AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10C00522R000100250001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Afghanistan Situation Report
23 August 1983
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23 August 1983
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AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT
CONTENTS
SOVIETS AND AFGHANS ASSESSING AFGHAN ARMY PROBLEMS 1
Soviet and Afghan officials are investigating widespread reports
of the Afghan Army's low morale and readiness, defections, and
collaboration with insurgents.
IN BRIEF 2
PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN IN JULY 3
Fighting intensified in July, with the insurgents successfully
attacking regime convoys in several areas and seriously
disrupting security in several major cities and towns; political
divisions, meanwhile, continued to trouble both the Afghan
Communist Party and resistance organizations.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and the Office of Soviet Analysis.
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SOVIETS AND AFGHANS ASSESSING AFGHAN ARMY PROBLEMS
on 1 August groups of
high-ranking Afghan Ministry of Defense officers and Soviet
advisers began to visit each Afghan Army division to assess
reports of low morale and readiness, defections, and
collaboration with the insurgents.
in mid-August a Ministry of Defense
official stated that Army manpower and morale was at its weakest
to deteriorate, and even
and refusing to report for some
has
troops will
state ever. Discipline continues
officers are becoming disobedient
duties. The Ministry of Defense,
recalled some reservists in the hope that these
increase manpower and be more disciplined.
Comment: The Ministry of Defense commissions are unlikely to
come up with any quick solution to the fundamental problem facing
the Afghan Armed forces--lack of will to fight the insurgents for
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the Karmal regime and the Soviets. Many of the reservists
probably will not respond to the goverment's recall. Forcing
reservists to rejoin the Army probably will worsen the desertion
and morale problems the government hopes to improve.
IN BRIEF
UN Special Mediator Cordovez has
postponed his September trip to Kabul, Islamabad, Tehran, and
Moscow, alleging no side is ready to compromise.
-- Fundamentalist alliance leader Sayyaf has told journalists in
Islamabad that "we will kill" former King Zahir Shah "as soon as
he sets foot on Afghan soil." In response to rumors of the
King's return, Sayyaf charged that moderate resistance leaders
want to come to power under Zahir's shadow.
-- A German emigre from Soviet Central Asia says that non-Muslim
nationalities there are generally supportive of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan, but Soviet Muslims--particularly
before Andropov's accession to the leadership--have been openly
supportive of the Afghan rebels. Since Andropov's takeover
people have become more cautious in expressing their views
because of their fear he will be more effective in crushing
dissent.
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PERSPECTIVE
AFGHANISTAN IN JULY
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Fighting throughout Afghanistan intensified in July, compared to May
and June. With the aid of their intelligence networks, the insurgents
were generally able to avoid large Soviet-Afghan operations, and they
successfully attacked regime convoys in several areas and seriously
disrupted security in several major cities and towns. Political
divisions, meanwhile, continued to trouble both the Afghan Communist
Party and Afghan resistance organizations.
Military Developments
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Nevertheless, during July 110 insurgents
from Qonduz and Herat Provinces came over to the regime, as did about
500 members of the Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin) faction in Parvan Province.
making
support
strenuous efforts to mobilize
moreover, the regime is
civilians in Paktia and to win the
of tribal chiefs, with grants of money and arms.
Panjsher Cease-Fire. The fragility of the Panjsher cease-fire became
evident in July. Embassy sources, who report that the Soviets have
sought a two-month extension of the cease-fire, also said that Masood
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ordered the small contingent of regime troops and Soviet advisers out o
the valley in early July.
Kabul Area. Insurgents maintained a high level of activity in the
)capital throughout the month, dramatically showing their power by
attacking the airport and security outposts around the city, as well as
disrupting the electrical supply, bombing government installations, and
continuing to assassinate art offiCal .s. uspected secret police
informers, The Embassy reported that
tightened security measures during the Id al-Fitr holidays in mid-July
brought relative calm, but by late July the insurgents had again
increased operations despite additional searchlights, increased security
patrols, and more government troops.
