to the poor, was
apparently long under consideration. Two years ago an
AID-donated vehicle was confiscated, and COPROSA has been a
frequent target for charges of collusion with the CIA and other
"anti-revolutionary" organizations, such as the American
Institute for Free Labor Development.
The regime's determination to curb Church activity was
again demonstrated on April 5. Lay activist Dr. Marvin
Caldera, responsible for printing a Church bulletin for use
during the Easter period, was forced by State Security agents
to recover all distributed copies of the pamphlet and hand them
over on pain of imprisonment. The bulletin contained only the
liturgy for the second Sunday of Easter and a general prayer
for the "year of the Eucharist."
Radio Catolica, closed by State Security on January 1,
1986, remained under government control. Minister of Interior
Tomas Borge suggested in an interview with El Nuevo Diario that
the closure is, for all intents and purposes, permanent. Borge
refused to offer a definitive judgement on the future of the
station, but did state emphatically that it could never again
be what it once was, "a practically defiant instrument in
opposition to revolutionary laws." Borge also lent some
credence to recurring rumors that the station may be turned
over to the state-sponsored "popular church," suggesting that
Radio Catolica might yet "reappear" in a "new context."
Church-related news continued to be censored regularly
from opposition daily La Prensa. Thus deleted was the text of
a pastoral letter from the Bishops calling for peaceful
reconciliation through negotiation; an end to the violence; and
cessation of efforts by the popular church to divide Catholics
and to manipulate doctrine for ideological purposes.
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The Political Opposition
On February 7, six opposition parties delivered to the
regime their proposal for ending the civil conflict. Conceived
and signed by the Social Christians, Social Democrats,
Conservatives, Constitutional Liberals, Liberal Independents,
and Democratic Conservatives, the document calls for repeal of
the state of emergency; agreement between all political parties
for preparation and implementation of new elections;
fulfillment of all international agreements and obligations for
internal democratization; and the assistance of foreign
representatives in assuring realization of the demands.
Although the government did not reply directly, it offered a
response in advance of its actual receipt of the proposal. On
February 6, the day before the letter was delivered, the
government press dismissed the proposal as another "tired" CIA
plan and one of its authors, Virgilio Godoy (Liberal
Independent Party President and representative in the National
Assembly), as a "new traitor." Having received no official
response, Social Christian Party (PSC) President Erick Ramirez
on March 22 sent the government a telegram urging acceptance of
the proposal. His request has never been answered.
The civic opposition has been stung by continuing attacks
on party activists and the realization that the draft
constitution will provide a more comprehensive legal basis for
elimination of organized opposition. Aspects of the draft
constitution particularly worrisome to the opposition include:
?11M,
National Assembly authority to grant and cancel the
legal status of civil and religious entities;
vaguely worded authority to limit the existence of
political parties;
failure to guarantee the right to private property;
failure to define the term "mixed economy";
failure to limit the tenure of the President;
broad powers accorded the President: the right to
suspend civil liberties, to assume legislative
authority during recess of the Assembly, and to
impose a state of emergency under undefined
conditions;
failure to grant to the Assembly budgetary authority;
and
inclusion of an integrated party-state-army concept.
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The obvious utility of the draft constitution as a means
of expanding and perpetuating Sandinista control of the country
has caused deep concern not only among the main-stream
opposition, but also among parties represented in the National
Assembly. The Liberal Independent Party and at least one of
the Democratic Conservative factions have withdrawn from
participation in the drafting process in protest of Sandinista
refusal to alter key anti-democratic provisions of the draft.
Two other parties are reportedly considering withdrawal.
Despite regime claims that the draft is open to changes
suggested during the round of "consultations" underway, there
is little likelihood that any of the provisions guaranteeing
Sandinista control will be altered.
The Social Christian Party suffered the loss of another
party activist on January 20 (not previously reported) when two
Sandinista soldiers gunned down Daniel Gonzalez Rivera.
Gonzalez Rivera, a Social Christian Revolutionary Youth
activist, had earlier been physically assaulted by the same two
soldiers, concerning which a complaint had been filed with the
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH). The murder was
the third in several months. To date there are no indications
that any punitive actions have been taken against the
perpetrators of the crime.
In reaction to intense and sometimes violent harassment of
PSC members and supporters, Party Vice President Azucena Ferrey
in late April sent Daniel Ortega a letter condemning Sandinista
policies and actions and calling for Ortega's resignation. On
May 1, traditionally celebrated only by the labor unions, the
PSC organized anti-government demonstrations and speeches by
its own members and those of the PSC-affiliated Nicaraguan
Workers Central (CTN). Participation in the activities was
less than anticipated, however, since supporters in other
cities found that no mass transportation was available to them,
all of it having been reserved for government use.