In the Shomali and Paghman areas north of Kabul, the Soviet and
regime offensive on the insurgents concluded late in the month, with the
regime announcing that the area had again been pacified, according to
Embassy reports. The insurgents, however, appeared to remain as strong
as ever and to hold the same areas that they had held prior to the
offensive. .the offensive was
occasioned 1137 reports of Masood sending weapons and possibly fighters to
Paghman. Bombing and heavy fighting caused only light resistance
casualties because the insurgents had received warning of the operation,
and attacks on regime convoys continued.
In the Lowgar Valley, south of the capital, insurgents continued
successful attacks on regime convoys. A three-day joint Soviet-regime
operation in the Lowgar, which featured airborne troops, had little
success because the insurgents once again were forewarned and vacated
the area until the ground forces withdrew, according to Embassy reports.
The insurgents were thus able to continue pressure on Soviet and regime
efforts to resupply their forces in Paktia and Paktika Provinces, where
insurgent activity also remained intense,
The South. Ghazni Province in July was the scene of some of the
fiercest fighting of the war, A
Soviet-Afghan multibattalion operation in early and mid-July brought
little success, with the insurgents again having been forewarned.
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Soviet reprisals were unusually harsh,
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Qandahar. The Afghan Ministry of Defense judged that the situation
in Qandahar Province was growing worse daily and reported that more than
20 Soviets were killed in a large firefight with insurgents. Joint
Soviet-Afghan operations again were unsuccessful owing to the
insurgents' having advance notice,
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The North
Embassy sources report
that insurgent action and Soviet/regime retaliation in Balkh Province
were at a high level. In Mazar-e Sharif, night fighting was more
intense than in Kabul, and there were several daylight assassinations of
party members within the city. Embassy sources indicate that security
in other northern towns and cities is similar to that in Mazar-e Sharif.
The East. Government forces in the eastern provinces were
outnumbered two to one by the insurgents, according to Afghan Ministry
of Defense information, and the military leader in the region requested
an additional division for deployment in Laghman Province. Soviet
airstrikes were a daily occurrence in Nangarhar Province, and the
civilian death toll rose significantly because of sweep operations,
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Political Developments
Party Plenum. President Babrak's address on the 12th Afghan
Communist Party plenum on 4 July reflected continuing factionalism
within the party, Embassy and press reports indicated. Blaming disunity
on such factors as tribalism, ambition, and favoritism, Babrak avoided
discussing the Parcham-Khalq feud explicity. The plenum concluded with
no announcement of changes in the regime Cabinet.
factionalism deepened following the plenum as a
result of changes in Central Committee membership. The proportion of
Khalqis now on the Politburo and in the Central Committee has been
reduced to about 25 percent, heightening resentment on the part of the
Khalqis, many of whom now covertly help the insurgents.
Resistance Unity. Prospects for resistance unity continued to remain
distant. Although former Afghan King Zahir Shah indicated that he plans
to participate in a conference to forge unity among the various Afghan
resistance groups, according to an Afghan exile source, opposition to
Zahir among fundamentalists remains strong.
in Peshawar, meanwhile, the alliance of
fundamentalist insurgent groups is threatened by a rift between alliance
leader Sayyaf and Hizbi Islami faction leader Gulbuddin. Moreover,
moderate resistance leaders are attempting to exploit the situation to
strengthen their own numbers.
Economic Developments
Additional Soviet economic assistance to Afghanistan was announced in
July. The Kabul press reported that Soviet and Afghan officials
concluded protocols on a Soviet grant-in-aid of 175 million rubles for
consumer goods, on the postponement of debt repayment to the USSR for
another 10 years, and on the extension of the service period of about
100 Soviet advisers in the Afghan Government.
Southwestern Afghanistan. As of late July, the economy in Qandahar
and Helmand Provinces remained "extremely disrupted,"
Agricultural output was declining because of a labor
shortage and widespread damage to irrigation canals caused by the war.
Villagers, however, generally continued to support the insurgents, but ,
the insurgents expect the mood of the civilians to change as their share
of their own produce continues to decline.
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