Several opposition activists who were imprisoned in the
wake of the state of emergency were released during this
period. Their reports of detention were generally similar: all
reported intense psychological abuse, including mock
executions, threats, and repeated interrogation, and physical
abuse such as frequent sleep interruption. Harsher forms of
physical abuse appeared to depend on the length of detention
and the recalcitrance of the prisoner's opposition to
Sandinista policies. All were also warned upon release not to
seek out any human rights organizations, not to speak to anyone
about their detention, and to expect continued surveillance.
Similar accounts were also offered by labor unionists released
after several months imprisonment.
The imprisonment of Luis Mora Sanchez, released after ten
months as a result of the intervention of former President
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Carter, was more severe than the others. Arrested on June 15,
1985, for his participation in a public reception for
newly-invested Cardinal Obando, Mora was beaten en route to the
El Chipote prison where he was interrogated and held for three
months. He was held in a tiny, airless room, in the dark,
without a bed or sanitary facilities. Irregular meals
consisted, he stated, of "rice and cockroaches." Like other
prisoners, Mora was subjected to frequent sleep interruption
and interrogations. He was never sentenced, nor was he ever
questioned about his alleged "crime." From El Chipote, he was
sent to the Zona Franca prison, where he shared a 20x10 foot
cell with anywhere from 20-30 other prisoners. According to
Mora, the appalling prison conditions had caused serious mental
instability in many of those detained, and many others were ill
with infectious diseases.
Mora was transferred to the Carcel Modelo (Model Prison)
after a letter he had written seeking the help of the Cardinal
was intercepted. Mora was given an individual cell, but soon
had a cell-mate who proceeded to beat him brutally in full view
of the guards. After a six-day hospitalization where he was
treated for broken ribs, a broken nose, and internal injuries,
he was sent to Tipitapa prison. He remained there for two
months until his release. Mora was given new clothes and a
warning to announce his satisfaction with the conditions of
imprisonment.
The Press
There was no noteworthy change in the already heavy
censorship of the press. La Prensa continues to face cuts of
up to eighty percent of its daily material, a situation which
prevented publication for the second time in 1986 on April 7.
Among the articles prohibited for publication on that day were
the text of the Bishops' pastoral letter; a declaration by the
Liberal Independent Party that it would not participate in
"open meetings" on the draft constitution; a statement by
private producers on low levels of rice production; an
announcement of travel by opposition leaders to Contadora
countries; and a review of the April Contadora session.
Labor
?
A second prisoner released in April at the request of
former President Carter was union official Jose Altamirano of
the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN), arrested January 25 on
charges of collaboration with the "internal front." The
authorities have moved forcefully against the Confederation of
Trade Union Unity (CUS), which has received assistance from the
AFL-CIO's American Institute of Free Labor Development
(AIFLD). On February 21, the authorities denied a CUS request
for permission to hold a trades certification ceremony for 255
graduates, and the following day fourteen CUS officials were
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arrested without charge. Two escaped, and all but one of the
remaining twelve were still in prison as of May 4. Police
officials claim that they are under investigation for
"robberies and other crimes."
On March 25, CUS offices at the San Antonio Sugar Mill
were raided and occupied by State Security; and on May Day,
large numbers of CUS members were stranded in El Sauce and
Chinandega when authorities prohibited chartered buses from
transporting them to Managua. In Leon, other CUS members
waiting for their chartered bus to Managua were rounded up and
forced to march in the local Sandinista Central parade. One
bus driver who refused to carry Sandinista supporters after
being prevented from transporting his CUS clients was fined
100,000 cordobas.
Private Sector
Pressure to lend support to Sandinista goals or face
confiscation was maintained over the past ninety days.
Repeated threats against the private sector were given added
meaning with the promulgation of various regulations enhancing
the regime's control over private property and its ability to
take discriminatory punitive actions.
Minister of Agriculture Jaime Wheelock laid down a marker
on February 4, announcing to the foreign press that "exclusive
property [ownership] in perpetuity now does not exist for us in
this country," and asserting socialized agriculture as a
national goal. On February 11, the Ministry of Internal
Commerce (MICOIN) issued new regulations calling for
registration of all consumers, providing for the issuance of
ration cards by central rather than local authorities, and
mandating the licensing of merchants and vendors. In addition
to excluding from licensing all merchants in business less than
five years, the regulations call for applicants to meet an
"honesty requirement." MICOIN indicated it hoped to reduce
significantly the number of vendors and merchants as a result
of the new procedures.
On February 13, regulations for the new monetary control
law were issued. Under the revised system, every business in
Nicaragua will have a state-designated bank through which it
must conduct financial transactions, as well as a
state-determined petty cash limit. Businesses will be allowed
to withdraw funds only to replenish petty cash accounts and to
meet payroll obligations. Daily receipts, to be deposited the
morning after receipt, cannot be used to increase petty cash
and all expenditures of more than 200,000 cordobas ($200) must
be paid for by check. Businesses are also required to submit
to their bank a monthly report of petty cash expenditures with
a complete list of cash transactions.
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Finally, on March 6 the government published regulations
for the revised Agrarian Reform law providing for confiscation
of property for inefficient utilization, abandonment, or as
otherwise specified by the Reform law -- essentially, when
confiscation suits the interests of the state. The regulations
provide for an appeal of Ministry of Agriculture confiscations,
but only to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry can
issue title to land, but it also has the authority to revoke
titles from recipients who fail "to participate in agrarian
reform and general development plans." Another provision with
serious implications for private farming permits the government
to declare "agricultural development zones" in "emergency
situations" requiring a "quick solution." As indicated by the
regulations, such emergencies might arise where large
landholdings "demand a just and equitable" redistribution, or
where the state requires land for development plans "to meet
the goals of the state."
Although Agriculture Minister Wheelock assured the public
that efficiently farmed land would be expropriated only in
"extreme and exceptional cases,"-- such as when campesinos want
land and there is none to give away -- the revision grants the
regime unlimited authority to confiscate the holdings of the
opposition. A recent study prepared by the U.S. Embassy in
Managua suggests that the government has sufficient land
holdings at its disposal to meet demands from the campesinos.
Clearly, pressure against the private sector is largely
politically inspired.
Sixty-one percent of the land in Nicaragua is now
state-owned or in the "public domain." Thirty percent is
privately owned, with the remaining 9 percent held by
cooperative farms. More significant are the trends: between
1978-1985, 18 percent of the land has passed from private to
public ownership. Individuals now own 29.6 percent of the
land, down from 48 percent in 1978. Owners of the smallest
farms (less than ten manzanas or seventeen acres) lost 25
percent of their land; owners of farms of 10-50 manzanas lost
55 percent of their land; and owners of the largest farms and
ranches (over 500 manzanas) lost 70 percent of their holdings
to the state. Despite the acquisition of private holdings for
state use, the government has yet to open any new territories
for agrarian reform. Judging by the record thus far, it is a
fair assumption that the regime intends to continue
expropriation of opposition holdings, transferring it to
persons whose "ownership," in conformance with the regulations,
is directly dependent upon cooperation with government
objectives.
Further underscoring the intention to expand state control
of agriculture, Vice Minister of Agriculture Alonzo Porras on
April 11 stated that state-owned properties were slated to
assume a leadership role in their locales, the basic vehicle
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for which would be their control of supplies. Under the
envisioned system, state farms would mete out to surrounding
farms -- including those privately owned -- needed seeds,
transportation, and equipment. Even storage facilities would
be located on the state farms. Porras described the intent of
)the plan As the "articulation" and "reinforcement" of
agricultural goals. He also explained that all of the land
seized by the government has been incorporated into state farms.
An illustration of the political motives behind government
confiscations was provided in late January, when Ministry of
Agriculture and Sandinista party officials visited the ranch of
an opposition leader. Calling together the families that live
and work on the estate, the officials promised rewards for
those that were willing to cooperate with the regime's plans.
They also warned that if the families did not cooperate, other
families would be brought in to take over the land. The owner
of the ranch had previously been approached with an offer by
the Sandinistas: in exchange for a "donation" of 2000 manzanas
of his land to the government and his signature on a public
statement condemning U.S. aid to the armed resistance, he would
be free from further measures against his property. His
refusal to cooperate apparently led to the effort by the regime
to arrange a "spontaneous" takeover of his property by
"disgruntled workers."
The regime's new clout was exercised on April 28, when
"Agricola Momotombo" -- a cotton and cattle complex -- was
served with confiscation notice. No explanation was provided
for the confiscation, leaving the owner with the presumption
that seizure of his property was "of public utility or social
interest," as provided for in the new law.
The reach of the state is extending inexorably deeper into
private life. Before being licensed to work in their chosen
field, Nicaraguan professionals must now provide the government
with a personal biography, photographs, a health certificate,
and recommendations from MICOIN and the neighborhood Sandinista
Defense Committee. In addition, applicants must complete a
lengthy questionnaire which includes sections on:
"class extraction": The names, ages, professions/offices,
employment and salaries of both parents
"political-ideological trajectory": Did you carry out any
political activities against the Somoza regime before the
Final Insurrection? provide the name of your superior if
you fought in the Final Insurrection and tell us why you
fought...what activities are you involved in in your zone
or barrio?...if you did not participate in the Final
Insurrection, set out your specific motives for failing to
undertake any political activities against the Somoza
regime...if you have had an opportunity to associate with
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the FSLN, provide the names/pseudonyms of persons who
offered you this opportunity and explain why you did not
accept it...if you had an opportunity to affiliate with
other revolutionary organizations or political parties,
provide the names of the parties and explain why you did
not do so
"friends": List names of friends working in any state
institution, the military, the police, or Sandinista
organizations
Atlantic Coast
The turmoil and violence that has plagued Nicaragua's
indigenous peoples erupted again in late March with an attack
by the Sandinista military against Indian villages along the
Rio Coco. The unexpected assault triggered a mass exodus of
Miskitos across the river into Honduras, where on April 4 the
United Nations High Commission on Refugees declared an
emergency.
According to reports of the events provided by the
Miskitos, on March 25 and 26 elements of the Sandinista Army
assaulted the villages of Bilwaskarma, Wasla, and Kum with
mortars and tanks. Many refugees reported seeing Red Cross
uniforms among the attackers, and there were claims that the
Red Cross symbol had been used to enable soldiers to enter the
villages without resistance, after which they began rounding up
youths for military service. The effort at forced recruitment
is said to have set off fighting, although it is unclear
whether this incident was isolated or somehow related to the
widerspread fighting that eventually occurred.
Refugees all agree, however, that it was the firing of
mortars and other weapons into the villages that set off the
panic. Many Indians fled as quickly as possible across the
river into Honduras, most taking along nothing but their
families; others headed for neighboring villages, where they
found similar waves of panic-stricken residents queuing for
canoes to cross the river. The fear that impelled the exodus
was reinforced when word spread that the Sandinista soldiers
were threatening to send the Miskitos back to the hated
relocation camps, from which they had been released only in
late 1985. In the end, approximately 11,000 Miskitos crossed
the border, leaving another 4,000 behind in the
militarily-occupied villages.
There was no readily apparent immediate cause for the
assault along the Rio Coco. Although the area is a source of
strong popular support for the Indian resistance, the level of
armed activity was not unusual or even high. The action seems
to fit into the general broad-ranging offensive by the
Sandinistas against all elements of the armed resistance.
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There have been reports that the army has increased its attacks
on the resistance throughout the Atlantic Coast in recent
months, and refugees entering Costa Rica are telling of
Sandinista death squads that are now operating there against
suspected supporters or sympathizers of the resistance. It is
also possible that the Sandinistas hoped to force an exodus of
the Rio Coco population into Honduras, thus depriving KISAN of
its support base in its area of operations. The latter
explanation would fit in with the reported military occupation
of the region.
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HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE
During the past ninety-day period, the Nicaraguan
Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) conducted operations in
the manner described in the previous Presidential Reports to
Congress, and continued to be guided by the criteria set forth
in the legislation, as clarified by subsequent expressions of
Congressional intent.
As of March 25, NHAO had obligated the entire $27,000,000
authorized by the legislation (which specified that the funds
would remain available for obligation until March 31).
However, not all of the supplies have yet been delivered.
GAO AUDIT AND CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
On March 5, 1986, following a General Accounting Office
(GAO) audit of NHAO's operations, representatives of GAO and
the Administration testified at a hearing conducted by the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee.
The GAO witness stated that : (a) there is no evidence
NHAO paid for lethal items; (b) NHAO exercises "considerable
control" over purchases from US suppliers; and (c) NHAO and the
Department of State "have done about as much as they can" to
monitor the disbursement of funds. However, GAO alleged that
NHAO is unable to verify expenditures made in Central America,
that NHAO cannot observe the end use of procured items to
assure that no diversion takes place, and that there is an
inadequate audit trail for NHAO's payments into the U.S. bank
accounts of Central American suppliers.
NHAO responded to these criticisms with the following
observations:
-- Political sensitivities in the region precluded NHAO
from having its own representatives in Central America to
monitor and verify purchases, or to have a bank account from
which to pay local suppliers directly. Moreover, the terms of
the authorizing legislation excluded both the CIA and DOD from
the administration of these funds. Thus NHAO was denied access
to the operational infrastructure of those agencies in Central
America, though NHAO was able to utilize their information
gathering capabilities, particularly to verify deliveries.
-- The basic assistance items -- food, clothing, medicine
-- provided by NHAO are priority needs of the resistance
forces; they have no incentive to divert or exchange these
supplies for prohibited lethal items. GAO agrees there is no
evidence to suggest they have tried to do so.
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-- With respect to the payment of Central American
suppliers, some are receiving payments directly through their
own accounts in Miami (this is true for 66% of the dollar value
of such payments). Other suppliers are paid indirectly through
the account of a designated agent. There is prima facie
evidence that the suppliers are in fact being paid: they have
provided NHAO with notarized statements of payment, they have
not complained of non-payment, and they continue to dispense
supplies to the resistance.
It is therefore not true, as some have alleged, that NHAO
cannot account for the funds disbursed to Central American
suppliers.
RESOLUTION OF TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS
As noted in previous reports, starting in mid-October NHAO
experienced difficulties in transporting to Central America
supplies that had been purchased in the united States. In
mid-February, these difficulties were overcome and the
resistance forces were able to draw down the sizable
inventories of pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and supplies
such as boots and clothing that had accumulated during the
period when transportaion arrangements were interrupted.
ENHANCED OVERSIGHT
Coincident with the resumption of transportation from the
United States to Central America, NHAO was able to arrange for
its Field Operations Officer to travel on a TDY basis to the
region. The periodic presence of this officer in Central
America has significantly improved NHAO's ability to monitor
the resistance movement's logistical system and personnel as
well as the regional suppliers.
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CUMULATIVE SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS
NHAO Grants
1. Program Grants (to be disbursed through letters/memoranda
of commitment, except Project Hope and Fundacion grants, see
"notes" below)
Grant 601 (UNO)
issued 10/3/85
Grant 602 (UNO)
issued 10/15/85
Grant 603 (UNO)
issued 10/29/85
Grant 604 (UNO)
issued 11/11/85
Grant 605 (Fundacion de
Nicaragua)
issued 11/13/85
Grant 641-003 (Project Hope)
issued 12/02/85
Grant 606 (UNO)
issued 12/23/85
Grant 607 (UNO)
issued 2/13/86
Grant 608 (UNO)
issued 2/28/86
Grant 609 (UNO)
issued 3/24/86
Grant 610 (UNO)
issued 3/25/86
2. Administration Grants
Grant 641-001 (UNO Washington)
issued 10/17/85
Grant 641-002 (IDEA, Inc.)
issued 11/06/85
3. Direct NHAO 0b1igatioftV444,42 .
$1,000,000
$1,500,000
$3,000,000
$3,000,000
$ 675,000a
$3,400,000b
$3,000,000
$1,500,000
$3,000,000
$3,000,000
$3,600,990
$ 114,000c
$ 50,675d
Grant 632-001 (Butler Buildings) $ 19,335
issued 12/23/85
4. NHAO Administrative Costs $ 140,000
(see below for breakdown)
TOTAL $27,000,000
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NHAO Commitments
1. Against Program Grants through
5/1/86
Humanitarian Assistance
$23,478,572
Food
$8,570,778
(36.5%)
Clothing
$3,525,714
(15.0%)
Medical
$5,472,356
(23.3%)
Equipment
$2,084,283
( 8.9%)
Transport
$3,700,441
(15.8%)
Human Rights Program
$125,000
(0.5%)
2. Against Administration Grants through 5/1/86
Administration Commitments $ 164,675
UNO Liaison Office
IDEA, Inc.
$114,000
$ 50,675
TOTAL NHAO COMMITMENTS $23,643,247
NHAO In-House Administrative Expenses
NHAO Administrative Expenses $ 140,000
Direct Personnel Costs
$ 66,000
Travel
$ 31,515
Office Rent
$ 32,600
Telephone toll calls
$ 5,885
Miscellaneous
$ 4,000
Notes
a. The program grant to the Fundacion de Nicaragua funds
longer-term care in the U.S. and UNO's medical staff in the
Central American region. Support for UNO's human rights
program is also being channelled through the Fundacion.
b. Using information provided by NHAO staff, Project Hope
produced a comprehensive program to meet both emergency and
on-going health care supply needs. Pursuant to that program,
the grant to Project Hope funds the purchase within the United
States of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.
c. The administration grant to UNO's Washington office
stipulates that its activities must be strictly limited to
providing liaison between UNO and NHAO so as to facilitate the
flow of humanitarian assistance.
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d. The administration grant to IDEA, Inc. (with
provisions comparable to the UNO Washington grant regarding
cash advances) funds administrative support services, including
assistance to the regional medical program and to KISAN (the
Indian/Creole component of UNO) in submitting assistance
requests to NHAO through UNO.
Doc #3714c
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